"Tank Busting – Blowing Up the Myth of the Mighty...." Topic

Worse for 7th Army, the better formations were typically committed to the Eastern Front, while the Western Front received I large part, units of lesser/low quality.

Often claimed so a while back I went and checked the combat ratings for the Panzer/Pz Gr. Divisions in the summer of 1944. The Germans gave each division a 'Combat Worth' of I to IV and 7 of the 10 Panzer Divisions in Normandy got 'I' compared to 5 rated as 'I' in the East. There were 2 or 3 Eastern Division where no rating was given as well as 17th SS in the West but that does not alter the salient fact-that the NWE Divisions were, on balance, every bit as powerful as anything in the The East. There were more Panzer Divisions in the East but the total number of tanks in the East was roughly the same as in The West so the troop density in Normandy was far far greater there. The bulk of the Stugs (80% & roughly equal to Panzer numbers in the East) were in the East

It wasn't the PD's I was referring to, it was the infantry divisions. The PD's retained their quality longer as they got pulled out for rest and refitting whereas the ID's stayed in the line much longer.

By and large most German Infantry Divisions in France were very weak with some having only 7-8,000 men of questionable quality, few AT Guns, a company of SP TD or StuGs if they were very lucky and a mixed bag of artillery, much of which was captured and horse drawn with limited ammo supply. Contrast that to the average allied divisions which had substantial dedicated armored and TD assets assigned and many more corps level artillery assets and it really wasn't a fair fight. Much is made of the Armored Divisions vs the Panzer Divisions, but I agree with other posters here the fight was decided by the Infantry and at that level it was no contest. Which is why the Germans had to consistently use Panzers to prop up the front.

German capacity can be summed up in several key factors :

- Manpower
- Training/quality
- Production/fuel
- Logistics

In terms of Manpower the German army increases in size in 1942, dips to slightly below Barbarossa levels around 1943 and a steady decline with a sharp drop in the latter half for 1944.

Training remains good into 1944. But it's hardly outstanding due to several factors, first the veterans are now starting to suffer from fatigue, next the replacements are of decreasing quality as training is cut short to increase the replenishment cycle. In late 1944 the situation is so bad most replacement companies are sent to the front reducing training to a few hubs where troops get minimal training before being sent off. Quality suffers at this point. For mechanized units the problem is even worse, with a dire need for fuel, fuel rations for training vehicles is cut short (see the pictures of tanks converted to gas propulsion) by late 1944 fuel reserves are so low that most new tank drivers have never actively operated a tank before. Commanders in the field complain that unqualified drivers cause more problems than enemy action.

The fuel situation explains why the Germans demotorize their army, transferring these assets to their mechanized corps. This is not so much an issue as the Germans have a superb railroad supply network, which in times of great offensives is a serious handicap, but in a defensive situation with most units being defensive and static it allows the Germans to keep most units supplied to some degree. As you can see conditions dictate strategy. The German army no longer has the means to launch theaterwide offensives, but can still defend to a reasonable degree until the Summer of 1944. If before this everything was a matter of an ordered retreat, after D-Day and Bagration it's starting to look more like a rout and a desperate struggle to stay afloat.

Production remains high until the end of 1944 when the German production and logistics chain falls apart.

This explains the last offensives. A core of veterans, past their prime are expected to prop up well-equipped but very poorly trained green troops who lack tactical flexibility and are expected to just slam into the enemy.

So if Panthers were a deadly foe in Normandy, their performance is extremely poor in the Ardennes.

Logistics for the Germans breaks down when the Allies target the railroads seriously handicapping troops in Normandy. Same in the East where the Soviets unleash ground attack planes to hunt trains on a massive scale, disrupting all attempts to keep the units supplied and replenished.

You can get along with lesser quality troops as long as you limit your expectations. Defensively they perform quite adequately as long as you can keep them properly supported. If you can relieve them or take off the pressure to allow them to fall back, they will be overwhelmed by an enemy who has full offensive capabilities.

The other issues like a critical lack of fuel are just as important as the quality of the troops.

On the whole the Germans were able to make the best of the situation for quite a long time, managing a major crisis as effectively as long as they could, even with diminishing quality, lack of fuel and an eroding logistics and industrial infrastructure.

Funny but the Canadians did very well with their Sherman tanks, just look at their actions later in 1944.
Also 4th US Arm at Arracourt they used great tactics to knock off, if I remember rightly, 9 panther with a flank ambush whilst a company hit them frontal getting the Germans to turn to face that threat.

