"When can a commander ignore orders" Topic

Hello Bill!

I'm always amazed at your ability to highlight historical examples pertaining to the question at hand. Your Wellington example is kind of the icing on the cake at illustrating my original attempt to inform LH that his quest for "wording" is going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

I am, however, puzzled at your inclusion that this is a "National Characteristic". I'm getting older and my memory is fading, but I don't recall any such similar item in the old rule sets that included NC. Could you please just give me a few words to enlighten me?

Best regards,

Glenn

McLaddie wrote:

In one early battle Wellington personally ordered a brigade of Guard cavalry to charge and the commander refused to his face, telling Wellington that he didn't answer to him because he was a guard unit. There were no repercussions that I've I've every read. The incident is mentioned in Rory Muir's book on the tactics and Experience of Napoleonic Warfare.

McLaddie,

As this passage seems to describe an actual example of a commander deliberately disobeying an order, which is bang on topic, perhaps you can tell us where in Muir's book this can be found?

I have only seen this incident mentioned in one of Scott Bowden's books – perhaps in the intro to Empire III rules.

It appears to be nonsense. The British Guard Cavalry were only present in the latter stages of the Peninsular War and I can find no record of this event, so would appreciate some clarification.

This has been discussed here in the past:

TMP link

Hello, MaJor:

While I saw an account similar to the one you linked to:

link

It is not the written account I saw and it wasn't anything Bowden wrote. [I'm afraid I don't have much faith in his works] My memory has failed me as to where I saw the account. I was sure it was Muir's book, but no, it is not there. So I will have to do a search. I do remember that one comment by the writer was just as Smith notes, all the commanders listed for the Guard brigade stayed much longer.

The suggestion in the account I read was that the young commander was 'acting' commander at the moment and as he resigned soon after he arrived and took command, that he was never recorded as a commander of the Brigade.

We'll see. It could well be nonsense or not. Thank you for pointing this out.

I'm always amazed at your ability to highlight historical examples pertaining to the question at hand. Your Wellington example is kind of the icing on the cake at illustrating my original attempt to inform LH that his quest for "wording" is going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Glenn:

Well, you can be less amazed. The account may be apocryphal, as Major S. points out. I did note while searching Muir's book that he considered orders, both verbal and oral as fairly informal and often not specific. [pp. 143-149]. For instance, to Packenham at Salamanca, Wellington's orders were "Edward, move on with the 3rd Division--take the heights in your front--and drive everything before you." Packenham had no questions.

Napoleon's orders were similar in detail: At Ligny, the orders he gave to Girard, commander of the IV Corps saying: "You must go toward that steeple, and drive the PRussians in as far as you can. I will support you . Grouchy has my orders."

That is very much like Lee's order with Pickett's Charge: 'Advance on the clump of trees and drive the enemy before you.'

As there were so many expected directives and limitations on commanders at different levels, more detailed instructions weren't often necessary from an Army commander…. depending on the subordinate.

In a game system, orders really only need a terrain or enemy objective, not detailed information or instructions--IF players have been given the same command parameters contemporary commanders operated under.

I am, however, puzzled at your inclusion that this is a "National Characteristic". I'm getting older and my memory is fading, but I don't recall any such similar item in the old rule sets that included NC. Could you please just give me a few words to enlighten me?

Glenn:
I thought I would address this question separately. Assuming for a moment that the Wellington account is true, can you see the same thing happening with Napoleon and a Guard Brigade commander? Not a chance. National differences.

The whole question of National Characteristics have been handled in a very johnny-one-note fashion by game designers, if not just badly altogether.

An army's National Characteristics have always been an important issue because it speaks to how different armies respond to the same combat situations, often in very different ways. National Character comes down to different decisions and behaviors.

This has several levels:

1. Organization. The WWII Germans did not organize their platoons the same way the British or Americans did. The Prussians never organized their army before or after 1806 like the French.

2. Tactics. Those organizations might be well thought out to specifically support chosen tactical docrtine like the WWII Germans or created based on necessity like the Napoleonic Prussians. In both cases, Tactical decisions were based on the strengths and weaknesses of those organizations.

3. Command. Like Wellington and Napoleon, because of the cultures and governments of the armies they commanded, they had very different options in decision-making. To suggest in games that armies have good, average and bad command systems misses a great deal regarding the actual command abilities and issues--which were based on different command systems and cultures.

4.National Character: One thing that is completely overlooked by wargame designers--and many writers--is how important National Characteristics were to the Napoleonic officers themselves. They saw the different Nation's characters as a significant element in any effective military system.

Major Short has often quoted British General Maxwell. One of his points in his writings was the role national character played in British victories:

Maxwell, William H. Stories of the Peninsular War or Peninsular Sketches. 1870 "THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN of 1809." P. 71

We could not but feel that here was to be another trial of the ancient military rivalry of England and France; that the cool, constitutional, persevering courage of the former was again to be pitted against the more artificial, however chivalrous, though not less praiseworthy, bravery of the latter.

