"Battle of the Bulge question" Topic

I am not that clued up on this battle nor the western front generally – all I have read on the Bulge has been in passing where it was mentioned in books about something else. So this may be a dumb question, but I'll ask it anyway.

When the Germans attacked in the Ardennes, was there a reason why the allies didn't just fall back before the attack, pinch off the flanks of the salient and bag the entire German force?

Off the top of my head…. "Fall back" implies an organized retreat with at least some organized planning and C3. Ardennes was a "sleepy" sector, the allies were not expecting an attack, and thus I doubt that they would have had any contingency plan to fall back. Its hard to fall back when your lines have been penetrated, disrupted and in places overrun. The events developed so rapidly that the priority plan was to contain.

bag the entire German force?

This was essentially the end result anyway.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing :)

The Germans fooled us and the attack was a total surprise.

The US forces there were a mix of very green and exhausted, lacking in the normal transport elements and taken by suprise. No one really knew what was going on and in such circumstances ordering a fall back/withdraw under pressure is a very risky undertaking. Was an example of small units using their initiative and doing what they thought 'best' with great courage and tenacity.
L

When the Germans attacked in the Ardennes, was there a reason why the allies didn't just fall back before the attack, pinch off the flanks of the salient and bag the entire German force?

I have always wondered why so many US authors spent 50 years castigating Monty for 'failing' to capture the Germans at Falaise whilst ignoring their own Generals exact same type of 'failure' during The Bulge.

The Germans achieved not only surprise, but managed to put several American defending divisions through the meat grinder before Bradley even realized it was a major attack. With his overextended front shattered and the Strategic Reserve limited to two divisions, 82nd and 101st, Ike was pressed to patch up the front and stem the tide. I believe his strategy of "holding the shoulders" was correct and was what created The Bulge. After the front had been stabilized the proper axis for the counterattack to "bag" more German divisions has been hotly debated for years.

Here's my take which will probably also be hotly debated.

1. Bradly choked badly and but for being Ikes buddy would've been sacked.

2. Ike deserves more credit, the several decisions he made turned the battle and insured victory.

3. Monty did JUST enough to back up the US forces and slam the door which prevented any possibility of a Meuse crossing.

Many Americans like to diss Monty, and Ike and say that Patton won the Bulge. I say the "tough when cornered" GIs and Paras, awesome US artillery and Exceptional Engineers were what really won the battle. Cheers!

I say the "tough when cornered" GIs and Paras, awesome US artillery and Exceptional Engineers were what really won the battle. Cheers!

I would say the Germans lost it. The battle was essentially unwinable. However far the Germans got they just didn't have the strength or resources like fuel to pull it off. Sooner or later the offensive would have ground to a halt and then they would have come under sustained counterattack. The limited extent of the penetration enabled the Germans to collapse the bulge and avoid being trapped. The German generals achieved about what they expected. Limited penetration, mauled a lot of US divisions, almost wiped out the 106th and disrupted allied plans for about 6 weeks. I think the only thing they were disappointed by was the failure to capture Bastogne.
As for conducting an orderly withdrawal in front of the attack I can't see that working. The US commanders obsession with holding on to ground condemned a number of US units to destruction that could have been saved. Monty had to countermand Ridgeway's order to hold St Vith that would have lead to the loss of what was left of Hasbrouck's command.

The Germans achieved complete surprise and the Allies, i.e. US, etc. thought the war would be over shortly, e.g. by Christmas.

But yes, for as Hitler planned to push on to Antwerp, etc. it was almost impossible. As many of his Generals knew … As Fred pointed out – Limited penetration and killing a lot of GIs.

I think it may have actually shortened the war in the ETO. If the Germans used all those troops, tanks, etc., in fighting more of an overall defensive strategy. With limited counterattacks, spoiling attacks, etc.

Regardless the Germans were fighting on two fronts.
With the Allies having massive assets, with massive supply/resupply capabilities, air superiority, etc. It would have been just a matter of time. And more blood & treasure expended.

In the movie, at least, Patton asked, "Why don't we have the nerve to let them get all the way to Paris and then cut 'em off?" Unfortunately, they weren't aiming for Paris.

When your line is penetrated like that, the traditional response it to hold the shoulders of the penetration, to keep it on as narrow a front as possible -- then cut it off. That's essentially what Ike did, though it could be argued that he should have made the counterattack(s) farther east to bag a larger haul of Germans.

Fred, can't completely agree. Several noted historians, especially more current accounts, state the key early action, which threw the entire German time table, such as it was, out of whack was the defense of the "armored goose-egg" of St Vith. Certainly it shifted the emphasis from Dietrich's 6th Panzer Army to Manteuffel's 5th.

