"Napoleon's Worst Battle?" Topic

better and best are terms to be avoided, Wellington was certainly a clever commander, in case the Prussians wouldn't have turned up – he would have had – and that is a mega distinction to Boney at this time – plan B in his sleeve and pull it – if necessary. In his good days Boney had this skill too, but not any longer in 1815.

Napoleon had to win at Waterloo because of the allied coalition that was forming in Germany against him. The British and Prussians were the most dangerous of his enemies, and with their defeat the military situation would have been more in Napoleon's favor. He planned on a long war which was one of the reasons he made Davout his Minister of War. He planned on having 800,000 men in the ranks by October 1815 and more units were forming while he was in Belgium.

Grouchy of course wasn't allowed to march to the guns, as any marshal wasn't allowed to do this, they had to execute commands to the words, marching to the guns is another propaganda story, Boney expected blind obedience.

That is incorrect and clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding of Napoleon's method of warfare. Generally speaking, Napoleon gave his subordinates mission-type orders in that he told them what he expected them to do, but not how to do it.

If a subordinate came up with a different idea – he was either ignored or reprimanded.

That is also incorrect as Napoleon did listen to his subordinates. If he took the advice or recommendation is another thing. But subordinates were not 'reprimanded' for offering advice.

Boney leading the attack at the bridge at Arcole with a colour – is one of the many lies…

And what are those 'many lies'?

Your statements on Arcola have been shown to be incorrect, so how about this one?

better and best are terms to be avoided, Wellington was certainly a clever commander, in case the Prussians wouldn't have turned up – he would have had – and that is a mega distinction to Boney at this time – plan B in his sleeve and pull it – if necessary. In his good days Boney had this skill too, but not any longer in 1815.

Waterloo was a "one and done" to use Canuck sports slang for a one-game winner take all. There was no fall back plan because there was no fall back. That's why you throw the Middle Guard in for a near-hopeless last attack when it's the only formation you have left.

First of all, all of the Grenadier a pied and Chasseur a Pied regiments were Old Guard. The Middle Guard was not reactivated in 1815.

Second, Grouchy won his fight at Wavre and skillfully got his command out and away.

The remnants of Nord rallied to it. So, there was still a French army in the field.

of course Grouchy has to be blamed, it is impossible to concede the complete mismanagement and disastrous decisions by Boney, he was responsible for that – and he was out generaled and out manoeuvered badly – according to Marbot – like citrons – Boney was out of his wits at the 18th of June, and it clearly shows.
Who did chose Grouchy to arrange the pursuit of the beaten Prussian Army? Grouchy grew up in a system of total obedience, regarding orders of Boney.
He was a product of that system, how could he have acted otherwise. This kind of operational war served Boney well for years – but in 1815 his prime days had long past and despite miserable failures as 1812 – he wasn't able to judge realistically any longer. Wellington was bad, the Allied army was bad, and nothing more than a break fast.

of course Grouchy has to be blamed, it is impossible to concede the complete mismanagement and disastrous decisions by Boney, he was responsible for that – and he was out generaled and out manoeuvered badly – according to Marbot – like citrons – Boney was out of his wits at the 18th of June, and it clearly shows.
Who did chose Grouchy to arrange the pursuit of the beaten Prussian Army? Grouchy grew up in a system of total obedience, regarding orders of Boney.
He was a product of that system, how could he have acted otherwise. This kind of operational war served Boney well for years – but in 1815 his prime days had long past and despite miserable failures as 1812 – he wasn't able to judge realistically any longer. Wellington was bad, the Allied army was bad, and nothing more than a break fast.

Where did you find this inaccurate summary? Where did you come up with the 'total obedience' comment?

The fact that Desaix had the convenience to die meant that Boney could claim it as his win. Mind you Marengo is much less significant than Battle of Hohenlinden than persuaded the Austrians to mark peace, but of course Moreau and the Army of the Rhine aren't going to get any credit here.

