"Was d'Erlon's defeat inevitable at Waterloo?" Topic

Similar incidents? Sure,at Bussaco especially.

In the grand scheme of things, the "heavily pressed" are the French. They have chucked in four divisions against four weak brigades and achieved – perhaps – the routing of one of those brigades and pushing back half of another, with the attack spent, except for the single regiment on Marcognet's front. The situation is, in the context of a Napoleonic battle, not particularly desperate.

I leave it entirely to your judgement whether you think Uxbridge was rash or not, or his charge worth it or not.

Not Bussaco. Smaller narrower French columns spread over a much bigger area not supporting each other. Also the terrain is very different (I have walked both). How the French got up Bussaco hill is amazing.
Most Peninsular columns were 1 or 2 companies wide. That is what makes the Waterloo columns exceptional, they are 5 or 6 companies wide, depending on skirmishers in or out.

Well, I guess it depends upon what you think the salient point is. D'Erlon's formation at Waterloo seems to have been unique; a minor success in the midst of large French failed infantry attack seems very similar to me.

The "close run thing" remark relates surely to the just-in-time arrival of the Prussians rather than to any specific event.

In the main area of the assault there were 5 French brigades vs. 3 Allied brigades. Kempt's brigade seemed to be in good shape. The leading unit (of what size?) of Donzelot's division was stopped, as well as Bourgeois' brigade to their left. Marcognet's division was in compact formation and was pushing across the road. Donzelot's division seemed to be spread out behind, not sure if the two brigades were in two groups, but it seems like Donzelot's second brigade was still coming up. Pegot's brigade of Durutte's division had not engaged yet, and very probably never reached the allied line, having started so late after the other three divisions. So it's not really possible to know if the French could have created a crisis in Bijlandt's and Pack's brigades. If the French did create a crisis at that point, who knows if Lobau's divisions could have advanced in time to exploit it.

This may be of Interest:

Apart from the ‘first' Kempt's letter (below) that was published in the well known ‘WATERLOO LETTERS' by H.T. Siborne, I have posted those letters that were published in Gareth Glovers ‘SIBORNE'S UNPUBLISHED PAPERS' and in his ‘WATERLOO ARCHIVE' series of books. I have only transcribed letters by individuals where they go into the action in some detail.

Letter 148: General Sir James Kempt to Sir Hussey Vivian (no date)

"On the 18th, the 95th regiment was in front of the other Regiments of my Brigade, occupying a knoll and some broken ground Light Troops, and in a line with a considerable Corps of Belgian and Nassau Infantry. All these retired as the head of the Enemy's mass of Infantry approached them, at which critical moment, and just and just as the French Infantry were gaining the road and hedgerow which runs all along the ridge of the position, I met it at the charge with the 28th, 32nd, and 79th Regiments in line, and completely repulsed the Enemy's column, driving it in a state of the greatest confusion down the slope of the position.

This was completely affected, and I was in the act of restraining the men from the pursuit (having no supports whatever), when General Ponsonby's Brigade of Cavalry charged a separate column that had come up on our left where Pack's Brigade was stationed. The Enemy made three different attempts to carry the position Immediately on the left of the road where my Brigade was posted, and were invariably repulsed in the same manner.

*********************************************************
Gareth Glovers ‘SIBORNE'S UNPUBLISHED PAPERS'

28th Regiment of Foot

Letter 176: Captain Charles Cadell Edinburgh 1835.

"About 1 or ½ past 1 – when the 28th in the rear of La Haye Sainte, checking with the bayonet and musketry, a heavy French column that was charged shortly after by the heavy cavalry. After which we moved to the rear of the hill and lay down to avoid the heavy cannonade, with the skirmishing in the front."

Letter 177: From the same. Letter 177

"With regard to Waterloo, I think that the 79th was to our left, after the attack of D'Erlon's, I am certain the Cuirassiers attacked the 28th, I think it was to the close of the fight that the 28th brought up their left also marching to throw a flank fire into a column that was opposing us."

Letter 178: Ensign Thomas William Blewett Mountsteven (undated)

"About half past 10 o'clock, the enemy were observed falling in, and soon after, in movement to commence the attack. To wait his approach the regiments of the 5th Division (Picton's) were ordered to form into close columns at deploying distance. The enemy continued to advance in columns, under cover of a tremendous cannonade, which was answered by our artillery with great spirit. A body of Belgian infantry which had been posted some distance in front fled on the enemy's approach and were honoured with hisses and cries of shame in passing our troops. The 8th Brigade (Kempt's consisting of 95th Rifles, 32nd, 79th, and 28th Regiments) then deployed into line and advanced close to the division guns, lined a road which ran along the summit of the ridge having a hedge on each side. The 9th Brigade (Pack's consisting of the 1st, 42nd, 44th, and 92nd Regiments) were in reserve in the second line. The light companies descended into the valley and maintained a severe contest against superior numbers, being at last obliged to retire by the advance of a strong column of the enemy towards the left of the 79th and right of the 28th , a close engagement followed with the line, of warm and obstinate duration, but of lasting honour to the 8th Brigade. The enemy were charged and routed; and the Brigade of cavalry (Ponsonby's consisting of the 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons) coming up, intervals were made for them, they gallantly charged past us, surrounded the flying column and took the whole prisoners, it was at this period of the action that General Picton was killed. A body of the enemy's cavalry which had come to the support of their infantry having now been perceived in our front, the 79th Highlanders advanced about 50 paces and formed square. The enemy having been repulsed, the 79th were soon after ordered to this former position, and again lined the hedge nearest the enemy, and were sufficiently occupied by his advanced troops in front."

