"Sherman 75mm gun knock out a Tiger 1,Panzer 4 model “H” " Topic

This is all very interesting and cool.
But let's boil it down to what's really important.

Straight or curved swords, which was better?
If we can figure out that, then all other pieces (like tanks and world hunger) just gets sorted out by itself.

Fred, these are not problems the "average" tank had:

The Panther's final drive was expected to last 150km, roughly 90 miles. That's waaay below average. That's why they had to move them by rail whenever possible. The Panthers and Tigers could never have matched the Sherman for extended road marches during exploitation which is desirable for a breakthrough tank, the Germans lacked it. The D model would catch fire on its own because the engine area was sealed to expedite river crossings (too heavy for many bridges) and faulty fuel connections. The sealed up engine area that would not ventilate gas fumes combined with an engine that was prone to backfiring (that's not your average tank).

These were easily correctable problems. WP rounds could set the engine on fire (Tiger too) without needing to penetrate the armor. It had an unbalanced turret that could hardly be traversed while on a slope. It had poor gas mileage and no auxiliary engine to charge its batteries. The gunner lacked a periscope sight making it harder to engage targets. These are all "below average" characteristics compared to most other WWII tanks. The 75L70 gun was fantastic – unless you were in a town or the woods, then the barrel was too long (but not for the Sherman). However, in the American's AO it was overkill and the 75L48 was proven to be adequate.

The weakest area of a tank is its drive train. The Sherman had a few different engines, some more reliable than others. The radial engine it first came with was a proven reliable design. The Sherman transmission used helical gears which are stronger and deliver more torque, they didn't break after 90 miles. I don't think the Germans had them.

When the Model D was accepted the German Staff knew it had the transmission and engine fire problems but put it into production anyhow saying these were typical teething problems that could be fixed later. The US would not have approved it.

Since you are looking at "failures" the German's failure to deploy a reliable tank to their crews, something that the Allies did not do. They knew the shortcomings from the start and failed to address them and support the tank in the field. They "failed" to develop a sustaining and balanced combined arms strategy too. I think "balanced" is the key. Since strategically they were conducting fighting withdraw after Stalingrad they could have built four StuG's for each Tiger. Check to see what the StuG's kill ratio was. Why they continued to build offensive tanks for a defensive war seems like another "failure".

A large percentage of the Tiger and Panther tanks were destroyed by their crews, maybe this is why they came off the assembly line with a demo charge already installed. The average tank was not destroyed by its crew because of breakdowns. Sure, say it's not the fault of the design but the design had poor gas mileage, a high breakdown rate and too heavy to be easily recovered. It was designed that way and the High Command knew it and deployed it anyhow. German manufacturing decisions guaranteed a shortage of spare parts by deciding to make more tanks rather than spare parts, another failure.

Over its lifetime, the 504th Heavy Tank Battalion in Italy claimed to have knocked out more than 100 enemy tanks; 59 percent of its own 78 losses were from crews destroying their vehicles, while only 19 percent were destroyed by the Allied forces. Source: Schneider 2004, pp. 327, 342. From the stats I've seen the Tigers and Panthers performed the worst against the American "outclassed" Sherman's. If the Germans had used captured Sherman's at the Bulge maybe they would have been more successful.

When the Tiger and Panther worked it worked well especially if it had a tactical advantage (Goodwood and the East Front) but strategically they had no impact as they could not make enough of them and support them. The Panther was supposed to be an offensive weapon but failed at Kursk, Arracourt, and the Bulge. It's not totally the Panther's fault as the Germans "failed" to develop an effective combined arms offensive after 1942.

Their successful Blitzkrieg was performed with "average" Panzer III's that were outmatched on paper against French and Russian tanks. The Allies pulled the same trick on the Germans in 1944-45 blitzing them with "average" reliable Sherman's as part of a successful combined arms strategy. Yes, they had numerous tactical setbacks when attacking (ambushed) but these setbacks did not stop their strategic victories. You can lose all of the battles and still win a war.

What was the final kill ratio of the US Sherman against the Panther?

Many US crews did not want a tank optimized for tank-tank combat and give up mobility and speed. Why would they if only 10% of the engagements were against other tanks. I'll concede that the Americans did have a fair amount of luck on their side because of the shorter engagement ranges in Western Europe and so few German tanks in their AO. The Brits up north did not fare so well.

The Sherman just happened to be a balanced design (it too had some teething problems but they were overcome) that took advantage of the terrain, the Pather's weakness and the crews developed winning combined arms tactics. Combined with an overwhelming manufacturing advantage is what won the war and overcame advantages the Tiger and Panther had. Whether the Sherman was "average", "adequate" or "inferior" does not matter in the end, it got the job done by having the right balance of armor, speed, and firepower.

Wolfhag

There is another dilemma. What is a tank supposed to do, save the most lives or save tankers lives. Better tanks cost more and are typically more unreliable. Tanks save a LOT of infantry lives. Tanks spend most time fighting with the infantry. So where in the discussion, Lose fewer tankers in more expensive machines or lose a relatively few more tankers but a lot more infantry lives.

High command has a lot of unenviable decisions to make. You need to trade infantry lives for Tanker lives. As it was infantry lost proportionately far more men as well as men in total. That balances what an optimum tank is. It most certainly is not a "super tank" like the Tiger when fighting in Normandy. Tigers never achieved in Normandy what they did in Russia.

The Panther's final drive was expected to last 150km, roughly 90 miles.

That is based on the oft quoted French post war experience. German reports paint a somewhat different picture. According to a report written by Guderian on March 5, 1944, the constant improvements to the Panther tank series resulted in some positive feedback from the user community. He wrote that one Panther tank-equipped unit on the Eastern Front stated that they felt their tank was far superior to the Red Army T-34 medium tanks. They went on to report that all the early mechanical difficulties that had so bedeviled the early production units of the Panther tank had been ironed out of the design. In addition, the same Panther tank-equipped unit reported that final drive breakdowns had ended and that transmission and steering gear failures were now within an acceptable range. Jentz quotes that improvements were made in response to transmission failures in September 1944 and as a result of those changes transmission life is quoted by the Germans as 1,500-1,800Km.