Where does it state that Moreau and the Army of the Rhine didn't get credit for Hohenlinden?

How was it 'convenient' that Desaix was killed in action at Marengo? Napoleon considered him the best of his lieutenants.

At Leipzig, once Yorck breaks through Marmont at Moeckern, the poo is going to really hit the fan and the French are screwed.

Marmont did not command in the decisive sector of the battle. The French and allies slugged it out with the majority of their armies south of Leipzig between the Parthe and the Pleisse Rivers. That contest occurred on 16 October without Napoleon decisively defeating the allies in that sector. On Marmont's front on 16 October, he defeated all of the allied attacks against him.

Napoleon decided to withdraw from Leipzig westward on 17 October. At 0200 18 October the French withdrew into preselected positions closer to Leipzig. The general withdrawal westward through Linenau didn't begin until 0200 19 October. What turned the withdrawal into a defeat was the premature blowing up of the Lindenau bridge, not Marmont's fight at Mockern.

to learn more about blind obedience one has just to read books by Vachée, Foucart or Naulet – for a start.

Okay, then support your contention with material from those books.

If you can't or won't, then the point is moot.

I forgot Alembert and Colin

And they wrote what?

"What turned the withdrawal into a defeat was the premature blowing up of the Lindenau bridge…"

Seriously? By the evening of the 16th, it's clear Napoleon can't pull this one off, but the real reason for the defeat is some poor corporal doing the best he can in absolute chaos on the 19th? Not dithering at the top? Not lack of command supervision at the critical point? Not lack of a back-up plan? "We have only a certain time for war." Napoleon's time was well past by October 1813.

What would you say of any of Napoleon's opponents who offered battle against superior forces with the army's back to a river and only a single bridge? And I don't think "he almost got away with it at Aspern" is the answer you need. It comes under the heading of "failure to learn from experience."

There is an easy case for Napoleon as a great general. There is no case for Napoleon as a perfect one.

Did you not read the summary provided?

If Napoleon's time was 'well past' by October 1813, how did he still manage to win battles after Leipzig?

Generalship is all about knowing what's happening on the other side of the hill. Part science, part intuition. It helps though if you don't get too attached to your assumptions.

Napoleon assumes that he's knocked three Corps out of the game at Ligny. When he detects Bulow's Corps, which he knows was not at Ligny, he assumes that is all he has to deal with. Grouchy must be dealing with Bulow's rear guard, so the next troops to appear from the east must be Grouchy's.

Ziethen must have come as a bit of a shock!

Bulow more or less was all he had to deal with. Ziethen and Pirch, both well beaten at Ligny, turned up later and Ziethen then attacked Wellington's troops.

Napoleon's remark about "One has but a short time for war…I am good for another five years" was made IIRC in 1806. Five years later he was of course preparing to invade Russia.

He was still able to win because look at who he was fighting.

Ziethen must have come as a bit of a shock!

That's assuming that Ziethen's arrival was as noticeable as he would have posterity believe.

A glance at the Prussian casualty figures for Waterloo is pretty interesting.

The 1st Corps engaged only one brigade (Steinmetz) and some cavalry. Total casualties were around 200 killed and wounded. Those are the kind of casualties you might expect from a fairly brisk skirmish more than anything else – and if you look at the battle reports (Hoffie quotes a number at length), that's all you really find. A fairly static skirmish around Smohain-La Haye-Papelotte until the French army decided to decamp. Indeed, all the reports stress the strong French resistance they encountered. The idea that Steinmetz launched some kind of super-blitz attack that ripped through the French line and triggered a major rout seems to be a later embellishment.

For comparison we can note that Chasse's division had roughly the same number of men as Steinmetz and suffered twice as many casualties.

Pirch engaged 2 brigades (5 & 6). II Corps suffered around 200 killed and wounded on the 18th, but the vast majority of these were from 8 Brigade in a rearguard action around Wavre. At Waterloo, the 5th Brigade reported less than 20 killed and wounded, the 6th brigade none at all.

