"Sherman 75mm gun knock out a Tiger 1,Panzer 4 model “H” " Topic

People should check the Focke Wulf gap from Aug 1941 to see that this scenario is not confined to tanks.

Quite different. The solution to the Fw190 in the shape of the Spitfire Mk IX was not long in coming and the major change fitting the more powereful Merlin 60 series engines was quite straightforward, in fact the first Mk IX's were Mk Vc's with the new engine. Rolls Royce were continually improving the Merlin to get more power out of it. And of course the RAF didn't think they were going to see out the war with just the Spitfire so specifications for other fighter designs had already been issued and designs were underway. Hence before the end of the war the RAF had Typhoon, Tempest and Meteor all in squadron service.

Seems to be a thread here about the "poor US tankers and their Sherman Death Traps"

So how about the poor bloody infantry that had BARs to fight MG42s. Fair fight?

Or the B-17 crews that had to wait until 1944 for a proper escort fighter because "flying fortresses didn't need fighter escorts".

Or the P-51 pilots that had to face Me-262s? True they shot down a few but …

Hey, how about the Brit air defenses and civis that had no defense against the V-2?

Or merchant marine seamen vs Wolfpacks?

War isn't fair and I still say the poor US tanker in their Death Trap is way overdone. Many died because of things that coulda shoulda mighta been done or done differently, but weren't.

If I had to feel sorry for someone it would be the hundreds of thousands of civilians killed by terror bombing, starvation, disease or death camps.

Cheers!

Seems to be a thread here about the "poor US tankers and their Sherman Death Traps"

Its a euphemistic thread. In reality its so those who believe the uber-panzer myth can drool over their invulnerable tanks whilst pretending it is about Allied tank design. I used a perfectly apt comparison with the introduction of the FW 190 to show how common the situation was. Wonder-weapon introduced by side A is countered by side B introducing their wonder-weapon B within a year. Rinse and repeat with side A and B taking turns to be the innovator.
The Uber-Panzer myth is an obsession with some and they think that the 11 months from D-Day to surrender was the most critical period of the war when strategic decisions made in 1942 are what decided things. So confident were the Western Allies that they allowed just over a year from D-Day to force a German surrender (which was done with a month to spare) that the UK was cancelling all Military production that was not expected to deliver by that date.

We all know published games are commercial enterprises so they try to sell 'stuff'.

German stuff sells well…allied less so. If we take a very successful business model as our example – Flames of War – it is extreme.

I've always found competitive wargaming unsatisfying. Realistic scenarios have to be skewed heavily one way or the other – balanced engagements are very rare and it usually means someone messed up the planning.

I've always used games as a way to study the historical problems faced by the protagonists. As such I am interested in scenarios were success was measured relative to what might be expected. E.g. 15 Shermans against a lone Tiger 1 should be a forgone conclusion. It would be interesting to see how much damage the Tiger could cause before it was knocked out.

The rarity of Tigers is well known [though not well modelled in most games]. I understand the US forces in the ETO encountered no Tigers in Normandy and only a very few before the Bulge fighting. The Shermans they had were equal to the Panzer IVs they mostly faced and able to cope with Panthers given good tactics and adequate numbers.

It kind of works out like this

1:1 – Panther kills Sherman
2:1 – Panther kills one Sherman – 50-50 chance threafter.
3:1 – Panther kills one or two Shermans but falls to the third.

This assumes there is room to manoeuvrer for a flank shot.

I for one HATE that Uber German nonsense.

Every German wasn't Michael Whittman (sp?) and every battle wasnt Villers Bocage! How about the battle of Arracourt? I recall reading (for the life of me I cant recall where at this moment) about a company of Sherman's taking on several King Tigers during the battle of the Bulge. So most of the Sherman's should have been toast right? Wrong. They plastered the Tigers with HE so that their crews bailed and went and hid in a basement. And getting back to Herr Michael … isn't there still debate about whether he was done in by a regular Sherman or a Firefly?

The Uber German is a gaming myth to sell minis. In fact I once worked out the real ratios of German AFVs you should use for gaming and they were something like for every five AFVs on the German side 2 should be StuGs, with one each of Pz IV, Panther and JzPz of some model and for every 15 German AFVs you get ONE Tiger I (for 1944 … ratios would vary by year).

Most games I've seen have way too high a ratio of Tigers and Panthers to everything else on the table. But hey it sells miniatures! Gamers should try reality … give the German 10-11 Marders or even Hetzers and the American 30 Shermans and 30 M10 TDs. Now you have the basic day by day fight when infantry divs clashed.

Cheers!

Its a euphemistic thread. In reality its so those who believe the uber-panzer myth can drool over their invulnerable tanks whilst pretending it is about Allied tank design.

No it is a thread about people who believe what tank you have decides if you win wars and hence call the Sherman a war winning tank. In reality the Sherman was an adequate tank in a war winning army. The Panther was an adequate tank in a war losing army. Both had their strengths and weaknesses.
As for the rest of it those who believe it was somehow preordained that the US had to have the Sherman, because anything heavier the cranes wouldn't lift, the LST's couldn't carry and the bridges wouldn't support is utter nonsense. All it would have taken is for the appropriate decisions to be taken at the right time and actually plan for a follow on design. In the end the US had to have the Sherman, because that is all they planned for. The clear headed decisions that lead to the Sherman and enabled Ordnance to come up with the design and industry to find the motors to power it and the factories to build it is in stark contrast to what happened for the rest of the war when Ordnance floundered around with no clear direction from the army on what they wanted.
All a good weapon will do is give you an edge in a tactical combat. There was only 1 war winning weapon and that was the atomic bomb, and even that is dubious as Japan was already beaten they just needed something to nudge them into accepting the fact and surrendering.

+1 Fred.

No one (that includes my humble self) here is advancing a "Deathtrap" meme.

The Sherman had many good qualities in terms of AFV design. But, it also greatly benefited from the combat environment in which it operated – i.e., one in which -
> it operated with a numerical advantage on the ground ranging from significant to massive.
> it was part of an army which almost always enjoyed significant to massive advantages in overall numbers, artillery, etc over its opponents.
> it operated almost always under an umbrella of air superiority/supremacy.
> it rarely ever lacked for fuel or supply.
> it was supported by a well equipped, well supplied and intact field maintenance organization.

The most significant defect of the Sherman tank that could be deemed intrinsic to its physical design was an evolutionary failure to keep pace with the growth in gun power. By 1944, the 75mm – as an anti-armor weapon – was obsolete and its replacement, the 76mm, proved inadequate to the task of dealing with heavy German armor. The record shows that this lack of gun power was, from 1944 onward, the principal complaint of the Sherman's "end-user community".