Their successful Blitzkrieg was performed with "average" Panzer III's that were outmatched on paper against French and Russian tanks. The Allies pulled the same trick on the Germans in 1944-45 blitzing them with "average" reliable Sherman's as part of a successful combined arms strategy.

Quite so. An average tank in a war winning army. For some reason some folks seem to think that assessment is a slight on the Sherman.

If the Germans had used captured Sherman's at the Bulge maybe they would have been more successful.

They did pretty well anyway. 2nd Panzer virtually wiped out 2 Combat Commands from US AD's, for little loss. And the US were on the defensive so would have had the advantage of surprise and first shot. But the Sherman would have made no difference to the Germans in the Bulge. In the end it was their Achilles heel, lack of fuel. 2nd Panzer didn't stall in front of the Meuse due to breakdowns or combat losses, but lack of fuel.

The Panthers and Tigers could never have matched the Sherman for extended road marches during exploitation which is desirable for a breakthrough tank, the Germans lacked it.

It wouldn't have mattered anyway the Germans didn't have the fuel for exploitation operations. The desperate state of German fuel supplies is illustrated by the plan for the Ardennes Offensive which was a modest 150 mile advance and would virtually exhaust Germany's remaining fuel stocks.

I am unable to fathom why or how these discussions always seem to devolve into these holy wars, with any criticism of the Sherman tank is interpreted as a barbarian attack upon a sacred shrine … and, yes, likewise with respect to certain devotees of German armor.

Just shaking my head here.

B

I am unable to fathom why or how these discussions always seem to devolve into these holy wars

That could be a psychology thesis.

"That could be a psychology thesis."

Sometimes I think our entire hobby could qualify as such!

B

I am unable to fathom why or how these discussions always seem to devolve into these holy wars, with any criticism of the Sherman tank is interpreted as a barbarian attack upon a sacred shrine …

That is just absurd. I saw no claims the M4 is above criticism. I see someone trying to equate Panzer mechanical reliability with the M4 on the basis of a short and exceptional period when the British deliberately ran their tanks into the ground.

That is based on the oft quoted French post war experience. German reports paint a somewhat different picture. According to a report written by Guderian on March 5, 1944, the constant improvements to the Panther tank series resulted in some positive feedback from the user community. He wrote that one Panther tank-equipped unit on the Eastern Front stated that they felt their tank was far superior to the Red Army T-34 medium tanks. They went on to report that all the early mechanical difficulties that had so bedeviled the early production units of the Panther tank had been ironed out of the design. In addition, the same Panther tank-equipped unit reported that final drive breakdowns had ended and that transmission and steering gear failures were now within an acceptable range. Jentz quotes that improvements were made in response to transmission failures in September 1944 and as a result of those changes transmission life is quoted by the Germans as 1,500-1,800Km

Jentz, a man not normally know to miss a chance to speak highly of the Panther added his own take on that claim. In short he said it was misleading because it applied to frozen conditions when going was firm. Jentz counters it with another Abteilung's experience in the mud. Panther Tank, Quest For Combat Supremacy page 140. l/Pz Rgt 2 reported many mechanical issues with final drives and transmissions. They are the ones who said the longest distance driven (thus not normal transmission life but the 'best') was 1500-1800 kms in 4 of their remaining 7 Panthers. That is some faint praise!

@ Mark 1
A single class of USN destroyers, which only entered production in 1943, was built in larger numbers than all the destroyers, cruisers, battlecruisers and battleships of the German navy throughout its entire history, combined.

My favourite statistic of this nature is that at the battle of Leyte Gulf, the US had more destroyers than Japan had aircraft.

they focused on flights of fancy, pursuing magic weapons that would sweep all adversaries before them

As someone remarked on a previous occasion when we discussed this, Hitler was a wargamer. He wanted Tiger, Panther, and Maus, rather than trucks, boots and a proper logistical train.

It does make an interesting what-if though. Let's say Hitler has a totally debilitating stroke in November 1941, the party keeps it secret and thereafter Germany still fights the war (because nobody will conclude a separate treaty with Nazi Germany). What should she build to optimise the prospects of, if not victory, a negotiated settlement based on allied exhaustion?

Of course such what-ifs are dodgy, because if we change X in the German approach the allies will react by changing Y. With no Hitler in December 1941 there would have been no declaration of war on the USA. There is also the air / sea / land balance to consider.

In the above scenario, though, it's easier to say what she rationally would not have built. The Me262, the V weapons, and the Tiger, Panther and other tank programmes should have been cancelled. Recognising that the best she could hope for in Russia was a landgrab and a very long border, she'd have faced the same problem the Romans had in 500AD to which the answer was limitanei at the border (the limes, whence "limit") to hold it thinly, and mobile comitates (from comes, whence French comte, whence English "count" and "county") behind to close off penetrations.

The forces to hold this would have been PaKs and StuGs in large numbers at the front, with Panzer IV in mobile units in depth. The FW190 becomes the standard type for both air superiority and ground attack. The Ju88 becomes the standard heavy / night-fighter and / or ground support type. A long-range four-engined bomber gets built, both to attack factories behind the Urals and to stalk convoys far out in the Atlantic.

Having gamed this period for a long time, I find it quite hard to point to any particular advantage that a Tiger has as an ambush weapon over something like a StuG III with the L/48 weapon. Against what they faced on either front, they were equally deadly, but the StuG was a lot more reliable and if built in lieu of Tigers and the like would also have been far more numerous. The hardest vehicle of all to fathom is the Jagdtiger which feels like a solution in search of a problem; what, really, could it do that a Jagpdpanther couldn't? And what could a Jagdpanther firing from ambush do that a Nashorn couldn't?

@ Lee494
the poor bloody infantry that had to face the MG42.

To be fair, the US did have an equivalently awesome weapon, in the shape of the Browning 0.50". The MG42 is praised to the skies for its staggering rate of fire, but those half-inch rounds the other side was firing back arrived with considerable authority too…

@ mkenny
There was no chance the UK was going to 'do a Panther' and put an unreliable tank into the front line.

Well, arguably they'd already tried this with the Crusader, and concluded there was no future in it. I see this as a decision not to "put an unreliable tank into the front line" again.