******************************************************************************************************************

Gareth Glover's ‘WATERLOO ARCHIVE'series

Letter 88: Major General Sir James Kempt to Major General Sir James Willoughby Gordon.
Genappe, 19th June 1815

" I do assure you on the faith and honour of a soldier, that 3 British Regiments in line, very weak (for they had lost upwards of 800 men and 42 officers two days before in the action at Quatre Bras) absolutely met, charged and repulsed a mass of the enemy not less than 8 thousand just as they had gained the crest of the position. After the Dutch, &c. &c. had given way, and at a time when were without any support whatever; it was an act of desperation but it succeeded, there was for one moment a struggle and as example is everything in our profession, I placed myself at the front of this particular crisis. The enemy were on one side of the hedge, we on the other; and how I escaped alive I cannot imagine. In every part of the position the attacks were equally furious and all had I believe, to exert themselves in an equal degree, on these occasions you must excuse a little egotism. I was wounded slightly in three places although I fear one in the knee, the ball having entered to the bone, will be unpleasant and tedious, but I have left the Division for an instant and write with great pain and difficulty."

79th (Cameron Highlanders) Regiment of Foot

Letter 83 Sergeant William Dewar to James Dewar.
Paris 5th August 1815

"Accordingly, the following Regiments made a most desperate charge with the bayonet after firing a volley; 28th Regiment, Royal Scots, 42nd, 79th, and 92nd Regiments and met the enemy who had just advanced to the mouth of our guns and after a few minutes of butchery the enemy retired in all directions. This being observed by the general commanding the heavy cavalry, he immediately charged the enemy and rode down thousands under their feet. I saw one sergeant of the Scots Greys cut down 7 men with his own hands; the Scots Greys and Queens Bays [Royals] made this charge and brought back some thousand prisoners…"

95th Regiment of Foot (Riflemen)

Unknown Officer (By Editors deduction, could be Orlando Felix, William Chapman or William Shenley)
Camp of Clichy

"but all of a sudden his cavalry turned to the right and left and showed large masses of infantry, who advanced up in the most gallant style, to the cries of ‘Vive L'Empereur', while a tremendous cannonade was opened to cover their approach. They had arrived at the very hedge behind which we were the muskets were almost muzzle to muzzle, and a French mounted officer attempted to sieze the Colours of the 32nd Regiment. Poor Picton ordered the charge of our Brigade, commanded by Sir James Kempt. When the French saw us rushing through the hedge, and heard the tremendous ‘Huzzah which we gave, they turned; but instead of running, they walked off in close columns with greatest steadiness, and allowed themselves to be butchered without any material resistance. At this moment, part of General Ponsonby's brigade of heavy cavalry took them in flank, and, beside killed and wounded, nearly two thousand were made prisoners."

*********************************************************

9th Infantry Brigade: Major General Sir Denis Pack

Gareth Glovers ‘SIBORNE'S UNPUBLISHED PAPERS'

92nd (Highland) Regiment of Foot (Gordon Highlanders)

Letter 184: Lieutenant James Kerr Ross
25th November 1834

"We were at all events some way down the slope from the crest of the position, with a view, to our avoiding the cannonade as much as practicable, having been a very weak battalion after the severe loss we had sustained on the 16th.

In consiquence of Sir Denis Pack's intimation we advanced in close columns up the hill, on our ascending which, we encountered a strong column of French infantry forming on the top of our position, whose leading files gave us their fire which our men did not return, but advanced steadily to the attack, and when we got within a very short distance of the enemy (at perhaps not 30 yards) they broke up and ran back in great confusion. Our fire now was very distructive and on our charging the enemy columns which was now in flight in all directions. The Scots Greys were marched from our rear towards their flanks, and got into and round this part of the enemy, which on attacking was estimated by us to consist of about 3,000 men and out of which, I believe the French lost two thirds in killed and prisoners."

Letter 186 Lieutenant James Hope

Extract from the Military Memoirs of an Infantry Officer 1809-16

" With drums beating and colours flying, and eagles soaring above their huge headdresses, the enemy advanced in solid columns to attack. Their progress was considerably retarded by the fire of our artillery, and volleys of musketry from the Belgian infantry, till the enemy having almost gained the summit of the ridge, our allies partly retired from the hedge. At the entreaty of their officers, the greater part of them again returned to their posts, but it was mearly to satisfy their curiosity, for they almost immediately again retired without firing a shot. The officers excerted themselves to the utmost to keep the men at their duty, but their efforts were fruitless and at length the whole corps took to their heels.

