"Tank Busting – Blowing Up the Myth of the Mighty...." Topic

yet nothing was achieved to resolve this foreseen issue in two years.

Which is not the same as nothing was attempted. In the end a decision was made to 'skip' upgrades

and proceed swiftly from a T26 prototype to production

Thanks for the clarifications Blutarski. I'm old and forget a lot …

IMO, a 90mm Sherman could have been delivered in ample time for Normandy if any serious will to do so had been brought to bear.

I agree …

The reason is called competing priorities. I'm sure P51 pilots that ran up against Me262s wished they had jet engines. The P51 didn't even have cannon, only .50 cal mgs. Why? Because the Merlin engine and .50 cals were GOOD ENOUGH to get the job done. Not Best In Class but Good Enough. As were the 75 and 76mm Sherman. We won the war by producing tons of weapons that were GOOD ENOUGH. The Germans focused on Best In Class at the expense of quantity. Even the US with its industrial might had to choose quantity or quality. History shows what choice won.

Ahhhhh you say BUT they could have just put a better gun on the Sherman! True. And we could have built aircraft carrier submarines like the Japs. Or copied the German Mg42. Or built jets. Or rockets. We elected instead to build M1 Garands, heavy bombers and atom bombs. My point is that to upgun or not upgun the Sherman was not an isolated decision, it was framed in the context of the overall strategic picture. And in that picture with Priests*, M18s and M36s supported by P47s, the Sherman 75 and 76 were GOOD ENOUGH to get the job done in NW Europe.

Even if it meant you lost a few extra Shermans on the RARE occasions when forced to fight with Panthers and Tigers. AT guns and ATRL were also big killers of Shermans and ypu were not going to be able to up armor them enough to be impervious to these weapons and in fact the 75mm was arguably better against them than the 76mm. You design to fight against your Basic Enemy, very rarely can you be impervious to every weapon.

Cheers!

*While lamenting the Sherman its nice to remember that German panzers divisions that were lucky might have a dozen SP artillery each, while the standard US Armored division had 54 Priests IIRC. It's not all about armor thickness and gun size!

The M36B1 (which mated the M36 90mm gun turret to a standard M4A3 medium tank hull – 187 produced Oct-Dec 44) would have filled the bill. If I am reading the data correctly, "battle weight" this vehicle was in the range of 62,000 lbs (31 short tons). The Sherman M4A3E2 series Jumbos operated in action at 82,600 pounds (41+ tons). If I'm not mistaken, the T23 90mm gun turret fit the Sherman's turret ring also.

The problem with the 90mm gun is that it was heavy. The M36 TD turret had massive counterweights on the back just to get the turret balanced, and then it was so heavy it required a powered traverse.

The reason is called competing priorities. I'm sure P51 pilots that ran up against Me262s wished they had jet engines. The P51 didn't even have cannon, only .50 cal mgs. Why? Because the Merlin engine and .50 cals were GOOD ENOUGH to get the job done. Not Best In Class but Good Enough. As were the 75 and 76mm Sherman. We won the war by producing tons of weapons that were GOOD ENOUGH. The Germans focused on Best In Class at the expense of quantity. Even the US with its industrial might had to choose quantity or quality. History shows what choice won.

The P51 didn't really need more than .50cal MGs to shoot down fighters. The Me262 needed 30mm cannons to shoot down bombers.

And the US very nearly DID build MG42s, but someone screwed up on the blueprints so the .30-06 prototype wouldn't run. The .30-06 cartridge is also about 0.25" longer than the 8mm Mauser, and that really matters when you're trying to run a machine gun at 600+rpm.

My point is that to upgun or not upgun the Sherman was not an isolated decision, it was framed in the context of the overall strategic picture.

The development work on tanks in the US indicates that they had every intention of producing a follow on design to the M4 and have it in production by 1943 it is just that Ordnance couldn't come up with anything that was superior enough to the M4 to justify changing production or that actually worked properly.

Or copied the German Mg42.

Well they did try, but messed it up.

Or built jets.

I don't think so. The US was well behind in jet fighter development. If it hadn't been for the British giving them the engines including taking one from the first prototype Vampire they wouldn't have had a jet aircraft flying at all by the end of the war.

"Which is not the same as nothing was attempted. In the end a decision was made to 'skip' upgrades"

….. Read the complete official histories. The above quote also ignores the fact that while SOME factions were making an honest effort to produce a successor, they were confronted by entrenched bureaucratic opponents with opposing views – the end result being that no new MEDIUM tank was delivered. Two years were spent rejecting various project designs because they threatened to surpass 40tons in combat weight.

From Chamberlain & Ellis (p.154) -
"Meanwhile in September 1943, the Ordnance Department had urged immediate production of 500 T25E1s and 500 TR26E1s for delivery in 1944., but this was opposed by the Armored Force Board, who would have preferred the 90mm gun mounted in the M4 Sherman medium tank, and by the commander of Army Ground Forces who did not consider a 90mm gun desirable in a tank ….."

When an exasperated General Staff FINALLY forced shipment of the 20x T26E3's (still considered as under development and not yet officially accepted as the M26!) to the ETO , what did they receive???? A vehicle weighing 43 tons (battle weight – 46 tons) now classified as a HEAVY tank!

This causes of this development failure (IMHO) were the interminable turf wars and ego contests waged among the bureaucratic agencies responsible for overseeing the task. They NEVER came to agreement or compromise.

The T71/M36 never would have made it to the ETO without Marshall's direct personal intervention.

It later took the direct intervention of the General Staff to overrule continued stall tactics of AGF (as late as Dec 44) trying to prevent shipment of the T26E3s to the ETO.

B

"The problem with the 90mm gun is that it was heavy. The M36 TD turret had massive counterweights on the back just to get the turret balanced, and then it was so heavy it required a powered traverse."