This view of the relative valour of the two nations cannot be questioned, if we consider that the reminding the British of this moral quality is wholly unnecessary, and instead of language of excitement being constantly applied to our soldiery, that of control, obedience, and composure is solely recommended; while our ancient opponents are obliged incessantly to drive into the ears of their men, that they are nationally and individually the bravest of the human race. Hearing nothing else so flattering to their unbounded vanity, they become so puffed up by this eternal stimulant, as to be fully convinced of its truth, which, in con sequence, makes their first attack tremendous. Buonaparte, being aware of this weak point in their character, fed it in every way, and the object of wearing a paltry piece of enamel gained him many battles. But this sort of created courage is not capable of standing a severe test, and the French have always been, in their military character, more Gauls than Franks; and what Caesar said of the former, eighteen centuries ago, is still applicable to the races now occupying their fine country….

However, brilliant Vimiera and Corunna, still Talavera must be considered as the place where the military character of the two nations was fairly brought to trial and proved. This battle proved the total want of firmness of the enemy in meeting our troops with the bayonet, and offered an example, followed by others on every occasion, of their best troops flying like chaff before the wind, on the hostile troops arriving within charging distance.

Notice, that Talavera was won with British Character, not superior tactics.

What is amazing is that the French agreed with Maxwell with his assessment of the French Character.

"It is the distinctive characteristic of the French nation to attack"
---French Marshal de Saxe, Rêveries, 1725

"The French were without discipline, hardly suited to fire fights . . . . redoubtable in all attacks with cold steel . . .. They had then, as today, that initial moment of vigor and impetuosity, that shock which one day nothing can stop, and which the next day, a slight obstacle throws back, that incredible combination of a courage sometimes above everything and a consternation sometimes carried on to a weakness."

---General Comte de Guibert, Essai Génénal, 1783

"It is in the nature of the French to attack. It is why I abhor any defensive action."

---Napoleon 1814

What was the reason the French rejected the Prussian Fire system after 1770, what was the core argument for the Column in the arguments among the French military in the Red and blue debates? French National Character noted by Guilbert. It can be argued that the tactical system finally established for the French was based on what the French perceived as their National Character.

Every military officer felt that National Character was significant element in an army's combat abilities.

For instance, Scharnhorst on French Light Infantry: Again, not tactics, not experience, not organization but Character explains what makes them better skirmishers.

‘A lively regard for honor, for competition and distinctions, the ability to learn quickly and to adapt easily to changing conditions and circumstances
make French soldiers better skirmishers than any other nation.'

-Scharnhorst, Essay on Infantry Tactics, 1811.

I have just touched on this issue. There is a great deal more that I can provide to support its importance in the decision-making and tactical actions of each nation.

McLaddie, the order management process is an interesting one. Certainly in campaigns orders were written and copied in the order book of the commander issuing the orders. When received they would be written into the operations journal or something similar with time or receipt duly noted.

Battlefield orders do appear to have been different, written and carried by couriers and sometime verbal, these orders certainly of the type you describe, brief and to the point with an expectation that the recipient knew how to execute the orders.

Mike:

Yes, the difference is that on campaign where there was great distance between formations and at the beginning of a battle where the battle plan was set down, there would often be written orders copied and placed in order books.

Once the battle plan had been set, it was simply a matter of saying 'go'. Any orders within that established battle plan would not need to be extensive.

Hello Bill!

My impression of you remains untarnished, as I have also read that same passage and have no clue where it was.

Thanks immensely for your detailed answer on NC.

Best regards,

Glenn

I am not sure I'd trust anything written by a British in 1870.

Next we'll be hearing about Christian values, native characteristics, the Raj, Kipling, and being made to learn the words to 'Jerusalem'.

Whatever happens, we have got
The Maxim gun, and they have not.

It would make me a lot happier to hear that there were different systems at work:

- Noisy: as what is practised by the Jean-Francois
- Quiet: as practised by the Britischers, the Rooshians, the Prooshians, and probably everyone else

Or Revolutionary vice Reactionary

I was reading a book the other day which justified why the English army leadership hierarchy was different to that of the Continentals:

The English officers didn't want to have their reputations tarnished by mistakes made by NCOs, so the NCOs had very little responsibility.

The Continentals had a different organisation – their prima-plana NCOs had much greater responsibilities.

Another reason may have been that Britain's lack of a standing army – Regiments were notional and battalions raised as needed (and then exported). Vice the continentals where the regiments were permanent and consisted of many, many administrative companies

McLaddie,

which is why I prefer to activation to be coupled with orders. Get a unit prepared then have it move/attack in accordance with its orders. It starts moving once it has been activated.