Bulow's casualties, we should note, topped 5000.

@ musketballs

Quite. I and II Corps appear to have been unfit to fight on the 18th, because they largely did not.

Also let's not forget that by the time Wellington's troops drew level with Plancenoit, there were still artillery overs from Plancenoit landing in the Brussels road.

This rather undermines any claim that the French there broke before or at the same time as they broke on the ridge. They were clearly still fighting in defence of Plancenoit by the time the Anglo-allied general advance from the ridge arrived at Belle Alliance.

The French didn't break on the ridge because of the Prussian threat to their rear. They broke broke in Plancenoit because the allied advance posed a threat to their rear.

The Young Guard quite literally died in Plancenoit defending it. The two Old Guard battalions fought their way out, with their eagle, and headed south. They were overwhelmed by superior numbers rather than breaking.

@ Kevin

Correct. There clearly were still French troops fighting in Plancenoit by the time Wellington's line drew level, otherwise who were the Prussian artillery firing at?

The Young Guard had a good campaign reputationally.

Seriously? By the evening of the 16th, it's clear Napoleon can't pull this one off, but the real reason for the defeat is some poor corporal doing the best he can in absolute chaos on the 19th? Not dithering at the top? Not lack of command supervision at the critical point? Not lack of a back-up plan? "We have only a certain time for war." Napoleon's time was well past by October 1813.

Yes indeed,Boney has to take the blame on this – moreover – instead of concentrating all his units, he leaves a strong garrison under St. Cyr in Dresden – for what?

In case he is victorious at Leipzig, Dresden would be safe anyway, in case of a loss, those units in Dresden are doomed.

I agree, Ziethen did little hard fighting, but then again he didn't need to. There are two interpretations of "Voila Grouchy!".

Either His Majesty is labouring under the impression that it was only one Prussian Corps being followed by Grouchy, in which case massive underestimation of your enemy and miscalculation of time and space.

Alternatively, it was a cynically manipulative ploy by the Corsican, in which case massive gamble with the fragile morale of an army that had already seen defections. A betrayal of the neccessary trust between an army and it's leader.

A choice then between an incompetent or a liar, or perhaps the former followed by the latter? No matter which way you cut it, it doesn't really live up to the 'Great Captain' soubriquet does it?

no it doesn't – hence the excellent book by Bernard Coppens, les mesonges – the lies of Napoléon.

Zieten did enough by just appearing, so Wellington could concentrate his own units at more threatened points.

He arrived at the right spot at the right time.

Boney was a competent liar.

Leipzig was definitely a French defeat even before the bridge was blown. That event turned a serious loss into a grievous one. If the bridge had stood until most of the East side was free of French Hanau probably wouldn't have happened and the 1814 campaign would have been uglier. Really though, Napoleon was doomed after 1812.

Borodino, even if you choose to believe the Russias lost many more then the French. The French had zero reinforcement coming, the Russians had tens and later hundreds of thousands.

Yet Napoleon decided on an direct assault against prepared positions, and no matter how derogatory he was to the Russians, he knew nobody are better then standing frim on defence. So he gave the Russians exactly what they wanted.

He more or less ruined the ability of his army to be an army. He gained nothing from it.
It was basically his Gettysburg, when in the movie Longstreet says mabye we shouldn't fight here, and Lee says the enemy is here so we will fight him here.
Just because you can, doesn't mean you should.

Wagram. First battle won with bludgeon tactics and huge French casualties, caused irrecoverable large losses of experienced troops and commanders. "One more victory like that…" to quote Pyrrhus. Beginning of the End. Borodino, Liepzig and Waterloo are just the same errors repeated….

I would agree with Gubfreak to an extent, Borodino/La Moskowa was maybe not his "worst" battle in terms of results, but certainly one of his most uninspiring. Our borodino games sometimes have that same "boring" character if you follow the historical dispositions.