Today early on the History Channel they showed an episode of Patton 360. And the historians and soldiers[some former] discussed Arracourt and the Lorraine Campaign. With some excellent CGI showing the tank battles along with reenactors and archival footage.

My Father as an INF NCO in the 90ID there. And was awarded the Purple Heart. After being WIA from German Indirect fire.

"The Armoured Campaign in Normandy" by Stephen Napier is a good study. Recommended.

B

You say Arracourt – I give you Puffendorf:

from THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT:ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT, first published 1968, page 325:

The Tank Duels on the Roer Plain

On the 17th, shortly after dawn, as two tank battalions of the 2d Armored Division's 67th Armored Regiment were drawn up on a slope outside Puffendorf, ready to attack toward Gereonsweiler, the men of the 1st Battalion saw long, high-velocity shells plowing furrows in the soft earth between their tanks. Then out of the heavy morning mist came a German tank; two Tigers and four Panthers moved out of the woods on the western fringe of Gereonsweiler. There was a hit; one of the Shermans went up in flames, then another and another and another, as the Germans got the range. Soon the tanks of the 2d Battalion were also being thinned by murderous fire from the big tanks. The Germans, alarmed by the speed of the American advance on the first day of the offensive, had brought up elements of the strong 9th Panzer Division—veteran of the Russian front—to Gereonsweiler and were attacking at Puffendorf with a force estimated by 2d Battalion at twenty to thirty Panthers and Tigers.18

The battle at Puffendorf was tank against tank: on both sides the infantry was pinned down by artillery fire. The Germans had the advantage of position: the Americans were hemmed in by sloping ground that made flanking movement impossible. The Shermans fought back desperately, stepping up to attempt to slug it out with their 75-mm. and 76-mm. guns, but the tanks that got close enough for their guns to be effective were quickly cut down by enemy fire. And when the American tankers did score direct hits on the German tanks, their shells ricocheted off the thick armor and went screaming into the air. One Sherman fired fourteen rounds of 76-mm. ammunition at a Tiger before it had any success at all—and the next moment was destroyed by another Tiger. When some companies were down to three or four tanks and ammunition was running low, both battalions sent back for the 90-mm. tank destroyers to come up. With the help of these "can-openers," as the tankers called the tank destroyers, the Germans were beaten off, but at heavy cost to the two battalions in tanks and men. The second day's action on the Roer plain cost the 2d Armored Division 38 medium tanks, destroyed or knocked out, and 19 light tanks; 56 men killed, 281 wounded, 26 missing; and all but a few of these losses were incurred at Puffendorf.19

At the end of the day the American tanks were ordered to withdraw to the protection of the stone buildings of Puffendorf. The Germans did not counterattack. They were extremely short of infantry; their own tanks were having trouble getting through the sticky mud caused by con-

[325]

tinuing rains; and their commanders knew that the 2d Armored Division's Combat Command A, with the 66th Armored Regiment, had arrived on the evening of 17 November.20 But though the Germans failed for whatever reason to follow up their advantage, they stopped 2d Armored Division's attack cold for two days. Not until 20 November did enough ammunition and reinforcements arrive to make possible a successful three-task-force attack on Gereonsweiler, preceded by intense artillery concentrations; and it was not until 28 November, after six days of bitter, house-to-house fighting in Merzenhausen, that the 2d Armored Division reached the Roer.

The very next chapter: "Attempts to Provide a Better Tank", is also a great read as is the "Zebra Mission", which goes into some detail regarding the Pershing, dissatisfaction with the Sherman, the press attempting to beat up the situation and all sorts of typical yankee spin as various people and institutions try and blame each other.

It's online and a great read.

You say Arracourt – I give you Puffendorf:

That would be a error on your part. For a start the German attack was a failure. It did not achieve any of its objectives other than to cause a 2 day delay to the US advance. The number for knocked-out US tanks is also incorrect. There are detailed accounts of the action at Puffendorf in the Unit AARs that have lower loss numbers than the 57 you quoted. It seems that a weeks tank casualties have been incorrectly counted as just the first-day losses and all tanks lost to all causes have been wrongly attributed to the Tigers.
The mud & mines were more a problem as this account of the previous day shows tank losses when not a single German tank was involved

four tanks mired in the soft ground and six others were blown up by mines,……………………The tank assault of FLOVERICH reduced Company Gs strength by six tanks. Mines blew up three, a bazooka set one on fire as it crossed a trench, a mortar shell stopped another, and a sixth had mechanical failure due to previous damage…………….The Germans held their fire until the tanks had reached an area approximately 300 yards south of APWEILER. Then the guns simultaneously opened with intense and accurate fire on the attackers. In two minutes Captain White lost seven medium tanks. Three 'burned and the others were Immobilised, The three remaining tanks opened fire on the guns silenced four of them. In the ambush, Company G suffered the loss of seven tanks, three
tankers killed and seven seriously wounded……………..Company G had a bad day. The days action had cost the company. 14 of their 16 tanks.