The post thus abandoned by Les-Braves-Belges, was instantly re-occupied by the 3rd Battalion the Royals, and the 2nd Battalion 44th Regiment. Those two weak battalions poured on the assailants a heavy fire of musketry, but the latter continued to advance with unflinching courage, till they succeeded in compelling out friends also to retire from the hedge.
Everyone was now convinced that our affairs had approached an important crisis and that an attempt to resist the torrent must instantly be made, or the heights, and with them victory, yielded to the enemy. The Belgians had left us; the royals and 44th had also retired to our rear, and the 42nd regiment being posted on an important spot considerably to our left, from which they could not move, the hazardous attempt devolved upon the 92nd Regiment, then about 230 strong.

On arriving at the hedges, the enemy formed in close column, opposed to us a front no longer than our own, but then they had ten similar fronts to support the one in view. In fact their numbers were 3,000, ours 230. Precieving the urgent state of affairs, and the absolute necessity that existed of adopting some decisive measures, Sir Denis Pack, said with all earnestness, ‘Ninety Second, you must charge! All the troops to your front have given way!' To this not very encouraging address, the regiment responded with cheers, then advanced to measure bayonets with the enemies. For some time the latter seemed resolute to give us a meeting, but in arriving within 30 paces of them, the whole column completely panic struck, wheeled to the right about, and in the utmost confusion, attempted to escape. But it was now too late; for on perceiving the disorderly manner in which the French infantry were retiring, Sir William Ponsonby rushed forward with the 1st, 2nd Scots Greys and 6th regiment of Heavy Dragoons, cut his way through them as far as the valley – killed and wounded an immense number – captured 2 eagles, and took 2,000 prisoners.

Paul :)

Paul, always good to mine Siborne and associated works.

The letters of the 1st Light Bn KGL 147-162 (Glover) support the notion of Kempt's brigade attacking the French, a couple of companies of 1st Lt KGL firing first on cuirassiers and then on the flank of the French column. The British cavalry appearing a few minutes later.

Wellingon himself appears to have ordered this action.

Thanks Paul. Kempt's brigade has a ton of reports, but Pack's brigade didn't have much.

SO from the accounts from Dibble:

1) French masse- though could repel cavalry fairly easily with the file holders and flanker moving/ turn to L or R to fill in and face about is what would eb the a"solid" square type formation was not able to conduct this action upon the charge of the Hvy brigade.
2) THis was due the panic and disorder already in progress due to Packe's advance/charge the head of the French column shortly after it had to proceed some distance out of the hedge ( and yet any disorder command and control it had caused in process of recovering).

.: makes sense of it failure and need to have Less put forth and RES as mentioned by many.
D'Erlon had a more difficult task than what many games seem to present.
Tactical game attack's against troops on reverse slopes are very challenging, I can confirm!

I also understand there are some books on their way with the French perspective.
It would be good to find out their view and how it might confirm or counter Packe's and Kempt's view of that situation. For example I have seen something ( can't sight) but the heads of D'Erlons central two columns were in the process of deploying out at the one or both of the hedges.
IE the second battalion of the columns were marching to a flank to place battalions in line side by side for a 4 battalion, closer supported line of battle. If true-how far did it get before being hit/repulsed or just panic'd?

I wonder how effective the large columns used by D'Erlon would have been against cavalry.

Battalions equalised the strength of their companies so that all companies would have been the same strength and the same frontage. If a battalion close column formed closed square, it was simple matter of the flank files of each company facing outwards.

How would a division formed with battalions in line one behind the other have formed such a closed square? All the battalions in the column had different strengths and therefore took up different frontages. If one of these columns tried to form a closed square, the sides would have been completely irregular.

I am so grateful that what I thought a daft question has produced so many responses.

The consensus seems that this was a massive and dense attack, in some formation that is still very much disputed. It went against units depleted by action 48 hours earlier but who largely stood, indeed counter attacked, but were in a fairly precarious position.

The French were in columns, of some sort, which could defend themselves against cavalry, we then seem to agree. But wait a minute, and it is well documented, we now hear about them deploying into a more extended firing line. Makes perfect sense against enemy infantry. Bit fragile though!

Let us add in a hedge or two, that no one expected (but give or take a bull in a field, a sunken lane, some stream no one knew about) that should have been allowed for.

Let us then concede the simply incredible timing of the cavalry attack, to the second, to catch the French in disarray……..

I keep coming back to my opening question. How could professional senior officers send infantry up a masked slope, against notoriously resolute infantry, knowing that the only possible reaction would be a cavalry counterattack? Without any cavalry support worth mentioning…? They had no cavalry support. None

OK, the restricted space…but then do not do it and invite disaster. Had the infantry line broken, as desired, what other arm of Wellington's Army could have saved the day, in the minutes available?

His defeat was inevitable. Except it actually was a close run thing I admit. Great discussion here. Thanks

With regard to the extended firing line, I guess we have to bear in mind that most accounts mention a massive French skirmish line.

This would have filled the gap between the columns and added considerably to the French firepower…if even only half the Voltiguers available to Divisions Donzelot & Marcognet and Brigade Bourgeois reach a firing position, that's still 1000 muskets banging away through the hedge – enough to account for the intense fire that many British accounts recall.

As to why anyone would order it…in theory, the Division Blob should have been cavalry proof by reason of sheer mass, and I'm sure I've read at least one French account that describes the British cavalry battering at the flanks of the columns, but being unable to actually break in.