As for why the Allies didn't try to pinch off the base of the Bulge and trap the Germans, well, I'm afraid that Monty is mostly to blame for that. When the attack began, Montgomery convinced Eisenhower that with 1st Army split in two it made the most sense for Bradly to assume command of those forces to the south of the Bulge and for Montgomery to take command of the forces to the north. In truth, there was some sense in this move as Bradley's HQ was already to the south and some of the north-south communications lines were being cut.

But once the main emergency was past and it was clear the German could be stopped, many Americans proposed exactly the plan to cut off the Bulge near the base and trap the Germans. Patton was coming up from the south through Bastogne and they wanted a similar southward advance to recapture St. Vith and Clerveaux and meet up with Patton.

Unfortunately, Montgomery wanted nothing of that and insisted on a more orderly advance which would push the Germans out of the Bulge rather than trap them. Eisenhower deferred to Montgomery's plan.

As for why the Allies didn't try to pinch off the base of the Bulge and trap the Germans, well, I'm afraid that Monty is mostly to blame for that

Yes of course. That must be it. The failure of the American Armies to cut of the Bulge and capture all the Germans is Monty's fault. Eisenhower was tricked by the dastardly Brits once more.

When the attack began, Montgomery convinced Eisenhower that with 1st Army split in two it made the most sense for Bradly to assume command of those forces to the south of the Bulge and for Montgomery to take command of the forces to the north. In truth, there was some sense in this move as Bradley's HQ was already to the south and some of the north-south communications lines were being cut.

Complete fiction. The decision to shift Hodges to Monty was taken because Hodges was in the middle of some sort of mental breakdown and completely out of touch with reality. Bradley had lost all control of his northern Army and had no idea where it was or what it was doing. The matter was so serious that Eisenhower had to act swiftly to prevent complete disaster. Bradley was so incensed by the move he threatened to resign and Eisenhower ended Bradley's bad-tempered rant by telling him that those were the orders and he had to carry them out or go.

Thank God good old Monty was there to save the day!

B

Thank God good old Monty was there to save the day

Indeed it was.

The opinion of the men on the ground:

The First Army staff, already resentful of the change of command, is alleged to have been less than pleased to be under British command. Such resentments, and many seem to be of postwar creation, were not evident to James Gavin, the 82d Airborne commander, when he dined with Hodges and his staff several days later. "The staff spoke of Montgomery with amusement and respect. They obviously liked him and respected his professionalism." For his part, Gavin was impressed with Montgomery as a soldier. "I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years."……………………General Bruce C. Clarke, commanded Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division during the critical defense of St. Vith." Montgomery paid several visits to the 7th Armored front: "General Montgomery was impressive to me," Clarke later said,
"Very cool in battle" Before Montgornery's order to withdraw, Clarke said, "lt looks like Custer`s last stand to me."…………………J. D. Morelock, Generals of the Ardennes; American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge: "Morelock points out while Bradley and Patton were angry at Monty`s receiving command in the north, many lower level American commanders were delighted to have the British Field Marshal take charge of the confusing situation in the northern sector of the Bulge. Monty's "timely assumption of command in the north," writes Morelock, was welcomed by Hodges, Simpson (9th U.S. Army commander), and their subordinate commanders who were fighting desperately to stop the German drive. He comments, "it cannot be denied that Montgomery brought much needed order and discipline to a confused and chaotic situation."…………………..Montgomery`s role is discussed objectively by Russell F. Weigly in his account, Eisenhower's Lieutenants.· The Campaign of France and Germany l944-I945. While critical of Monty's arrogance, Weigley acknowledged that
Montgomery "took hold on the north flank with the energy and verve that were as characteristic as his peacockery." Weigley defended Monty's tactic of giving ground the better to build up his reserves, or where the benefits of holding on would no longer match the cost. He withdrew the U.S. 7th Armored Division and the 82"' Airborne Division from their forward positions. General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander of the 7th Armored Division, reported on December 22 that the time had come to abandon St. Vith. The defense of St Vith had dealt a crippling delay to the German's 6th SS Panzer Army drive on Leige-as important an action as Bastogne's stand, though not as dramatic, Hasbrouck's corps commander, however, General Matthew B. Ridgway opposed withdrawal. He was decisively overuled by Montgomery. Soon a message reached Hasbrouck from Monty, "You have accomplished your mission-a mission well done. It is time to withdraw." Hasbrouck would later go so far as to say that Montgomery "saved the 7th Armored Division."

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