"The Evolution of Skirmish Tactics in the U.S. Civil War" Topic

Of possible interest?

mvep.org/skirmishold.htm

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mvep.org/skirmishold.htm

Amicalement
Armand

I will have to give this a closer read when I have time. It does look interesting and I was impressed that the author refers to tactical developments after the Civil War. This is a common flaw in tactical analysis: not putting it into a wider context.

On the other hand I was a little taken back by a statement in the opening:

"…the massed formations were used relatively infrequently, primarily in the major battles."

Okay… :)

Hope you enjoyed it my friend!.

Amicalement
Armand

The article is well done, but it is basically a chronology of regulations, all of which are very Napoleonic in character… nothing new. He fails to note that Hardee's manual was titled "Light Infantry Tactics", so it wouldn't be particularly odd or innovative that the emphasis was on light infantry tactics.

In response to Scott's being taken back by the infrequent use of massed formations, that is understandable. That statement is at best misleading… certainly close order formations were frequently used. He does not seem to see any difference between loose and open order formations, which is confusing. Having said that, Sherman does note:

William T. Sherman on Tactics and Entrenching (Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman, 1891, vol 2, 394-397) Transcribed and annotated by David W. Lowe

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and o every cover.

The other thing that is missing from the article is any battlefield examples of skirmishing during the ACW.

Soldier: Persons, Warren B. Allegiance: Union
Unit/Service Branch: 64th Infantry Date Written: Saturday, May 30th, 1863 Location: Camp near Falmouth, VA Correspondence Type: Letter Link Source: link

When a regt. acts as skirmishers it is usually divided into two parts, one to go in advance, and one to remain back in supporting distance as a reserve. The reserve remains in two close ranks while the advance is formed into single file rank, the men being five paces apart, This formation is called deploying. This time our Co. was in the reserve. We continued to advance into the woods half or three quarters of a mile, the hostile batteries playing over our heads. This was my first experience under fire. Soon our advance was seen coming back as if they were in a hurry, we waited until they came up and found the rebs advancing on our right flank with the intention of cutting us off. We fell back towards the road. and then towards Chancellorville the rebs following after With yells like so many devils. soon after gaining the road we passed Syke's regulars drawn up in line of battle across the road with two pieces of artillery planted in the road. We had just fairly got in the rear of these, the rebs yelling behind us, when one of the most terrific reports of firearms fell upon our ears that mortals ever heard, the earth fairly trembled beneath our feet. The rebel yells and cheers most suddenly ceased, and they went back full as fast as they came on. Joining the rest of our brigade we formed in line of battle in the field by Chancellorsville, and then filed into the woods north of the road forming a line perpendicular to it. As soon as this position was taken Col. Brooks com'd'g brigade called on Col. Bingham of our regt. for his three best Cos to go forward as skirmishers. Co. D was one of the three called for, we all went in advance this time, as the rest of the brigade could act as a support, We advanced something like half or three quarters of a mile so that we could see through the woods into the field beyond where we could see the rebs marching in and forming in line of battle. They were so near I could plainly hear the commands of their officers such as guide center, half right, etc. Presently they sent out a line of skirmishers to meet us, each of us took a tree and waited till they came within proper distance when we gave them a few volleys which they returned and then fled. We remained where we were which position we held all night watching the enemy.

Note that instead of teams of two skirmishing as shown in the article, the skirmish was done with a single line.

Another good essay – PDF link
- on ACW entrenchments (and infantry tactics).

B

Many thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

Blutarski:

I've read this monograph before and his main points are not only fairly conventional, but generally wrong.

1. Battlefield casualties for the ACW were no different than those of the Napoleonic wars, particularly for similar-sized armies over similar time-periods.

2. Artillery in the Napoleonic wars had similar problems following an attack. While the longer range of rifle-muskets made artillery more vulnerable at longer ranges, the wooded nature of US terrain also had an impact.

3. Entrenchments were just as common in the Napoleonic wars as the Civil war. Several Napoleonic battlefields had entrenchments and fortified areas, from Talavera to Borodino. The reasons were often because one side had a significant advantage over the other side… Like the last year and a half of the Civil War.

4. The phrase "Possibly it has no parallel in history" was and is often used to describe some situation in most wars, particularly by those who don't have a real knowledge of other wars. At the sieges around Spanish cities in the Peninsula and earlier in Italy around Mantua… the same close proximity of lines existed…particularly with shorter ranges for smoothbores.

5. The same methods for besieging 'forts' and entrenchments in the Napoleonic wars, from mortars to dirt-filled baskets and 'bomb-proofs', were used just as they were in the Civil War around besieged cities in the Civil War including tunneling and exploding mines underneath them.

We can quibble about the size of the armies involved, the effects of larger/rifled cannon, RRs, and longer ranges of muskets influencing some siege techniques but the when, why, how and how often entrenchments were used strategically and technology-wise had changed little from 1800 to 1865.

Bill,

Entrenchments were just as common in the Napoleonic wars as the Civil war.

Doesn't that depend on the definition of use?

OK you have various Sieges, to which I'd add the Lines of Torres Vedras and as you point out Borodino and Talavera but surely not a constant running sequence of Battles and Skirmishes like the Overland Campaign or Western actions like the series of battles around Chattanooga.