I find it fascinating that, even though the 90mm gun was seen as a valuable insurance policy against German armor development as early as 1942 (even by McNair!), it took 2-3 years before anything at all reached the front.

B

Mark as you like scenarios so much how about trying this one. Give the US the Panthers etc and the M4's to the Germans. Keep the same reliability rolls, but this time if an M4 breaks down there is only a 25% The Germans have the spares to fix it. If that fails it remains broken and is unavaialble for the next battle. In addition if the Germans lose and have to retreat dice for each M4 with a 25% chance it runs out of fuel and is lost. Let us also say that the Germans can write off a broken down M4 to double their chances on repair rolls for the next 2 battles. If any Panther, PzIV etc breaks down the US has the spares and repair teams to fix and is automatically ready for the next battle. The Americans get to keep all their other advantages, ToT artillery, air support etc. Play that through then you can tell me if the M4 is still a war winning tanks!

Give the US the Panthers etc and the M4's to the Germans. Keep the same reliability rolls …

Fred you seem to miss the point.

Reliability doesn't happen because of pre-ordained dictats from God. Nor does adequate supply of spares. Nor volume of production.

These things don't happen just because you "give" the tank to the Americans. These things happen because of decision-making, by decision-makers, that produce the tank and the tank force that operates it.

The decision making necessary to have adequate spares, adequate logistical infrastructure, adequate numbers, adequate training all flow from the same decision making that provides the Sherman. Decide on a Panther and you won't get the rest.

You can't tell an organization (or worse yet, half-a-dozen separate but occasionally co-operating organizations) that they should optimize for reliability and supply, and then expect to be two full generations ahead in your design. Particularly if you have no meaningful experience or guidance on what those two generations ahead features must be.

You can't have it both ways. Focus on innovation and next-generation technologies, and if you have competent people on board you'll get innovative next-generation results. But there's a reasonable chance you'll miss the target, because you're effort was trying to predict the future, with a poor experience base if you were American in 1942. Focus on robust, supported, workable and if you have competent people you'll get robust, supported and workable results. Particularly if you are an American in 1942, as you have an accumulated experience in automotive production that is second to none.

But you can't say focus on robust, supported and workable but give me next generation innovation. You won't get it.

The US DIDN'T KNOW HOW to build next generation innovation in tanks. Why not? Because in 1940 the US built all of SIX medium tanks. And even the French, in their hour of desperate need, turned them down as useless. The US simply didn't have any history, any accumulated knowledge base or understanding of tank warfare.

In that same year the Germans built 1,400 medium tanks! And the German army had extensive experience in 1939 and 1940 in tank combat. They accumulated a wealth of information about what worked, what didn't work, what could be better, and how it would contribute to victory.

Criticize if you must, but I think it is pretty d@mned silly to expect US designers to predict the future trends in tank design better than the German designers in that scenario.

But in 1942 the US built 13,000 medium tanks, and supplied tanks to both the British and the Russians that made vital differences in combat in their respective theaters of action. And in 1943 the US was producing almost as many tanks per month as the Germans were producing per year. And those tanks were defeating German armies everywhere they met.

That didn't happen by itself. It happened because THAT was what decision-makers focused on. Automotive components used in the initial M4 were proven in the M2 and M3 medium tank designs. Further new components went into production only when proven to meet high standards of maturity.

Observations from the 1940 and 1941 French and British army liaisons gave definition for what would be at the leading edge in 1942. But not what would be ahead in 1944. And once it was locked and loaded, and with a half-year lead time to combat theaters, the cost of change became very high.

Sure we can sit here now and say that predicting the future should have been easy as we look at the past. So how much Amazon stock did you buy in 1998? (What? None? Oh you simpleton. I can tell you as I look back that it's an obvious winner!)

Not that there weren't efforts to predict what would be ahead in 1944. There were. But they missed. They missed on predicting what would matter, and they missed on predicting what would work. Whatever was created in the M7, T20, T22 and T23 programs didn't offer enough of an advantage to warrant disrupting the all-important supply lines of the M4.

In the end the definition of a better tank design was not just better guns or better armor, but better tank production, better tank supply, and better tank logistics. More tanks, more serviceable tanks, more ready-to-roll-in-the-morning-unit-status-report tanks, more training on the tanks. THAT was the focus that won on the battlefield, again and again.

Change to a whole new tank in 1943, with unproven components and new technologies and techniques, and you don't get any of that. You can't HAVE a US Panther in 1944 that is as reliable and as well supplied and supported as a Sherman. Because the reliability, supply and support don't just happen by themselves when you put a white star on a tank. If Americans decided NOT to have a 1942 tank, constructed from proven components, form the basis of their 1944 armored forces, Americans wouldn't have had 2 years of working through all the thousands of details that gave us the production numbers, trained units, and supply of spares.

Don't just say "Oh I'm confident in American capabilities". If you go changing the decision-making process, you get different results. Doesn't matter if it's Americans making the decisions. The tank doesn't conform to racial profiles or cultural biases. It conforms to the decision-making process that produced it.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Fred you seem to miss the point.

Reliability doesn't happen because of pre-ordained dictats from God. Nor does adequate supply of spares. Nor volume of production.

No you are missing the point. What you are talking about has nothing to do with design. What you are talking about is building a better war machine. Which is the point I am making. There is no war winning tank.

Criticize if you must, but I think it is pretty d@mned silly to expect US designers to predict the future trends in tank design better than the German designers in that scenario.

I was not asking them to predict the future, just take a sensible approach to ongoing tank design. You know the capabilities of the tank you are about to put into production. If you are going to carry on designing new tanks and possibly putting them into production it would seem sensible to follow 2 approaches. First is to look at increasing the capability of the existing design and to be fair Ordnance did that putting the 76mm gun into the standard Sherman turret. The army didn't like it, but at least Ordnance were trying. The second approach is to design a new tank that is more capable. How would it be more capable? Well gee how about a better gun and thicker armour. Hardly rocket science is it? Issue a specification for it. Maybe you get it wrong, but at least you are working to a definite goal and even if it is not perfect might be adapted to what you find you need. A good starting point would be to build a tank that can beat the one you have. So a tank that has armour that can withstand the 75mm AP at 500yds and a gun that could penetrate that armour at a 1,000yds. That is essentially what the Germans did with the Tiger design, which was started in May ‘41, before the T34 or KV1 had been encountered. They didn't say what tank do we need for 1943, they said we want a tank with a gun that can penetrate 100mm of armour at 1,500m and armour to withstand attack from a similar weapon.

Don't just say "Oh I'm confident in American capabilities".