Your source (Mayo) footnotes MacDonald as its source for those loss numbers and that appears to be where the original mistake was made. Most just quote the MacDonald entry without checking but I went to the AARs and other period documents.

Sure. Absolutely nothing of importance occurred at Puffendorf. It was just another victorious day in the triumphant campaign to crush Germany. After all, why would anyone pay any attention to the official history of the US Ordnance Department. What would they know? It is far more important to quibble about discrepancies in the counting of tank losses.

Funny thing, though. Puffendorf was one of the biggest head-to-head armored actions fought between US and German armor in the entire NWE campaign. Why is it not mentioned more often?

What if one could learn how the actual soldiers themselves viewed the situation? Well, it turns out that you can! Read through "A Report on United State versus German Armor" prepared for General of the Army Dwight D Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, by Major General Isaac D White, Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division, 1945. This document was prepared at the direct request of General Eisenhower in consequence of the troubling information filtering back to his HQ regarding inferiority of American tanks in armor versus armor actions. This document includes direct interviews with dozens of 2nd Armored Division soldiers, ranging from commissioned officers to enlisted tank crewmen who had actually fought at Puffendorf.

This report is available in book form via Amazon under the title "United States versus German Equipment" by Isaac D White – link

Read it and draw your own conclusions.

B

dp

What if one could learn how the actual soldiers themselves viewed the situation? Well, it turns out that you can

Indeed we can. That I why I used the AAR and other Documents of the Units involved to get a clearer picture of the losses in the battle.
I note you stay well away from claiming my central point that the 57 US tank loss total is an error
Why is that?

After all, why would anyone pay any attention to the official history of the US Ordnance Department. What would they know? It is far more important to quibble about discrepancies in the counting of tank losses.

That is the difference between us. You have a version of history (the German one) you prefer. I went looking in the US documents to find their version and then made my decision on what happened. Turns out 'your' version is inaccurate.
Quelle suprise!

Absolutely nothing of importance occurred at Puffendorf. It was just another victorious day in the triumphant campaign to crush Germany.

Curses foiled again. I tried very hard to make it sound like a crushing German defeat but I should have known a man of your caliper (sic) would expose me. Who helped you? Was it the person who posted this about how badly the US tanks did on the day before the 'mass'tank battle?
This:
four tanks mired in the soft ground and six others were blown up by mines,……………………The tank assault of FLOVERICH reduced Company Gs strength by six tanks. Mines blew up three, a bazooka set one on fire as it crossed a trench, a mortar shell stopped another, and a sixth had mechanical failure due to previous damage…………….The Germans held their fire until the tanks had reached an area approximately 300 yards south of APWEILER. Then the guns simultaneously opened with intense and accurate fire on the attackers. In two minutes Captain White lost seven medium tanks. Three 'burned and the others were Immobilised, The three remaining tanks opened fire on the guns silenced four of them. In the ambush, Company G suffered the loss of seven tanks, three
tankers killed and seven seriously wounded……………..Company G had a bad day. The days action had cost the company. 14 of their 16 tanks.

Who was it who posted that? Err…………….seems it was little old me trying hard to show it was It was just another victorious day in the triumphant campaign to crush Germany.

Well again … here we see the USA's need for a tank with a bigger & better gun. Going back to my comments here and previously. The M26 or a similar Tank, e.g. M25 would have been welcomed to many I'd think.

And yes, in many cases some US and/or UK tank crews may not have run into many Panzers. Well I believe it is better to have the capabilities to take on heavier tanks/Panzers, etc. Than not. E.g. we always jumped with a reserve chute. Because just in case you may need it. Again better to have it than not … Fortunately I never did …

And I was not in WWII … so …

Well, well – so there is a dispute over what happened at Puffendorf? Who would have guessed. Puffendorf wasn't a "German attack" – It was a reaction to the US attack that was trying to smash through what is generally called the Siegfried Line, which doesn't seem to have happened. Regardless as to whether is was mud, mines, panzerfausts or Tigers, isn't the central point that the US attack was stopped and beaten back? Something the Shermans were only able to do with the help of their tank destroyers – surely something all sources actually do agree upon. I guess the whole Puffendorf thing must therefore be seen as another smashing Arracourt style victory by the US tankers and all the subsequent kerfuffle about getting better Shermans and the Pershings into action was just fake news. Oh well, at the end of the day, if you don't like it, you can just leave – much like the 67th Armoured regiment leaving the field at Puffendorf.