Incorrect, based upon what I have read. Somewhere back in the forum threads, I transcribed a lengthy account of the M36 development program which discusses this in detail. The only imbalance/counterweight problem encountered was related to the original "proof of concept" experiment which involved mounting of a 90mm gun on an M10 TD, utilizing the M10's original turret. A completely new turret specifically for the 90mm gun was designed and delivered shortly thereafter.

Also, the 90mm gun mounted in the AFV projects was not the heavy AA version. It was in fact a re-designed and lightened version, firing at somewhat reduced MV.

According to my volume of Tank Data – Aberdeen Proving Grounds Series", the combat weight of the M36 (on the M10 chassis) was 30.5 tons. Combat weight of the M4A4 is given as 36.25 tons; combat weight of the M4A3E8(76) is given as 37.1 tons – (where "combat weight" IIUC = vehicle fully manned, fueled and stowed for action).

B

Read the complete official histories.

I have read lots of 'histories'. In my opinion it is more a case of US opinion as to what makes a reliable tank differed from the German view. That means mechanical issues played a bigger factor in the US compared to the obsession with only gun/armour by those concerned with German tanks.
Getting a 35t tank to the front line in substantial numbers meant far more to the US than the German way of hoping enough 50t tanks got there to matter.
I do not subscribe to the Conspiracy Theory of Everything.

"I have read lots of 'histories'."

We'll simply have to agree to disagree about what those documents have to say on the subject. I do not see anything suggesting that anyone in the USA was touting the design of a US super tank (how ironic then the appearance of a 46 ton T26). The fundamental issue, as I see it, was that initial battle experience in Tunisia convinced the planners who were paying attention that a more powerful gun would very soon be required to combat the coming generation of new enemy tanks; unfortunately the military theoreticians isolated in CONUS dismissed these warnings and persisted in advancing their pre-war theoretically-based ground doctrine.

- – -

"I do not subscribe to the Conspiracy Theory of Everything."

That's great. But the fact of the matter is that there was nothing either theoretical or conspiratorial about what occurred. It was old fashioned bureaucratic infighting among agencies advancing conflicting points of view with various degrees of stubbornness and a succession of duplicitous bureaucratic tactics. The entire story is nicely laid out for anyone to read in any depth.

B

BTW, Hunnicutt gives an all-up combat weight of 68,500 pounds (34.24 tons) for the M36B1 (M36 turret on M4A3 hull/chassis).

FWIW.

B

The fundamental issue, as I see it, was that initial battle experience in Tunisia convinced the planners who were paying attention that a more powerful gun would very soon be required to combat the coming generation of new enemy tanks; unfortunately the military theoreticians isolated in CONUS dismissed these warnings and persisted in advancing their pre-war theoretically-based ground doctrine.

The T20 series was started in May 1942. It went through T20/T22/23 before arriving at the first production T26 on October 31st 1944. It was the many failures in those individual designs (the problems were judged to outweigh the advantages) that was the problem. The problem was known and a solution was being worked on. You can not say they didn't know or that they didn't try. You can only say they failed to find a working solution before late 1944.

"The T20 series was started in May 1942. It went through T20/T22/23 before arriving at the first production T26 on October 31st 1944. It was the many failures in those individual designs (the problems were judged to outweigh the advantages) that was the problem. The problem was known and a solution was being worked on. You can not say they didn't know or that they didn't try. You can only say they failed to find a working solution before late 1944."

- – -

Are you certain of that? Or are you just guessing?

From Chamberlain & Ellis (p.154) -
"Meanwhile in September 1943, the Ordnance Department had urged immediate production of 500 T25E1s and 500 TR26E1s for delivery in 1944., but this was opposed by the Armored Force Board, who would have preferred the 90mm gun mounted in the M4 Sherman medium tank, and by the commander of Army Ground Forces who did not consider a 90mm gun desirable in a tank ….."

In any case, all that is extraneous to the case I am really presenting – i.e., that a logistically compatible 90mm Sherman could easily have been available in time for Normandy. The industrial capacity was unquestionably available. Only will and decisive leadership were lacking.

B

From Chamberlain & Ellis (p.154) -
"Meanwhile in September 1943, the Ordnance Department had urged immediate production of 500 T25E1s and 500 TR26E1s for delivery in 1944., but this was opposed by the Armored Force Board, who would have preferred the 90mm gun mounted in the M4 Sherman medium tank, and by the commander of Army Ground Forces who did not consider a 90mm gun desirable in a tank …..

Or

In terms of the actual events, Jake Devers immediately after assuming command of the Armored Force vice Chaffee, began to question the wisdom of staying with the "tried and true" 75mm and began pushing the already planned 3" development and then later the 90mm. It was he who initially accepted the first M4 76mm lash-up before rejecting it as being too crude. In early 1943, before he took command of the ETOUSA, Devers pushed for the development of the 90mm-armed T23, which became the T25/T26. Then shortly before he was relieved by Eisenhower as CG ETOUSA in December 1943, he requested the quick deployment of 250 of the T25/T26 to Europe. Meanwhile, Barnes again had tried to circumvent things, requesting authorization to produce 500 T26 (having unilaterally decided it was better than the T26), before the first pilot of either the T25 or T26 were complete. McNair, after having been burned time and again as Ordnance leisurely "perfected" the T20/T22/T23 (including conning the Army into building 250 T23 after Ordnance was repeatedly told nobody would accept it…and nobody ever did) said no, test a pilot and get service acceptance and then build it. That led to Marshall later inquiring if Eisenhower (ie, the ETOUSA) still wanted them considering there would be at least a nine month delay beofre they could be shipped. Ike agreed, so on 16 December 1943 Marshall directed McNair procure them. That was the end of it and shortly after McNair went to England and then France where he met his fate. In the meantime, the decision to build the T25/T26 pilots had already been made, concurred in by Armor and AGF…and the first pilot T25 and T26 rolled out one month after Marshall's directive to McNair.

link

I'm trying to be polite here …..