What I am confident of was the ability of the US to make the stuff work. Maybe misplaced, but the US did produce some extraordinarily capable designs and in large numbers. Take the B29 for example, no other country came even close to producing such an aircraft, but then it did have a definite design specification for a bomber that could carry 20,000lbs of bombs, 2,667 miles at a speed of 400mph. They issued that specification in December 1939 at which point not even fighter aircraft could do 400mph. But they did achieve it and built nearly 4,000 of them. It begs the question just exactly who they were going to bomb with such an aircraft in December 1939, but it did mean that when the war with Japan came along, they were only 9 months away from the first flight. How is that for predicting the future!

There were. But they missed. They missed on predicting what would matter, and they missed on predicting what would work. Whatever was created in the M7, T20, T22 and T23 programs didn't offer enough of an advantage to warrant disrupting the all-important supply lines of the M4.

No what they missed out on was having a clear design goal for a follow on tank. It was design by committee with everyone putting in their opinion and no one in overall charge. That is why you had designs like the T20, T22 and T23 or the M6 which they all ready to put into production until someone said hang on, we don't have a doctrine or use for such a tank and anyway it is a piece of junk! Which is odd as the design spec for the M4 was so clear headed. It has to withstand the German 37mm AT gun. It has to mount the dual purpose 75mm gun and it has to use as many of the M2 components as possible.

Fascinating thread! So far Mark +10.

Question… Why is it that the T-34 is often hailed as the best tank design of WWII while the Sherman is deamed a Death Trap.

IIRC the Sherman's 75 was actually better than the T-34s 76mm. Armor was very similar except the Russians had more quality control problems with theirs. Speed, I'll give that to the T-34. But the Sherman had reliability and the Ma-Duece.

Then we can get into the Diesel vs Gas argument. But all in all, I find the two tanks very similar in capabilities. As do most wargame rules I've seen.

So why the vast difference in legacy of Best Tank vs Death Trap? I say its historical myth making and Hollywood. But I'm willing to be convinced otherwise.

Cheers!

Only reason we didn't go into Normandy with M26 was because of McNair. Devers had requested them in 1943 but was blocked by McNair. Not the fault of the Ordinance Department, McNair blocked full production.
Goodwood, Brits lost about 155 tanks and the Germans 83. Not bad since the Brits were attacking and not all the tanks were Shermans. Not to mention what percent were from AT guns and mines.

The survey on knocked out Shermans is often quoted but the same type of survey done on knocked out Panthers rarely gets a mention. It found that 75% of all hits on the Pather penetrated.

One thing not discussed is what engines were available for a medium or heavy tank in 1940-41. Why did the Americans contract with Continental to build rotary engines that go on aircraft? What other alternatives were available and what horsepower? A number of different types of engines were developed but none we excellent. Diesel Sherman? Sure but a logistical nightmare in Europe as there were no other diesel vehicles. The Russians and Marines used diesels because diesel was available.

Fred, I don't totally disagree with you. However, silence your critics and create the ideal tank the US should have had if the US had thought of and done everything that you have thought of and had unlimited resources to do it in 1-2 years. That includes an upgrade of the logistical lift and docking facilities, new gun, new landing craft, new ambhib ships, etc if need be. Keep in mind Blutarski's excellent historical documentation of the behind the scenes machinations, problems, politics and unexpected technical delays you'll have to overcome. They are from source documents, not his thoughts.

Even if you do create the ultimate US "Tiger Proof" and "Tiger Killer" when they get to Western Europe they'll all be asking "Where are all of those Tigers???". The Germans pulled most Panthers from the bocage country because the gun barrel was too long, not a problem for the Sherman though. The Tigers are up north fighting the British. I guess the Germans should have thought about building more. Hopefully, the US made enough of the "Tiger Killers" to share with the Brits.

Also overlooked are some of the SERIOUS tactical flaws and shortcomings the Panther and Tiger had. When flanked by a Sherman the Panther D model had a traverse speed of fewer than 10 degrees/second. The Tiger I and Panther A and G model was variable based on the engine RPM. If static the driver could redline the engine to get about 20 degrees per second but chances blowing the engine, especially a poorly trained driver of which there were many.

Neutral Turn? Yes, but let's see what happens. It was about 10 degrees per second, not much better than traversing the turret. Neutral turns put immense pressure on the front and rear of the treads needing high engine revs chancing a blow out and a heavy tank like the Panther dug the treads into soft ground depositing dirt and rocks on the top of the track on the ground (do it on paved roads or really solid ground only). All of that dirt and rocks was pulled onto the idler wheel and drive sprocket popping or breaking the track or drive train. It also it put immense strain on the transmission and final drive – another weakness of the Panther and Tiger.

So if flanked just reverse while turning right? Not so fast there Herman. While in reverse and turning the lateral force of the treads would deposit dirt and rocks on top of the front part of the tread that is immediately pulled into the drive sprocket – bad things happen again. There was a reason for the front drive transmission.

So to respond to a flank attack the safest way is to reverse straight back about 20-30m (4-6 seconds), put it in 2nd gear and then turn into the attack taking about 5-7 seconds more to safely move forward and turn 80-90 degrees with a turn radius of about 8m. So the safest way is going to take 9-12 seconds before the gunner can even acquire the target. After backing up the Panther could skid turn by locking one track and pivoting around at about 20 degrees per second but again, the problems of the pressure on the drive train, tracks and debris pulled into the drive train. I'm not even including any delay time of the Panther crew being surprised and spotting a threat to their flank/rear while busily engaged to their front and poor crews in 1945.

The Sherman could get off 2-3 rounds before the Panther stands a chance to get off one and it will probably be an inaccurate Snap Shot. At ranges below 1500m, the Sherman 75L40 has an almost 100% chance of penetrating the side armor. Against a Tiger I he'll need to be inside of 500m. Then take into account being outnumbered and starting in 1945 poorly trained crews and the Germans don't stand a chance and I don't see where the US "needs" a better tank than the Sherman with the 75 guns.

To be fair, I should not leave out the fact that the Germans would try to have a StuG guarding the Tiger if the Shermans tried to flank him and maybe some infantry tank hunters too.

I've run games where the Sherman's are expecting Tigers or Panthers and the Shermans get ambushed. The best tactic is to have a few tanks loaded with WP, some with HE/Q and some with AP. When engaged the tanks with WP stop and shoot aiming short. If it hits it may start a fire and force the German to move. The screen will last long enough for maneuvering Shermans to close 300-400m. While closing if the German is targeting you start evading. If not being targeted you perform a halt Shoot & Scoot. An HE hit on the mantlet can cause optics damage and may cave in the roof armor causing spalling to the radioman and driver. A hit with WP could be a mission kill and start an engine fire because of the poorly protected engine deck of both tanks.

