"The Influence of Guibert on Tactics" Topic

I have published a new article on my website on "The Influence of Guibert on Tactics".

It can be viewed here:

link

Rod

I couldn't find this work (note 13) in any online library catalogue:

Tacticks for the Infantry operating in the Field, for Convoys etc, Instructions relating to the choice of Position and Disposition laid down by a Prussian Officer. Translated by Isaac Landemann, Professor of Fortifications and Artillery to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. 1787.

There is however, same year, same author:

Elements of Tacticks, and Introduction to Military Evolutions for the Infantry, by a celebrate Prussian General. Translated from the original in German by I. Landemann, Professor of Fortifications and Artillery to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. London 1787.

The latter is a translation of the famous "Taktische Grundsätze und Anweisung zu militairischen Evolutionen" by the Prussian general v. Saldern (several updated editions with varying titels in 1771, 1781, 1784 1786, French translation under the title "Elemens de tactique" in 1783).

Where did you find these "Tacticks for the Infantry operating in the Field" ?

Oliver,

I am in Spain at present, and am not sure where that source came from. I had a look in my collection of electronic books and it is not there. The possibilities are either a real hardcopy book on my bookshelves back in UK, or a photocopy (I have a collection of those from the pre-internet era) or possibly I transcribed some of it from an original in The British Library.

It may of course be the same book which you quote, since sometimes the title page is a little different to the proper title of the book.

I will have to check when I am back in UK in a few weeks time.

Rod

Thanks Rod, I will be patient :-)

Judging form the title (convoys, choice of position) the contents of your work must be different (enlarged?) from the one I know:.

link

Oli

Thank you very much for this. I will read it later with interest.
Regards

Oli,

I originally wrote the article over 20 years ago as part on a book, which I never finished.

I set my website up three years ago, mainly to cover my hobby of wargaming, but also decided to publish various articles on Military History which I had written over the years. I have updated all of the diagrams (the old ones were black and white) and made some tiny changes to the text, but not changed the footnotes at all.

All my sources will be things I have actually seen, either electronically or in real print. I never use second hand sources without acknowledging that, so I will have a copy of Landemann's book in some format somewhere.

I will look for that when I get back to UK.

Rod

That's a very interesting blog, I have bookmarked it for later purusal!

Once again a great article -I think you capture the essence better than many things I have read – especially for such a short text.

Question: It is you opinion that the french changes during the 18th century were mainly driven by frustration of not being able to maenuvre large formations in line and maintain fire discipline or by a belief that the ordre profond was better?

Thanks, obviously a lot of work went into this, good discussions about this are also to be found in the book of Grivet, also a fairly recently published book by

Claus Telp : The Evolution of the Operational Art

Operational art emerged from the campaigns of Frederick the Great to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. It was the result of three dynamic interrelationships: between military and non-military factors such as social, economic and political developments; between military theory and practice; and between developments in military theory and practice in France and Prussia.

Seemingly there is a free pdf download available, I put the link in the "useful stuff"

Sparta,

My understanding is that there was a clash of ideas in France during the 18th Century, with variations being proposed to traditional linear (order mince) by Puységur promoting the use of hasty à prest attacks, during which the troops did not fire but closed to their objective as quickly as possible and de Folard proposing alternative attack formations in heavy closed columns which he named ordre profound.

Guibert reconciled these into a tactic of advancing in column until the very last moment, then forming line, facilitated by the use of battlefield columns (half distance, quarter distance and close) which could form line on the head of the column faster than full distance columns could with processional or parallel conversions, and also form square very fast.

Guibert's sysrem was that formally adopted in their regulations by France, Britain, Prussia, Russia and USA (plus most others), prior to the Revolutionary Wars.

Rod

You can get online the whole works of Guibert in French, just did a few weeks ago though 18th century is more for next year, now getting a modicum of discipline…

The kind of article and analysis from a gamer I'd love to have nearby ;)

Guibert's system was that formally adopted in their regulations by France, Britain, Prussia, Russia and USA (plus most others), prior to the Revolutionary Wars.