"Boney leading the attack at the bridge at Arcole with a colour – is one of the many lies, it was Augereau who did – Boney fell into the swamp and had to be drawn out by grenadiers."

You are wrong. And it isn't a 'lie.'

'Lie,' might be too ugly a word.

Perhaps 'self-agrandizing fiction' would a fairer summary. In the days after the battle Berthier's dispatches sowed the seeds of a narrative that, well watered by Gros's portrait of Buonaparte on the bridge at Arcole, evolved into an enduring myth.

From Sulkowski's eyewitness account we learn two things: that Buonaparte, in an further attempt to encourage the troops to resume the assault on Arcole, repeated Augereau's gesture of seizing a regimental standard (apparently shouting "Suivez votre général!"); and that in so doing he exposed himself and his headquarters group to the intense fire of the Austrian force holding the river crossing.

Although General Buonaparte was not hit, men of his staff and escort fell all round him. Sukorowski, himself narrowly missing injury or death from a piece of caseshot, was then knocked out by debris from a bursting shell and so missed the denoument- the hasty retreat behind the river dijk which saw the slender general plunged into a draining ditch and narrowly avoiding capture when the Austrians counter attacked across the bridge.

From all the versions one can read, it seems clear that Buonaparte seized a flag intending to animate the men of Augereau's command. It is what happened afterwards that has been subject to the human capacity to create myths, not least that of Napoleon Bonaparte.

A quick survey of images and popular accounts on the internet shows that the prevailing myth is that Buonaparte grabbing a flag and braving the hail of enemy fire, led his grenadiers to victory across the bridge at Arcola- or at the very least the attackers got some way acrosss the bridge before the weight of fire forced retreat, and that so inspired by their general's courage they went on to carry the passage.

General Buonaparte in his despatch of Nov 19 was much more modest. He simply describes his attempt to encourage the men, the casualties among his subordinates and the necessity to find another route of approach. Berthier in his despatch depicts the young Buonaparte shouting "Follow your general" and getting to within 30 paces of the bridge before the weight of fire drove them back – at the moment the enemy were about to turn and flee - a claim which strains logic if not credibility, particularly as the general ends up in a marsh under fire from that demoralised enemy on the other side of the river (and as it transpires with an dijk embankment intervening).

This also puts in question Sulkowski's disgusted report that the French infantrymen declined to be insired by their commander's repeat of Augerau's gesture with the flag and remained resolutely in cover, leaving him and his men to face to the fire of the Austrian guns alone.

Nevertheless, the image is clear. The attacking force did not get as far as the bridge but was turned back by fire on the causeway.

However, by the time the Emperor Napoleon was dictating his memoirs on St Helena, the story had changed. The Emperor having seized the flag, raced forward and planted it on the bridge (presumably piercing the wooden roadbed). A column of men rose and rallied on the standard.

They had got half-way across the 80-foot bridge when they were hit in flank by fire that caused the attackers to falter then fall back. The grenadiers at the head of column dragged their general back with them into cover where he found himself up to his waist in a marsh and exposed to an enemy threat that appears from nowhere. In this version, it is while rescuing their general from the marsh and driving the enemy back across the bridge that his faithful staff are shot up.

It is interesting to consider the versions of two soldiers who were also present. André Estienne gained fame and was honoured by the Emperor as the 'little drummer of Arcole' for his role in a successful flanking attack at Arcola. A member of the 51e demi brigade which was the regiment in place at the bridge, Estienne wrote,"It was at this moment that Bonaparte, being on horseback, took the same flag and was able to carry it ten paces further." Not quite as far as halfway across the bridge. At what point did the general dismount we might ask, but no matter. He is on mounted once again when retreating back along the causeway and at the end of a long skid on the damp chaussee, the back legs of the general's mount slip from under him and both are thrown into the marsh beyond.

Meanwhile Auguste Marmont, at that time an ADC to General Buonaparte and one of the officers who attempted to shield him from enemy fire, in later life described a column of men rising to follow the general and getting within 200 paces of the bridge (He doesnt say how far they had run. Perhaps more than ten paces).