The scenarios start with a range of 400-800m and the Shermans outnumbering the Germans 3-1 or 4-1, somewhat historical. I've run about a dozen scenarios and the Tiger I with a veteran crew has never survived the encounter and never got more than two kills.

Wolfhag

That includes an upgrade of the logistical lift and docking facilities, new gun, new landing craft, new ambhib ships, etc if need be.

As I pointed out you don't need to upgrade everything if you start with a plan that includes upgrading your tanks, you build it in as you go. As Mark keeps telling us they started with nothing and a clean slate. Build the infrastructure with some extra capacity from the start.

US should have had if the US had thought of and done everything that you have thought of and had unlimited resources to do it in 1-2 years.

They produced the M4 from scratch in 2 years and had to learn how to do big castings to make the turret. Other countries produced totally new designs within 2 years and with far less resources at their disposal than the US. New gun? Well they did come with new guns anyway. Not difficult to do if you plan it. The design of the 17pdr started before the 6pdr entered service. As for a new engine well not lopping 4 cylinders off the Ford GAA should do it. Save development time too. But maybe you are right and it was just too much for the US to achieve. I guess they were not a smart as I thought. It might have been nice if they had given it a good go though and it would have given wargamers a different tank to play with. As it was there was no coherent plan for follow on designs and consequently it is no surprise they never got built.

Hopefully, the US made enough of the "Tiger Killers" to share with the Brits.

Hopefully, although the Brits cut back on domestic tank production to keep US factories open and even then the US closed some down, so I wouldn't have thought shortage of production capacity would be a problem.

Fred,
You are in charge of planning and production, like you said, not difficult if you plan it. Put it all together and show us the specs, gun performance, speed, ground pressure, armor, weight, etc.

I'm not trying to be snarky, I'm just open minded to solutions.

Wolfhag

Well I would probably go with the basic Jumbo spec with 100mm of frontal armour and 40mm on the sides. Widen the Sherman hull to enlarge the turret ring and adapt the 90mm gun to fit the larger turret. Fit with the HVSS suspension with wide tracks. Fit the Ford GAA with all 12 cylinders giving a 40t tank with a 500-600bhp motor. Interesting that the US did almost all those things except build a wider M4, but the HVSS, adapting the 90mm to tank use and fielding a Sherman tank with 100mm frontal were all done, if not put together.

Big Red wrote – "Didn't the US Ordnance Dept develop the 76mm for the Sherman and the 90mm Pershing to counter the Big Cats? If so, then the Sherman's limitations must have been noticed long before the end of the war."

IMO, that was not the case. As I understand it, BuOrd was exclusively invested in the 76mm as the "next big thing" to succeed the 75mm. All the US heavy tank design projects of which I am aware featured 3-inch/76mm caliber main armament.

The 90mm had been designed and built as an anti-aircraft gun and, as such, was never in BuOrd's plans as a tank gun. Adaptation of the 90mm to permit mounting in an AFV turret began as an "off the reservation" effort. Mark I may have some insights on this, but it is my suspicion that that it was the 90mm gun/turret combination designed for the M-36 that was ultimately installed on the Pershing.

B

Re Mark V Panther turret traverse rates, per Jentz -

"To quickly traverse onto a target, the Panther was outfitted with a hydraulic motor for the turret drive. In the Ausf D, the hydraulic drive traversed the turret at a maximum rate of 360 degrees in 60 seconds (i.e. – 6 degrees per second) independent of the engine speed.

An improved hydraulic traverse was introduced with the Ausf A in which the speed at which the turret was traversed under power was dependent on the engine speed. At the maximum allowable engine speed of 3000 rpm, the turret could be traversed at a maximum rate of 360 degrees in 15 seconds (i.e. – 24 degrees per second). After November 1943, with the HL 230 P30 governed at 2500 rpm, the turret traverse speed decreased to a maximum of 360 degrees in 18 seconds (i.e. – 20 degrees per second).

FWIW,

B

mkenny wrote – "The survey on knocked out Shermans is often quoted but the same type of survey done on knocked out Panthers rarely gets a mention. It found that 75% of all hits on the Panther penetrated."

Unsurprising – my guess is that the 75pct penetrating hits would have been on the vulnerably sides and rear of the Panther, while the 25pct balance were likely failures against the front glacis. This would fit with the statistical front/side distribution of hits.

Still, by comparison, the Shermans at Normandy were effectively vulnerable from all aspects.

B

Hunnicutt book page 212:

Sherman with the M26 turret and 90mm gun, both tanks had a 69-inch turret ring so no modifications needed.

Ordnance Department had considered the possible use of a 90mm gun in the Sherman "long before Normandy" (no exact date given). A BRL study of Oct 31, 1942 said it was feasible to install a 90mm gun (proven design) in a Sherman turret but it would need to be modified and the ammo was too large. The solution was a shorter barrel and chamber so reduced performance.

Evidently someone was thinking of a gun upgrade for the Sherman in the latter half of 1942 and did have a solution that could be tried.

In Fall of 1943, the Armored Board concluded only the Sherman could be available in quantities for the invasion. They requested 90mm guns installed on 1000 M4A3's. Ordnance did not concur as it overloaded the Sherman (no weight is given) and the solution was the new T-20 series with the 90mm gun.

End of page 212

T-20: link
Almost immediately after the M4 Sherman was standardized, the US Ordnance Department started work on a successor. The Ordnance Department had already been working on heavily armored infantry tank design for the British, using M4 parts.[1] The new project was started on the 25 May 1942, it was originally designated M4X. Starting with the T20, the Ordnance Department initially developed three series of improved medium tank prototypes, the T20, T22, and T23.
The Armored Board request was rejected on the grounds that destruction of enemy tanks was to be done by artillery and TD's. They did not want to encourage tank duels and wanted the Sherman's to concentrate on exploitation. Gen Holly (Chief of the Armored Section for the ETO) was directed by Eisenhower to expedite the production of the tanks/TD's with the 90mm gun (Sherman with the 90mm M3 gun). However, Gen Holly was informed that it would be 6 months before production quantities would be available and by that time the Pershing's would be coming off the lines. The decision was made to drop the Sherman with the 90mm and concentrate on getting Pershing's produced.

Keep in mind that it was also promised that the 76mm gun would handle the frontal armor of the Panther but combat results showed that that was only within 300 yards. This is the best info I could find. I let people read and come to their own conclusions. My conclusion is that the different (and competing) organizations were looking at a variety of hull, turret and gun upgrades throughout the war. Different organizations had different goals and ideas on solutions that did not always jive with retooling and production time, delivery time, personal preferences and the ultimate effect on the battlefield.

