"Why the Bulge Didn't Break: Green Troops Grew Up Fast " Topic

… to Become Heroes of Hofen.

"The master story of the Battle of the Bulge is the German breakthrough that created the bulge in American lines and the U.S. fight to restore the original line. Not well known is the story of the U.S. infantry that held the northern flank. If not for the stand by three rifle companies, the bulge may have become a break. This study focuses on the defense of Hofen through the first-hand accounts of 12 soldiers who fought there, the combat reports of units in the field, the analyses of two infantry officers, and the detailed account of the battalion commander. This study also places that isolated battle in the context of the full Ardennes counteroffensive. Analysis of that research identifies four keys to American victory: (1) sound defensive tactics by battle commanders and their front-line units demonstrated high levels of unity, adaptability, and resilience that overcame bad strategic planning at the division level; (2) fortified key points strengthened a thinly held line after officers surveyed the terrain, identified the most vulnerable to attack, and concentrated machine guns and mortars in mutually supporting positions; (3) the battalion commander's order to meet every enemy movement with armed resistance proved valuable in confusing the enemy; and (4) a reserve unit was decisive in pushing back the Germans after they penetrated deep into the village on the final day of the battle. The first-hand accounts add depth to an understanding about how a small unit could hold a key point and how U.S. troops outnumbered five to one prevailed against the Germans' desperate, well planned assault. This project will contribute to future research on combat motivation, small-unit tactics, and defense of towns by infantry units. This study adds to a body of research that makes this point: On the front lines, quick reactions and quick minds made the difference makers…."
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Amicalement
Armand

I don't think an isolated breakthrough at a single village would have lead to a breakthrough. The offensive was doomed before it started as all the German generals knew. The plentiful US artillery support was also a vital factor in holding many of these small villages. More so when the Us started using proximity fused shells.

Bridges and damned Engineers.

I remember reading how German officers observed US troops near the front and considered them slovenly, undisciplined layabouts. Then the shooting would start, and the Germans were, time and again, stunned by the transformation.

I think the Germans learned to never underestimate your enemy when the shoot'n starts. Especially with the US Troops. Plus a lot of US FA, CEs blowing up bridges, ability to resupply, etc.

Definitely worth reading.

They say the place to stop a breakthrough is at the shoulders.

Given how thinly held the front was in the Ardennes in Dec 1944 it is not surprise the Germans scored some local successes.

But given the poor supply and lack of strength in depth the Germans had it is no surprise there was no breakthrough.

Some US units did poorly. Some were outstanding. Same goes for the Germans.

It's an over-hyped battle with a lot of exaggeration on all sides so it's hard even now to get to the truth.

Surprise! Troops defending in rough terrain are hard to destroy. When was the last time German troops had a major offensive in the west? Answer: Never. In addition to all those comments above.

There was plenty of US heroism all along the line. The 28th Division held up an entire panzer army for two crucial days and allowed reinforcements to reach Bastogne in time to hold it.

Glad you enjoyed the reading my friend!.

Amicalement
Armand

Interesting that the 3/395 has a faceless opponent. I did look it up--two battalions of Volksgrenadiers (326th VG Division) without their weapons companies. They pushed hard, no question: the US official history describes some of the bodies falling into US foxholes. But they're not the soldiers of the "Blitzkrieg Years." Those men were mostly dead. These are older or younger, sometimes doubtfully German, and not as well trained. That's not to take anything away from the 99th. But battles are decided by both sides.

I'm also intrigued by the author's repeated mention of calling up older National Guardsmen. Am I missing something? The Guard was called up pre-War and by units. But there were certainly older men in the US replacement pool. My father was a 1944 draftee, and he used to tell me that one of his companions in Navy boots was 44 years old, one glass eye and five kids at home. (I note the Navy washed him out. The Volksturm would not have.)

It would be interesting to see what would have happened if they had been able to seize the fuel depot.