Cavalry-proof, that is, so long as everyone held their nerve and ground. Instead there was a mass panic. I suppose it's worth considering that, for D'Erlon's corps, this was their baptism of fire, given that they famously spent the 16th wandering between Quatre Bras and Ligny. Did that incident maybe jolt their confidence in their leaders, and leave them lethally vulnerable to a cry of 'We are betrayed!'?

How could professional senior officers send infantry up a masked slope, against notoriously resolute infantry, knowing that the only possible reaction would be a cavalry counterattack? Without any cavalry support worth mentioning…? They had no cavalry support. None.

One point to consider is that British cavalry counter-attacks of this sort had been quite rare in the Peninsular so it is possible that D'Erlon didn't consider it. He may have been focusing entirely on the infantry firepower problem and concentrated too much on solving that – which, although still unsuccessful on its own terms, seems to have been relatively more successful than attacking by battalion column.

Dawson's tome WATERLOO 'The truth at last' shows the casualties for each of Quiot's Division losses at Waterloo as a whole:

54th Regiment of Line Infantry: 921 other ranks. Lost 468.
55th Regiment of Line Infantry: 1,103 total. Lost 512.
28th Regiment of Line Infantry: 856 other ranks. Lost 702.
105th Regiment of Line Infantry:983 all ranks. Lost 450.

There is also this first-hand account by Dominique Fluret:

"We were engaged against the English sharpshooters and sixteen pieces of cannon formed in battery fired at us. In under a quarter of an hour the infantry had been pushed back and the cannons were captured at the point of the bayonet without firing a single shot. It was our Voltigeurs who burnt their cartridges.
After our assault had captured the battery, a mass of cavalry charged us and we jumped into the ditches. We did not have time to rally many. They were cut down by their sabres, and some others were made prisoners. The cavalry continued its charge, and we were then driven back by infantry. But as we stood in the depression, to our left, two regiments of Lancers came to our aid and saved us…With the cavalry passed, we crawled on our stomachs to join our squares, which fired from their four faces into the English dragoons. The drums of the regiment beat the rally. We were reunited. The regiment was reduced to about four hundred men, and were formed into a single battalion. We then deployed as sharpshooters along with the Young Guard. We marched against the Prussians"

So this account contradicts those of the allied infantry eyewitnesses who state that the French started to retire before the cavalry attack and there is the interesting point that at least one French regiment managed to form a square.

Just one other thing about this Dawson tome 'and I have brought it up before' is:

Dawson states that the 28th ligne must have "broken into" the 32nd foot because of what Lt.Belcher noted, and then goes on to Belcher's account as published in Siborne's Waterloo letters No.154.

"In the second attack of the French infantry on the left centre of the line, the brigade advanced in line to charge. Immediately on the passing of the narrow road which ran along our front, the ensign carrying the Regimental colours was severely wounded. I took the colour from him until another ensign could be called. Almost instantly after, the brigade still advancing, and the French infantry getting into disorder and beginning to retreat, a mounted officer had his horse shot under him. When he extricated himself, we were close to him. I had the colour on my left arm and was slightly in advance of the division. He suddenly fronted me and seized the staff, I still retaining a grasp of the silk; the colours were nearly new. At the same moment, he attempted to draw his sabre, but he had not accomplished it when the covering colour-sergeant, named Switzer, thrust his pike into his breast and the right rank and file of the division, namely Lacy, fired into him. he fell dead at my feet."

Dawson goes on in his narration

"However, the 32nd Regiment of Foot had lost their colour to the 28th regiment of Line Infantry. The French mounted officer is likely to have been Battalion commander Marens…."

Did the 32nd (Cornwall) Regiment of Foot lose their regimental colours?

Were they "broken into" by the 28th ligne?

Evidence shows not so on both counts. Dawson gives no evidence of what he claims seeing as the 32nd had deployed into line and that Belcher 'Who now had the colour' "on my left arm and was slightly in advance of the division" could not have meant that the 32nd was "broken into" as Dawson puts it because Belcher was in advance and the 32nd were deployed in line. Do we honestly have to believe that what seemed to be a French mounted officer, who had already lost his horse and was struggling to get up from under it, who no doubt grasped the flag-staff but was killed at that point, actually captured the 32nd's colour and the colours lost?

Oh, I would so love Mr Dawson to respond to this and give his reasons for why he came to that conclusion.

Paul :)

So this account contradicts those of the allied infantry eyewitnesses who state that the French started to retire before the cavalry attack and there is the interesting point that at least one French regiment managed to form a square.

Strictly speaking, it doesn't: Fluret doesn't refer to even attacking the formed Allied infantry, he refers to fighting the Allied skirmishers, which all the witnesses saw retiring. It seems likely therefore that Fluret wasn't in the leading infantry formations at the time of the engagement with the two Allied infantry brigades.