In hindsight, the M4 series was probably the best overall solution for the Allies because of its versatility and ability to produce large numbers of them for a variety of purposes. Fortunately, the US did not face German tanks in large numbers and they had excellent combined arms teams. In the end, that's what wins wars.

Keep in mind the overall low causalities of the US tank corps and the improvements for crew survival: applique armor, more escape hatches, wet storage for ammo.

Bigger guns on the Sherman's would mean more duels and less maneuvering and even the Pershing was not immune. The Jumbo was 3-4mph slower (14,000 pounds more) with greater fuel consumption than the regular M4 which is a big deal in exploitation to catch retreating enemies.

Is it worthwhile to have a 90mm gun (less ammo and slower ROF) to fight tanks when 90% of your targets are non-AFV? A high-velocity gun is less accurate against infantry and low profile dug-in gun targets.

German gun penetration at 700m: 75L48 120mm, 75L70 160mm, 88L56 130mm, 88L71 210mm

My question: Is it really worthwhile to upgrade Sherman's to 100-120mm frontal armor and trade it for reduced speed and maneuverability? Even an up-armored Sherman or Pershing is not immune to most German AT guns at typical Normandy ambush combat ranges. When the majority of the shots are at side armor because of ambushing is more frontal armor and less speed and maneuverability worth it? When ambushed is it better to turn into the ambush and fire (no guarantee of protection) or maneuver/evade to flank them with speed? Normally you want to get the hell out of the ambush zone ASAP.

Maneuvering and explorations reduce causalities. Tank duels are attritional warfare and increase causalities. There are trade-offs for a strategic victory or a tactical victory. Which direction do you go? I think McNair kind of had the right idea but it would not execute on the battlefield and fortunately, he was overruled.

Here is a good site to compare different Sherman models: afvdb.50megs.com/usa/index.html

Here is what a Sherman crew was capable of: link

So Fred, your design proposal sounds pretty good (no turret ring enlargement either). How do you think it would have fared based on what happened historically? Not mentioned was the Pacific theater. The LCT Mark 5 could carry 3x 50-ton tanks so a Pershing at 46 tons could work. They would need diesel engines which they had in quantity and would free up gas engines for Europe.

Supposedly twice as many Sherman's than Pershing's could be shipped across the Atlantic, something important to consider for an invasion in June 1944. Also the increased logistical burden of spares, trained crews, and new ammo.

So did the US combined operational development and production team "fail" to come up with a better tank to replace the Sherman? I guess you could make that argument as true but it was not for the lack of planning and attempting to develop solutions.

Because of the overall trade-off you need to make and other considerations I'm thinking Sherman all the way. Brave men they were.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag as I said it was an adequate design for a war winning army. As for the Pacific use the M4's produced prior to the new tank production there. The British soldiered on with the M3 in the Far East to the wars end.
Maybe McNair didn't like it, but the crews liked the Jumbo and building the tank in the US designed to take the extra weight is better than having field workshops weld salvaged armour from German tanks onto M4's. Having a properly designed tank with an engine able to cope with the extra weight answers the speed and agility problem of the Jumbo.
My reading of the 76mm penetration is that the standard AP shell couldn't penetrate at any range and HVAP could at short range, but of course that remained in short supply, until there wasn't any German armour to worry about as almost all went east in January 1945 for the final Götterdämmerung ride into Hungary.
I think rejecting my design on the basis of what happened in Normandy, when the US didn't face much German armour, and on the US tank destroyer doctrine is a bit short sighted. The tank would have a definite edge over PzIV and Stug and having extra armour is never a bad thing.
Do you have any evidence that the 90mm HE round was particularly poor? US tanks in Korea spent much time firing HE and I am not aware of any suggestions it was inadequate. Same goes for Vietnam.
I think the British would have liked my M5 medium tank or maybe they would have called it a heavy tank, who knows.

I guess you could make that argument as true but it was not for the lack of planning and attempting to develop solutions.

I think there was a lack of planning or certainly direction. Ordnance coming up with designs that nobody wanted. Various officers, from different branches saying one thing and others saying the complete opposite. Why spend all that time and money on the M6, for example, when the US had no doctrine for it, and no infrastructure to support it? And that is even before it turned out to be a dismal design. The failures of British tank design are well documented, but at least they knew what they wanted, even if some of the designs didn't deliver it and they had a clear upgrade path so successive designs improved on the ones before them.

Fred,
The US 75mm had an HE filler of 1.7 pounds, 76mm 0.9 pounds and the 90mm 2.7 pounds. They both have the same % of HE filler, the 90 is just bigger. I'm not sure of the fragmentation effectiveness of the 90mm gun because the thicker shell walls may not give as effective fragmentation as the 75.

But that's only part of the story. The Sherman 75 should be more effective at bracketing and getting the round on target because of lower velocity. I'm pretty sure the 90 HE has the same MV as the AP round which means it needs a heavier shell wall to withstand the shock so the fragmentation may not be ideal. Maybe someone else knows?

I don't know if the 90 had WP but they did in Vietnam with the M48. They did have a Beehive too. The Sherman 75 had WP and a canister round but I don't think the 90 did.

Wolfhag

Check out this PDF for effective fragmentation of 75mm, 76mm and 90mm.
link

Mobius that is an interesting document. Looks like the 90mm HE is pretty good. Fewer fragments than the 75mm at 20', but that evens out quickly and with double the explosive blast effects will be bigger with the 90mm round.

Wolfhag it looks like the 90mm should do fine to deliver HE and as I said previously the Germans and Brits fought most of the war without tanks able to deliver a decent HE shell, so I think the HE thing is overplayed.

Unsurprising – my guess is that the 75pct penetrating hits would have been on the vulnerably sides and rear of the Panther, while the 25pct balance were likely failures against the front glacis. This would fit with the statistical front/side distribution of hits.

See pdf pages 330-333, Table X on page 332 in particular:
PDF link

This debate is always interesting and amusing. But always misses the essential point: the US had a huge advantage in industrial base that was not being bombed. Likewise the US did not have an opponent capable of producing masses of highly effective AFVs on its Eastern flank. For these reasons the Germans produced far fewer Panthers (and of those they produced most went to another front) than the US produced M4s. Hence the M4 had numerical superiority. Had the Germans had equal numbers of Panthers (and the logistical base of POL, mechanics and spare parts) to face US M4s the quality issue would have been massive – but instead it was a minor irritant. The US also benefited from the UK facing most of the Panthers/Tigers in Normandy and having a 7.6XL to deal with them (while a minority of UK tanks they nevertheless often had more Firefly's alone than the Germans had Tigers/Panthers).

