I'm guessing that my last post was deleted by Editor Bill as spam due to my unwise exhortation to "buy this book" in the post header.
So let me try this again
I recently purchased "The Tanks of Operation Barbarossa – Soviet versus German Armour on the Eastern Front" by Boris Kavalerchik. It is one of the finest books I have read on the nut and bolts of Soviet armor design, development, technology, production and tactics from the mid-thirties through 1942/1943. The author has taken an immensely deep dive into original Soviet correspondence and secret wartime technical analyses and delivered up an array of information, insights and data that I have never come across in any other source.
Some examples drawn at random -
> "In addition, the T-34 in the first half of the war had only four gears – plainly inadequate for matching the tank's range of speeds with the engine's range of rpms; especially because a diesel engine's range of rpms, as a rule, is noticeably more limited than that of a petrol engine. In the ideal scenario, after shifting to a higher gear, the engine's rpms corresponding to its maximum power (in the V-2 engine, 1,800 rpms) should fall down to the rpms corresponding to its maximum torque (in the V-2 engine, 1,100-1,200 rpms). But in the T-34, the V-2 diesel engine's revolutions fell so precipitously in the process that it almost dropped to its minimum sustainable rpms (in the V-2 engine, 600 rpms, where its torque was much less than the maximum. Given the slightest delay in shifting gear or significant road resistance, the engine would stall and die. Loss of movement in combat conditions meant the tank became a sitting duck, so T-34 crews fought as a rule in second gear, with no gear shifts and without fully exploiting its speed capabilities.
> "….. the actual rate of the T-34's main gun, which was revealed in the course of field tests at the end of 1940, didn't exceed two or three shots per minute. Only after improving its ammunition stowage in May 1941 was it able to achieve four shots per minute. Yet at this time, on paper at least, its rate of fire was twice that."
> The reason that the T-34/85 with the three-man turret did not begin serial production until February 1944 was that, having been forced to abandon certain essential imported machine tools in their earlier strategic retreat and lacking a domestic machine tool industry able to replace them, the Soviets had no machine tools capable of turning/milling turret rings greater than 1500mm in diameter until replacements were finally delivered via Lend-Lease.
> It was impossible for the gunner to simultaneously operate the T-34's power turret traverse and maintain vision through the gunsight due to clumsy mechanical layout of controls. Not to worry, though, since large numbers of T-34's were delivered to the front without power traverse systems.
> In the first year or so of the war, there was such a shortage of AP ammunition (much of which was defective in any case) that the Soviets resorted to firing shrapnel shells at tanks! Apparently the shrapnel shell casing could act in a manner similar to a die punch and gave a better chance of holing thin armor than HE.
It just goes on and on in similarly fascinating detail I read the entire book in one long sitting and have already gone back to re-visit certain topics.
If you're reading this Wolfhag, this book will be right up your alley!
B