Rod:
That is absolutely brilliant finding those quotes and that information. I guess my question is why didn't the British and others actually use that system in any form until late in the war, particularly when all had at least documented the method and 'officially' adopted before 1792.

You write:

showed the intention to use reduced distance columns to manoeuvre in the battle zone (between the extreme ranges of artillery and musketry) but still to form line prior to any actual combat. The use of columns in this zone enabled faster movement and could be used on multiple axis attacks in order to confuse the enemy as to the real intention of the attackers.

I haven't found any documented examples of the French or Allies actually doing anything but going straight in once
they had come under artillery fire. That is, changing the angle of attack or final target once they had come within 1000 yards of the enemy line.

Have you? Or perhaps I am not looking for the right descriptions.

Bill

My understanding is that there was a clash of ideas in France during the 18th Century, with variations being proposed to traditional linear.

The French were embarrassed by their Army's performance in the SYW and strove to find remedies. They first rejected copying the Prussian system because it didn't fit the French Character.

To establish a theory on the method of forming the column for the attack, the most trifling circumstances have struck me as the most essential.
The study of this theory is of greater consequence to the French than any other nation, by reason of their national fire, which give them so much impetuosity in all attacks of main force, joined with their undisciplined and their ignorance, which too often suffers the splendor of victory to be born from the many signalized effects of their valour.

p.208 General Essay on Tactics M. Guilbert London J. Millian 1781

Guilbert goes into detail about the matching National Character to tactics in the first chapter of Défense du système de guerre moderne. 1779, but he is only reiterating most all French theoreticians of the era, particularly those advocating the column attack. For instance, Mesnil-Durand's as early as 1755 titled his first tactical study Projet d'un ordre françois en tactique (Project of a French order in tactics).

Very nicely written! I haven't see this explained quite as well before. It's a shame you never finished your book. Have you thought about teaming up online with an artist and working it up into something available online, like through Amazon?

Forwardmarchstudios,

Worth considering, but I will probably just go for updating the diagrams, then posting the rest of the completed extracts on my website (perhaps six more articles). That will cover 3/4 of the book. The challenge will be to finish off the last few chapters, which exist in outline only, although I do now have a lot more sources than when I originally wrote it.

Rod

My understanding is that there was a clash of ideas in France during the 18th Century, with variations being proposed to traditional linear (order mince) by Puységur promoting the use of hasty à prest attacks, during which the troops did not fire but closed to their objective as quickly as possible and de Folard proposing alternative attack formations in heavy closed columns which he named ordre profound.
Guibert reconciled these into a tactic of advancing in column until the very last moment, then forming line, facilitated by the use of battlefield columns (half distance, quarter distance and close) which could form line on the head of the column faster than full distance columns could with processional or parallel conversions, and also form square very fast.
Guibert's sysrem was that formally adopted in their regulations by France, Britain, Prussia, Russia and USA (plus most others), prior to the Revolutionary Wars.

From 1765-1789 was the French reform period, guided and implemented by the Duc de Choiseul, which was at least as significant as the later Prussian reform period after Jena, and undoubtedly more so. It was sparked by the dismal performance of the French army in the Seven Years' War. Not only were the infantry regulations redone, but the artillery arm was completely reformed and a definite French field artillery was established, though not without opposition. From this period the French staff system also was developed as did the organization of divisions.

Large scale experimental maneuvers were held in Normandy in the mid-1770s to see which 'system' was preferable: line of column combined with skirmishers (ordre mince against ordre profonde). Mince won out and the 1791 Reglement was the result. Guibert participated in the maneuvers as did de Broglie, Rochambeau and other French general officers.

The infantry columns employed in Normandy during the maneuvers were too big and unwieldy and this would later develop into the use of battalion columns for maneuver and sometimes for attack, preceded by sometimes whole battalions being deployed as skirmishers.

Rochambeau's expeditionary force was one of the results of these maneuvers and experiments and it was an excellent French force that was sent to North America, including the results of the new French artillery arm.

There is an excellent description of the Normandy maneuvers contained in Robert Quimby's The Background of Napoleonic Warfare. I would recommend that volume to any that are interested.