No doubt, they would have been able to advance a bit further, though as mentioned, ultimately the attack was too little, and too late to change the course of the war.

Should have had the panzer divisions attack Normandy's beaches in the first 24 – 48 hours, after the D-Day landings.

People often forget the Germans tried Panzer Attacks against US landings three times. Sicily, Salerno and Anzio. While they almost succeeded each attack was beaten back by naval gunfire. The armada assembled for Normandy was the largest yet and fully capable of stopping any German attack within 10 miles mol of the coast.

Then there is the tactical air support. Look what that did to the attack at Mortain. Add to it that the Allies landed over 1000 tanks on D-Day alone and the vaunted Panzer Reserve had about half that number anywhere near Normandy and you see the "had Hitler released the Panzers" myth exposed as post war Hollywood hype.

And as to the Bulge, it never broke in part because we were able to pull back faster than the Germans were able to advance … granted their advance was well hindered by the terrain, weather and "those damned" engineers." And in an even larger part because of the mobility of the allied forces which never allowed the Germans to achieve a real breakthrough. So the Bulge bent but never broke.

Cheers!

Not to take anything away from the defenders that held.
They had a tough time of it for a while.

But.

The germans they faced were low quality and demonstrated rather poor tactics. They were attacking in a rushed manner on a narrow predictable frontage with weak to no support.
The result was predictable.

Once the initial surprise was over the german units were stuck on those bad roads with nowhere to go other than the traffic jams to front and rear.
Without enough fuel to do either really.
It was always doomed.
Dooooomed I tell ye captain.

The German generals knew this wasn't ever going to work.
They knew their business.
Hitler might have thought they were probably right.
But maybe, just maybe a miracle would happen.
They would break through.
Allied morale would collapse.
He wouldn't have to call on the aliens to fly him to Argentina and fake his suicide.

Then there is the tactical air support. Look what that did to the attack at Mortain.

Another myth. Post battle operational analysis showed that the vast majority of German Panzers knocked out had been hit by AP shot. Even when they counted all the ones where it wasn't possible to determine th cause it only amounted to a handful of tanks. Conversely the losses of tac air pilots and machines was significant. Mortain was also the nail in the coffin of the towed TD units. Although the towed TD guns, primarily from the 30th ID, knocked out significant numbers of Panzers they suffered heavy losses. A similar pattern was found in the Ardennes and hastened the conversion of towed units to SP.

It's true that air attack did not actually knock out many tanks, but the fear of air attack was a major factor in reducing the effectiveness of German armor. During the Mortain battle, many German columns which had been attacking successfully during the night simply pulled off the road and hid themselves as soon as the sun came up.

Hitler was purging his generals in the hope to get a dream team of aggressive commanders who would push hard and compensate for the relative lack of mobility that was starting to cripple the German army.

He needed a knock out blow, a hard victory that would force one of his enemies to call an armistice allowing him to send everything left against the remaining enemy and hope to stop their advance.

One look at the situation in the East and it's clear there are no opportunities there.

There should be more chances in the West, places like the Netherlands and the Voges had been fought over bitterly without much result and Hitler in concert with his generals began to think that the Ardennes could be the ideal point of attack.

The dividing line between the British and the US ran pretty much through Belgium. If his army could retake Antwerp it would offer many opportunities.

First it would rob the Allies of their major supply hub. Second by taking Antwerp it meant that the British had no port to flee too and ship back to the UK, therefore the British might be willing to seek terms to avoid seeing their army destroyed and would reign in the Americans.

The distance to Antwerp was short enough and the carefully hoarded fuel was enough to get the armoured spearhead into Antwerp. The factories had been cranking out new tanks and equipment and German soldiers in the West would be the best equipped German soldiers ever. They would receive the heaviest air cover the Germans could muster.

They had defeated the French in that same spot in 1940 and all reports seemed to indicate the Allies were equally complacent about it in 1944.

From Hitler's perspective it could achieve a lot and possibly change the course of the war, or at least buy him time to stablize the situation in the East.

