"American Doctrine in WWI" Topic

According to historian Geoffrey Wawro, American military doctrine as they entered the First World War extolled American "courage" as the solution to the ongoing stalemate in the trenches. He says that the Field Service Regulations of 1914, 1917 and 1918 derided the Allies tactics as "timid" and "defeatist."

Were the Americans right?

Nope

No amount of courage beats a Macschinegewehr 08

Give me a second, I need to stop laughing!

No, they weren't right. The French already tried "elan" in 1914-15 as a solution to the stalemate, and discovered that machine guns, barbed wire and massed artillery aren't overcome by courage, elan, or any other state of mind…

The Us doctrine was based on Base of fire and then movement. Courage works with green and fresh troops at first.
Combined, this created success against troops that were worn down by 4 years of war and could count the seemingly endless USA reinforcements.
Wawro is a great historian but the "quotes" at the start of this topic feel out of context to me.

As mildbill said, the Americans trained to use fire and movement, not blind charges by lines and lines of infantry straight into the machinegun muzzles.

I would suggest you read My Experiences in the World War by John J. Pershing and General Fox Conner, Pershing's Chief of Operations and Eisenhower's Mentor by Steven Rabalais for some insight on the training they developed for the American Expeditionary Force.

Jim

Courage is very important … but not to the point of being stupid. E.g. Banzai charge. As noted the French take on "The spirit of the bayonet!" proved to not be a "winner". Only good for arms dealers and morticians.

The Us doctrine was based on Base of fire and then movement.

Yes and still is basically/generally …

My grandfather, who fought in the first world war (western front, Machine Gun Corps), told me he remembered the doughboys arriving. He said they were 'full of themselves' and saying things like 'just show us the way to this goldarned shootin' gallery'.
Well, they found it, and paid dearly.

The vaunted Pershing Fire and movement tactics were worthless when he wouldn't allow his commanders use them. I recommended the book Thunder in the Argonne that takes a serious look at Pershing's command capabilities. An enlightning book.

While the American intervention saved the Allies by stopping the German offensive during June and July, 1918 the actual American tactics of that initial period were nothing like the "fire and movement" tactics that they eventually evolved into.

June 6th 1918 was arguably the bloodiest day in Marine Corps history because the Marines were ordered to advance into the teeth of German machine guns in a line at a walk. They were discouraged from running on the basis they would then be too tired to engage in hand to hand combat. After the horrific casualties at Belleau Wood American forces gradually adopted the saner "fire and movement" tactics.

The problem is that between about 1850 and 1918, there was an ongoing discussion between proponents of "Elan" and those supporting "Firepower"

The problem is that both have their glorious examples of being right and the other guy being completely wrong.

While Pickett fails to break the line at Gettysburg we find regiments steamrolling over troops behind a wall as if it was a mere formality.

Colonial defeats were good example of "Elan" trumping firepower at Ishandlwana and Little Big Horn.

Petain may have concluded a superb defense at Verdun, but he was considered much too timid to lead an attack and was replaced by Nivelle who brimmed with confidence that he could "Break the Boche" in their trenches.

While everyone can cite the Somme, Passchendale or even Gallipoli as proof that it was all in vain and that you needed to "adapt your tactics" in other fronts battles often were pretty decisive like Caporetto, or the Brusilov offensive.

The Americans clearly understood that taking the initiative was part of the way to win battles and that an aggressive move at the right time will get better results than a masterful tenacious defense.

The mistake was to mistake taking the initiative with being reckless. The Americans believed that a bit of "Sturm und drang" would put the living fear in those exhausted Germans.

While this may work on a local level and unnerve a battalion or a company in a rough spot, the general German defensive system was extremely resilient and could afford to have troops lose their bottle in that the attacker was going to exhaust himself no matter what.

We see a similar problem in WWII, the Germans seem to win every tactical battle without effort, but are then completely crushed on the strategic level.

The Americans were not wrong to promote aggression in their troops, but their officers didn't quite know how to channel this in the right way. A lesson the French and British learned by spilling a lot of blood and while they had superb teachers, the Americans would have to pay a similar tribute to learn the final lesson.

link

I actually have an Infantry Training manual from 1910. As Colcambell points out there is a lot of fire and maneuver in it. Maybe reflecting Indian War tactics. There is a section on skirmishes and they are in every drawing.

The Americans were not wrong to promote aggression in their troops, but their officers didn't quite know how to channel this in the right way. A lesson the French and British learned by spilling a lot of blood and while they had superb teachers, the Americans would have to pay a similar tribute to learn the final lesson.

Agree …