Ok. So let's see we now have Villers Bocage (BTW the Germans DiD lose some Tigers there!) and Elst/Market Garden. The Bulge Peiper (ops … didn't he lose most of his tanks?) … and now Puffendorf. Several occasions where factors combined to give the Germans a lopsided tank vs tank victory. If the German tanks were so invincible why were they stopped at Mortain? Why didn't they stop the Breakout? Hold open the Falaise Pocket so ALL the Germans escaped? Take back ALL of Holland not just Arnhem? Reach the Meuse and Antwerp? In fact outside of limited tactical successes that had no impact on the overall campaign what exactly did the Uber Panzers accomplish?

I like to game large campaigns and YES there is some realism to War games, that's why the Germans started them. In my campaigns on a 4 x 8 or larger table using Micro Armor on a 1" to 500m scale its interesting to see the Tiger Battalion holding its 6 inch by 6 inch area like the Rock of Gibraltar vs The Tempest. While the rest of the German front falls apart. And that's just what they were, a blip in the overall campaign. If you were the unlucky Sherman that smashed up against those rocks you had a bad day. But how many US Tankers ever even SAW a Tiger much less had to fight one head on?

You can't build your tanks or your ARMY to win every battle or even the 1 in 100 battle, you build them to win the normal battles they fight day in and day out. You build to win wars.

Cheers!

Probably because all those "invincible" German tanks were just as over-hyped by the tank lovers? Afterall, Anthony Joshua was going to crush Andy Ruiz, wasn't he? And NZ had no chance at all against England in the ODI world cup, did they? But I fear we are drifting away from the central argument that the sherman was a 'bad' tank and the most significant allied failure of NWE – as asserted by Max Hastings.

Well, well – so there is a dispute over what happened at Puffendorf? Who would have guessed.

There is no dispute I know about. What we have is an incorrect count in MacDonald that was referenced by Mayo and then used by Tiger tank fans as 'proof' the superiority of the Tiger.
If anyone had bothered to read the Unit AARs then they would have realise the error about the number of tank casualties.
It is important to note that the paragraph in MacDonald is the single source (as in only source) for the high (57) US casualties.
The US attack was not 'beaten back' it just got hit by a German attack which they stopped and repulsed. After 2 days the US advance continued. The German attack was not 'continued'and they failed to take their objective which was Puffendorf

Oh well, at the end of the day, if you don't like it, you can just leave – much like the 67th Armoured regiment leaving the field at Puffendorf.

You should at least do some basic research before making these absurd claims. Only one side 'left the field' a Puffendorf and it was German. They attacked to recapture Puffendorf and they failed.

Where have I said that Puffendorf demonstrated the supremacy of German tanks? Isn't it your view that in order to be "successful" the Germans had to recapture Puffendorf? I recall that the German counter attack only had orders to eliminate the penetration of their lines. Surely the fact is that the US attack, which was designed to break through the Siegfried line, was stopped and the germans had held the line. And at 1600 hours on 17th November 1944 the US 67th Armoured regiment withdrew it's tanks to the outskirts of Puffendorf, which was a withdrawal from the field as the fighting had taken place on a flat plain outside of Puffendorf. If that isn't leaving the field then I don't know what is. And since when have after action reports been the holy grail of what happened? Plenty of errors in them during WW2, as has been pointed out before in cases as diverse as from Prokorovka to the Arakan.

"argument that the sherman was a 'bad' tank "

Hi William Ulsterman,
To categorize the Sherman as a 'bad' tank, IMO, might be taking a step too far. Even in 1944/45, the Sherman still adequately performed a wide range of important battlefield tasks.

The great flaw which became evident during the European campaign was the Sherman's inferiority in the anti-armor role versus the new generation of heavier German tanks. The Sherman could neither defeat nor defend itself against these opponents at typical combat ranges. Whereas its chassis was really unable to accommodate the necessary amount of extra armor without seriously compromising mobility and reliability, the answer (IMO) was to upgrade its armament to a degree where both opponents bore more or less equal risk of being killed. Hence my belief that a 90mm Sherman would have been a wise and economically viable stop-gap measure to even the odds in the armor versus armor arena in the short term.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

Where have I said that Puffendorf demonstrated the supremacy of German tanks? Isn't it your view that in order to be "successful" the Germans had to recapture Puffendorf?