Meanwhile the US army's vast military apparatus seemed to work quit well. Yes there were problems with AGF's reporting system and false assumptions that lead to a late introduction of more powerful equipment such as better tank guns, but it was a matter of a quick fix, as much of the footwork had already been done and they could be implemented in a matter of months.

The repple-depple system created "bands of brothers" veterans who could rely on each other, while replacements, many of them actual veterans returning from the hospital were treated as FNG's of the "Don't tell me your name, you'll be dead soon anyway."

Training and equipment was excellent and produced good results. Soldiers were tested for their aptitudes and while the infantry got the bottom of the barrel many were still fit young men, if a bit lacking in education and other talents. The men on the other side were either too young, too old and the veterans were exhausted after many years of war.

I won't go into the detail as to what went wrong on the German side.

US troops were taken by surprise and began to fall back, they were being pushed back, but they were retreating, not routing. Officers began to take charge, set up defensive positions, the US sent in its reserves to prop up the area. The veteran paratroopers bolstered resolve.

There never was a panic in the face of the Panzers, just like there never was a panic in Normandy or at any other point.

US troops didn't just stand slack-jawed and overawed by the enemy panzers and let them run over them. They fought back, it was hard, not very pretty, but then again good soldiers are hard and mean and learn to fight the enemy on their terms.

The line held and the Germans found themselves unable to push forward, the tanks sat idle, burning up fuel while the reserves of gasoline were stuck in traffic or still in the depots. The whole idea of "capturing enemy stocks" is a post-war fantasy, yes they figured it would be a huge boon if they could capture these stores, but even the most optimistic general knew that it only took one tough guy and a match to put an end to that pipedream.

The last attempt to score a knock out blow was lost because the US line may not have fought the Germans to a standstill, it caused enough disruption to stall the advance at which point it became increasingly exposed and vulnerable to counter-attacks.

That's a very interesting commentary, Patrick, thank you. In fact, this whole discussion is interesting! I'm learning a good deal.

Daryl

@Patrick R
The German generals were not under any illusion about the chances of the operation, unlike Hitler, which is why they tried so hard to push for the small solution. In fact the offensive achieved about what they expected. Their one disappointment was not capturing Bastogne.
The young boys and old men applied as much to the Americans as it did the Germans. Reports of the replacements received in the run up to the Bulge are depressing reading. The youngsters were not considered mature enough and the older recruits not fit enough for front line combat. The standard of training was lamented as inadequate and the officers and NCO's had to spend all their energies in keeping the men in the line and firing back when attacked by the Germans.
This thread outlines some of the problems.
TMP link
Unlike the Germans the US could supply sufficient replacements it was the quality that was lacking.

Interesting thread and appreciate everyone sharing! (I enjoy this about the hobby…)

A little piece I'd like to contribute is a snippet from my grandfather's experience. Not really adding to the overall details (like some of the excellent postings!) but putting a "human" touch on it.

He was a 26 year old replacement in the 28th Division and wrote a letter to my grandmother of his experience. I'll paraphrase (don't have the doc here.)

He shipped over to Europe in September '44 and in October, said that he and the other replacements camped out in a field and the next morning, trucks arrived and there was no rhyme or reason as to who went where. Men were loaded into trucks and sent out. It was also the last time he saw his best friend from basic, Milt Pfeiffer.

Next day, he was sent to either the 110th or 112th Regt. and 5 minutes later, because he had a drafting background, was sent to Division HQ (S-3) as a clerk. He did keep a small diary, about the size of a business card. Made notes of various things or duties (for example was a guard several times for Lt. Col. Tripani, the intel officer and was with him when the 112th was attacking Kommerscheidt. Tripani never reached the village because the jeep got ditched off the Kall trail.)

He was at Division HQ at Wiltz when the attack began and was one of the men thrown into the defense during the retreat. At one point (think Dec. 23rd, outside Seibert?) he, per the diary, "spent night in foxhole with bazooka."