Try going to the official technical services history of the US Ordnance Department in WW2 – "On Beachhead and Battlefront". Start on page 328: "Attempts to Provide a Better Tank". It's easy to access, just web-search under the title in quotation marks.

I can also provide some useful material drawn from the history log of the T20 series medium tank development project. Only if you are interested, of course.

B

Try going to the official technical services history of the US Ordnance Department

Try reading the linked post and the opinion about the veracity of the Ordnance accounts of what happened.
Hunnicutt's 'Pershing, A History of the Medium Tank T20 Series' book is also useful with page 49 giving the date for starting on the Sherman replacement (T20) as 'spring 1942'. His chart on page 51 has the T20 mock-up in May 1942 and pilot model in May 1943. That planning shows they were not 'ignoring' German developments

Sorry, but I don't recall making any claim that "they" were ignoring anything of the sort. Please re-read my posts if you are confused on this point. AS far as I am concerned, the facts of the case are clear that efforts to develop a successor to the M4 in a timely manner (i.e., by 1944) were frustrated by conflicting bureaucratic agendas, clashing egos and endless turf wars … the end result being that no new MEDIUM tank was fielded at all.

Go here for some further details -
Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States
Sep 76, A J Alexander
Rand Corporation

Start around page 89.

B

I don't recall making any claim that "they" were ignoring anything of the sort

You said 'CONUS dismissed these warnings and persisted in advancing their pre-war theoretically-based ground doctrine'………

Which is not quite correct. Development of a 'better' medium started in 1942. You conflate the failure to get a working design (as in one that was mechanically reliable as well as up-armoured and upgunned) with (either) deliberate blocking of a replacement or a mistaken belief the original Sherman could deal with any German improvements in their designs. Coming second in a two-horse race is not the same as not even entering the competition. The 90mm M4 was tried out but by that time the T26 was ready so they went for direct to the new design.
As you note there was a post-war blame-game between the different Departments about the delays and it appears you have accepted one of the player's excuses and ignored the possibility they might (just might) be engaged in an arse-covering exercise.

There is a current thread on AHF which covers some of these issues
Example: link

My complete statement, which you unfortunately truncated, read as follows – "The fundamental issue, as I see it, was that initial battle experience in Tunisia convinced the planners who were paying attention that a more powerful gun would very soon be required to combat the coming generation of new enemy tanks; unfortunately the military theoreticians isolated in CONUS dismissed these warnings and persisted in advancing their pre-war theoretically-based ground doctrine."

I trust you are aware of the meaning of the use of CONUS as a geographical nexus.

- – -

I don't recall mentioning anything about "post war blame games". That was your phraseology, not mine.

- – -

Little of your commentary matches what I have found in my own researches. We will therefore, once again, have to agree to disagree.

B

….. Read the complete official histories. The above quote also ignores the fact that while SOME factions were making an honest effort to produce a successor, they were confronted by entrenched bureaucratic opponents with opposing views – the end result being that no new MEDIUM tank was delivered. Two years were spent rejecting various project designs because they threatened to surpass 40tons in combat weight.

From Chamberlain & Ellis (p.154) -
"Meanwhile in September 1943, the Ordnance Department had urged immediate production of 500 T25E1s and 500 TR26E1s for delivery in 1944., but this was opposed by the Armored Force Board, who would have preferred the 90mm gun mounted in the M4 Sherman medium tank, and by the commander of Army Ground Forces who did not consider a 90mm gun desirable in a tank ….."

When an exasperated General Staff FINALLY forced shipment of the 20x T26E3's…

This seems to imply that there was some righteous set of visionaries who had it all figures out, but they were thwarted by the dark forces of entrenched bureaucrats, who either finally came around or were over ruled.

In fact, the proposal in September of 1943 to build 500 T-25s and T-26s was clearly a preposterous proposition. Neither design existed at the time!

They were to be ordered not even "off of the drawing board", but rather "off of a general concept". It was pretty much a case of: We should build a tank based on one of those prior chassis we did that didn't work out so well. This time, we'll add a new 90mm gun in a new turret we'll have to design, and we'll build one version with a 3-inch armor basis, and another with a 4-inch armor basis. That's enough to start the production lines, isn't it?

To which the proper answer was: No. It isn't.

In fact, when the prototypes of the T-26E1 were delivered in the spring of 1944 they were thoroughly tested, and were rejected as unacceptable. No big surprise. D@mned near every first prototype of a new tank design was found to need changes prior to production. That's why ordering production before even seeing the first prototypes was easily dismissed as a bad idea.

Unless of course you have an army that is in desperate need of something, even if it's not the right thing. If your army is flailing about, then you're development process has license to flail a bit too.

Clearly the overly entrenched bureaucracy had the opportunity before them to create a legacy of ordering tanks that were unfit for service. They missed their chance to make US equivalents of the Covenanter or Cavalier.

They missed this chance because of their perception that the US Army was not flailing about in 1943. Were they wrong? Was it losing battles and campaigns at such a rate that we could easily excuse shipping weapons that didn't work to the troops because they needed something, anything, to redress their overwhelming combat disadvantage?

I don't think so.

That doesn't mean that the US Army in 1943 was perfect. Far from it. The performance of the troops, including infantry, and general officers, and air-ground cooperation, and aircraft types (fighter, attack, and bomber) and artillery, and rifles, and trucks, and etc. etc. and even, yes, tanks, were all examined and criticized after the Tunisia experieces.

But the conclusions of the examination of tanks was that the important changes would in the organization, combat doctrine, training, and leadership of the armored divisions.

We can make a similar comparison in France in 1940. Char-B and S-35 tanks failed to stop a Panzerwaffe comprised mainly of Pz I and II, without enough III, some 35t and 38t filling in, and IV.