You made a joke:

Oh well, at the end of the day, if you don't like it, you can just leave – much like the 67th Armoured regiment leaving the field at Puffendorf.

Which obviously means you took the view it was a 'victory' for the Germans and (because you didn't check) you assumed 2nd AD had to vacate the battlefield and leave it to the victorious Germans. Since then you have done a Google and realising your error try and walk back you statement. The German attack had clear objectives and that was to take Puffendorf & Immendorf. It collided with a US advance from that area and though the Germans penetrated Puffendorf the were beaten back without taking either village. 2nd AD did not cede any of the ground they took the previous day. Two attacking forces met each other head-on. Both had to pull back from their objectives that day but 2 days later 2nd AD advanced to its original objective and took it. The Germans did not.

And at 1600 hours on 17th November 1944 the US 67th Armoured regiment withdrew it's tanks to the outskirts of Puffendorf, which was a withdrawal from the field as the fighting had taken place on a flat plain outside of Puffendorf. If that isn't leaving the field then I don't know what is

The German attack was tasked with sealing the previous days penetration by retaking Puffendorf & Immendorf. They gained neither objective and had to 'leave the field' Is that not a 'withdrawal' as well?

[ 1 ] Isn't it interesting how deafening the silence has been in connection with "A Report on United States versus German Armor".

[ 2 ] WU wrote – "And since when have after action reports been the holy grail of what happened? Plenty of errors in them during WW2, as has been pointed out before in cases as diverse as from Prokorovka to the Arakan."

True words. As I recall, Coox and Naisawald made some observations on that very issue in "Allied Tank Casualties".

B

Comical to watch posters trash period documentation because it contradicts the the fiction they prefer to believe.
Obviously a passing mention in MacDonald is a far better reference than the detailed account by the Unit Commander Disney.

More puzzling when you realise that Disney's direct superior this day was a certain Brig. Gen.I.D.White.

"Comical to watch posters trash period documentation because it contradicts the fiction they prefer to believe."

That is the most unintentionally funny thing you have ever written, mkenny. Made my morning.

B

The Germans held their fire until the tanks had reached an area approximately 300 yards south of APWEILER. Then the guns simultaneously opened with intense and accurate fire on the attackers. In two minutes Captain White lost seven medium tanks. Three 'burned and the others were Immobilised, The three remaining tanks opened fire on the guns silenced four of them.

This would have been the PzJgr38t's ("Hetzers") of the Panzerjaeger company of the 183rd Volksgrenadier Division. The reference to "guns" somewhat short-sells the performance of the Shermans. It obscures the fact that not every German AFV that Shermans had to fight was a Panther or Tiger.

These Hetzers held their fire until the Shermans were at about 300yds range. The Shermans were mired in mud, which restricted them to 1st and 2nd gear (and a rate of advance that was not more than a walking pace).

Source: Generalleutnant Wolfgang Lange, "183d Volksgrenadier Division (Sep 1944-25 Jan 1945)," MS # B-753, not dated, National Archives, 10, 13.

The great flaw which became evident during the European campaign was the Sherman's inferiority in the anti-armor role versus the new generation of heavier German tanks. The Sherman could neither defeat nor defend itself against these opponents at typical combat ranges.

According to US Army sources (I am NOT claiming these are complete and reliable -- just the best I have), in the ONE day action which is described as the German tank attack at Puffendorf, the US 2nd Armored Division lost 18 Shermans and 7 light tanks (I assume Stuarts, but that's just an assumption). They claimed 17 panzers (Panthers and Tiger IIs). Of the panzer claims, it is not clear to me whether that total includes the 6 panzers claimed by the US 702nd TD Battalion, or if those 6 are incremental to the US2AD claims.

In any case, we see the Germans throwing many Panthers, a full SchwPzAbt of Tiger IIs against mostly a single battalion of Shermans and light tanks, with tank destroyers (mostly M36s but some M10s) coming up as re-enforcements near the end of the battle.

SchwPzAbt 506 had 36 Tiger IIs ready for action at the start of the day. Several of these engaged from static positions at long range (not "normal combat ranges") because the Germans (was it von Elverfeldt of 9th Panzer that made the determination? I can not clarify) were concerned about their poor reliability and didn't want them failing on the field. But still there were Tiger IIs from the 506th with the Panthers when 9th Pz Div attacked.

Sources: Mostly: Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign: United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1993), p531.
And some from: Jack Bell, "Second Armored Drove Back Massed Tigers, Panthers in Roer River Battle," Chicago Daily News Service, found at: link

The Germans got the first shot. The same was true the prior day when the Hetzers engaged the Shermans. In that case, the exchange rate appears to have been 7 Shermans for 4 Hetzers.