It does strike me as utterly astonishing that despite the advantage of several years of war experience, and several years' head start before that on rearmament, the British tank industry was so ineptly managed that its army's best tanks, in 1942 to 1944, were those designed, built and supplied by a foreign power. Moreover, the foreign power was one that hadn't previously built a decent tank ever, yet which came up with and actually produced within a matter of months 75mm-armed tanks. And these were tanks that didn't break down, designed off almost a clean sheet of paper.

Basically after the Desert years British Industry was told actually ordered that reliability was to be the main focus of any future tank. This resulted the Cromwell and eventually the Comet.

If there was no supply of Shermans I am sure they could have built a lot more of them if required but as the UK had a supply of M4s they almost got out of the whole tank buisness.

Basically to sum up. Successful armoured campaigns required reliable "adequate" tanks. Better guns and armour certainly help but frequently reduce reliability.

While the MG42 was scary and had the ability to down an enemy squad or section in a second.
In a prolonged firefight. the average rounds of per minutes was about the same for an M42/34 and Bren or any other LMG of the period.

And that's really it, in the end, it all cancel each other out.
It's not super tanks or semi-auto rifles or MGs that win war, it's strategic.

If you have 50 million soldiers and the other side has 5 million. Those with 50 million will win barring nukes or such things.

Look at how ISIS loses now, is it because the other side has better tanks or HK416s?
No, it's because IS had about 50-100 000 fighters, and Irak, Turkey, Kurds, Syria, and western support could field 1-2 million soldiers.
The Anti ISIS coalitions could be armed with Winchester 73s and they would still win.

You don't fail if you keep trying. If the war had gone on for another year and the British put the Centurion onto the field they'd be hailed as the best designers of the war.

Maybe really they were? The design started in 1943. What made it so special? The 600hp Meteor engine? I think that basically, you need to design a tank around the engine. The US was stuck with a radial engine at the start of the war. The Russians had the V-2 diesel which was used in most tanks. Heavy tanks traded maneuverability for protection and many times used the same engine as a medium tank but it had to pull 15-30 more tons.

Because of the better engine, you can put on more armor and a bigger gun and still have enough speed and maneuverability. It's all about balancing the maneuverability, firepower and protection and what tradeoffs you want to make in one area to get an advantage in another area but your area. Designers have to use technology from other disciplines not developed by them so they don't have total control in all areas.

Historically, I'd have to say the British design team was the best in WWII or at least the most innovative. They eventually got it right.

After the war, the Americans kept trying but were not successful until they developed the 750hp Continental engine for the M-60. Imagine the performance of the KV's, IS, Tigers and Panther with a reliable 800hp engine. Maybe it's an interesting "What-If" scenario.

Wolfhag

The astonishing thing about the Centurion is that it weighed pretty much what a Tiger I weighed. And look at how much better it was…

It does make an interesting what-if though. Let's say Hitler has a totally debilitating stroke in November 1941, the party keeps it secret and thereafter Germany still fights the war (because nobody will conclude a separate treaty with Nazi Germany). What should she build to optimise the prospects of, if not victory, a negotiated settlement based on allied exhaustion?

There have been various discussions on different forums over the years exploring if there is a realistic chance of Germany winning. Most seem to come to the conclusion that you need to go right back to prewar and make very different decisions about what is produced and it what numbers. Also they need to not be Nazis and have a sensible approach to conquered territories. The problem with those what ifs is you then can come to the conclusion there is no war at all.

@4th Cuirassier
To be fair, the US did have an equivalently awesome weapon, in the shape of the Browning 0.50". The MG42 is praised to the skies for its staggering rate of fire, but those half-inch rounds the other side was firing back arrived with considerable authority too…

Have you ever tried carrying one? Awesome it may be, but it's not exactly a section level weapon!

If the war had gone on for another year and the British put the Centurion onto the field they'd be hailed as the best designers of the war.

The Centurion has to be a candidate for the best tank ever in terms of longevity and adaptability. I don't think any other tank remained in front line service for nearly 50 years and are still in service nearly 75 years after introduction. Served from the frozen wastes of Scandinavia, the heat of the desert and the jungles of Vietnam with success. Shame we didn't have them in 1943.

To be fair, the US did have an equivalently awesome weapon, in the shape of the Browning 0.50".

Yes, and the USA and others still use the new(er) versions of the M2 .50.

Have you ever tried carrying one? Awesome it may be, but it's not exactly a section level weapon!

So very true ! My M113 equipped Mech Co. '87-'89 had 15 M2s. One for each Track and 1 for our M35 Cgo Truck, "Deuce & Half" … IIRC …

The M2 .50 cal HMG with tripod/T&E is @ 128lbs. The Receiver alone is @ 60lbs. We rarely dismounted it from the Tracks or M35. Maybe if we were to set up a deliberate defense. But it takes 3 men to carry it plus one or two more with the ammo.

So yes it is one very effective weapon, but just very heavy to man-pack around. Which as I said we never did. At least not too far. Only to dig it in, etc.

Cumbersome the M2 50cal may have been ….. but it seems to have dramatically changed the definition of the term "hard cover" for anyone under its fire.

Has anyone ever studied the tactical effect of the M2 50cal in combat?

B

The back-and-forth in the discussion has highlighted to me a couple points of vocabulary: a) what do we mean when we say "design"? and b) what do we mean when we say "better"?

Admittedly I've never been involved in weapons procurement processes, much less in AFV development. But I work in the tech industry, and I've spent my entire (rather looooonnng) career around design engineers and development projects. When I use the word, it may mean something different to me than to those who come from other backgrounds.

To me the design of a product (tank, or not tank) does not mean the 3 features that someone considers to be important. Designers are involved in hundreds of features that they can fail on if they get wrong, not just the 3 features that someone looking in from the outside thinks they should get extra-bestest right.

And for me, a better design is the whole package, all the advantages and all the flaws, that gives you a tool that helps you win. Not that wins it all for you by itself. A useful tool, that fits in to your needs and your abilities. A tool you can not wield effectively is not a useful tool in my book.

The Panther was "a bridge too far" in tank design. That's my view. It was neither a better whole package, nor a tool that fit German needs and abilities. Great to say "better gun, thicker armor, faster." But it was not better, but worse, on dozens of other points.

It had all kinds of teething problems -- hey, OK, the bugs need to be worked out, I get it. But critical production capacity was shifted to it BEFORE the bugs were worked out. That was a fundamental error. The Germans needed vast increases in tank production in 1942 and 1943. What they had by the second half of 1944 was irrelevant.