The core issue is the bigger tank doesn't win. The better force wins.

From another thread, in the Media topic, on a new book about the great tank battles at Dubno in 1941:

Why did the … Soviets fail? Hundreds of heavy KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, the five-turret giant T-35 and famous T-34 failed to stop the Germans.

Let's stop here for a moment. How many threads have we had where we heap all forms of criticism on the criminal negligence of the German leadership for going into Russia with only Pz III and Pz IV as their most powerful tanks? I mean, what a disaster!!! They clearly should have had Panthers and Tigers leading the charge by June of 1941, right? Or they should have put a Panther's 75mm on the Pz IV by then. They could have, you know, because they once tried it and somebody wrote a memo or something.

Clearly nothing but bureaucratic intransigence left them so desperately behind the all-conquering Red Army of 1941. Oh those very clever Russians with their superior tanks.

Or not.

Based on recently available archival sources, A. Isaev describes the battle from a new point of view: that in fact it's not the tanks, but armoured units, which win or lose battles. … The German Panzer Division could defeat their opponents not by using tanks, but by using artillery, which included heavy artillery, and motorized infantry and engineers.

Clever bastidges, those Germans! Who'd a thunk it? Win battles by using well organized, well trained and balanced forces… (and tanks that had better operational mobility, reliability, ergonomics and were better supplied, I might add).

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

and tanks that had better operational mobility, reliability, ergonomics and were better supplied, I might add).

Not sure about the operational mobility thing. Experiences from France suggested that the Panzers were at about the end of their operational range and needed major overhaul by the time the campaign finished. Reliability? Hmmm not aware that any of the early German Panzers were particularly noted for reliability. About average, certainly no more. Better supplied? Well German logistics was stretched pretty thin for Barbarossa and there were enforced pauses to try and let the supply situation catch up a bit, remember they were no more motorised in 1941 than they were in 1944, mostly relying on horse power. And yet they still managed to conquer most of European Russia and they did that without air superiority, artillery superiority or having more men. They were even able to replace tank losses faster than the Russians, no factories churning out 3,000 tanks a month. I wonder how they did it? Could it be those things aren't as important after all?

The US Army had very specifically tried to avoid developing, manufacturing and sending useless equipment to the troops.

The War department also foresaw that local commanders might be averse to introduce new equipment, preferring tactical equipment with which they were familiar over potentially newer and better kit, something that did happen in the field, even with highly experienced commanders like Creighton Abrams or 6th AD who flatly refused 76mm gun tanks.

Suffice to say the system of Battle Need didn't work properly in the case of "better tanks"

Yet the timescale in which the problem was recognized, acknowledged and then fixed was in a matter of months. With the introduction of 76mm M4 in July-August and the deployment of 90mm armed TD and the M26 before the end of 1944.

I don't think the Germans, British of Soviets were ever able to match anything on that timescale because a huge amount of footwork had been done and even with the dawdling and missteps (M6, M7 various T2x models etc) they fixed problems at a pace that would have left their counterparts standing in their dust.

" With the introduction of 76mm M4 in July-August and the deployment of 90mm armed TD and the M26 before the end of 1944."

- – -

The 76mm gun, though an improvement over the 75mm in terms of AP performance, comprehensively failed to live up to the promises of its Ordnance Department developers. As well, in terms of tank gun armament, the pctg of 76mm Shermans in the field only grew slowly and IIRC remained in the minority through the end of the war.

The first 90mm M36s reached the ETO in Sep 1944; in Dec 1944, slightly less than 240 had reached the front.

Only 20 90mm M26s were shipped to the ETO and did not get into action until Feb 1945.

FWIW.

B

But this entire discussion keeps overlooking that it wasnt JUST the Sherman taking on Panthers and Tigers. Let's throw in all the M10, M18, Fireflys and Achilles not to mention ATGs and IIRC even 90mm AA to the equation. Sorta balances the scales! Cheers!

The 21st Army Group average ammo consumption per day for the 75mm in NWE was 1.1 rounds, For the 17pdr 0.4 rounds & the 6pdr consumed 0.2 rpd. The 25pdr was 36.8 rounds, 23.6 for the 5.5in & 12 rpd for the 7.2in/155mm. The 3.7in AA gun averaged 5.3 rounds.

Field Artillery was the king.

Field Artillery was the king.

Taking average like that can be very misleading as is the oft quoted it took 10,000 rounds of small arms ammo for every kill. Actually it only takes 1, but you have to have him in sight and be aiming at him. The problem with artillery is that it spends a lot of time shelling areas with minimal chance of inflicting casualties, that is not to say it is not useful, as suppression and area denial are useful tools to aid in victory. The other oft quoted statistic that most casualties are caused by artillery/mortars has also been questioned as most studies looked at those admitted to casualty clearing stations, so the wounded, not the dead. The studies that have looked at the dead show a rather higher proportion killed by small arms. Unfortunately the only comprehensive autopsy study was carried out by the US in Vietnam which showed the majority killed by small arms and rather worryingly a significant proportion killed by American bullets! However results from Vietnam are not directly applicable to WW2 as it was a very different kind of war.

The other oft quoted statistic that most casualties are caused by artillery/mortars has also been questioned as most studies looked at those admitted to casualty clearing stations, so the wounded, not the dead.