Using activation without orders is more of a constraint mechanism intended to randomise and add friction to the game.

Assuming for a moment that the Wellington account is true, can you see the same thing happening with Napoleon and a Guard Brigade commander? Not a chance. National differences.

Well, is it though? The incident I mentioned before with Massena and Imperial Guard is well attested. I can think of a dozen examples of similar sorts of thing in the French Army. It is probably more to do with the position of Napoleon as Emperor – it is difficult to imagine the Russian Guard Cavalry not charging for Alexander.

Every military officer felt that National Character was significant element in an army's combat abilities.

No doubt, but since they often said contradictory things, I don't think it helps much.

Every military officer felt that National Character was significant element in an army's combat abilities.

No doubt, but since they often said contradictory things, I don't think it helps much.

Whirlwind:
I seem to have missed your mention of Massena and the IG. Where was that in the Thread?

In regards to National Characteristics, there was a great deal of consistency in both the Continental views of National Characteristics over more than a century and a half, but it was continually used as 'the reason' for some military practice. Just a few examples of belief translated into military decision:

Voltaire, writing seventy years earlier would write in his Dictionaire Philosphique (1734):

"French artillery is very good, but the fire of French infantry is rarely superior and usually inferior to that of other nations. It can be said with as much truth that the French nation attacks with the greatest impetuosity and that it is very difficult to resist its shock."

Even in the 1730's, Voltaire's belief was not new. Marshal Chamlay extolled the superiority of the French infantry on the offensive in 1690. Marshal Claude Villars, the greatest French commander of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) was the first 18th century military man to not just identify a French national characteristic but suggest how to employed it.

In his Mémoires du Maréchal de Villars, 5 vols (1734-5) he lauded "the air of audacity so natural to the French" and stated "In my opinion, the best method for the French infantry…is to charge with the bayonet."

Folard's influential work, Nouvelle découvertes sur la guerre [1724] (New Discoveries on War):

"The strongest argument against the pike is a pure sophism. Those who do not approve of this arm say that a third or a fifth of pikemen would eliminate a third or a fifth of the fire of the infantry. Bad argument which proves nothing, if one knows a little of the character of the French nation. And which scarcely proves more in regard to the others. True valor consists not in combats which are made at a distance: but in shock and sudden attacks. That is the only road which brings us to victory."

[Italics mine]

OR de Saxe:

Saxe asserted:

"It is the nature of the French nation to attack. When a general is unwilling to depend on the exact discipline of the troops and the great order required in pitched battles, [such as fire combat] he has only to create the occasion to fight in detail and arrange for brigade attacks. And assuredly these occasions can be found. The courage and élan which animate this nation have never been contradicted, and since Julius Caesar (he states it himself in his Commentaries), I know of no example in which they have failed to make a dent in what was presented to them. Their first shock is terrible. It is only necessary to know how to renew it by skillful dispositions, and this is the business of the general."

-French Marshal de Saxe, Rêveries, 1725 page 97-98

Eighty Years Later,

Koch, Mémoires de Masséna rdéigés v2 (1848)

Recorded orders and discussions of
General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy, Scherer

24 Pluviôse year IV (13 February 1796)

Page 424 [Regarding columns]

By observing this method of attacking, you sense, my dear general, that we preserve all the advantages which French impetuosity can give us, and that we risk almost nothing.

Page 427

It is that our troops, unaccustomed to march in line and to preserve their alignment, will find a great facility in this method of attack, which favors their courage and their natural impetuosity.

French officer Lazare Cornot writs in his Dans le discours préliminaire de sa "Défense des Places fortes" (première édition en 1810, je crois): 3rd edition 1812 Lazare Carnot

In the preliminary speech of his "Defense of the strongholds":

Le caractère national du Français est d'attaquer toujours; il gagne de l‘audace en allant à l'ennemi; il en perd s'il attend: un rôle passif ne lui convint jamais.

Translation:
"The national character of the French is always to attack; he wins by the audacity in going to the enemy; he loses if he waits: a passive role never suits him."

Carnot recommend attacking in defending strongholds.

Then ten years later:

General Brenier in Le Spectater Militaire S1 V2 & # (1827) Regarding the three rank formation still used by the French:

Page 470

I say more: these firings,[in three ranks] which would certainly be useful in several circumstances, were they are not ordered so as to force the first rank to put knee-to-ground, because this movement is entirely outside of the natural habits of the French soldiers.

Page 475

One will mention, in favor of the formation in two ranks, that of a few foreign armies, and particularly of the English army, whose fires, however, are lively and sustained; I will answer that the kind of men chosen to be soldiers in these foreign armies, their physical constitution, their character, and the kind of discipline to which they are subjected, make them more suitable for this kind of formation. The French soldier, on the contrary, despite his courage, reasons his position.