One interesting point on Guibert is that after he wrote his treatise, he later refuted it in a subsequent work, Defense du systeme de guerre modern, which apologized for what he had previously written in the Essai: 'The vapors of modern philosophy heated my head and clouded my judgment.' This was written in 1779 after the maneuvers in Normandy.

Guibert was influential, but so was Bourcet and Gribeauval, among other reformers.

Interestingly, the 1791 Reglement says little about skirmishers. The development of formed infantry supported by troops in open and skirmish order in large numbers developed once the shooting started in 1792. Undoubtedly, some French commanders remembered the experiments with them in Normandy.

One interesting point on Guibert is that after he wrote his treatise, he later refuted it in a subsequent work, Defense du systeme de guerre modern, which apologized for what he had previously written in the Essai.

Uh, he didn't refute his entire Essai, just some things he said in it. He also defended other parts and compromised or adjusted others.

NB I know nothing about the American War of Independence.

Were these new tactics employed by the French in North America after 1779?

An interesting article, but I would say that the quotes from Dundas' "Principles of Military Movements" have been selected to prove a point and misrepresent what Dundas actually wrote. His focus was not on close columns and running them up to musket range before deploying into line.

Here is what he actually wrote:

link

Likewise, the British 1792 Regulations are quite clear about the distance from the enemy that columns should deploy:

When a considerable corps of troops has to act offensively it must form in line at latest within 1200 or 1500 paces of a posted enemy unless the ground particularly favours, and covers from the fire of his artillery; the enfilade of which is what chiefly prevents bodies in column from approaching nearer, and that space under the unceasing fire of their own artillery, troops in line will march over, in 18 minutes. However quickly columns could move up close to an enemy, yet as they must then form in line, no time would be gained, and their loss be heavier, than when the original formation is made at due distance.

Even after the Napoleonic Wars, when the British Regulations were updated to take actual practice into account, the same doctrine was used (this quote is from the 1824 Regs, but the same instruction can be found in the 1833 Regs):

Movements of attack may be made in columns, and the distance from the enemy at which these columns of attack should form in line, must depend upon his position, and the nature of the ground: In general, the line should be formed within 1200 or 1400 paces of a posted enemy, unless the ground particularly favours and covers an attacking force from the fire of artillery, the enfilade of which is what chiefly prevents bodies in column from approaching nearer; and the troops in line will march over that space in 12 or 13 minutes, under the constant protecting fire of their own artillery. Though columns may move with more rapidity close to an enemy, yet as they must then form in line, no time would be gained; and their loss would be heavier than when the formation is made at a due distance.

Major Snort,

I don't think I have misquoted Dundas. The quote was obviously selected to illustrate a point, but was not changed or taken out of context.

You are absolutely right about the distance at which the 1792 (and 1824) Regulations say that Line should be formed. I had somehow missed that when I originally wrote this article, over 20 years ago (all I have done now was to update the diagrams, from black and white to colour). I clearly need to do a major revise of this article.

However, I do think that Guibert was arguing for manoeuvring on the battlefield in reduced distance columns (half, quarter or close), then forming line before combat itself. He was also arguing for a more flexible use of troops on the battlefield in different formations, and not tied to the 18th Century concept of the whole army formed in a single inflexible linear formation. I think that Guibert's principles is what all of the Prussian, French, British and Russian regulations adopted immediately prior to the French Revolutionary War.

Rod

I think that Guibert's principles is what all of the Prussian, French, British and Russian regulations adopted immediately prior to the French Revolutionary War.

I am not sure about the Prussians nor Russians nor Austrians about this, the Prussians clearly went their own way, influenced by Saltern, Guiberts influence is seen in the 1791 French regulations but then???

Again, I think it is brilliant to have found the 'Guilbert' tactical consideration in pre-1792 regulations and manuals, but again, as VW points out, where did the Allied nations USE those methodologies before the late war period…if at all?

And, the idea that French or other troops would 'maneuver' within the 'approach zone' a la Guilbert while covered by enemy artillery sounds good, sounds good, but where do you actually see this? I can't think if a battle where any attach was carried out with that kind of 'keep-them-guessing-where-the-attack-is-coming' within enemy artillery range.

Interesting article and thread, many thanks to all.