If that was a factor then all it would do is change it from 'most deaths are caused by artillery' to 'most wounded are victims of artillery.' Unless there is a severe disconnect between the effects of artillery and small arms then it still confirms Artillery as the main cause.

link

Also:

During Worid War Two, the German Central Archives for Military Medicine analyzed some 3,015,589 wounded soldiers with extremely
detailed results. Overall, they found that of every 100 casualties, 24% were killed in action, 30% were seriously wounded and 46% were classified äs lightly wounded. This compared to a casualty rate of 13.8% killed and 86.2% wounded in Worid War I. The archivists believed the increased death rate was due, in part, to an increase in weapons' lethality; additionally, the greater fluidity of the World War II battlefields made casualty evacuation more difficult than in the more static Worid War I battlefields.
In 1942 the Archives did a study äs to the location of war wounds on the human body. They found that of all wounds inflicted on German soldiers 5% were skull wounds, 8% facial wounds, 1.3% throat wounds, 6.3% shoulderwounds, 7.3% chest wounds, 6.3% upper arm wounds, 16.5% lower arm wounds, 3.5% stomach wounds, 10.1% upper leg wounds, 28.3% lower leg wounds and 3.4% back wounds.
By 1944 wounds were further categorized (shown below) äs to location on the body such äs direct hit (massive simultaneous multiple wounds), head, chest, stomach, back, throat, legs and arms.

Thus it was shown that of those patients who were fatally wounded, 42.61 had received head wounds while only 3.04 had been wounded in the legs. Leg wounds (28.02), on the other hand, were the most frequent injury for seriously wounded patients, while arm injuries (37.77) were the most frequent type of injury to those patients who were classified äs lightly wounded.
Casualties who had serious wounds in their arms or legs had their damaged limbs amputated more frequently than in Western Allied armies.
Amputations reduced the possibility of infections and actually allowed the soldier to sometimes return to limited duty

If that was a factor then all it would do is change it from 'most deaths are caused by artillery' to 'most wounded are victims of artillery.'

Quite so, but as the tendency is to directly extrapolate wounded to those put out of action, ie the dead and wounded, if there are higher percentages in the dead category that have been shot then it reduces the percentage due to artillery in the total put out of action.
Thanks for the wound data. I was aware of the percentages having been a trauma surgeon and the figures still hold true although the patterns of injuries are different in the current conflicts.

Combined Arms … is King …

For comparison, etc., some interesting data from the US War in SE Asia/Vietnam. That I posted on another thread here. Scroll thru – TMP link

Returning to earlier posts….Max Hastings is not a historian, he's a journalist who writes books with a historical theme. The books are widely and positively reviewed by other journalists because they all believe that they can 'do' history. There are a few honourable exceptions – I thought Feargal Keene's book on Kohima was excellent.

Max Hastings is not a historian, he's a journalist who writes books with a historical theme.

The problem with journalists writing history is not so much that they get things wrong it is that they are always looking for the big story or scoop. By dint of their training they search out the ‘headline', the sensational story and the new twist. It's part of their DNA as journalists. It makes for a good story and grabs headlines, but it doesn't always make it good history.

I didn't notice this was all sparked by a Max Hastings article. Nuff said.

Not sure about the operational mobility thing. Experiences from France suggested that the Panzers were at about the end of their operational range and needed major overhaul by the time the campaign finished.

Fred:

I know that words like "operational mobility" and "reliability" don't flow easily when discussing the Panzers, but as you yourself have identified, the merit of the terms is related to the time and circumstances we are discussing.

Yes, the Panzers were about at the end of their operational range by the time the French campaign finished. Yet, during that campaign the French failed at several critical points to put tanks into battle because they were slower to march to the assembly points, they needed refueling before entering combat, and without radio coordination they had to attend in-person briefings at every level of hierarchy to have any chance of knowing what their missions were.

When you were consistently 6-8 hours late to start your counter-attacks, the Panzerwaffe of 1940 was impossible to beat, because they were never sitting around in the same place long enough.

Reliability? Hmmm not aware that any of the early German Panzers were particularly noted for reliability. About average, certainly no more.

Again, 'tis all about who and when you compare. The Red Army of 1941 had some 22,0000 tanks. But less than 10,000 were operational, and that's BEFORE you start trying to do something with them.

Better supplied? Well German logistics was stretched pretty thin for Barbarossa and there were enforced pauses to try and let the supply situation catch up a bit, remember they were no more motorised in 1941 than they were in 1944, mostly relying on horse power.

Again, true, but …

There were several Red Army formations that had no AP ammunition, relying on HE when facing the Panzers. There was virtually no flow of spare parts (not the reliability issues above).

Russian sources, even to this day, often characterize the Pz III as a faster tank than the T-34. In theory it was not. But in practice, in 1941, it very much was. In fact the Pz III danced circles around the T-34. Sure, the German reports describe their shock and dismay when they saw their AP rounds bounce off the low, squat monsters that they portray T-34s to have been. But all of that show and dismay is within reports of how they raced around them in circles shooting them again and again, and how they had to close to within 50 or 30m and shoot them from the sides to kill them. BUT THEY DID. In huge numbers.

The point is that the better tank force can win even if their guns aren't better, or their armor isn't thicker. And in fact, if they have the tools to be more mobile they can withdraw faster when facing superior forces, they can concentrate their own forces faster, and attack into an enemy's weakness more often, creating wholly disproportionate results that dwarf what you get from a tactical trading of blows contesting who's got the bigger gun and heavier armor.

The Germans were consistent winners when their tanks were more mobile and lighter.

The Americans were consistent winners when their tanks were more mobile and lighter.

The French were consistent losers when their tanks were slower and heavier.

The Russians were consistent losers when their tanks were slower and heavier.

Even the Germans were consistent losers when their tanks were slower and heavier.

Many years later, the Americans field heavier tanks, and win. But … those heavier American tanks are also faster, more mobile. And the force that operates them has generally been better trained in total force mobility.