My vision of the entire attack is as follows based on many years of reading accounts and of walking the ground.
1. There is no one account that encompasses the entire attack. Each participant had a limited view and a unique experience.
2. There was a very heavy French skirmish screen preceding the attack, 2000+ men over a 1000m front. It would have been equivalent to an ACW fighting line. This would be similar to the Prussian style of fighting with a dense fighting line supported by columns.
3. Kempts brigade probably did as he describes and drove back the French prior to the cavalry charge.
4. The French skirmish screen crossed the sunken road and engaged Packs brigade. The heads of the following columns struggled to get across the road breaking up their formation. Many of the rear ranks did not get over.
5. The skirmish line having found the British line falls back/is driven back on the main body who are forming up having crossed over.
6. The cavalry now appear from dead ground surprising and panicking the French infantry. They are tumbled down the hill with the British infantry moving after them.

This is a coherent flow of action and generally fits with individual memories and records. It is unprovable, it is just my impression.

Without the sunken road breaking up the columns would the cavalry charge have been as successful, probably not imo.

With more time before the cavalry charge would french numbers have driven the British line back? Probably imo.

Should dErlon have expected a cavalry response. Yes and I think he did with Crabbes cuirassier to the left and light cavalry to the right. The dense mass should have been cavalry proof.

Is anything in military history certain, no.

Just a point on Fleuret – he was in the 55e Ligne, which formed part of Brigade Charlet. Charlet advanced against LHS, not the main ridge, which would have given Fleuret a distinctly different experience to his comrades with Bourgeois, for example.

- He first observes the 95th and Kempt's skirmishers driven back up to the ridge, and the over-running of Roger's guns, plus possibly the two guns Ross had on the road itself.

- He is charged by cavalry. The 55e had the misfortune to be hit by a cavalry furball of fleeing Cuirassiers pursued down the east side of LHS by the Household Brigade. For a time its eagle was in the hands of the Lifeguard, evidence that the regiment had been thrown into considerable disorder. Many of the French infantry on the east side of LHS did indeed take cover in the sunken road – British cavalry accounts confirm it.

- He is attacked by infantry. This may be Kempt's Brigade advancing. However, it appears that 1st KGL Light was also sent forward at this point to clear the French away from LHS and may have fought the 55e.

- He makes a getaway to the squares. This may be the main body of the 54e south of LHS.

Fleuret does not contradict anyone…his account is impressively consistent with what others witnessed and reported happening around LHS.

Were Rogers' guns overrun? He doesn't say they were, saying that they spiked one themselves (and later drilled it out) and the rest were fine: link

Hi:

Just because the French over-ran the battery, doesn't mean they spiked any guns themselves.

As to Rogers account:
- He mentions that his guns fired 'as long as it was possible to continue it'.
- Mentions the Enemy coming into close contact.
- Mentions the gun being spiked without elaborating why anyone would do something like that.

Captain Clark of the 1 Dragoons mentions seeing artillerymen withdrawing through his regiment at this time.

We could also note that after mentioning the cavalry advancing, Rogers becomes pretty vague about what happened next…couldn't see anything in the smoke, melee etc. A cynic might believe that he simply wasn't in a position to see what happened next, as he was back down the slope to the British rear.

How far Bourgeois' main body got is one thing…his skirmishers at least got far enough to silence Rogers' battery and force the gunners to withdraw.

This is the oft repeated tale that a sergeant in Roger's "Battery" got into a panic and spiked his gun. Not sure ever any more detail than that however often the story is told

The suggestion seems to be that the guns were overrun temporarily, as happened so many times later when the French cavalry attacked further west. Of course the idea was then to immediately seize them back in a counterattack.

How could professional senior officers send infantry up a masked slope, against notoriously resolute infantry, knowing that the only possible reaction would be a cavalry counterattack?

No reports of cavalry in the area.

How could there have been? It was a reverse slope so anyone there was largely masked.

Napoleon and his generals surely had a pretty good idea of the make up of the forces they were facing however, unlike at Quatre Bras. Maybe not their disposition I admit. Only the day before at Genappe they saw what British Heavy cavalry could do.

They knew Wellington had cavalry somewhere and they will be kept back from the first line, when on the defensive. Only cavalry have the mobility to then quickly react to any break in the infantry defence line.

I am increasingly impressed though by the opinion that columns that were intact and well formed would be able to withstand a cavalry attack…but if shaken already, disorganised by hedges and a sunken lane, then taken by surprise…..

Napoleon possibly thought the heavy cavalry had been suckered into moving west, or simply underestimated their numbers and quality. He was used to facing Prussian, Russian and Austrian cavalry, who were perhaps more tactically adept but were ill-mounted compared to British heavies.

Sweeping cuirassiers aside like they weren't there would have been a novel experience for everyone.

Two points I had never considered, nor ever seen even suggested in print.

But makes perfect sense! Now that is surely worth further comment

I had no idea what this daft question of might unearth.

Thanks

It's not a daft question, it's a very good question!

The defeat of d'Erlon is I think the key event of the day for Wellington.

Once half of Napoleon's infantry had been put out of the picture, he was short of both men and time.

Mouton's men were too few to attempt anything nor could he attack by redeploying Reille's infantry, because that would have taken the pressure off Wellington's right and allowed him to strengthen the centre. So there is no gain there; fresh French troops would meet fresh allied ones, in Wellington's reverse slope position.