Always felt the 28th never got credit for slowing up the advance. I didn't learn much directly from him as he did not want to talk about it much and I was 16 and too ignorant to ask the "right" questions when he passed. One or two stories he did mention I was happy to have corroborated 30 years later when I inherited the letters and documents and able to get a better appreciation for what those guys went through.

J

Why the 28th and the 99th sustain their positions and the "Golden Lions" of the 106th desintegrated as a card castle…?

Amicalement
Armand

Lots of reasons Armand. The 106th suffered the perfect storm. Even before they shipped out to the ETO the division had been hit hard for replacements and lost over 7,000 men, practically the entire fighting strength of the division to replace losses in Italy and Normandy. They received a lot of 18 year old draftees and replacement officers and NCO's and had little time to train and wield the division into a cohesive whole. They were held up disembarking in France by a storm and suffered 3 days on ship and the inevitable sea sickness. Arriving on the continent to take over from the 2nd ID they were cold, wet and exhausted. Although taking over the 2nd ID's emplacements they only had the standard allocation of heavy weapons. The 2nd being veteran had acquired more and took the extras with them. The few days before the German attack were spent trying to get the troops dry, provide hot food and settle in rather than getting familiar with plans to defend against a German attack and coordinating with units on either side.
Once the offensive started there were command failures right up to Middleton at Corps level who gave Jones wildly optimistic timescales for reinforcements arriving. Jones then based his entire plan on those reinforcements arriving when Middleton said they would. When that didn't happen he went to pieces as he had no other alternative plans. There was also the extraordinary mix up between Middleton and Jones over the withdrawal of the 2 Regiments on the Schnee Eifel. Middleton thought he had given Jones permission to pull them back, Jones thought Middleton told him to hold. There was no coordination or supervision of Devine's 14th Cavalry Group and they were left to their own devices. Devine should have been relieved of his command when he pitched up at the 106th command post on the 17th as he had lost control of his unit, but the staff of the 106th failed to recognise there was a problem. When finally ordered to try and breakout the 2 Regiments on the Schnee Eifel failed to coordinate their actions and attacked piecemeal. Had a single coordinated attack been put in it is possible they may have pushed through, albeit with some loss. As it was the piecemeal attacks were easily beaten back by the Germans.
Other parts of the division such as the 424th IR fought well. So the division wasn't a total washout.

Fred Cartwright and others, would you please use common English and no initials for us non-rivet counters out here. What is an AP or TD for example?

Plus a lot of US FA, CEs blowing up bridges, ability to resupply, etc.

FA = Field Artillery
CE = Combat Engineer

Post battle operational analysis showed that the vast majority of German Panzers knocked out had been hit by AP shot. Even when they counted all the ones where it wasn't possible to determine th cause it only amounted to a handful of tanks. Conversely the losses of tac air pilots and machines was significant. Mortain was also the nail in the coffin of the towed TD units.

AP = Armor Piercing
TD = Tank Destroyer

Yes, I thought most gamers/history guys/Vets would know those abbreviations. But No matter, Steve is correct. And everybody should feel free to ask if they are not sure. Many here are always glad to help.

Wow Fred. In a very short amount of space an excellent summary! Well done!

The interesting thing for me about Ardennes, Mortain etc is how decidedly so-so German tanks were when on the offensive.

When given first shot from a concealed place with an L/70 against Shermans, they were pretty potent. When it was Panthers doing the advancing against concealed Shermans, suddenly they look a bit…ordinary.

It's almost as though the tactical situation somehow shapes the performance of the troops and their equipment. Imagine that!

@Patrick R
The German generals were not under any illusion about the chances of the operation, unlike Hitler, which is why they tried so hard to push for the small solution. In fact the offensive achieved about what they expected. Their one disappointment was not capturing Bastogne.

The generals were really nervous in 1940, expecting any moment a report that their armoured spearhead had been flanked by a French army.