Any tank crew will want more armor and a bigger gun. But clearly if you want to win battles you want to have better operational mobility. At least that's what I read from the last 70 years of large scale armored warfare. Doesn't necessarily apply in positional warfare. But even on the defense, I'd take my odds of having 20 vehicles that are more mobile, but half a lethal, over 10 vehicles that are more survivable but slow. Because I can bring more of my vehicles to any fight I chose, and avoid combat when I don't chose -- if I am more mobile than my opponent.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I would have thought that the sherman was designed on the premise that it would have to be shipped 4000 miles to get to Europe and then be light enough to fit into the tank landing craft that had been previously designed and had already been produced. How could the US and the Poms invade Normandy in June 1944 with a heavier tank without providing it with a bigger tank landing craft? And this at a time when the availability of any landing craft at all was at a premium? Upgrade the gun, by all means. But this was done prior to D-day – there were over a hundred M4A1 76mm shermans in the UK by 6th June 1944 – and the US army didn't want them because tanks weren't supposed to be fighting panzers. The 76mm gun made the sherman better then the Panzer IV H and the Stug in terms of gun power. But as others have noted, what tended to kill tanks in WW2 were anti tank guns. Even the towed US tank destroyer battalions proved very good at this when they actually got to engage German tanks and the mobile tank destroyer battalions were excellent at this when fighting defensively. But these battalions were corps level assets allocated to individual divisions; what was needed was for the US infantry and armoured divisions to have some organic hard hitting anti tank weapons (like the PAK 40) or to have simply split up all those tank destroyer battalions and given each infantry or armoured regiment its own high velocity AT company. The organisation and doctrinal rigidity of the US army stymied the sherman just as effectively as the bocage. By September 1944 the US army was upgrading all of its shermans as quickly as it could and throwing out the rule book – the Jumbo and the M4A3E8 were direct responses to many of the problems that had been identified. Therefore I would dispute the assertion that there was a sherman tank scandal. What happened was that people realised that not all of the wartime propaganda about the sherman could not be sustained once it entered into combat in France in 1944. A public relations illusion was shattered.

"The Americans were consistent winners when their tanks were more mobile and lighter."

….. and outnumbered their opponent about 6 to 1.

It seems that this keeps slipping out of the discussion.

B

I didn't notice this was all sparked by a Max Hastings article. Nuff said.

Sorry, are you a moderator, or just somebody who over values his own opinion?

The Russians were consistent losers when their tanks were slower and heavier.

Yeah nice try Mark, but the bulk of Russian armour in 1941 was BT's and T26's. The T34's and KV's were very much in the minority.

Even the Germans were consistent losers when their tanks were slower and heavier.

No, that is not right either. The Germans started losing consistently before their tanks became heavier. Have a look at Kursk. There were 2 Panther battalions and a total of 3 or 4 battalions of Tigers operational, 1 of which was in the north and the other in Sicily. The bulk of the Armoured vehicles are Pz III, IV and Stugs. Panthers don't really come on stream until early ‘44 in significant numbers and the number of Tiger battalions is never very high, probably no more than a dozen active at any one time across all the fronts. I am with Frank Chadwick on this one. The Germans kept winning while their infantry divisions were good and started losing when they weren't. If you look at Barbarossa most of the heavy lifting is done by the infantry. They tear the great holes in the Russian front lines the Panzers motor through and they reduce the great cauldrons the Panzer spearheads have created, while the Panzers charge on. The failure of the German infantry offensively is followed by their failure defensively and they now require support from the Panzer divisions to hold the line. Normandy is a classic example of this. Try as they might the Germans have to keep putting the Panzer divisions back in the line.

Many years later, the Americans field heavier tanks, and win.

Not sure the heavy tank US current structure has been put to a real test. GW1 and 2 don't come even close to what would have happened in a Cold War gone hot scenario. I remember seeing footage of the columns of fuel tankers following on behind the tank spearheads and thinking how much tougher that would have been with serious opposition. A single artillery strike could have resulted in a lot of very expensive pill boxes! Quite how long the US could have maintained the logistical tempo required to support such a force is debatable. Even getting supplies to,Europe would have been a challenge.

Everything is combined arms.

The Soviet forces in 1941 had the wrong tanks, the wrong training and their support infrastructure was inexistant, which lead to critical shortages in ammo, fuel, transportation etc. Motorized units did worse in 1941 than foot units because they at least had horses to pull their equipment, the motorized units lost all their heavy equipment for lack of transport.

Stalin's reign of terror resulted in huge shortcuts to achieve those incredible numbers. Many of the tanks left the factory with a minimal service life expectancy, the order was : "Make as many tanks as possible." Nobody specified things like spare parts or even bother to check if they were suitable for service.

You see all those frame aerials on Soviet Tanks, but only a fraction of those even had radios installed. Radio production fell behind, but escaped notice since everybody was busy making the critical tank production numbers.

Actual speed doesn't matter, speed is relative in most cases, all those vaunted racing car speed tanks very rarely used them in the field. They were impressive for demonstrations and in the minds of some people, but being able to coordinate an entire battalion was critical. Speed is not mobility. You need vehicles that need to reliably go from a to b in realistic time span, most of them, not a bare minimum. War is an attempt to tame raw chaos, but if you can't tell if your armoured regiment will even get up and move, you're in trouble before the battle even started.

Soviet Divisions didn't become better by getting T-34 tanks they got better when they received fully equipped repair units and communication elements. They became better when they started to use them according to their strengths and weakness and did everything to remove weaknesses. A good example is the common reference to the fact that Soviet divisions became smaller. This was not because of manpower shortage, they needed so many divisions they just reduced numbers, but they were not weaker, because everything from machine-guns and mortars to heavy artillery in each division went up. And even more importantly they fixed the logistics and support problems.

The French also failed at combined arms. They were halfway there, but their divisions were just ineffective and as Mark said "Operationally slow." They lacked supporting infantry, artillery and most importantly they were extremely sluggish compared to German divisions. Yes, they could hit hard when hurled into battle, but it was an unwieldy sledgehammer and individual regiment performance could go either way on the same front only a few KM apart from each other.

Mechanization and how to apply it properly is one of the most misunderstood aspects of early modern warfare. Everybody understood that tanks and trucks were a huge force multiplier, but they didn't quite grasp how to do this.