As has been noted in many threads here, and demonstrated by examination of many tank engagements, the guy who shoots first in any tank-v-tank engagement holds a significant advantage. Whether you are in Hetzers or Panthers, if you are the first to shoot you hold the advantage.

If the information above is close to accurate, the US lost something like 25 tanks (of which 18 were Shermans) vs. the German losses of something like 17-23 Panzers (the majority of which were Panthers, with a few Tiger IIs). Note that the US TDs did not claim any Tiger IIs that day.

I do not see any indication that the Panthers and Tigers were somehow overwhelming uber panzers. At least not on this day. There is no evidence that the Shermans demonstrated some great flaw, or that they were hopelessly out-armored and out-gunned.

The Panthers and Tiger IIs performed about as well as I would have expected StuGs, Pz IVs or Hetzers to perform, given an advantage in position, first shot, and reasonably balanced numbers.

The Americans might have reacted more aggressively if they had not been facing Panthers and Tiger IIs. They would not likely have done much better if equipped with M26s, as the M26 was less far more difficult to drive in the muddy conditions that dominated that day, and in order to be present in numbers by that date they would have had to have been T26E1s where were probably less reliable than even the Tiger IIs that were largely left behind.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Mark great stuff as always. Not challenging you an honest question any chance some of the light tanks could have been M24s and the TDs M18s? Ill admit ahead of time not having researched this battle other than what appears here on TMP.

Cheers!

Sources: Mostly: Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign: United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1993), p531.

The high US tank losses are referenced in 1963 by Macdonald, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. page 533
PDF link

This was repeated citing MacDonald in
Mayo's 1968 THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT . 1963 page 325
PDF link

The 2 above are often given as 'Official' references for the high loss count when in fact it is just MacDonald with Mayo simply repeating MacDonald.

MacDonald list this 1949 paper as one of his references
link

and I do not know why he ignored the details within.
There are 5 parts (download links at far RH side of the page) if you are interested and it is a very detailed account of all the engagements, well worth a study for those with an interest that goes beyond tales of Uber-tanks.
Point is that short bit about 57 US tank losses is widely quoted as an 'official' fact when it is nothing of the sort.

any chance some of the light tanks could have been M24s and the TDs M18s?

In this link

link

from page 22 gives very detailed breakdown of US Units involved.

They claimed 17 panzers (Panthers and Tiger IIs). Of the panzer claims, it is not clear to me whether that total includes the 6 panzers claimed by the US 702nd TD Battalion, or if those 6 are incremental to the US2AD claims.

Are those claims confirmed by German loss records? If not I would be very sceptical. I haven't looked in detail at that action, but the ones I have looked at in the Bulge are wildly out. I went through all the US claims for 2nd Panzer, for example, and by the time they reached the Meuse they should have been down to about 5 tanks, but they in fact lost the bulk of their armour when they ran out of fuel and were caught by US 2nd AD.

Are those claims confirmed by German loss records?

Claims are always too high. Only a fool would defend raw crew claims as being a reliable record of actual enemy losses. Schneider lists 4 Tiger casualties/losses on Nov 17th but the passage is a bit confusing.

Here is an example of how important the first shot is. The Sherman has a lot of tactical advantages for a quick engagement time and getting off an accurate first shot. However, it can't defeat a well-orchestrated surprise ambush.

Wolfhag

an honest question any chance some of the light tanks could have been M24s and the TDs M18s?

Lee: I have the same question about the M24s. My assummption is Stuarts (mostly M5A1s), but by this time the M24 was starting to arrive (in dribs and drabs) so it is possible, if unlikely, that there would have been a few.

In this link

link

from page 22 gives very detailed breakdown of US Units involved.

I have downloaded the PDF from the link MKenny provided. It looks very interesting, but I did not find details on the vehicle types in skimming, and I have not fought my way through the details of all 38 pages yet.

It refers to units (Regiments, battalions, companies as assigned to combat commands and task forces) and does make reference to "light tanks" on several occasions. But I have not found any reference to specific vehicle types.

(It does reference TDs as "Tank Destroyers (90mm)" on a couple occasions. That's about as close as I have found to a vehicle type.)

I should mention that my earlier post above suggested some numbers of Shermans. The sources I point to also typically refer to these as "medium tanks" without identifying them specifically as M4s. But the US2AD didn't operate any other type of medium tank at that time, so I have taken the liberty of calling them Shermans.