US tank crews were very aware of the problem – if they had the bad luck to encounter German tanks. Their response was to make "hilly-billy" Jumbos by welding Panther armor onto M4s. Likewise they field mounted 7.6Ls into Jumbos as ordinance was too dumb to do so. They wanted more Jumbos not less and had to make their own and up armor them (including Abrams who knew a bit about fighting German tanks).

Ordinance's excuse is we didn't think the Germans would build better tanks and waited till they did to do something. Of course then it was too late. Even fitting a 17pder to an M10 (an easy conversion) was beyond their thought process (fortunately the combination of Brit/US tech was not ignored by the Air Corps resulting in the Mustang).

Poor planning but bailed out by the strategic situation which made using swarms of adequate M4s rolling over largely tank less German infantry seem brilliant.

TomT

I have to disagree with T-T's assessment on several points.

…the US had a huge advantage in industrial base that was not being bombed. … For these reasons the Germans produced far fewer Panthers (and of those they produced most went to another front) than the US produced M4s.

The Shermans that we all criticize so adamantly, the 75mm armed Shermans that rolled into Normandie in 1944, were built in 1943.

Are we to believe that, if not for the bombing of their factories, the Germans would have built 13,000 Panthers in 1943? Really? Because that's the alternative scenario that would have to be valid for T-T's hypothesis to stand up to reason.

Likewise the US did not have an opponent capable of producing masses of highly effective AFVs on its Eastern flank.

So the Germans DID build 13,000 Panthers, but sent them to the Eastern Front? I missed that detail in my readings.

Before we go too far with this "US didn't face an enemy on the other side" line of reasoning, let us remember we are speaking here of production. Production of the weapons of war, designing the weapons of war to be produced. Managing the logistics of spares and ammo and training….

How many aircraft carriers did German factories have to supply steel for? Munitions for? Spares for? How many battleships? How many cruisers?

The US built more cruisers than the Germans built of all classes of all surface warships during WW2. A single class of USN destroyers, which only entered production in 1943, was built in larger numbers than all the destroyers, cruisers, battlecruisers and battleships of the German navy throughout its entire history, combined. And the US built more merchant ships than the Germans built locomotives!

If you don't think that US tank production was challenged by constraints you are being entirely too simplistic.

In 1917, when the US Army arrived in Europe they had to use artillery, machine guns, aircraft, tanks and in some cases even rifles provided by the allies. Are we to believe this was because the US factories were being bombed … in 1917?

In 1940 the US produced 6 medium tanks, while Germany produced 1,300. In 1942 the US produced 13,000 medium tanks, while Germany produced 3,800. Are we to believe that this vast difference in scale of production was because German factories were bombed into oblivion … in 1942?

(Let me give you a hint on this. The great Schweinfurt raid, that stroke of brilliance that the USAAF was sure would cripple German industry in a single blow, took place in the second half of … wait for it … 1943! Oh, and it took perhaps a week and a half for ball bearing production to recover, while there was no perceptible impact on German overall industrial output.)

So no. No and no. No magical thinking please. The US was not predestined, nor ordained from God on high, to produce more tanks than Germany. The reason the US produced more tanks than Germany was because talented and dedicated people in the US made all the decisions they needed to make to build more tanks, while talented and dedicated people in Germany decided to build bigger and shinier tanks, and never focused on the decisions needed to build 2,000 -- much less 3,000 -- tanks per month. I don't doubt that the US would, due to it's greater industrial might, eventually out-produce Germany on tanks if it so decided. But Germany could well have produced 6,000 or 8,000 more tanks in 1942 and 15-20,000 more in 1943 IF THEY HAD MADE THE DECISIONS needed to do so. They did not. Instead they focused on flights of fancy, pursuing magic weapons that would sweep all adversaries before them rather than on what worked well enough and could be improved for higher production rates.

Imagine how the Normandie campaign would have gone if the Germans had fielded 8,000 useful tanks, instead of 1,000 "superior" tanks, against the 1,500 useful tanks the Allies managed to get ashore over the beaches. Or better yet give the Germans 8,000 useful tanks against 6-800 "superior" Allied tanks (led by the M26A1 Pershings-that-don't-yet-work-right).

Both sides achieved what they set out to do. One decision process was a war-winning mindset, and the other won the hearts and minds of generations of future wargamers.

The US also benefited from the UK facing most of the Panthers/Tigers in Normandy and having a 7.6XL to deal with them…

I'd be interested to see any assessments of destroyed Panthers and Tigers that gives inference on how many were destroyed by Sherman Fireflies. I've never seen such numbers, but my guess would be … a minor percentage. Maybe 5% or 10%? Anyone got a number?

Ordinance's excuse is we didn't think the Germans would build better tanks…

"Ordnance's excuse"? Despite all that has been presented here? Perhaps you could share with us the information that causes you to dispute that Ordnance pushed for the 76mm gun in 1942, as soon as the Sherman design was stabilized? And that Ordnance was pushing for the 90mm gun? And that Ordnance was pushing for many different designs to replace the Sherman?

Or does none of that count for you because it's just easier to say Ordnance made excuses?

Even fitting a 17pder to an M10 (an easy conversion) was beyond their thought process …

Is it beyond your thought process to ask why it was such an easy conversion? If it was beyond their thought process, why was having a turret and mantlet big enough to accept the upcoming British 17pdr part of the Ordnance M10 design spec?

And did you miss the part about those simple-minded unimaginative Ordnance louts putting the 90mm gun in the M10? Would someone care to share sound reasoning why Ordnance would want to use an as-yet unproven gun that the Brits won't be able build fast enough, with an eventual real shortcoming in accuracy (by US standards), when they already had a gun, the US 90mm, that promised the same or better anti-armor performance, better accuracy, for which barrels and ammo were already in volume production, and which could fire a downright useful HE round?

Before we jump all over the "US were idiots saved by the factories nature blessed them with" model, perhaps we can examine how it was that the British NEVER fell behind on the guns-vs-armor race, or how the Germans or the Soviets went through the entire war on the cutting edge? Oh wait, they all fell behind at some point or another. Of course with a 6 month pipeline from factory to field the US stayed behind almost as long as the Germans, and only half as long as the Brits, but then to the dismay of wargamers for generations to come the time it took the US to catch up was the same time it took to end the war. Because just as the 2pdr-armed Crusaders and the 76.2mm-armed T-34m1942s swept all before them, the 75mm armed Sherman managed to roll from Brittany across all of France and into the Rhineland, all the way down to Czechoslovakia. Sure it's humiliating to the US Army, and they should have waited for the M48 Patton because we can all show how that could have been available for ETO if those clowns at Ordnance were only as smart as we are, but …

Sigh.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Mark +10. Cheers!