These are all experienced French officers justifying their choice of tactics based on French National Characteristics, the same beliefs held for over 150 years.

Again, I have just touched on this. The French army published an entire study Le caractère militaire des différentes armées européennes engagées dans la guerre tardive in 1800. It echoed long-accepted conclusions. The treatise was quickly printed in London in the original French in 1802, to be followed by complete English translations in 1803 and 1804,(The Military Character of the Different European Armies Engaged in the Late War)portions to be found in English publications for decades. I have included a link to an 1809 partial printing of the study below:

link

Impetus for this printing and then reprint of the document is explained in the Translator's forward:

The following work has been translated into English, in order to convey to the British Army, and to the nation at large, the opinions and sentiments of some foreign officers, whose talents and abilities (if our information be correct) are of the first rate."

The French officers themselves, state the goals for their work:

"We have endeavored not to suffer ourselves to be prejudiced by partisan spirit, or dazzled by the brilliant appearance of success. In relating circumstances, as they appear to us, we leave everyone to draw from them whatever conclusion he may think the most probable. Truth is our object. This object we think we have attained; we presume too, that those, who are acquainted with the armies, of which we are speaking, will meet with their own sentiments on this head although they may not perhaps have clearly defined them. If officers, who are well instructed in each service, discover that what we relate is so true, as to be common, we shall fancy that we have gained the objective , which we had in view." Introduction page viii

A book written for British officers in 1804, 1809 and reprinted up to the 1830's The Military Mentor echoes all of the above conclusions in its second volume. Page 139

LETTER XXXVII.

ON THE PRESENT STATE OF Tactics IN THE PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN ARMIES.

link

You'd think the chapter written by a veteran British General to new officers would indeed cover what we consider 'tactics'. What is covered instead for the entire letter are the National Characteristics of the different armies.

You can find similar works on National characteristics well into the 1850's saying the very same things about each nation.

These long-held beliefs about unique National Characteristics was one of the foundations for the surge in Nationalism during this same period.

Why this emphasis on National Characteristics: Colonel de Vernon, writing in the French Army's textbook for officer training at the Polytechnique: A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification, v1 (1805) – as translated and published in the US in 1817; p.29:

Hence it follows, that the organization of the army of any one powerful nation, affords a general insight into the formations of all European armies, regard however being paid to modifications existing in all armies from the National Character and government.

Hi McLaddie,

I am aware of the idea you mention above, that French officers thought that the French soldier was naturally great at the attack. Surely what matters is whether it was true or not? Myself, I have never seen much evidence that French troops were noticeably useless in defence or particularly brilliant in the attack; or even especially keen on using attacking modes of combat.

From the book you linked to:

The French artillery now preserves nothing of what it formerly was, but the name. Their officers are ignorant, unexpert, and inferior to all others. Their battalions have no fieldpieces attached to them.

Their adversaries ought to remember that the French are more dangerous when they treat than when they fight. Their superiority of resources, and especially their prodigious sacrifices of men, ought to ensure them the victory: they have, nevertheless, almost always lost it, whenever they had to deal with the archduke Charles or Suwarrow. Cobourg and Clairfait, although inferior in numbers, have often rendered the balance even. Buonaparte saw his star turn pale before the archduke Charles. His good fortune, by means of an armistice, delivered him from the danger into which his rashness had drawn him.

(The Russian) method is to charge the enemy with the bayonet, at full speed, crying, Owri, Owri. No troops in the world can stand this charge: the firing does not abate their impetuosity ; they attack a battery in front, if that is a readier way than to attack it in flank. To withstand.this shock, the enemy must not wait for it, but proceed to meet it with the same resolution. The French are more remarkable for boldness and rashness than for intrepidity: the approach of the long and broad Russian bayonets always alarmed them ; their grenadiers could never stand the impression. The courage of the Russians is proof against every thing; they know how to die to ensure victory, and to die rather than be beaten.

they (the British) are the finest troops in Europe; because in them, more especially is to be found that native valour which is the first element of a soldier.

Are these the elements with which we create our rules?

I am aware of the idea you mention above, that French officers thought that the French soldier was naturally great at the attack. Surely what matters is whether it was true or not?

whirlwind:

True? You mean in the absolute sense? Actually, it doesn't matter whether we believe it or if it is actually true. It matters that the men of the period believed it and acted on that belief.

When Napoleon wrote this: "It is in the nature of the French to attack. It is why I abhor any defensive action."

He wrote that in 1814. Even with his back against the wall, he attacked. Assuming that he didn't believe that, why would he write that? Simple: Because it would be accepted as reasonable.

Myself, I have never seen much evidence that French troops were noticeably useless in defence or particularly brilliant in the attack; or even especially keen on using attacking modes of combat.