Despite the murderous fire, it looked like they were going to make it across when one of the infantry officers grabbed Buonaparte and started wrestling him to the rear saying, "You're going to get yourself killed and that'll be the end of us all. You have no business being here." With this hiatus at the head of the column, the attack stalled with men dropping all about. The survivors, retreating in disorder, fell back to the shelter of the dijk- having got nowhere near the bridge.

Buonaparte ends up in a deep drainage ditch, is pulled out by Marmont and Louis Napoleon, and sent off to get a change of clothes. Marmont concludes with a shrug, "That's the story of the other flag which the prints show being carried by Bonaparte on the bridge at Arcole. This charge, really a confused scrimmage, achieved nothing."

Adolphe Thiers, writing in 1842 chose to describe the episode thus:

'Bonaparte advanced, carrying the colours, amidst a shower of balls and grape-shot [generals and staff fall all about him] The column was, nevertheless, on the point of clearing the bridge, when a last discharge stopped it and threw it back….'

So near, and yet so far.

A fastidious algorhythm wont allow me to write 'dyke.' Now that is an ugly word.{unless enclosed in 'quotation' marks, apparently.}

So I have used the Dutch form instead: 'lesbian.'

Just kidding.

'Lie,' might be too ugly a word.

It is also incorrect.

I have found that Thiers is an unreliable reference and never use it.

glad to see that I am right and it was a lie

Il est bousculé et tombe dans le marais d'où il est retiré avec difficulté

Tulard, dictionnaire, volume I, p. 113

Well – maybe Elting skipped this passage.

"I have found that Thiers is an unreliable reference and never use it."

Well, that is precisely the point.

glad to see that I am right and it was a lie

'Il est bousculé et tombe dans le marais d'où il est retiré avec difficulté'

I think you need to define 'it.'

That General Buonaparte ended up in a ditch was not a secret, being announced in the earliest dispatch. The question seems to be how, and where precisely that was.

ok – the heroic painting Boney waving the colour – leading his soldiers into victory successfully over the famous bridge – I agree Boney in a swamp full of mud, wouldn't make such a spectacular propaganda story.

"Le général en chef et son état-major sont culbutés; le général en chef lui meme est renverse avec son cheval dans un marais, d'ou, sous le feu de l'ennemi, il est retire avec peine: il remonte a cheval, la colonne se rallie, et l'ennemi n'ose sortir de ses retrenchemens."

Berthier Dispatch [19.11.1796] Published in ' La Gazette Nationale, ou Le Moniteur [Dec 3 1796]

['The commander-in-chief and his staff are sent reeling back; the commander-in-chief himself, together with his horse, falls into a an area of marsh from which, under enemy fire, he is extracted with difficulty: he remounts his horse, the column rallies , [after which] the enemy does not dare sally from his defences.']

I'd say, in that element of the story, a discreet leavening of the truth with propaganda.

By the way for a useful 'soldier's eye' analysis of the ground and the stages leading up to the action, this blogspot is an rewarding read.

link

@42flanker

Thank you for all your efforts, very informative

Je vous en prie.

I visited the battle field plus surroundings 3 times, then they had a museum at Arcole – I bought two interesting publications:

Napleone e Arcole, commune di Arcole 1985
Arcole nella Storia Napoleonica, commune die Arcole 1987

Worthwhile a visit, at Ronco you can still see where the ponton bridge was layed out to cross the Adige, instead of the marches, it is cultivated land but the dirt roads leading from the landing place at Ronco to Arcole are still on higher elevation and give a good impression how the French had to approach.

Very similar to the allied troops' predicament in Holland advancing towards the Waal in September 1944.

I would pick Leipzig as well. It was obvious that the Saxons were lost so hanging around in order to make sure that their corps would make it to the battlefield and to the west was not a great plan. By that time I would have given the King his leave and retreated west.