So who does this leave? The Guard? Out of the question. Who else? The heavy cavalry. Hang on though. You don't attack unbroken infantry with heavy cavalry. Except when you do:

- the enemy has no heavy cavalry left to counterattack them with
- Wellington's infantry are of shaky quality (else why the reverse slope?), and some are politically unsound
- what other options do I got to hit the (presumably weakened) centre if Reille is still pinning troops down to their right?

and sure enough, not long afterwards, forward went the heavy cavalry….

Once half of Napoleon's infantry had been put out of the picture, he was short of both men and time.

Corps strength at Waterloo

-I Corps (d'Erlon):685/16,200

-II Corps (Reille): 679/16,549

VI Corps (Lobau): 235/6,625

Guard:

Old: 408/12,305

Young: 117/4,166

I Corps made up roughly 41% of Napoleon's available line infantry at Waterloo.

I don't agree that Lobau's 'men were too few to attempt anything' as they had the mission later to defend the army's right flank and along with the Young Guard and two battalions of Old Guard infantry did a superlative job against the Prussians.

Why is a Guard employment 'out of the question'? They were certainly deployed later in the battle, so the comment actually makes little sense.

And it should be noted that when Ney ordered the heavy cavalry to attack, Napoleon had no knowledge of it until he actually saw it in motion. He did comment that it was an hour too early.

I disagree with the idea that d'Erlon's repulse was 'inevitable' and in fact observers thought that it had been successful until they saw the results of the British cavalry counterattack. And it should also be noted that the Union brigade was destroyed between Jacquinot and Guiton, the latter hitting the British heavy cavalry in front and Jacquinot from the flank.

D'Erlon's formation for his corps was unusually heavy and not typical of French infantry formations of either the early or later Empire. And the entire corps was not formed in this huge mass, only two divisions being so formed.

Three of d'Erlon's four divisions were caught by the British heavy cavalry, one retired in fair order. D'Erlon's shaken corps was reformed by 1600.

Whirlwind-Musketballs:

Yes you may be quite right, but then you/I may be wrong. I will try to be more thorough when posting these accounts. But then, I had read the first couple of lines of that same quote I used above but omitted them as I felt it unimportant, which said that:

"The 18th, at 7 o'clock in the morning all the army was in line and the bands of each regiment were at their heads. The signal was given. We formed the 1st division of the 1st Army Corps on the Right wing."

Note Fleuret of ‘as is noted, the 55 Ligne, mentioned 'Right Wing' of the Division supposedly being that of the 28th/105 Ligne. His recollection mentions only of what occurred in front of Kempt's 8th Brigade and nothing of fighting around La Haye Sainte.

With him also mentioning light infantry and of Rogers Battery lead me to believe that he must have been part of or very close to Bourgeois' Brigade and that he was part of that attack. it must be remembered that Kempt had skirmishers out in front of the 32nd/79th/28th. The 1st/95th were on the right flank of Rogers guns who were in front of the 32nd/79th/28th, and to the left of Rogers was Bijleveld with his Dutch Horse Artillery. So as I said above. If he had witnessed the incidents with Rogers' guns, So what of the advance of Kempt's 8th Brigade and the retirement of Bourgeois' brigade? Fleuret mentions nothing about La Haye Sainte in his quote.

I hope I am not pushing this issue excessively and I again admit I have learnt much that has convinced me that d'Erlon was a competent professional soldier, who very nearly won the day.

and yet.. as Brechtel198 tells us;
"I disagree with the idea that d'Erlon's repulse was 'inevitable' and in fact observers thought that it had been successful until they saw the results of the British cavalry counterattack.".

But what other response could they have expected? Wellington's Army gives in without any counterattack and flees (perfectly possible of course), an infantry counterattack (takes more time to organise) or the swift response of a cavalry move (which, if timed to perfection with any French disorganisation or panic is disastrous, in the absence of any significant cavalry immediate support)?

"And it should also be noted that the Union brigade was destroyed between Jacquinot and Guiton, the latter hitting the British heavy cavalry in front and Jacquinot from the flank.". Very true but only once the infantry had been routed, the gun line attacked and the Union Brigade had advanced too far out of control. Imagine if there had been better retention of reserves and control of the cavalry units. With a little restraint they would have been back behind the ridge before the French horsemen got a look in. (historically not too likely however, knowing British cavalry of the era)

@ Brechtel

To use the 41% figure is to overlook that by the time d'Erlon went forward Reille had been heavily engaged against Hougoumont for a couple of hours. At that point Reille didn't have 16,000 men any more.

Committing the Guard at 2 in the afternoon was out of the question empirically, because those are the final reserve.

Mouton was not an option because he with 6,000-odd men was not about to accomplish what d'Erlon had not with 16,000.

Which leaves the cavalry.

Re the OP's question I reckon the answer is in some synthesis of the above responses…Wellington just didn't 'do' divisional-scale heavy cavalry counter-attacks; the terrain didn't favour a cavalry counter-attack, except above LHS, and the cuirassiers had that covered; the real risk was musketry from concealed positions; the terrain's ability to break up deep infantry formations was not well understood.

@ deadhead

Historically, when British cavalry had defeated whomever was to their front, they whooped and went after them.