And even after the bugs (or at least some of them) were worked out, it didn't achieve notable success against it's adversaries. Even when the Panther A and Panther G became available, the Panther was a nightmare to operate. It was a tempermental beast which offered no margin for error, whether in how it was operating in combat, how it got to the combat zone, or how it was maintained outside of combat. As a specialist tool in the hands of elite veterans on the open Russian steppes it might have been quite an adversary. (Oddly, the Russians didn't give it much attention, while they found the Tiger to be very notable. Might be because that's how Tigers were deployed, but not Panthers.) But Panther A and then Panther G became available in numbers at a time when the fighting was in highly developed regions of Europe, not the steppes, and when the Germans needed to raise new formations with new recruits that the Germans could not afford the fuel, time or talent to train.

What they needed was a design that they could ramp in production in 1942, based on proven components, that was easy to operate, and could maintain a high tempo of operations (tempo of operations was what the Panzerwaffe was SO good at). Through a cascading set of decisions they went the wrong way, and got the wrong design. A design that failed them across the board, making its own contribution to the German army becoming the losingest army in modern military history. (And please note I am NOT saying the Panther lost the war for Germany, only that it made it's own contribution, just as the Pz III had not WON the campaigns of 1940 – 1942, but had made its own contribution.)

Say that the Sherman was only adequate if you like. That was the winning decision set for the design. It was a useful tool for the allied armies. It got to the battlefield more often, in larger numbers, and achieved more success on the battlefield, than its adversary. Did it win the war all by itself? No, certainly not. It was not a magic wonder weapon.

But in terms of being a better design? I would say yes. It was available in numbers, and pretty well debugged, when it was needed. It was relatively easy to operate and maintain. It required less maintenance, and the fact that it had seen only minor changes over a period of two years meant that it was possible for crew, maintenance and supply personnel to know their jobs even before they got into combat.

It was just a tool of war. A hammer, if you like. But a hammer is a better design when the task calls for a hammer.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Round and round we go. I will give this one more try. Criticism of the Sherman tank is not a blanket attack; it is time related and partially function related.

I do not think any sane person would criticize the Sherman tank in 1942 or 1943. It was a top notch war fighting vehicle in all respects over that that period. But problems arose, just as the US Ordnance Department predicted in 1942, in respect of the fact that the Sherman would be obsolescent by 1944. They were not wrong. All products, whether tanks or toasters have a useful design lifespan. Although the Sherman still retained many of the virtues of its originally excellent design (reliability, ease of maintenance, crew comfort and amenities), by 1944 it was no longer competent in the specific regime of tank vs tank combat: its gun was no longer adequate against new enemy tanks and its armor was no longer adequate against the more powerful weapons carried by those new enemy tanks. A huge advantage in numbers, as well as a broad and comprehensive overall superiority of the armed forces within which it operated, masked the penalties paid in armored combat by persisting with the original Sherman tank design (the 75mm gun) for so long and putting forth an armament upgrade (the 76mm gun) that delivered so much less than promised. The saddest part of this story is that an adequate gun (the 90mm) existed, could easily have been installed in a timely way and would have greatly improved the performance of the Sherman in tank combat.

The fair and honest assessment is that the Sherman tank was approaching the end of its useful design life cycle by 1944 and the update/replacement process was botched.

My opinion.

B

Well said Mark and Blutarski.

I'll give it one more shot too. I'd like to thank Fred for his constructive posts. I think the crux of his posts was the Panther was an excellent design and a lot of what occurred during the war was not the fault of the design. To a very high degree, I concur. I like German tanks, I'm half German, I visited my cousin in the German Navy last year. Our village has a monument to my six relatives killed in WWI. We lost two at Stalingrad, no monument for them. My son's name is Wolfgang. I always thought the Sherman was a POS and the Panther the best tank ever (Panzer Blitz days) until I looked at and considered the big picture, tactics, combined arms, and design/production decisions and compromises that had to be made. I'm not a fanboy of either one. Unfortunately, there are not many games that bring out the real strengths and tactics the American Sherman's used in Western Europe.

As others said, there are so many different drivers that can impact the design and manufacture of a tank. As Fred said, nothing is impossible if you put enough resources and have enough time. War does not allow that. I don't see where the US had enough time and resources to rebuild their logistical, port and marine lift capacity to deploy a tank that would have been a worthwhile improvement over the Sherman. I just don't see where it would have been worth it. What other weapons and systems would have been deprived of those sources? Fewer ships, planes, trucks or equipment? More time for the enemy to prepare for the invasion? Less Lend-Lease to out Allies? Deprive the Pacific Theater? Impossible? Maybe not, we'll never know.

According to some of my research and reading (qualifier here), the Germans didn't have the machine tools to make make the Panther final drive to the specs they needed if it was going to go into mass production. They could make quality drives for limited production. They knew there could be a problem if they mass produced it but that was the decision. They had allocated spare parts but bombing impacted the production so a decision again was made to get tanks out the door as a priority and spares secondary. When you have limited resources and capacity these types of choices need to be made. Like Fred said again, it was not the fault of the Panther design, it was the fault of the Allies war-winning combined arms strategy. The Panther was supposed to be a breakthrough tank. It was not the design's fault the other factors of the combined arms equation were missing. It's the fault of the Allies combined arms strategy.

After the war, the French said they found evidence of sabotage on the Panther. Again, not a design issue.

As Fred said, many of these problems (and the lower mantlet problem) were eventually addressed later in the war but there were few experienced crews to man them (Arracourt) to make a difference. Poor crews are not the fault of the design, is it? Comparing tanks that have a 15-ton weight difference or ones that had different purposes is interesting but really pointless. As is calling a tank adequate or average, that's why I put it in "quotes" so much.

The US Sherman was part of a combined arms effort, they were fortunate they did not meet more tanks in open terrain as the Allies up north or they may have had the same results. The reason they met fewer tanks in Normandy is that the Germans deemed the Panthers and Tigers unsuitable for the terrain and sent them north. The Sherman did fine so wins by default over the Tiger and Sherman. A better anti-tank gun would have meant a longer barrel overhang and less suitability for dense terrain (the Panther's problem). With 79% of the shots hitting a Sherman's side armor more frontal armor and less maneuverability was not the answer. No tank is going to have 120mm+ side armor. I tip my hat to those brave crews that knew what was in store for them.