The British made the mistake to think that Tanks were just like cavalry and tried to used them in that role in North Africa. What little infantry support they had was quickly neutralized by the German infantry and then the tanks fell prey to the Anti-Tank gun screen, after which the Germans counter-attacked with their tanks.

To underscore the need for a proper mix a General in North Africa was promised extra tanks, and he replied he would rather have more infantry.

The name of that moron who doesn't understand infantry are useless in North Africa ? Erwin Rommel …

The Germans were only good as long as they could sustain combined arms. Arracourt didn't fail because US tankers were so much better, it was because the Panzer Brigades were all tanks and little else. They could not effectively engage US Anti-tank guns or provide support to cover the tank advance.

Also note that in 1939-1942 German Panzers rarely engaged the enemy unless it was absolutely necessary, that effectiveness fell when tanks were reduced to smashing headlong into Soviet forces in an endless series of counter-attacks. Notice that the Germans weren't geniuses who understood that tanks are the only weapon to deal with enemy tanks, but rather that in many cases they faced the exact problem the US had highlighted in 1941 when formulating the Tank Destroyer Doctrine. They were now on the receiving end of mechanized assaults and their AT assets were often not enough to stop them so they started using tanks, the famous "fire brigade model" note that the Germans never stepped away from using self-propelled anti tank guns because it was a core doctrine, their tanks merely evolved to take on enemy heavy tanks whenever possible.

The key issue that the Germans master combined warfare they never achieve mechanization, something the Allies do manage to varying degrees.

The gap between the heavy reliance on railroad for support (the vast majority of the German supply effort relies on trains as the only sustainable option) and the operational mobility of tanks leaves the infantry stuck. They need trucks but end up marching and using horses to pull their equipment.

The US has trucks and halftracks to spare. Mechanized combined arms win the day, when all your assets are either pulled by some kind of motorized vehicle or self-propelled and have the same level of operational mobility as your tanks.

As I have repeated often the M4 is only a functional cog in that machine, where combined arms and operational mobility can only be achieved by having a fully integrated fighting force and in that regard the CCKW and SCR300 are probably even more vital than the M4 ever was.

US divisions are able to outfight German forces that may appear much stronger on paper because they are so much more efficient, much like a Panzer III will outfight a Somua because it is so much more efficient in using its assets of mobility and firepower to bear.

The French lost the game because they tried to fight a strategic war where everything would be decided at the highest level. Generals and Marshals would plan the offensives and initiate the action. They were not blind to radio communication, rather they were only too aware of relying too much on it. Their system was designed to be bug-proof, but at the expense of flexibility and responsiveness. Something the Germans were completely at the other end of the scale, flexible with decisions made at the Divisional or even Regimental level and then flowed up to higher formations.

The Soviets had a similar problem in that Stalin by means of Stavka kept all control over the armies so that anyone who showed any initiative stood out, catching the eye of Stalin who had a dread of anyone who might be a potential threat.

Ultimately the Germans were defeated when they were reduced to being responsive to the situation rather than dictating where and when to fight a battle, like they tried at Kursk, attack before the Soviets do, force the battle to happen and not be a bad surprise. It failed and after that all other attempts to do so failed.

Yes they achieved local success until the last days of the war creating a credible illusion that they were dominant and in control all the time, whereas in reality they were consistently losing after 1943. They cheer the tactical victories as if they were epic battles and ignore the loss of entire armies as mere glitches because in April 1945 three tanks destroyed twenty Shermans, kicking ass until the very end.

Everything is combined arms.

Good posts as usual Patrick & Mark !

As John Boyd might have put it, the cause of the French failure in 1940 rested upon their inability to efficiently manage their OODA Loop.

B

As John Boyd might have put it, the cause of the French failure in 1940 rested upon their inability to efficiently manage their OODA Loop.

Agreed, the French were expecting days between individual attacks, not hours. Radios made hours between attacks possible.

OODA Loop – that's something you don't see very much in war games.

Wolfhag

Ultimately the Germans were defeated when they were reduced to being responsive to the situation rather than dictating where and when to fight a battle, like they tried at Kursk,

None of that had anything to do with the Germans suddenly becoming useless at combined arms or the Panzer divisions becoming incapable of operational mobility. A few months before at Kharkov the Germans had delivered a masterful lesson in operational mobility to the Russians. Of course that had been delivered off the back of a skillfully conducted withdrawal, but showed the Germans still had a good grasp of operational principles. The loss at Kursk reflects a change in the balance of forces and the Germans weren't able to impose their tempo on the battle. The failure on the northern flank to penetrate the defences, or in the subsequent battle to prevent the Russians eliminating the Orel salient, primarily failures of infantry shows just how far behind the Germans were getting. None of this had anything to do with what tanks the Germans had, but the myth of the war winning tanks lives on.

They were now on the receiving end of mechanized assaults and their AT assets were often not enough to stop them so they started using tanks, the famous "fire brigade model" note that the Germans never stepped away from using self-propelled anti tank guns because it was a core doctrine,

The Germans had always been on the end of mechanised assaults, the difference in the latter part of the war is that German infantry weren't able to stop them, which forced the Germans to use their Panzers to shore up the infantry rather than using them concentrated as a mobile reserve or attacking force.

A German infantry division in the early part of the war was quite a formidable obstacle to most allied units.

By 1943-1944 they are even stronger with extra MG's, mortars, better allocation of artillery and bigger, better AT guns as well as the introduction of a plethora of new infantry anti-tank weapons.

But why do they fail if they are so much stronger ?

The mechanized assaults of earlier years were rare and often poorly done. The British certain broke their teeth often enough on German defenses in North Africa and so did the French in 1940, the Soviets in 1941-1942 and the Americans in 1943.

So why does German infantry "get worse" ?

They didn't get worse per se, but conditions changed.