Not'keen' on using attacking modes of combat? You haven't seen that in battles involving the French? So when did the French use defensive modes? Chose to fight a defensive battle? Most all French battles during the Napoleonic era were offensive in nature. Aspern-Essling is the only one that comes to mind and that was intended as offensive.

However, "Useless on the defense or brilliant on the attack" isn't what these men were saying. They were saying that the National Characteristics of the French favored quick movement and attacking over standing still on the defense. As noted, the general idea military men held was for an army to take advantage of the Character strengths of the nation in combat while exploiting the character weaknesses of the opponent.

I can provide any number of examples.

Are these the elements with which we create our rules?

Sure, why not? If particular types of combat were preferred based on the perceived character of the combatants, it is simply a likelihood of particular tactical choices being made by different nations.

Just as it was during WWII or current conflicts.

Actually, it doesn't matter whether we believe it or if it is actually true. It matters that the men of the period believed it and acted on that belief.

No? Surely it makes a great difference to our simulations as to whether:

a – French troops will attack because they are actually good at it(+1 to the French when attacking)

b – French troops *must* attack in circumstances x, y, z

Not'keen' on using attacking modes of combat? You haven't seen that in battles involving the French? So when did the French use defensive modes? Chose to fight a defensive battle? Most all French battles during the Napoleonic era were offensive in nature. Aspern-Essling is the only one that comes to mind and that was intended as offensive.

Well, I did say "especially keen".
Take Austerlitz. Or Jena and Auerstadt, even better. Did the French fight noticeably harder on the attack than on the defensive in those battles? Did the French fight noticeably harder at Bussaco than they did at Redinha? They did a lot of attacking because that is how one wins campaigns.

However, "Useless on the defense or brilliant on the attack" isn't what these men were saying. They were saying that the National Characteristics of the French favored quick movement and attacking over standing still on the defense. As noted, the general idea military men held was for an army to take advantage of the Character strengths of the nation in combat while exploiting the character weaknesses of the opponent.

So are they – or you – saying that the French "favoured" attacking but they weren't actually any better at doing so than anyone else? Or are you not?

Sure, why not? If particular types of combat were preferred based on the perceived character of the combatants, it is simply a likelihood of particular tactical choices being made by different nations.

Just as it was during WWII or current conflicts.

I'm just as sceptical of this kind of generalization in WW2 as I am for the Napoleonic Wars. The military situation, not the "character of the nation", appears much more key to who attacks and who defends in any given situation. The popular image of WW2 Americans is that they love attack. And what are probably the two most iconic actions? Bastogne and Guadalcanal…

Q.Are these the elements with which we create our rules?

A. Sure, why not?

I don't believe you would accept a Napoleonic game which reckoned that:

1 – The French Foot Artillery was uniquely awful
2 – Charles, Suvarov, Coburg and Clairfait must be rated higher than Napoleon.
3 – Russian infantry are more effective on the offensive than their French counterparts.
4- British troops are simply better than everyone else.

Yet that is what the book you linked to described as the "national characteristics" of not even the Napoleonic Wars, but the Revolutionary Wars.

So are they – or you – saying that the French "favoured" attacking but they weren't actually any better at doing so than anyone else? Or are you not?

Whirlwind:

I am saying that the FRENCH favored attacking because THEY believed attacking was something inthe French nature…as Napoleon said.

Whether they were actually better than other nations at the offensive is another question.

I'm just as sceptical of this kind of generalization in WW2 as I am for the Napoleonic Wars. The military situation, not the "character of the nation", appears much more key to who attacks and who defends in any given situation.

Be as skeptical as you want… The men of the time weren't skeptical. That is the point.

Are you saying that the Allies didn't generalization about the Japanese and German national character during WWII…and didn't act on those beliefs tactically?

I don't believe you would accept a Napoleonic game which reckoned that:

1 – The French Foot Artillery was uniquely awful
2 – Charles, Suvarov, Coburg and Clairfait must be rated higher than Napoleon.
3 – Russian infantry are more effective on the offensive than their French counterparts.
4- British troops are simply better than everyone else.

Not you or I, but just maybe the French Army 1800.

Yet that is what the book you linked to described as the "national characteristics" of not even the Napoleonic Wars, but the Revolutionary Wars.

That's right, in 1800, written by veteran French officers for the French Army at the time which published those conclusions and the British and other Nations felt was important enough to translate, publish and echo several times.

Yet, many of the Characteristics that 1800 publication outlined were repeated by veteran French, British, Prussian, Russian and Austrian officers during the Napoleonic Wars and after.

I am only pointing out what the men at the time believed and that those beliefs influenced their decisions, tactics, strategies and actions during the wars.

Whether we believe those ideas concerning National Characteristics are nonsense or absolutely true is not the issue here.

I am saying that the FRENCH favored attacking because THEY believed attacking was something inthe French nature…as Napoleon said.