Call the Sherman "average" or "adequate" if you like but also call it a great fit for a combined arms strategy (with a little luck). Fortunately, people back in the US prevented an unproven design from being deployed, call that a "failure" if you like, I call it a wise decision.

Wolfhag

What they needed was a design that they could ramp in production in 1942, based on proven components, that was easy to operate, and could maintain a high tempo of operations (tempo of operations was what the Panzerwaffe was SO good at).

Mark I would be interested to know what that design would have been. The Panzer III had reached the end of its design life and the short 75mm gun and 50mm armour would put it at disadvantage against allied armour. The decision to switch the chassis to Stug production seems the right one, giving a vehicle with a low silhouette, reasonable armour and a decent gun. The Panzer IV was also pushed to the limit. 80mm of armour and the long gun over stressed the chassis. Also the design was not a good one for mass production. The best the Germans would have got from using Panther facilities to produce extra Panzer IV's is about another 10% greater production. We are not talking 2,000 tanks a month level. It would would have needed a new design for a 35t tank that was easy to build and maintain, probably 60mm glacis sloped at 55 degrees, you could probably get the 75L70 gun on it in the weight limit and a 400bhp motor. That design would need to have a been started in 1940, to start mass production in 1942. In fact probably earlier to get large numbers of tanks in the hands of the troops by the summer of 1942 for the push to the oil fields, because to make it worthwhile you need that Russian oil. Otherwise you haven't got fuel for all the tanks you are mass producing in 1943.
Of course as well as that you have to be mass producing day and night fighters in large numbers and training large numbers of pilots to take on the best the allies have and shoot them down in droves. You need to mass produce U boats and train crews so you can hit the convoys hard and slow the flow of armaments and reinforcements to the UK. You also have to find a source of manpower and facilities to train them and equip them so you can maintain the quality and numbers of your infantry formations. Without those things producing lots of extra tanks, at best prolongs the war for an extra year and probably earns Berlin the dubious distinction of the first recipient of the atomic bomb.

@ Fred, Windy, Legion, Blutarski

You are quite right that the 0.50" wasn't as man-portable as an MG42. OTOH, it was issued largely to armies with plentiful half-track-type vehicles that would do most of the back-breaking porting. Like the Sherman, the M2, limitations and all, made good sense in the armies that operated it.

Fred, your point about rational decisions meaning no war is of course correct. This is why I postulated the loony having started the war, but relatively rational people then taking over in late 1941. Then then have to try to exit from it with least pain having already committed to fighting in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Russia. What might you do if that were the hand you were dealt?

@ Mark
Say that the Sherman was only adequate if you like. That was the winning decision set for the design.

These are almost precisely my sentiments about the Airfix Sherman.

Wolfhag wrote – "The US Sherman was part of a combined arms effort, they were fortunate they did not meet more tanks in open terrain as the Allies up north or they may have had the same results."

Hi Wolfie – Some comments:

> Plenty of Shermans ran up against heavy German armor in open country and suffered; they were just manned by British, Commonwealth and Polish tank crews.

> Eisenhower knew he had an armor mismatch problem as early as July 1944. He sent Holly to hand-carry a letter to Marshall demanding immediate "yesterday delivery" of 90mm T71/M36s.

> Bradley was also aware of the problem and tried (without success) to get 17-pounder Fireflies from the British before Cobra.

> US tankers had a very sharp lesson delivered at Puffendorf in Nov 1944. It took 90mm M36s to restore order.

> When the Bulge broke out in December 1944, despite priority delivery ordered by Marshall, less than 250 90mm M36s had reached US 1st Army; Eisenhower and Bradley again sought Fireflies from the British.

The above suggests (to me at least) that, from the point of view of US ETO command, things were not altogether a cigar smoking Normandy to Berlin cakewalk for US armor. Otherwise, why all the urgent requests from highest US ETO command levels for M36s, Fireflies, etc.?

Inquiring minds.

B

Two points.

I would not rate the Panther as an excellent design. Rather, like with the assessment of the Sherman, adequate. Solutions to problems were not optimal. For example I am surprised no one has mentioned the Panther's interleaved suspension. Yes it solved the problem of the increased weight by distributing that weight more evenly allowing for a smoother ride and good traction. But it did so with a system that was overly complex to build and poor from a maintenance stand point. Lucas Friedli in his books on Repairing the Panzers makes the claim that on the Tiger I, a similar system, it took some 10 hours to change out the road wheels. And this is without getting into the veracity of how serious clogging of the system with mud and effects of freezing may have been. The fact this was in no way a "perfect" system can be seen post war when only a few APCs, recce vehicles and some French prototype tanks tried using this system.

And I dispute the Sherman was or had reached the end of its useful design cycle. Certainly the Israeli M50 and M51 series shows there were still a lot of legs in the design. After all they adapted both the French 75 (itself a copy of the Panthers 75) and 105 as well as engine and other upgrades.

Hi Marc,
Fully agree re the downside of the inter-leaved suspension system. Yes, it improved weight distribution on the tracks, but the repair and maintenance complications it engendered were very considerable – a true Chinese puzzle. To replace a mine-damaged interior road wheel would involve fully or partially dismounting five road wheel assemblies.

A classic example of German over-engineering …

- – -

Re the Sherman's post-WW2 career, let's be fair: it was an up-gunned version that was issued to Israeli reserve units; it was no longer a front-line tank.
I was not arguing that it was obsolete (as in ready for the trash bin); I was citing BuOrd's assessment that it would be "seriously obsolescent" by 1944 and, in that respect, it is IMO difficult to argue that it any longer could claim "top dog" status on the armored battlefield at that point in time. The Sherman (IMO) was really betrayed by the failure to install a truly more powerful gun like the 90mm, which could have extended its useful life as the Israelis (and some other nations IIRC) demonstrated.

FWIW.

B

May be of interest:

The Chieftain's Hatch: French Panthers
link

Once again must respectfully disagree.