- The Allies get their tactics right.
- Mechanized attacks are now more frequent, better coordinated and larger in scale.
- The vast majority of infantry units have become defensive units, an overview of 1944 divisions shows that while in 1941 most divisions were suitable for offensive or at least limited action, this is completely reversed in 1944 with most units only fit for defense or limited offensive actions on a good day.
- Generally infantry divisions do resist enemy attacks quite effectively for a certain amount of time, after this they start to lose their effectiveness quite quickly, so it is critical to stabilize things before this happens. Ideally the unit should withdraw to regroup, but this doesn't happen.

(Incidental note, the fact that German units remain in position is not Hitler's fault as has been stated so many times, though he did order his troops to stand and fight, it was often a problem that many infantry divisions would not be able to disengage properly without suffering heavy losses for lack of mobility and reserves to take their place. The Germans simply realized that holding on and waiting for a counter-attack or reinforcements was often better than pulling back.)

Of course in major operations like D-Day or Bagration where intense fighting goes on for weeks, German forces are usually pushed to the point of rupture where their formations tend to lose their fighting cohesion, where you get the phenomenon of an uneven distribution of who fights and who runs, much in the same way as the French would break through in certain places or be stopped dead in others. Those few formations that retain some cohesion and combat ability become the pockets the Generals use to focus their counter-attacks around and this where you hear the stories of heroic German troops racking up huge kills and seemingly doing so well, whereas of course the story of those units that completely disintegrate is never told.

The main issue is that in the late war defensive battle the Germans have few options other than to hold on and hope for some kind of strong counter-attack to give them a breather to regroup. They lack the reserves and means to launch major counter-operations, but even a minor offensive action can disrupt an attack as seen with XXX Corps during Market-Garden. Most of the units were hardly elite forces, but they "bleed" the spearhead by repeated flanking attacks, draining XXX Corps momentum.

It doesn't help that most infantry divisions have minimal mobility, most of their equipment is horse-drawn and motorized forces tend to be minimal. Truck-towed guns become a luxury and you're lucky to have a STUG company.

Attrition becomes the biggest issue, the NWE campaign and the Soviet offensives means that while the Germans manage to hold on to some degree, the margin is getting dangerously thin. If German infantry was bad they would have collapsed much earlier and it would have been much harder to recover.

Hitler and his generals are given no other choice than to continue to fight as they refuse to surrender, hoping the Allies will stall sooner or later and they can restore the line.

In that optic the Bulge is not some foolish last charge, but a serious attempt to deliver a solid punch in the West so they can try to salvage things in the East.

The Americans may be a bit spent after their dash to the Rhine, but their cohesion is mostly intact and their recovery is beyond anything the Germans could have hoped for.

Note that into 1945 the Germans still have a small core of capable units, but they are too few to have any real impact, so that the Germans still win several tactical battles, which have zero effect on the strategic campaign.

Because these are highlighted so much they give the illusion that the Germans were still full of fight, even though entire armies were disintegrating left and right.

In 1944 German forces are in an odd situation, their frontline units are rarely well-rounded combined-arms units, while their attackers increasingly are. They lack operational mobility, often fighting static battles to avoid being overrun by forces that are much more responsive and can exploit gaps in the line. Their armoured forces go from being a mobility asset to mobile reserves, where a design like Panther can shine.

Returning to the M4 Sherman in that view the Sherman is highly suitable for operations against German troops and we also see why they might be highly success and fail at the same time.

- Sherman tanks are on the offensive and face more threats than ever before.
- They have all the features (AP/HE/MG/Mobility/Range/Numbers/Reliability) to perform offensive actions and operate in well-rounded combined arms.
- Offensive actions are costly until the enemy breaks and it's the happy time of running roughshod through enemy lines.

So you get the Paradox of US tanks having both a bad time breaking enemy defenses and holding off counter-attacks, combined with increasingly successful breakthroughs, the biggest one being Cobra and the Falaise Gap, if you look at the timeline you see the US take most casualties early on, but they drop quickly once the Germans break and run.

Yes, good post Patrick !

But why do they fail if they are so much stronger ?

They fail because the quality of the troops is declining. Read Omar Bartov's book Hitlers Army which shows quire clearly the decline in German infantry divisions, well documented by the Germans as to what the divisions were capable of from fully capable down to suitable for limited defensive tasks.

The main issue is that in the late war defensive battle the Germans have few options other than to hold on and hope for some kind of strong counter-attack to give them a breather to regroup.

Quite so and of course has nothing to do with any decline or otherwise of the operational mobility of German Panzer divisions or anything to do with war winning tanks. It is simply a reflection of the declining power of German units as the experienced NCO's and officers become casualties and are replaced by whatever the Germans could scrape together as reinforcements.

Quality doesn't become a key issue until late 1944. Average quality of German forces remains good enough until the heavy losses in Normandy and Operation Bagration.

A f

Quality doesn't become a key issue until late 1944.

Bartov's book argues differently. He suggests there is a steady decline, particularly in the quality of leader replacements from late ‘41 onwards. This evidenced from reports by the German divisions and details the efforts to get round this. The problem is the constant day on day losses, which the short, sharp campaigns the Germans were involved in prior to Barbarossa didn't have.

I must agree with Fred on this point. You can find in the CARL Digital Library (on the web) an English language translation of the German 7th Army's account of its experience in the ETO during 1944-1945. The author makes explicit mention of the overall deterioration of the quality of the German infantry due to the unsustainable losses suffered on the Eastern Front. Worse for 7th Army, the better formations were typically committed to the Eastern Front, while the Western Front received I large part, units of lesser/low quality.

B

Von Luck talks about it in his memoir and cites the loss of good junior leaders earlier in the war (in the East) to the problems he faced in Normandy. He is saying by 1944 the army is really suffering from both a shortage of leaders and a decline in quality.