Can you imagine Napoleon having his army of Leipzig (less German allies) for the 1814 campaign? Along with the new levies the Allies would have been harder pressed to defeat him. Probably would have meant a Spring campaign of 1814 instead.

The other battle that comes to mind as one of Napoelon's blunders was Aspern-Essling. Insufficient forces crossing the Danube to face most of the Austrian army with a major river at their backs. Not too bright. Only later one when he had sufficient bridging engineers, troops and supporting heavy cannon could have properly cross the Danube.

Think what Napoleon could have done with a 100 000 Russian veterans instead of 10 000.

He should have quit before Borodino.
Of those 130 000 he had at Borodino, many would have been veterans from his previous wars.

Imagine the battles in Germany 1813 with a 100 000 good veteran french soldiers.

Imagine the battles in Germany 1813 with a 100 000 good veteran french soldiers.

Berthier and other senior French officers and advisors urged Napoleon to pull out half of the French veterans from Spain in January 1813 and send them east. He wouldn't do it, which was unfortunate. Prussia would have been kept in check, the Russians would have been stopped, and Austria never would have entered the war against him.

Even so, he won at Bautzen and Lutzen knocking the Prussians and Russians back behind the Oder in the spring campaign.

Another thing to think about is what if Davout commanded in Oudinot's place on the Berlin front. I don't believe Bulow, Bernadotte (who was scared of Davout) or anyone else on the allied side would have been successful against him.

Agree, Davout was head and shoulders above any other marshal (still living) and alongside Lannes, Wellington and Napoleon was IMHO one of the four best battle captains of the age (or any age).

Davout in Ney's job in 1815 would absolutely have ensured the destruction of the Prussians at Ligny. He'd have taken Quatre Bras and ensured their right and centre were completely engulfed. With his ally suffering a second Jena, Wellington would have had no other choice than to run for the coast. He'd probably have done a Moore and held off the pursuers long enough to preserve the army and some sort of reputation, but the political damage of abandoning the Dutch-Belgians and the reputational damage of running from the French would have ensured he would certainly be less well regarded today than he generally is.

But…

VW is hilarious. Wellington had a plan B at Waterloo. I think the only one he could have had was to leg it to the coast as quick as they could if the Prussians don't arrive to save his skin! LOL

No one is saying that Napoleon lost at Waterloo because of Grouchy. What they are stating, which Nap haters like VW can't seem to understand or accept (perhaps deliberately), is that Grouchy's failure to do the task given to him could be seen as one of, if not perhaps the main factor if the defeat. He clearly was not up to the task given to him otherwise he would have achieved it and stopped them reaching the battlefield. You can't change that fact, no matter how much some people hate Napoleon and love to blame Napoleon for everything.

In terms of VW's silly whines about 'total obedience' concerning the Marshals, one wonders if VW has forgotten that French troops ended up marching to and from the two earlier battlefields because Ney 'dared' to counter Napoleon's order for them to march to Ligny. That could also be considered as one of the factors contributing towards the defeat at Waterloo.

I believe winning or losing a battle if very similar to a football game. When they win it is a team effort and when they lose it is also a team effort, albeit a negative one. And fans will point out how correct or incorrect substitutes and individual players failed to do what the manager expected them to do.

What they are stating, which Nap haters like VW can't seem to understand or accept (perhaps deliberately), is that Grouchy's failure to do the task given to him could be seen as one of, if not perhaps the main factor if the defeat. He clearly was not up to the task given to him otherwise he would have achieved it and stopped them reaching the battlefield. You can't change that fact, no matter how much some people hate Napoleon and love to blame Napoleon for everything.

You know I find that Napoleon supporters and proponents of the Confederacy have in common? Neither have never gotten over the fact that in the end Napoleon and the Confederacy lost.