As to be issued to reserve units in 1967 Israeli ground forces had a standing force of some 74,000 made up of some 2,000 regulars/cadre and up to 72,000 trainees and reservists under going training. A further 200,000 were added on full mobilization. The vast majority of Israeli armored units are reserve units. Further of the some 800 tanks the Israelis had a full quarter of them were the M-51. Rather than an old design they had been introduced to the Israeli public in parades in 1965. M-51 Battalions served in all three commands during the 67 war and not in a secondary mission. Given that some 150 of the 800 were AMX-13s a good reason the M-51 was an MBT.

By 1973 the M-50s had been phased out and the M-51s relegated to secondary roles.

However my point is starting in 1948, again in 1956 and finally in 1967 wars the Israelis had managed to make significant upgrades to the Sherman. As argued here the platform might indeed have been modified to use say the 90mm if the US had made that a priority (and here speaking of course as a tank gun and not the M-36). Wonder what the assessment of the Sherman would have been in 44 had it been successfully mated with the 90? :)

As to FWIW, as per your usual inputs, very worthy!

Rather, like with the assessment of the Sherman, adequate.

I think that is a fair assessment.

And I dispute the Sherman was or had reached the end of its useful design cycle. Certainly the Israeli M50 and M51 series shows there were still a lot of legs in the design.

I think that is pushing it. They were very much 2nd line vehicles and I am sure the Israelis would rather have had more Centurions or Pattons had they been able to get them. When more modern designs became available in sufficient numbers they were very rapidly withdrawn and rebuilt into SP guns etc, where their short comings as a tank were not exposed.

Given that some 150 of the 800 were AMX-13s a good reason the M-51 was an MBT.

The AMX-13 was only a light tank. The fact that the Israelis had to press it into service in their armoured brigades is a testament as to how short they were of capable modern designs.

> US tankers had a very sharp lesson delivered at Puffendorf in Nov 1944. It took 90mm M36s to restore order.

A German attack that completely failed in all its objectives and caused maybe a day or two of delay in the US advance.
If you read the AARs on the battle you will also find out the claims for US tank losses bear no relation to reality. Post-war US accounts are partially responsible for the inflated kill claims because they were 'circular referencing' and using German accounts rather than checking US unit documents.

Marc,
The Panther interleaved suspension had a shock absorber that could travel 20 inches. The Tiger's and T-34's 9 inches and first Shermans only 4 inches (Panther: Germany's Quest for Combat Dominance by Michael Green). This alone enabled the Panther to effectively move more quickly over rough terrain than other tanks – as long as it did not break down. It also made it easier on crews when traveling over rough terrain.

The Panther had a flotation rating of 150-155 which was the lowest of any major WWII tank. The T-34/76 was 175, Sherman HVSS 205, Sherman VVSS 282, T-34/85 196, and the Chaffee light tank 175. Of course, this is only of value if traveling over soft ground and a severe handicap in freezing mud.

Just like any other design, there are tradeoffs. Solving one problem normally creates another problem. My opinion is that the design was good and solved many problems but the tradeoffs they had to make for production gave it the poor characteristics. Also pushing it out to be at Kursk meant known problems were not going to be solved until after the battle. But using metal fittings on the fuel lines that leaked is inexcusable.

But as Fred said, most of the problems were solved in late 1944. It should have had a roof mounted periscope for the gunner and no excuse for the mantlet shot trap. Like any other weapons system, it had its strengths and weaknesses and needed the right tactics to succeed.

Wolfhag

To replace a mine-damaged interior road wheel would involve fully or partially dismounting five road wheel assemblies.

Not sure of your meaning in detail, but in general yes.

If we are counting individual wheels, to replace an interior road wheel anywhere in the middle of the track run we must remove an average of 5 other road wheels first. But if we are at the front or rear it would be a few less.

I say "an average" of 5 because the actual number is either 7 or 3, depending on the wheel.

If it is an interior wheel of an "inner" pair, one removes the outer wheel on each side, then the outer wheel of the pair in question. Now, having removed 3 other wheels, one has access to the inner wheel.

If it is an interior wheel of an "outside" pair, one removes the outer wheel of the pair, then the outer wheel from the "outside pair" two wheels away on each side, then both wheels of the "inner" pair on each side, for a total of 7 other wheels, before one has access to the inner wheel.

And if you are wondering, each of those wheels is HEAVY!

At least that's how I remember it. Don't want to be too absolute on this point, as I have only ever participating in breaking track on a Panther once, and at that it was nearly 15 years ago.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I dont have the numbers at my fingertips, but I seem to recall that during the Bulge tanks losses were slightly higher for the US, but nowhere near the oft claimed 3-1 or 4-1 slaughter. I also recall somewhere that a study of tank losses showed many causes, of which enemy tanks were one component, but by no means the majority.

I'm sure others here can probably correct me with the proper data. Still, my points are first, based on this thread we should have expected tanks to be the primary killer of other tanks (that's why the Sherman gets such a bad rap right?) and second, that the US lost many more tanks, by a factor of 3 or 4 to 1, in the Bulge.

Because if the primary tank killers were not other tanks and the US losses were not much higher than German losses in the Bulge it kinda sorta deflates the argument that those Death Trap Shermans got slaughtered by the German Uber Panzers.

Willing to be proved wrong. Cheers!

They talk a little bit of Hitler being too tank centric, Especially in regard to the Tiger.
YouTube link

Jefthro3,
If you are still out there I'll try to get back on the topic and show you how I'm approaching the Sherman 75 versus the Panzer IVH and Tiger I.

‌

Determine Hit Location: Roll a D20 on the correct one of the 5 target aspects. If the shooter and target are static and within Precision Aim range, the shooter can modify the die roll +/-4 to target a weak area or get a Critical Hit. A hit location roll of 8-19 is a miss against hull down targets and a 15-19 is a miss against suspension down targets.

Critical Hit: Roll D20 again, no modifiers, on the correct row, front 90 degrees or rear 270 degrees.

System Damage: The hit location color determines which system is hit. Red is ammo storage, green is mobility (engine/transmission), blue is fuel storage. Roll a D20 + the Shell Damage Value (the shells weight in kg) to determine the level of system damage. A "delay" extends the targets Action Turn a certain number of turns simulating suppression and chaos generated by internal damage.