The earliest instance of this I'm aware of is Royalist cavalry scattering both wings of the Parliamentarian army at Edgehill, then detouring in order to loot the baggage train instead of reforming to rout the rest of the enemy. There is not a lot of evidence that much had changed in the intervening 175 years since Edgehill. In fact I'd be very interested in hearing of any instances where British cavalry reined in, fell back and reformed after a successful charge in any war. Offhand I can't think of any except where the scale was very small (eg the retreat via Genappe).

Seven heavy regiments went forward. Properly, one regiment from each brigade should have been held back to rescue the other five after they predictably lost it. It didn't happen but maybe even if it had it would mean that five out of seven got destroyed, and we'd still all be shaking our heads over it.

The question comes up quite a lot in wargames. I could rout that movement with my cavalry, but I will probably write off my cavalry; what do I do?

At Waterloo, both sides thought it worthwhile writing off their entire heavy cavalry to secure the speedy defeat of a large part of the enemy's infantry. Wellington secured his left against further infantry assault for the remainder of the battle. Napoleon blew his cavalry.

I often wonder what would have happened if the heavy cavalry had been sent against Blucher's line instead of Wellington's. I tend to conclude we'd all now be speaking French.

The Duke of Wellington was disappointed in the unimaginative way Boney attacked, Drouet might have chose better tactical formations – like attacking in two battle lines, the second would give support.

The attack was a failure – Wellington again outwitted Boney in particular.

To use the 41% figure is to overlook that by the time d'Erlon went forward Reille had been heavily engaged against Hougoumont for a couple of hours. At that point Reille didn't have 16,000 men any more.

Reille was not 'heavily engaged' for 'a couple of hours' by the time d'Erlon advanced. Reille's artillery opened fire around 1130 against Hougoumont and the woods were cleared by Jerome's troops by 1215 or so. Only then did Jerome attempt an assault against Hougoumont itself.

Do you know the losses of Jerome's division in the fighting against Hougoumont?

You made the comment that d'Erlon had half of the French infantry available not including the Guard, and that is not an accurate statement. And it should be noted that the fighting continued unabated after d'Erlon's repulse and the corps was rallied and continued to fight from 1600 on.

@ 4th
Marlborough cavalry was held well in hand, Blenheim a good example. Also remember while Ruperts cavalry where "British" and famous for getting out of hand From wells cavalry were also British and famous for being well controlled.
British Heavy cavalry saw little action in the Napoleonic wars Indeed this was the first action for the Scots Grays. Quality of the officers would appear to be the principle problem. Indeed Uxbridge who should have been organising supports charged with the Life Guards.
As gamers we have an expectation of heavy cavalry performance shaped by these Waterloo charges. But they are exceptional and I struggle to think of another such charge in these wars. Kellerman at Marengo, but he caught the Austrians in the flank? The British at Salamanca?

From well should read Cromwell

@ kevin M

In the Blenheim era did cavalry charge home or did they do the caracole thing? If the latter I'd expect more restraint…Cromwell's cavalry were of course the exception to the rule.

A quick summary of French 1st and 2nd Corps officer losses at Waterloo by division. Number in brackets is the number of CdeB or above killed or wounded. Numbers from Martinien as presented in D Smith, 'Napoleon's Regiments' Please note M. didn't record captured. –

Marcognet (1 Corps) -…109 (9)
J. Bonaparte (2 Corps) – 91 (7)
Donzelot (1 Corps) -…. 90 (3)
Quiot (1 Corps) -……… 86 (4)
Bachelu (2 Corps) -….. 72 (6)
Durette (1 Corps) -….. 71 (2)
Foy (2 Corps) -…………… 46 (4)

Strikingly, the 3 hardest hit regiments in I Corps were 105e (Bourgeois) with 32, followed by the two regiments which headed up Marcognet's column – 45e and 25e, both with 31 officers killed or wounded. You can prove anything with statistics, of course, but this aligns just too nicely with our understanding of who took the hardest punch due to being hit by combined arms.

Another interesting glimpse from the figures is the high number of dead officers from the 105e – 12 killed or died of wounds (half the division total), compared to 14 for the whole of Marcognet and just 10 for Durette. This is probably not surprising, given that Bourgeois was advancing directly into the fire of two artillery batteries (Rogers and Bijleveld).
Donzelot's division also suffered a strikingly high number of officer fatalites (29), but these (I would suggest) were likely suffered in the divisions later attempts to take LHS. Nothing like a good storming to thin out the officer corps…

In the Blenheim era did cavalry charge home or did they do the caracole thing? If the latter I'd expect more restraint…Cromwell's cavalry were of course the exception to the rule.

By the 1700, no cavalry did true caracole(but I think it was stilled trained at)
Very very broadly in the early 1700s.
The French fired of their carbines or pistol then made contact with swords, at a trot.
The English/British, Dutch etc. Charged home with swords at a gallop without firing first.
But it was at least for the French partly up to the colonel and so you would have some French charging at a gallop without firing.

A fascinating lady horse expert explained to me that the warhorse of Marlboroughs period was the Baroque horse, like the Lipitzarner horses. By Napoleons time they were more of an Arab horse, bigger and more excitable.
Never found this info mentioned anywhere else. Can anyone confirm or add to this?
Gunfreak is spot on for Marlburian tactics.