And I just have to add that those swarms of M4s overrunning tankless German Infantry was not ordained by God, but was a result of the "clueless" Ordnance folks back in the US realizing that a swarm of "adequate" tanks was going to win your war quicker than one Uber Panzer out of gas and broken down miles behind the front.

Of course every American Tanker would have loved to ride into Normandy in an M1 Abrams but it wasnt in the cards. So tired of hearing about the poor US tankers!

What about the Submariners that died because our torpedoes were defective? The bomber crews who died in droves because our bombers didn't need escorts. Or the poor bloody infantry that had to face the MG42. The list of stupid things that got guys killed was long and sad. I just dont happen to include Shermans on that list.

I'll also stoke this debate a little bit more. I dont think the tank everyone says the US should've built could have been built during WWII. To get Panther like performance you needed a weight in the 45 ton range. Like the Pershing. IIRC that tank actually had so much engine and transmission trouble they actually pulled them OUT of service in Korea in favor of the Sherman Easy Eights, and a very few of the brand new M46 Pattons which had corrected many of the Pershings problems.

The Russian "tanked" their KVs. Their JS III didnt arrive until the very end of the war and left a lot to be desired. In short I don't think ANY ARMY had the capability to build a RELIABLE 45 plus ton tank with a good gun, speed and armor until after the war. For the same reasons all countries had jets but just a few made it into combat. The technology just wasn't there to get it right during the war.

Cheers!

In short I don't think ANY ARMY had the capability to build a RELIABLE 45 plus ton tank with a good gun, speed and armor until after the war.

Well the JSII was in that weight range and worked very well. They tanked the KV1 as it offered no real advantage over the T34 so started work on a replacement, got it into production. So I guess those Russians were just smarter than the dumb yanks at actually designing and getting into production a follow on design.

The bomber crews who died in droves because our bombers didn't need escorts.

Well there I would have to agree with you. Sheer bloody minded stupidity bordering on criminal negligence. The RAF told them it wouldn't work, but they had to try it. It is not as if the daylight raids were any more effective. The much vaunted Norden bombsight performed no better than anyone else's in combat.

Fred regards JS II respectfully disagree. It was too slow, had a low rof and if IIRC very limited ammo supply. Obviously the Russians thought so too which is why they quickly followed up with successor models at the end of and after the war just like we followed the Pershing with the Patton.
And the Brits followed the Comet with the Centurion.

Centurions, Pattons and T10 (aka JS-10) models stayed in production for decades. Unlike the Comet, Pershing and JSIIs which came and went in the blink of an eye. IMHO this just proves my point that the technology to build SUCCESSFUL heavy tanks did not exist during the war years.

Just my 2 cents. Cheers!

It was a 45 ton tank that worked. They chose the 122mm gun over the 100mm as they wanted a gun that was good at HE, as it was specifically built as a breakthrough heavy tank. For what it was designed for it was a very good design. As for being slow top speed was 23mph which was about average for WW2 tanks. It was a significant improvement over the KV1.
As for replacing it post war, well everyone did. The US dropped the Sherman and started producing Pershings and Pattons, Brits built the Centurion etc. If you are saying the JSII was a failure as they dropped it for a modern design post war, well the same goes for the M4.

No it is a thread about people who believe what tank you have decides if you win wars and hence call the Sherman a war winning tank. In reality the Sherman was an adequate tank in a war winning army. The Panther was an adequate tank in a war losing army. Both had their strengths and weaknesses.

No, the Panther is NOT adequate. Transmission was too weak for the final weight of the tank, so reliability suffered greatly.

Had the Panther been a 30-ton tank instead of a 45-ton tank (as originally designed!), it would have been exceptional.

Does anyone have references for the original armor thicknesses of the lightweight Panther?

I have question, if the germans had decided that their Sherman was Panzer IV.
And instead of making Panthers, tiger 1/2 and other big expensive tanks.

How many Panzer IVs could they have churned out? Maybe not 13 000 in a year.
But maybe 7000?
And isn't 25 panzer IVs laying in ambush.
Better then 1 tiger and 2 Panthers in ambush?

Gunfreak,
Here is a good chart but I'm not sure of the source:

Wolfhag

Simple question to answer Gunfreak. The Panzer IV was not a very efficient design. It took about 10% more resources to produce a Panther and about double to make a Tiger. So in stead of 5,000 Panthers and 1,500 Tigers you have 8,500 Panzer IV's. Not a huge extra number of tanks I think you would agree. And of course you have to train an extra 2,000 crews to man them.

Actually, gun freak, that military history visualized guy had another video (which I can't find right now) of a what-if alternative scheme of the Germans using their tank steel to build just anti-tank guns and artillery.

But, that would cause the Allies to fight a different way.

In a multi-player points campaign we once had for modern armor one player did just that. He only bought artillery and forward observers and just called in artillery when his opponents came on the table.

He destroyed most everyone who had a combined arms force.
I kind of remember the guy who just bought aircraft bombed him to rubble.

No, the Panther is NOT adequate. Transmission was too weak for the final weight of the tank, so reliability suffered greatly.

If you look at the actual availability rates then the Panther was about average for a WW2 tank, certainly once the initial teething problems were sorted out. There was a deterioration again late '44 onwards due to lack of spares, poor quality components (possibly due to poorer quality alloys or sabotage by forced labour) and poorly trained drivers due to lack of fuel for training. But the decline in serviceability late war applied to all German vehicles, not just the Panther. If you look at British and Russian tanks availability rates are not much better, which is why the British were so pleased to get the Grant and Sherman, and why the Russians instituted improved build quality in their factories and increased reliability making operations like Bagration possible. Attrition rates due to breakdowns during the Russian winter offensives '42/43 was one of the reasons Manstein's backhand offensive was so successful as when he launched his counterattack the Russian tank armies were down to handfuls of tanks.
So yes the Panther was an adequate tank in a war losing army and any actual or perceived problems with the Panthers reliability were not the reason the Germans lost the war.

Several posters appear to attribute the excellent reliability of the Sherman tank solely as a function of its intrinsic mechanical design. While the efficiency of its very fine automotive design must be given full due, the impact of the lavish service and maintenance organization that pretty much followed along wherever the Sherman chose to venture cannot be discounted. To appreciate the consequences of an absent service and maintenance support, take a look at the serviceability rates of 21st AG Shermans during the post-Normandy pursuit phase across France.