I know you are. And I am saying that the French "saying" that they favoured attacking is not the same as them actually "doing" more attacking.

If it were true, what would it look like?

a – The French Army attacking where we would expect that they might otherwise have chosen to defend.
b – The French succeeding in attacks that we would not have expected them to (because it was in their 'nature').
c – The French defending poorly (because it was against their 'nature').
d – Since this applies at the soldier level, we would expect to see all this tactically.

I am only pointing out what the men at the time believed and that those beliefs influenced their decisions, tactics, strategies and actions during the wars.

Whether we believe those ideas concerning National Characteristics are nonsense or absolutely true is not the issue her

I don't think anyone disputes that the men at the time believed it. What the extent of that influence was on their decisions, tactics, strategies and actions is less clear. And as players and designers of games, or enthusiasts of the period, then whether those ideas are nonsense or absolutely true is very much the issue. The mechanisms to simulate a belief (which is untrue) are likely to be very different from simulating something which is true.

Glenn said that he and his group had dropped the use of national characteristics from their wargames, finding, on examination, that the claims for national characteristics did not translate into actual effect on the battlefield in the universal way that they imply. For that approach to be wrong, then two things must be true:

a – The effect size must be significant enough to matter at a game level.
b – The effect must be near-universal for a given army (i.e. not a scenario-specific rule).

What "national characteristics" do you think Napoleonic Wargames should include which would make Glenn's games more realistic?

And I am saying that the French "saying" that they favoured attacking is not the same as them actually "doing" more attacking.

Whirlwind:

I agree. Actions establishes how strong that belief is and where a belief is applied.

If it were true, what would it look like?

a – The French Army attacking where we would expect that
they might otherwise have chosen to defend.

Such as Napoleon's entire career, even 1814 when going on the defense certainly is suggested by the situation, was was the situation around Mantua during his first Italian Campaign. He chose to attack.

b – The French succeeding in attacks that we would not have expected them to (because it was in their 'nature').

You mean like Auerstadt?

This doesn't necessarily follow. You are saying that their belief has to be proven by success… A stubborn refusal to change tactics in the face of defeat is just as viable a 'proof.' [I'll show you what I mean in another post.]

c – The French defending poorly (because it was against their 'nature').

Well, there are several battles in 1813 and 1814 where Soult defends with little success, though his attacks are more successful.

d – Since this applies at the soldier level, we would expect to see all this tactically.

That is only if the French decided to apply it tactically, but as I said, I'll give an example in the next post.

Glenn said that he and his group had dropped the use of national characteristics from their wargames, finding, on examination, that the claims for national characteristics did not translate into actual effect on the battlefield in the universal way that they imply. For that approach to be wrong, then two things must be true:

a – The effect size must be significant enough to matter at a game level.
b – The effect must be near-universal for a given army (i.e. not a scenario-specific rule).

What "national characteristics" do you think Napoleonic Wargames should include which would make Glenn's games more realistic?

a--Sure the 'effect size' should be 'significant', that is make a marked difference in how one army behaves compared to another.

I can't speak to Glenn's definition of National Characteristics or how he saw them being not demonstrated in different wargames.

b-Why should the 'effect' be near universal?' When has any military idea, tactic or belief been near universal in an army… and how would you prove it unless it affects how an entire army is organized, it's doctrine and common behaviors over time?

Again, I will address that in the next post.

What "national characteristics" do you think Napoleonic Wargames should include which would make Glenn's games more realistic?

I'll address that in the next post.

Such as Napoleon's entire career, even 1814 when going on the defense certainly is suggested by the situation, was was the situation around Mantua during his first Italian Campaign. He chose to attack.

Well that is a biographical fact about one person. For it to be a "National Characteristic" then to me it would have to apply to a large majority of the commanders of that nation – attacking where we might have expected defence, and that action not being attributable to some other factor.

This doesn't necessarily follow. You are saying that their belief has to be proven by success… A stubborn refusal to change tactics in the face of defeat is just as viable a 'proof.' [I'll show you what I mean in another post.]

Ah no, I am not suggesting this is a necessary condition, just a possible one.

Well, there are several battles in 1813 and 1814 where Soult defends with little success, though his attacks are more successful.

Yes, but for the National Characteristic to be true, it would have to be shown that we would have expected the French to do rather better than they did. Conversely does this show an unexpected British affinity for the attack?

That is only if the French decided to apply it tactically, but as I said, I'll give an example in the next post.

Okay, but the mentions so far have all been about the French soldier . So I think we should be surprised if it does not show up tactically.

Why should the 'effect' be near universal?' When has any military idea, tactic or belief been near universal in an army… and how would you prove it unless it affects how an entire army is organized, it's doctrine and common behaviors over time?