Unhappily, the linked PDF is only "part_1". It does not include the actual 9th Pz Div counter attack (which starts on Pg 44 of the report, and so must be in "part_2".)

As to the M18s, the answer is no. I am pretty confident, although I won't claim to be demonstrably proven true. The 702nd was an M10 unit. They were one of the early ones to start upgrading to the M36. But that process was not a wholesale replacement. There are several first-hand accounts that M36s played a role in the battle. But the unit still had some M10s on strength at that time.

Typically US TD battalions operated M10s, or M18s, or towed 3-inch guns. Mixed was not common. It was the M10 units that were provided with M36s (it was basically an upgrade to the M10, although most were on the M10A1 hull). IIRC a few M18 units actually turned in their M18s for M36s -- could be recalling that wrong -- but in any case they would not have mixed them unless they were caught wrong-footed in the brief window of transition.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Unhappily, the linked PDF is only "part_1". It does not include the actual 9th Pz Div counter attack (which starts on Pg 44 of the report, and so must be in "part_2".)

Links to all 5 parts are at the RH side of the page.

link

mkenny is correct. The 2nd Armored Division's "Hell on Wheels – The Drive to the Roer" document comes in 5 parts, all of which can be D/Led from the CARL Digital Library site. The Puffendorf action is described in Part 2, but the entire five part document makes for informative reading.

90mm-armed M36s were in fact present in the action.

B

Wolfhag re Table IV. Great stuff! Question perhaps dumb but here goes: Row 1 Shermans vs Panthers. First Fire losses 2, Second Fire losses 12. Does that mean the Shermans that fired first killed 2 Panthers or only lost 2 Shermans in the engagement? And the Panthers lost 2 or 12 Tanks? Probably obvious to everyone but me lol. Thanks for your help! L

Here is what the 2nd Armored Division's research report had to say about th 17 November engagement at Puffendorf -

link
Hell on Wheels in the Drive to the Roer
Part 2 – starting on pg 44

At 0700, Co D 67th AR, outposting PUFFENFORF, reported receiving small arms fire from the north. A heavy morning mist obscured enemy activities, but the tanks of Company D returned the enemy fire with all weapons. Shortly after dawn, as the tanks of the 1st Battalion drew up on line and the 2nd battalion moved up on their left in preparation for the scheduled attack, high velocity armor piercing shells began to plough furrows in the soft earth around the tanks. The 11th Panzer Grenadier Regiment supported by 20 to 30 Mk V and VI tans had launched a counterattack with the mission of re-taking PUFFENDORF.

The counterattack caught TF1 off balance while it was preparing its own assault. The tanks of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 67th AR on line in an exposed position, lacked the necessary depth to cover any advance by fire. Out gunned, out armored, and out maneuvered, in the slush and mud, which favored the German Mk V and Mk VI's with their wide tracks, the tanks of TF1 fought back furiously.

The Germans had the advantage with their long range, high velocity guns and thick armor. Time and again the tanks of TF1 scored direct hits on the enemy armor only to have their shells go creaming off into the air as they ricocheted off the heavily armored enemy tanks. One tank of the 2nd Battalion fired 14 rounds of 76mm shot at a Mk VI before destroying it, only to be knocked out the next moment by another Mk VI.

The enemy fire began to take its toll as the German gunners found their range. The tanks of TF1 were being picked off one by one. In the space of a few minutes, Company A lost five light tanks to direct fire. There were too many tanks and too little room for maneuver. The Shermans fought back desperately, but the range was too great for their lower velocity 75mm and 76mm guns. The enemy had the additional advantage of position and maneuverability, which rendered advance or flanking movement impossible. By early afternoon the situation had become critical. The 1st Battalion had only three medium tanks left in Company D and only five light tanks in Company A. The 2nd Battalion had fared no better. Company F had eight medium tanks remaining and company E was left with four, having lost seven to direct fire. All were short of ammunition, with only four or five rounds of 75mm and 76mm left in each platoon. Losses of officer personnel further increased the difficulty of keeping control of the situation.

Since it was impossible to continue to defend their exposed positions, the American tanks were ordered to disengage and withdraw to the outskirts of PUFFENDORF. Here the ruins of the stone buildings would afford some protection.

<snip>

The withdrawal to PUFFENDORF reversed the situation. Now the German tanks had to come out in the open to attack. One Mk VI was knocked out by Lt. Hunicutt's Tank Destroyer as it charged PUFFENDORF, firing as it came.

After six hours of fierce fighting the enemy withdrew to a defiladed position south of GEREONSWEILER, and continued to harass the positions in PUFFENDORF with fire the rest of the day.