B

To appreciate the consequences of an absent service and maintenance support, take a look at the serviceability rates of 21st AG Shermans during the post-Normandy pursuit phase across France

A time of break-neck pursuit measured in hundreds of miles where all resources were allocated to advancing at any cost leaving behind all support services whilst the Tanks and infantry took as much ground as possibly to end the war 'by Christmas. Churchill Regiments were grounded and supply units stripped of their transport to give wheels to the advancing infantry.
If you check German 'ready' numbers you see a clear pattern. A Panzer Division would enter combat with 100+ tanks and within a week or so be reduced to 50% runners. The Kursk numbers are the starkest example of this attrition. Because of the obsession with only counting 'total combat losses' (check out the 'only 3 Tigers were combat losses at Kursk' mantra) the number of Panzers in repair are counted as if they were still fit and active.
Check (for example)12th SS for Normandy. Pz IV 'ready' numbers halve in 10 days

Thank you for your contribution, mkenny. I'm not sure, however, how it relates to the point I was raising, i.e. – that AFV serviceability rates depend a very great deal upon having a good service and maintenance echelon at hand.

B

If you check German 'ready' numbers you see a clear pattern. A Panzer Division would enter combat with 100+ tanks and within a week or so be reduced to 50% runners.

I think the key phrase is combat. All units availability rates went down in combat, not least from damage sustained. Particularly looking at Kursk which involved some of the most intense combat in WW2. That is different to availability rates when conducting a pursuit against minimal opposition.

The Germans put all their eggs in one basket. Huge heavy tanks with little thought given how to keep an effective number of them working in trying conditions. They built sexy specialised tank killers that were maintenance-heavy. The Allies worked the other way around. They decided an easy-to-maintain one-size-fits-all 'average' tank in sufficient numbers would do the job. To this end they constructed a balanced Army where maintenance and repair were every bit as sexy as an invulnerable glacis. The Commonwealth even had specialised Tank Regiments who did nothing else but ferry replacement tanks to combat units. No Allied Unit ever suffered the same attrition as a German Panzer Unit. The Allied system was geared to prevent a German-style degradation of front line numbers. The Allies designed into their system enough support and replacements to make sure they never lost 50% of their front-line numbers in any unit for more than a day or two.
The drop in numbers for 12th SS (the example I used) happened during the early days of Normandy and so had nothing to do with pursuit disintegration. If fact by the time the pursuit began all the Panzer Divisions had been severely depleted by losses in the earlier battles. As I said in an earlier post it is a mistake to conflate the losses in August with German losses in June and July. That is when the damage was done and the pursuit was the icing on the cake for the Allies. They were not 'gifted' the pursuit losses but earned them by going toe-to-toe with the Uber-panzers and forcing them into retreat.
To use a common UK phrase the Germans were all fur-coat and no knickers!

They decided an easy-to-maintain one-size-fits-all 'average' tank in sufficient numbers would do the job.

mkenny well at least someone agrees with my average tank in a war winning army assessment then!

The Germans put all their eggs in one basket.

I am not sure you could say they put all their eggs in one basket. They did build large numbers of Stug's and in fact Stug production was greater than Tiger and Panther production combined.

They built sexy specialised tank killers that were maintenance-heavy.

I don't think the Marder, Hetzer or Jagdpanzer IV series were particularly maintenance heavy.

No Allied Unit ever suffered the same attrition as a German Panzer Unit.

Except during the Ardennes Offensive when the US became very short of replacements due to losses sustained. So much so that the Brits had to give them 400 back. I hope they knocked the cost of those off the Lend Lease payments! :-)

They were not 'gifted' the pursuit losses but earned them by going toe-to-toe with the Uber-panzers and forcing them into retreat.

Blutarski was referring to the losses due to breakdowns that the allies sustained during the pursuit, due to the repair services being unable to keep up to argue that much of the M4's reliability was due to the repair services and not inherent reliability of the design. The Chieftain says as much in one of his videos on US armour.

Except during the Ardennes Offensive when the US became very short of replacements due to losses sustained.

Even with those losses US % numbers never sank to German levels. We are talking about a US AD losing a couple of tanks per TOE.

Blutarski was referring to the losses due to breakdowns that the allies sustained during the pursuit, due to the repair services being unable to keep up to argue that much of the M4's reliability was due to the repair services and not inherent reliability of the design. The Chieftain says as much in one of his videos on US armour.

I know where the table comes from and it was not a serious issue because even the most minor issue would render a tank immobile resulted in it dropping out. Repairs that would not even show up on a tanks daily returns became a problem because a tank with a faulty track was soon many miles in the rear of its advancing unit. It was a deliberate decision to simply abandon these tanks in order to advance as far as possible. It in no way compares to 12th SS being in a fairly static position in early June and losing 50% of its runners in less than a fortnight.

Repairs that would not even show up on a tanks daily returns became a problem because a tank with a faulty track was soon many miles in the rear of its advancing unit.

It was related to reliability and shows the M4 breaks down as often as any other tank, it was just that the repair was service was very efficient and usually had those tanks up and running again quickly. You can't compare that to a unit in combat as losses includes both breakdowns and repairs for tanks damaged in combat and use that to draw conclusions about tank A's reliability vs tank B. Tank availability rates for units in combat reflect both efficiency of repair services and access to replacement tanks.

Question… Why is it that the T-34 is often hailed as the best tank design of WWII while the Sherman is deamed a Death Trap.

I think the mythical reputation of T-34 is largely due to the having been employed first in battle. It went into production just in time to be around in numbers in summer 1941, and came as a real surprise to the Germans.

Sherman went into production a bit later, and first saw action in late 1942, by which time its dual-purpose 75 mm gun and frontal armour had much less shock value.

Had the Sherman gone into production and action two years earlier, it would have probably made quite an impression on its debute.

It does not help that the performance of Sherman is often compared to that of German equipment in 1944, while T-34 may get compared to German equipment available in 1941-42.

It was related to reliability and shows the M4 breaks down as often as any other tank

No it did not. Extensive road trials were carried out in the UK against domestic designs and it always came out top. An Allied tank (mid-late war) had mobility issues as one of the major factors in deciding if it entered full production. There was no chance the UK was going to 'do a Panther' and put an unreliable tank into the front line. The Challenger (17pdr armed) was developed in 1942 but issues with the mobility prevented it entering service until late 1944.
Tanks are fragile creatures and lack of routine maintenance soon catches up with you but again using a hectic full-speed reckless dash into NWE as the measuring stick for M4 reliability is absurd.
Again 12th SS lost 50% of its Pz IV runners in 10 days whilst being fairly static. That was a real problem

Again 12th SS lost 50% of its Pz IV runners in 10 days whilst being fairly static. That was a real problem

Again they were in combat, that does make a difference. My great uncle was a REME fitter and worked on all the wartime and post war tanks upto the Centurion Mk3. M4's soldiered on into the 50's in U.K. service as Kangaroos. His opinion of the M4 was it was about as reliable as the Cromwell and Comet, but easy to work on. His favourite tank was the Comet.