Because if it isn't, then it is hardly a national characteristic – it is a characteristic of a particular commander, or army, or corps or whatever.

I'll address that in the next post.

Looking forward to it!

Are you saying that the Allies didn't generalization about the Japanese and German national character during WWII…and didn't act on those beliefs tactically?

I'm asking when, in fact, those beliefs were actually acted on in a way recognizable as a national characteristic.

I can think of two (related) things, off-hand: banzai charges and US attitudes towards Japanese prisoners. What would you add to that?

Frederick the Great had already the idea of National characteristics, like a Russian Army had to be fought differently than an Austrian one.

In the Napoleonic time, again Russians proved to be extremely tenacious fighter, the French said you had to kill them and then topple them over.

How to implement such attitudes for wargaming – difficult.

For the tactical side, but in case you ignore tactics – it doesn't matter, a Prussian Army of 1806 would manoeuvre much differently to one of 1812.

Two examples of a Prussian birgade of 1812, basically when commanding a Prussian army, you should deploy your brigade like this.

theminiaturespage.com

‌"TMP link

theminiaturespage.com

‌"TMP link

at least such formations would be there at the start and then you would re act out of those formations according to circumstances.

In case I look at a lot of wargaming reports none such tactical consideration whatsoever are taken into account and the units are deployed in fantasy.

The French artillery now preserves nothing of what it formerly was, but the name. Their officers are ignorant, unexpert, and inferior to all others. Their battalions have no fieldpieces attached to them.

Source and citation, please-including the page number if you would.

Antoine de Brack gave his opinion on 'national characteristics' as he faced them on the battlefield:

'If the Cossacks attack you during the night, it is to keep you awake, to wear you out…you seldom have to do anything more than look alert.'

'If the Prussian cavalry attacks during the night, that is more serious; you must not only be ready, but maneuver [to meet them].'

'If the Austrian cavalry attacks at night, they probably have their infantry with them…'

'If the English cavalry understood war, they might be…the most terrible in Europe…'

'[If you have ridden over them] the Austrian infantry throws down its weapons, each soldier claiming to be a Pole, they obey you honestly.'

'The Prussian infantry throws down its arms, but will grab them up promptly if they see help coming. The Russian infantry falls flat, lets you pass, gets up, and starts shooting again.'

National characteristics, IMO, unquestioningly exist. They derive from culture, society, religion, political indoctrination, even military doctrine, organization and training.

How many other militaries outside of Japan fielded a large-scale organized kamikaze corps? Why did common Japanese soldiers prefer suicide to surrender? Why did they prefer to starve to death in New Guinea rather than surrender?

Why did post-WW2 western militaries study German Auftragstaktik so closely?

Is it not a "national characteristic" that the armies of the Mongols were founded upon cavalry?

Is it not a "national characteristic that the French Navy of the latter 18th century doctrinally avoided pitched battle at sea unless forced to engage? Or that the Royal Navy of the Napoleonic War period as a rule fielded much better trained crews than their opposition?

All that having been said, I think it is important to recognize that national characteristics are not in every respect immutable themes over time. National characteristic are a reflection of all the underlying factors mentioned in the first paragraph of this post and will evolve/morph in response to changes thereto.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

National characteristics, IMO, unquestioningly exist. They derive from culture, society, religion, political indoctrination, even military doctrine, organization and training.

Exactly, as Blutarski says.

Whirlwind:

Okay. First, the the intellectual foundations in the belief in National Characteristics here and then the applications in military thought and action in the second post. It is necessary to see a connection between a common belief and actions influenced by it. There is no need to prove whether the belief is true for us.

With intellectual history, it is only a matter of understanding what was believed as true, why and how that effected those contemporaries' decisions and behavior.

The belief in a specific national character for each nation and culture was as accepted as our current notions of the existence of a 'conscious' and 'uncounscious,' though that was only 'invented' by Freud at the turn of the 20th Century. Few today ever ask for proof of that mental dichotomy, doubt that it is actually a real thing. Everyone knows about it, accepts it and often will note some behavior as the consequence of it. But how would you establish
1. That it is actually a universal belief and
2. That it does indeed influence our decisions and behaviors?

First, the basis for the universal belief in specific national traits. John Locke wrote a book in 1690 that influenced the next two centuries of thinking on scientific thought and epistemology, that is, the basis for sound judgement: An Essay on Human Understanding This was radically different from previous thought, that posited character as being inborn, an element of 'breeding'. Such a view supported the nobility and class system.

Locke stated that men were born a'Tabla Rasa', blank slate and that "No man's knowledge can go beyond his experience." He gave the example of the Polynesian who--no matter how intelligent--would have no reason to believe a visiting European that water can become hard enough to walk on, not until he experienced it himself.

Of course, thinkers of the time saw this as a sound explanation for the differences in language, morals, beliefs and behavior among disparate cultures in Europe and around the world: environment and experience.