Ricochet: If the armor value is highlighted there is a chance of a ricochet. On the Panzer IVH frontal aspect a hit location roll of 7 is a hit on the mantlet front with armor of 50mm. On the "Ricochet <= D20" row the "4" is highlighted in the same color of the 50mm armor. The round will ricochet on a D20 roll of 1-4 , no modifiers.

Determining Penetration: To achieve maximum and damage the round needs to penetrate 110%+ of the armor. A penetration of 100%-110% roll a D20 again, a 1-10 full penetration is achieved and an 11-20 is spalling damage from a partial penetration. If penetration is 5mm < armor there is still a chance for spall damage or an Action turn delay.

The Sherman penetration figures are from the "WWII Ballistics and Armor" book.

Example: A shot from a Sherman 75L40 AP at 1000m hit with a penetration of 76mm. A D20 is rolled for the hit location and a 13 is rolled, UHF 70 (upper hull front, mobility, 70mm of armor). The penetration is between 100% and 110% and a D20 roll of an 8 means full penetration is achieved. To determine the level of damage roll a D20 + the Shell Damage Value of 5, a 10 is rolled + 5 is 15 which is a KO and for mobility the tank cannot move.

What I like about this is that no tank is totally immune and penetration is variable and not 100% guaranteed. In the example if the Tiger were hit with a Critical Hit (5% chance) a weak spot could be hit. Precision Aim is normally out to 500m so getting close enough allows you to get a better chance of a Critical Hit. The chances for hit locations for the different aspects was done by an analysis of the the exposed areas.

I hopes this helps.

Wolfhag

couldn't that all be worked out so that a roll of 72-100 is a mission kill? You want the game to move. Plus it doesn't seem to allow for a non-penetrating mission kill.
Saw the same problem when I was working on Navy computer gaming for the Navy. They wanted to know where the SSM hit, what compartments were damaged, if there what systems were affected. They finally came around to the fact that most hits from an SSM were mission kills on anything but the carriers.

thomalley,
Of course, you could abstract it out to a mission kill or any number of abstracted ways. I can see an abstracted mission kill from an SSM. What are the chances of a mission kill from a single hit from a 150mm shell?

We've been using this in smaller 1:1 engagement for people that want to see the historical differences, variables, weaknesses, and strengths of different armor configurations. For people not interested in it abstract away to your heart's desire I say.

Jefthro3 asked

Can anyone advise re how likely a Sherman with a 75mm could destroy a Panzer 4 and or a Tiger from the front

My answer is a study of the target's compound armor angles from various aspects and attempts to identify weak spots that historically existed. If this is the level of detail players are looking for the game moves along fine. However, I would not recommend it for a division level game.

Non-penetrating mission kills are from spalling damage, partial penetrations and forcing crews to bail out.

You could look at these and come to your own conclusion and make abstractions to fit whatever level of play you are looking for.

Wolfhag

"They talk a little bit of Hitler being too tank centric, Especially in regard to the Tiger."

Manstein made the same observation while planning his counterattack at Kharkov.

I haven't got Lost Victories to hand, but to paraphrase it was something like "The Fuhrer believes that battles can be won by the intervention of specialist units such as heavy tanhk battalions whereas what is required are the application of large numbers (many divisions) of conventional troops".

I do sometimes wonder if the Sherman had simply been armed with a 76mm from the start (so it was roughly equivalent to a Pz IVG), we wouldnt have these endless uber panzer vs Sherman threads. But hey, where would the fun be in that! Or alternatively if the Tiger had just had slightly thinner side armour so Sherman 75s and T34/76s had a chance against it.

Buckley goes into a lot of this stuff in 'British Armour in Normandy', while also analysing the British way of war in 1944, which didn't need uber tanks.

I dont have the numbers at my fingertips, but I seem to recall that during the Bulge tanks losses were slightly higher for the US, but nowhere near the oft claimed 3-1 or 4-1 slaughter. I also recall somewhere that a study of tank losses showed many causes, of which enemy tanks were one component, but by no means the majority.

link
Well this guy has done extensive research in to US reported losses and compares them to the oft quoted figures by Zaloga and shows that allied tank losses were hugely under reported. Even simple figures like the numbers of M4's shipped to Europe for use by the US and it's allies compared to the numbers left at the wars end shows something like 13,000 M4's unaccounted for. He also delves in some detail into the losses in the Ardennes and shows convincingly that Zaloga figure of 730 tanks and tank destroyer losses is an under estimate and the US lost at least double that amount.
By contrast the German losses are easy to track and they lost 190 Panthers in the Ardennes and about 400 other tanks, assault guns, TD's etc. However not all German losses were combat losses. Both 2nd Panzer and 1st SS lost the bulk of their strength when they ran out of fuel and many of the tanks had to be abandoned. Also the Ardennes is ideal ground for the M4 to shine. US were on the defensive and in the narrow valleys and towns the US had the advantage of short ranges, firing first and more chances for flank shots. So the evidence suggests that the exchange rates were significantly in the Germans favour which would explain why the US were over 800 tanks down on establishment by January ‘45, despite replacements and some units like the 707th TB disappeared from the front lines for several weeks.

Well this guy has done extensive research in to US reported losses and compares them to the oft quoted figures by Zaloga and shows that allied tank losses were hugely under reported.

He has no credibility at all as he manipulates and distorts numbers. He has even been caught out using fake War Diary entries and when the data does not match his fiction he simply makes things up. His claims are worthless.

Even simple figures like the numbers of M4's shipped to Europe for use by the US and it's allies compared to the numbers left at the wars end shows something like 13,000 M4's unaccounted for.

This is old news and not, as the poster you mention claims, his new and 'shocking' revelation. The info was posted by Richard Anderson some 10 years back on AHF

link

with this being the whole thread.

link
Read it and see how you are being misled.The uber-panzer troll twists things to suit his agenda.
Anyone who believes 10,000+ destroyed Shermans were hidden is insane.

He has no credibility at all as he manipulates and distorts numbers.

A lot of the data he is quoting in that piece are from Napier and Zaloga. I haven't had a chance to check the particular references yet, but will do. However if you accept that the figures quoted by Napier and Zaloga are correct then the conclusion that the losses are not being counted in the correct month is a reasonable one.

Anyone who believes 10,000+ destroyed Shermans were hidden is insane.