The classic post-war narrative, even if we take into account failing memories, honest mistakes and 20/20 hindsight, doesn't quite mesh with some of the evidence that came to light when it turned out most of the German archives had not been destroyed, but had been safely kept in East Germany.

It seems that while many were apprehensive, they also very much wanted it to work, if only in view of basic self-preservation. They may have known there were too many problems to overcome, despite the massive effort to gather the last major combat force they would deploy in the war. They were all hoping the allies might have a bad day and if you are desperately looking for solutions …

The young boys and old men applied as much to the Americans as it did the Germans. Reports of the replacements received in the run up to the Bulge are depressing reading. The youngsters were not considered mature enough and the older recruits not fit enough for front line combat. The standard of training was lamented as inadequate and the officers and NCO's had to spend all their energies in keeping the men in the line and firing back when attacked by the Germans.

There was a major manpower crisis in the closing months of 1944. Especially in the infantry where casualties were really getting out of hand. At this point they were still sending fit men to be clerks, artillerymen, supply personnel, while fast-tracking whatever they could scrounge to fill in the ranks of the infantry. They had also assumed that the advance would be much slower allowing men to accommodate to their units. In practice we had "bands of brothers" where the FNG (effing new guy) wasn't given room to fit in.

But even if the 18-19 year olds or those in their late 20s and early 30's may have seemed like kids or old men to the twenty something veterans, it was a far cry from the problems facing the Germans. If the US had a manpower crisis, the Germans were in a catastrophic situation.

They still had veterans, but many were exhausted and long past their peak efficiency. Many units now had a mix of 15-16 year olds and 40-50 year olds, propped up by all the men who had until now been able to dodge frontline duty, but who found their cushy position back in the Fatherland no longer got them immunity from the meatgrinder at the front.

Many german soldiers were already malnourished by default, some having less than half the required daily rations available, supplemented by whatever Scho-Ka-Kola and Pervitin they could scrape together (being caffeine laced chocolate and methamphetamines)

Both faced manpower problems, but the American one was pretty much a significant inconvenience, while it was a huge problem for the Germans.

Unlike the Germans the US could supply sufficient replacements it was the quality that was lacking.

The disparity at this point became critical. Despite their desperation this was the last realistic attempt to rebuild a force in the West, come 1945 it would be children as young as 12, men in their 60's and 70's and women of any age that would have to take up arms to defend the Reich.

Oddly enough many of these last stand garrison units had one tiny advantage over the frontline troops, they still had some small food reserves and were slightly better off.

Of course they were no match for regular troops and most resistance collapsed no matter how brave they tried to be.

Another point on the 106th Infantry. The position they were placed in was simply untenable in the face of a major German attack. The 2nd ID, which had held that position the week before the attack recognized that and had plans in place for an immediate fall-back if there was an attack. Unfortunately, when the 2nd ID turned things over to the 106th they did not share their plans with them. The commander of the 106th quickly recognized the vulnerability of his position and was in the process of creating a similar fall-back plan, but the Germans attacked before he could get it in place. A lot of plain bad luck doomed the 106th.

If the US had a manpower crisis, the Germans were in a catastrophic situation.

The parlous state of the German replacement system is well recognised. The manpower raised for the Ardennes offensive was the scrapings of the scrapings of the barrel. It is a surprise to many that the US repple depple was under the degree of strain it was.

Another point on the 106th Infantry. The position they were placed in was simply untenable in the face of a major German attack.

The simple truth is that those 2 Regiments should never have been on the Schnee Eifel. It served no military purpose to keep them there. They should have been pulled back and the line shortened, particularly in the stated US policy of gambling on keeping the Ardennes thinly held. If you are going to keep a line thinly held best to shorten the front as much as possible. There was a misplaced feeling that having captured it they shouldn't give it up as that would mean retreating and American pride wouldn't stand for that. I am not sure the poor boys of the 106th would have shared that view.

Many thanks!….

Amicalement
Armand