Doesn't that depend on the definition of use?

Sure. So, what are you thinking of.

but surely not a constant running sequence of Battles and Skirmishes like the Overland Campaign or Western actions like the series of battles around Chattanooga.

Really? So, what about the sequence of skirmishes and battles during the Russian retreat[s] before Borodino? Or the British advance into France and the series of battles in 1814?

Same use of entrenchments and redoubts, the same methods for both sides in dealing with them and they are used for the same reasons. I would say that one big similarity between them is that one army was facing a far bigger enemy army.

However, the armies in 1812 and 1864 were definitely different because of terrain and ranges.

I think that the entrenchments you see in photos from Petersburg are no different than the entrenchments found around besieged cities like Badajoz and enemy entrenchments, or the Lines of Torres Vedras, or the redoubts and trenches found at battles of say Toulouse or Orthez. We just don't have photos of those.

Even the length of time of some of those sieges are similar between the two eras.

You look at Jackson's line at 2nd Manassas and what is left of the Trenches around Petersburg or Vicksburg, they look just as deep and extensive. Even the trenches and redoubts around Yorktown both 1781 and 1862.

What I am saying is that there is a common / long-held desire to see some significant difference between 1814 and 1864 so that the ACW is the dawn of modern war because of the trenches etc. when the trench technology or the extent of and reasons for their uses wasn't that significant a difference. The Confederates and Union dug in and went to trenches for the same reasons Napoleonic armies did.

However, the armies in 1812 and 1864 were definitely different because of terrain and ranges.

That's certainly hard to disagree with.

I would also have to agree that formal siege lines would have been pretty much identical in concept but as the whole business was based on French practice going back to the days of Vauban and was taught as such at West Point, I guess that's a given. Particularly, as the French probably besieged more places in the Napoleonic wars was than anyone else so there must have been a lot of practical examples. There was also an Engineer representative on that little jaunt to the Crimean War that Little Mac and others went on so that would have provided more recent input.

I think what I was saying is that the ACW experience wasn't unique but had some areas of more intensity. Lee didn't get called the "King of Spades" for nothing and that preceded the more intense period of May – June 1864. When the ANV were marching, throwing up field fortifications, shooting the hell out of the AoP and then doing it again for an entire month.

It's that rapid ability to throw up pretty substantial works at the end of a march to head off Grant on repeated occasions, while in not too distant proximity, that I don't recall a Napoleonic equivalent of.

Yes, the terrain was massively in Lee's favour and his Engineering training had a big influence (I wouldn't expect Napoleon to personally have taken interest in the hight of parapets) and he was indeed doing it to counter Grants numbers but the manner and use of the opportunity feels different to my mind to any sequence in the Napoleonic period.

Of course ultimately non of it was new, as any time travelling Roman miles gregarius could testify. March for miles, dig a camp. Get up tomorrow and do it again!

I think what I was saying is that the ACW experience wasn't unique but had some areas of more intensity. Lee didn't get called the "King of Spades" for nothing and that preceded the more intense period of May – June 1864. When the ANV were marching, throwing up field fortifications, shooting the hell out of the AoP and then doing it again for an entire month.

Oh, I agree with that. But was that because of 'modern war' or simply the strategic and tactical situation? Lee was facing an army twice the size of his. The same with Johnson against Sherman. Add to that their supply situation, and any advantage was seen as a necessity.

But consider Soult's actions from October 1813 through March 1814. from the storming of the French trenches at Vera, then Nivelle which was nothing but French artillery works and entrenchments, to The Nive where BOTH sides threw up redoubts and trenches.Like Lee, Soult attempts spoiling attacks like St. Peirre, but retreats to Orthez, and there again, entrenches. The stand at Toulouse is again a series of entrenchments.

The hills and mountainous terrain were certainly part of Soult's defense. Soult could afford to retreat as he had far more land behind him than Lee did. Lee ran out of retreat space before Soult did. Toulouse can be seen as Soult's Petersburg in many respects, though obviously there were differences including the ACW Rail lines, the larger sizes of the armies and the relatively cramped maneuver areas for the Union and Confederate armies compared to the British and French… though the Spanish and French terrain was pretty restricting too.

Even with the differences, the strategic situations were basically the same, a smaller, weakened army defending against a larger, better supplied army. The response was the same for Lee and Soult: Dig in wherever they could, continually protect their flanks and strike back when the opportunity presented itself.

For Grant and Wellington, it was the hunt for flanks and attack head on when there were none hoping to catch the enemy unprepared.

We have graphic evidence of what the entrenchments looked like at Petersburg, and how they compared to WWI. We don't for Soult's defenses. In fact, if you look at any of the paintings and drawings of the battles I mentioned there are no redoubts or entrenchments, though all the maps show them.

Those redoubts in the Pyrenees are a mystery. On the maps all right but no trace in reality. Believe me I've looked!

At one point we even found a local walking the hills who proudly took us to a fortification that turn out to be some kind of mini Maginot Line cupola!

You are right about the space limitations for Lee & Grant especially in contrast to out West. Which of course was why Johnston was never going to stop Sherman. I saw a talk by Earl Hess the other week where he was dissing that old ACW/WW1 trope, pointing out that by 1915 there were no flanks and Johnston couldn't dig a 400 mile line at Atlanta!