I don't think anyone thinks 10,000 destroyed Shermans were hidden, but clearly there are oddities in the data. For example how do you explain the 4,000+ losses to 30th June 1945 as documented by Zaloga and Napier? Virtually all German armour went east in January 1945, leaving only a couple of hundred left and there were no large armour battles and yet the losses are 3 times that for the Normandy campaign.

For example how do you explain the 4,000+ losses to 30th June 1945 as documented by Zaloga and Napier?

As documented by Allied loss numbers and thus not something suddenly discovered by modern authors
It was never hidden. The losses are very easy to explain. The German Army was shooting at them. It is absurd to 'hint' they were all knocked out by half a dozen Panthers rushing up and down the Westwall and keeping the puny Shermans out of the Fatherland. You might want to check up on the vast number of static flak guns that were in Germany and thus able to engage (for a short while) Allied armour as well.

Virtually all German armour went east in January 1945, leaving only a couple of hundred left and there were no large armour battles and yet the losses are 3 times that for the Normandy campaign.

That is the mythical version of the Uber-Panzer. However if you check German production numbers for 1945 you will find that there are a lot of missing tanks, missing German tanks. The numbers given in the 've vos outnumbered' self-serving memoirs do not match the factory gate numbers.

then the conclusion that the losses are not being counted in the correct month is a reasonable one.

Old news again. Now the ground has shifted and its implied the Allies 'hid' their losses by delaying the reporting of write-Offs.
No Allied unit wrote off its tanks. At the end of a day all tanks not with the unit or tanks damaged and needing repairs expected to take more than 24 hours were struck from the rolls and handed over to a workshop. Once all the damaged/destroyed tanks were collected/inspected the Workshop not the unit decided what was scrapped and what was repaired. This means that counting every tank struck from an Allied Unit as destroyed is wrong. It also means compiling Allied tank numbers was difficult if a workshop was busy and simply stored crocs until they had time to work through them. That is why Allied loss numbers do not chime with periods of intense action. Nothing hidden away and no conspiracy to deceive just the way the system worked.
So the assumption losses are not being counted in the correct month is correct and this was first committed to print in Zetterling's Normandy book over 18 years ago. Old news indeed.

That is the mythical version of the Uber-Panzer.

Eh?! What has it got to do with mythical Uber Panzers. Of the Panzer units in the west for Nordwind and Watch am Rhein in January 1945 1st, 2nd, 9th, 10th and 12th SS and 21st PD went east along with 503rd and 509th Tiger battalions, FGB and FBB Panzer brigades plus some Stug and Jagdpanzer battalions. That is a lot of German armour heading east or is that a myth?! According to Zaloga German AFV strength in the West had halved by February 1945 and halved again by Mid March. However according to Zaloga again the British lost over 1,500 tanks in the last 100 days of the war, or about 15/day which is equivalent to the loss rates in Normandy where British tank units were in some very hard fighting, compared to 1945 with falling German AFV strengths, and collapsing German resistance. As for flak guns a lot of those went east too to defend the Seelöwe heights. So how did a dwindling number of German AFV's of doubtful reliability, remnants of German units, some flak guns, Volkssturm and Hitler Youth with Panzerfäuste inflict so many tanks losses on the Brits?

Nothing hidden away and no conspiracy to deceive just the way the system worked.
So the assumption losses are not being counted in the correct month is correct and this was first committed to print in Zetterling's Normandy book over 18 years ago.

I haven't claimed there was any conspiracy to deceive just that it makes it very difficult to get accurate figures for allied losses in a particular area in a defined time period which makes comparison of German vs US losses in the Ardennes problematical. That was the question that Lee494 posed. I am currently reading Bergstrom's Ardennes book and the figures he gives for US losses in the Ardennes are somewhat higher than Zaloga quotes.

The numbers given in the 've vos outnumbered' self-serving memoirs do not match the factory gate numbers.

It is clear from the figures that Zaloga quotes that German AFV numbers dropped to a quarter of their peak at the start of the Ardennes Offensive within a few weeks of the offensive finishing and as you keep saying with reliability so poor a significant proportion of those were not runners, so we was outnumbered is a pretty accurate reflection of reality on the western front from February 1945.

As for flak guns a lot of those went east too to defend the Seelöwe heights.

Not the fixed ones that I mentioned. They (the majority) were not going anywhere

the British lost over 1,500 tanks in the last 100 days of the war It looks like he is using the total losses for 1945 in which case it is 120+ days.
Can you explain what your thinking is here?
Do you believe the loss of c.1600 tanks (the correct total) is an indicator that the Commonwealth soldiers were 'bad' or that their tanks were 'bad' and the losses indicate the Germans were 'superior' and that there is a 'correct' number of tanks you can expect to lose and if you excede this figure it means you are doing something wrong? What is the yardstick you use to claim the Commonwealth losses mean they were 'inferior'? Who did it better? Who can we look to and get an idea how it should be done?
What exactly is the significance of tank losses in isolation and why is it so important to so many people?

I am currently reading Bergstrom's Ardennes book and the figures he gives for US losses in the Ardennes are somewhat higher than Zaloga quotes.

Whilst he was working on his book he contacted me about tank loss numbers. I know little about US tank numbers so I put him in touch with Richard Anderson and all the info Bergstrom used came from Rich. This is what Rich has to say about the way Bergstrom misused the date:

I supplied him the data for losses. He chose to expand on it via speculation regarding non-write offs…………Christer conflated "knocked out" with "write offs". They are NOT the same thing..

link

link

Note that 'Shermaninterest' who is arguing with Rich in the last AHF link above is the same poster (now calling himself ChristianMunich)you linked from Reditt. Despite Rich explaining to him in November 2016 how Berstrom had inflated the losses (in the AHF thread) he went ahead in 2018 and used those inflated numbers because they better fitted his fantasy scenario. That is one example of how how dishonest your linked source is. Tank loss numbers is a small area of interest and you have to know the players to know who knows and who is flying a kite

Coox and Naisawald of the US Operations Research Office (Johns Hopkins University) undertook, at the instruction of the US Army, a major study of Allied tank casualties in WW2. There is a great deal of value to be found in their work, but one important point made by the authors was that the records were so incomplete and fragmentary as to preclude any confident assessment of total tank casualties suffered by the Allies.

Based upon that, I really question whether any useful calculation can be possible now, 70+ years after the fact.

B