The counterattack had been stopped before the Germans had reached their objective; but at great cost to TF1. The 2nd Battalion alone lost19 tanks from direct fire. The enemy known losses were, two tanks knocked out by the Shermans and two knocked out by the 90mm guns of the 702nd Tank Destroyer Battalion.

This action was tank versus tank. The artillery fire of the 78th(?) and 83rd(?) Armored Field Artillery Battalions combined with the fires of the mortars and assault guns of TF1 had driven back the enemy infantry. On the U.S, side, some of the most devastating artillery fire of their experience pinned down the doughs of the 3rd Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment.

The reasons for the Germans not following up their initial success are debatable. The heavy artillery concentrations had little or no effect on their armor. But they did stop the infantry. The arrival of Force A in PUFFENDORF may have been a deciding factor. In any event the Germans failed to push the counterattack home. They did, however, succeed in delaying the 2nd armored Division's advance to the ROER River, nearly two days.

<snip>

The counter attack on November 17th had stopped the division's advance dead and had thrown its schedule off balance. Braced for another counterattack the morning of the 18th, the 2nd Armored Division did not get started again on the second day except for the capture of APWEILER. Thus the assault was delayed for two days after initial successes of the first day. Contributing to this setback were the inferiority of our tanks in guns, armor, and maneuverability; the advantageous defensive position held by the enemy; and the aggressiveness of the defenders, in that order.

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Wolf +1 !

As a side bar. A gent I know whose Grandad(?) was in an M5 Stuart Lgt Tank in France. Sometime after Normandy his M5 was driving along and they saw a Tiger I break thru a woodline to their front. They quickly realized they were no match for the Tiger's 88. They could not out run the 88mm rounds or make it to any cover before the Tiger fired. So they rapidly abandoned their M5. And ran for cover. Some of them were WIA'd by the schrapnel from the exploding M5.

If the above mentioned M5 were US then they would never have encountered a Tiger in Normandy. That said… a Pz IV would totally outclass an M5 and all German tanks were known as Tigers to many troops. So it could still basically be true.

The deal with German armour is their guns were much better on average. Everything else was about equal.

Well as I said it was sometime after Normandy … so … I don't think one could say an M5 never ran into a Tiger I in the ETO, yes? But I was not there and only relaying a story third hand, of course.

However, from my recent research online, I found out as I believed, the M5 was used in the ETO.

USAGE IN WORLD WAR II

The M5 made its debut in the invasion of Casablanca in French North Africa. By 1943, and at the time of the invasion of Sicily, the M5A1 was becoming the standard light tank of the American armored divisions. Because of limited firepower, the M5A1 eventually took on reconnaissance and escort duties in Italy and, after the invasion of Normandy, throughout Europe. I

But yes they could have miss-ID'd the Panzer that was about to blow them up !

And I agree many of the German tank main guns & AT guns were better than much of their Western counter parts generally. Save for e.g. the UK's 17lber …

Sorry – I was reading on the bus without my glasses. I stand corrected. The US encounter a small number of Tigers after Normandy. The British and Canadians encountered more, but there were some left for the US troops to deal with…

Apologies. Haste hath made a fool of me again…

It would be late July when US forces started bumping into various scattered Tigers. More likely in the areas south of Vire. Possible individual meetings but none that can be referenced. During the pursuit a TII encounter would be more likely and 1 kp each both sPzAbt 503 and sSS PzAbt 101/501 did engage US Units.

Someone took responsibility for being wrong???

Oh the horror, what is TMP coming to?

Skarper is a better man than I am.

Wolfhag

The Sherman was a mediocre tank manufactured in HUUGE quantities, 4 or 5 Shermans vs one Tiger or Panther. They weren't nicknamed 'Ronsons' for nothing.

Footnote: The Ronson was an American cigarette lighter, whose motto was. "Lights first time, every time."

Von Schwartz. Thanks for so eloquently restating the age old UNTRUE myths. Do some research before you quote cliches.

Cheers!

Interesting complication in play here. Look at the percentage of "brew-ups" of certain Commonwealth Shermans cited in Coox and Naisawald – something on the order of 80 percent. Not sure why and no explanation was given. Maybe stowage of excess ammunition?

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Apparently the Brew-up problem was more related to ammo storage than gas engines. When they started using so called "wet stowage" the problem was significantly reduced. And the M4 was not the only tank prone to burning, the vaunted Panther was as well. Cheers!

80 percent was a BIG percentage. Other tanks hovered around the 50-60 pct mark. There must have been, I think, a real reason why the brew up phenomenon was so noteworthy to the Germans.

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