I always wondered who did come up with d'Erlon's formation. Napoleon didn't usually pay much attention to formation. Several of the generals reportedly met the night before and they probably discussed things such as this. D'Erlon was not thought highly of as a general; someone mentioned that's why he was usually addressed as Count… and not General…It could have been a general consensus or agreement. Then again it could have been Napoleon. He wasn't one to admit fault if things went wrong. The cavalry reserve was Napoleon's prerogative, and only he could authorize it's release.

The Young Guard was in this formation at Lutzen.

I agree that when d'Erlon was defeated, especially when the Prussians showed up, the battle was basically over, other than the French possibly getting a draw.

@kevin major

A lecturer at the National Army Museum explained that horses had been bred larger and stronger to serve the mid 18th century mail coach services.

These larger horses could then be used for pulling heavier artillery.

Perhaps this feeds into your baroque to arab narrative.

Napoleon did pay much attention to formation – in his better years, see his discussion with Soult about that topic when planning the attack at the Pratzen -but there he did not believe a battle would take place at the 18th of June, no preparations whatsoever were made, no pre planning nothing, an improvised plan – that was it. Wellington was right to be disappointed by the tactical finesse of Napoleon – might have been another story in 1805

Napoleon certainly expected some form of battle on the 18th. He pressed the Allied position on the evening of the 17th and from the volume of fire judged the Allies to be in force on the ridge.
Napoleon own army was strung out along the roads behind him trudging through mud and rain. Many of his troops would only come onto the field mid morning of the 18th.
His "plan" was to start the battle and see how it developed. In broad outline he wanted to place a large body of men on the allied ridge and force the Allies to react. Forcing a hinge into the enemy line and then breaking that hinge was often his aim. But here the repulse of this first move was so complete the battle in many was was brought to a halt.
Napoleon was now a general without a plan B. Protective of his reputation he is now sick/unavailable/ inactive for several hours. The appearance of Prussians on his flank compounded his problems

When you walk the battlefield, it becomes quite clear that the front was so constrained, Napoleon didn't really have the space to use his advantages to the full. Hougoumont, LHS and PSLH all had the effect of funnelling attacks into narrow areas where having fourteen regiments of armoured cavalry or an intact 17,000-strong body of infantry didn't actually help you. The ridge position, the BUAs and the woods south of Hougoumont substantially mitigated his five-to-three advantage in artillery.

La Haye Sainte should have been eliminated as a matter of priority, IMO, before even the diversion against Hougoumont.

I disagree Napoleon did not expect a stand by Wellington due to his assumption that the Prussians wouldn't be able to be operational so quickly, it is a great propaganda story of Boney to cover this up – after all he couldn't admit that old Blücher did dupe him, could he?

It is a pity that one of the key works about this battle – that one by Bernard Coppens, is totaley ignored.

In his younger days Boney would have tried to do a very thorough pre battle reconnaissance, which he failed to do so – and for that reason just did not know what was behind the ridge, Droute attacked blindly in a must unsuitable tactical formation.

Has the Coppens effort ever been translated? The reviews of the French text are quite dismissive, eg
Il manque aussi, s'il s'agit des mensonges de Waterloo, une analyse en profondeur des écrits et analyses historiques en Grande Bretagne et en Allemagne.

"It also lacks, if it's a question of the lies of Waterloo, any in-depth analysis of the writing and historical analyses in Britain and Germany".

Seems to be chiefly a hit job on Napoleon's rep?

Coppens, with Courcelle, produced that marvellous series of books, that fill the shelves in the battlefield shops but, incredibly, have never been translated into any other language. I can never find any translation of his work. Imagine the potential market, for very little outlay. The books are written, the illustrations painted….what does a translation cost by comparison?

A single example; Les Carnets de la Campagne n°2 – Waterloo 1815 "Le chemin d'Ohain"

@ von Winterfeld. I cannot go with your proposal that Napoleon did not expect the Allies to stand and thus had no plan.
The core of the campaign of the central position is to defeat first one and then the other enemy before they unite and overpower you. Napoleon was desperate to come to grips with Wellington once he had defeated the Prussians. He hoped Ney would hold them at Quatre Bras but due to Napoleons own slowness they slipped away. The Allied retreat ended at Waterloo, it was clear from the amount of guns deployed that evening the Allies would hold the ridge.
In the early morning French cavalry probed the flanks and confirmed the enemy was still there. But oh! for a drone or gallon to look over the ridge.
Napoleon was committed to the fight o matter where the Prussians where. The only alternative would be to retreat. Impossible in the political climate. It was win or bust.
A flanking move to the French left would tend to drive the Allies toward the Prussians. A thrust on the right to continue the campaign logic of leavering the two apart was the only choice.
That Napoleon was no longer the General of 10 years before is unquestionable. Brawn replaced brain and a man that knew the value of 5 minutes now frittered hours away

as you wish, but this is not my view at all, in case he would have known that Wellington would fight – then why not draw Grouchy in Wellingtons left flank – instead of pursuing a beaten and routing enemy – the Prussians?

Reading Coppens Les mesonges – was an eye opener.

Grouchy was to be the sabre pressing into the Prussian kidneys ala 1807. But Grouchy was a rubber sword. Without the Prussians moving onto his flank Napoleon has Lobaus Corp and the Guard, ie enough troops.