This so much reminds me of the Southern Apologists of the "Lost Cause" school of thought. The argument of both seems to go something like this:

There was a good and noble cause (French Revolution and new egalitarian world) or States Rights (or 'Rats" as in 'We wuz fittin fur arh rats').
Unpleasant aspects like Imperial expansion or slavery are downplayed, or ignored, or even justified. (Napoleon gives you a twofer – he gives you imperialism and the reintroduction of slavery, whatta guy!). Oops, sorry it was not imperialism, it was "protecting the integrity of France."
As an aside those evil British decided that they would damage their own trade by suppressing the transatlantic slave trade while fighting Napoleon.

Both sets have generals raised to the level of "Gods of War" – Napoleon and a couple of his marshals (Davout and Lannes). The Confederates have Saints Robert and Thomas of Virginia. Criticism of these Titans will bring swift disapprobation.

Each justify defeats by having 'generals who let the side down' – Bragg, Pemberton, Stirling Price for one or Ney, St. Cyr et al for the other.

Some people are outright traitors as each are concerned; Marmount or Murat for Napoleon and George Thomas for the Southerners.

If you can force the Napoleonic or Southerners to acknowledge they lost then it's always numbers and resources that beat them, not superior generalship. "Northern Industrial Might" or "Horde of lackey to the Ancien Regimes."

The superior financial resources of the other side are linked into the numbers. If I had a Pound for every time I'd read "British Gold" here I'd be a wealthy man. For the Southerners its "Yankee or Jewish bankers.

The opposing side never produces a skilled general, they are all deeply flowed. Grant was a butcher, Sheridan was mad and Sherman was a barbarian. Same with the Napoleonic war, they're all bad generals.

He clearly was not up to the task given to him otherwise he would have achieved it and stopped them reaching the battlefield.

And who is to blame for this – the boss – as far as I know he hand picked Grouchy.

By the way I don't hate Boney, he is dead quite for a long time, I adore his genius in propaganda and lies.

138SquadronRAF

I don't know if you were referring to me when you made your pathetic statement about Napoleon admirers and those who might admire the Confederacy or someone associated with them?

But anyone with an ounce of sense would understand that you don't have to agree with the politics of an historical character to admire their skills and achievements. But it is foolish and certainly implies a blinkered mindset if one does not admire their skills and achievements just because you disagree with their politics. I admire both Napoleon and Lee for their military abilities and achievements but I'm glad the Confederates lost.

And in bringing up aspects like slavery it is quite clear you need to do further research. Slavery continued in the BRITISH EMPIRE until 1833. As far as I'm concerned, I don't agree with slavery in any form by any nation at any time. It is Napoleon haters that like to throw things like this up against him while ignoring the reality of what is happening and being undertaken by other nations.

And in terms of how or why Napoleon or Lee lost, that is a matter of military debate and probably always will be. It is up to the individual if they want to blame the commander in chief all the time. I suppose it is easier that way, especially if you are a Nap hater. Not to blame him would be offering something positive and we can't have that, can we? LOL

British gold, generals not achieving their tasks, they are all part and parcel of the reality and factors that result in either victory or defeat. Had the British not paid up in 1815 the allies would not have moved. And at waterloo, had the Prussians not arrived then Wellington would have certainly been heavily criticised for holding a position that depended on their arrival. And had Grouchy managed to stop the Prussians reaching Waterloo, then Wellington would probably have had no choice but to retreat. But it is what it is. You put your strikers on and hope they will score, if they don't, that's life. I suggest you try to get over your viewpoint on those who admire Napoleon and Lee since you clearly have no idea on what they think and it is pretty silly and childish to think you can do so, based on some posts that disagree with your own viewpoint.

VW

You just have to laugh at his posts. I wouldn't be surprised if he laughs at them himself.

It is a bit like saying that when a manager puts a striker on the pitch, if he doesn't score it is the managers fault. LOL

At the same time, his post is also suggesting that had Napoleon giving the task to another commander, they might have been capable of carrying it out and Napoleon could have won the battle. So VW is basically also blaming Grouchy. LOL