They began applying such ideas to fashion government, the legal systems and yes, the military. All the philosophers mentioned wrote about national character and how to apply what they saw as sound descriptions of the national differences between nations' traits.

Every thinker for the next 100 years called themselves "Lockian", from Voltaire, [1734 "The Philosophical Letters" & 1756 "Essay on the manners and spirit of nations"], and Montesquieu [1732 "Persian Letters", 1750 "Of the spirit of Laws; Essay on causes that can affect minds and characters"] where Montesquieu first coined the phrase ‘National Character' in writing of how laws, both internal and international, must take into account differences in culture and society. From Rousseau, Goethe and Schiller to Herder and Kant, their ideas began with a belief in Locke's model of understanding and by logical extension, the reality of unique National Characteristics.

For instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, when asked to write a constitution for Corsica in his Projet de constitution pour la Corse [1772] (Constitutional Project for Corsica) he stated up front:

"La première règle que nous avons à suivre est le caractère national. Tout peuple a ou doit avoir un caractère national et s'il en manquait il faudrait commencer par le lui donner."
(The first rule we have to follow is the national character. Every nation has or ought to have a national character, and if it is lacking, it should first be given to it. [i.e. determined.])

This foundational belief hasn't been overlooked by military historians, authors such as Azar Gaz in his The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz , John Lynn in his A History of Combat and Culture and Mark Wishon's German Forces and the British Army; Interactions and Perceptions, 1742–1815 . They have noted the persistent influence of the era's conceptions of National Character from the common soldier to the general and philosopher. In his first chapter abstract, "Nationalism and Transitional Professionalism," Wishon writes:

"The focus here is on stereotypes and, particularly, the discourse concerning ‘national character', a term common among the writings of soldiers through which their accounts of foreign soldiery were often filtered and which entailed a set of theories about a polity's collective psychology and innate traits. This emphasis on national character is relevant to the entire period under examination, but gained more value, and greater emphasis at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the proliferation of nationalism in Western Europe."

National Character as conceived by Enlightenment thinkers was an integral part of their conception of nature and scientific thinking. Experimental proofs flowed from Locke's thought. They remained constant from 1700 to well into the 19th Century. This meant beliefs in National Character required delineation and then proper application in war, how such beliefs should be used to greatest advantage.

So, what were the salient beliefs about the French and how were they used by the military? We have to go with Locke: "I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts."
—John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

In his Mémoires du Maréchal de Villars, 5 vols (1734-5) he lauded "the air of audacity so natural to the French" and stated "In my opinion, the best method for the French infantry…is to charge with the bayonet."

link

(Colonel) Lake stopped now, waiting himself for the other four companies of his Regiment to arrive. Even as the French behind the wall began a galling fire, he still waited, crying "Don't fire men; don't fire; wait a little, we shall soon charge, the bayonet is the true weapon for a British soldier."

Whirlwind:

I haven't had the time to respond until now. So, I need to draw a line between the belief in a particular National Character for the French, their organization, tactics and doctrine [Or what passed for it during the Napoleonic wars.]

Okay. Here is the French character as describedby the French militaryin 1800—again as a base point. I am not going to repeat any of the other quotes given above:

Le caractère militaire des différentes armées européennes engagées dans la guerre tardive. (The Military Character of the Different European Armies Engaged in the Late War) that I have mentioned before. You can see in the translation I provided the link for--"Character of the Armies of the various European Powers at the Peace of Amiens, 1802" pp. 189-190 reprinted in 1809Essays on the Theory and Practice of the Art of War… chiefly translated from the best French and German writers, Vol. 3

"It has been seen, in the previous article, that the properties of the French Army are different. The French soldiers are impetuous; their courage requires something to excite, and movement to keep up its warmth. Their attack is more violent; but they are not, like the Austrians, able to sustain a regular and open fire from the line; they have not that moral and physical immobility, which, without being affected, can see whole ranks fall beneath the bullet, and whole files swept off by the cannon. The Courage of the French is less constitutional than artificial; emulation and vanity are its most powerful incentives: honour, example, and habit, keep it up to its proper pitch."

Note that
a. This description was a consistently adhered to and repeated by the French military men from 1710 to into the 1870s with the "Furia francese.".
b. Every other nation repeated the same descriptions for the same nations for the same time period, over 150 years.

The traits where were:

1. It is in the French nature to attack.

"Mesnil-Durand favored shock combat, declaring like Saxe, that fire was not very formidable, and that it would be fatal to depend upon it. He referred to Puyégur's declaration that the great trouble with coming to grips was that from one hundred sixty yards on, one lost many men from enemy fire, which caused the troops to speed the march, with resultant disorder. The plésion, Durand's form of the infantry column] naturally was not subject to this, because it would move so fast that it would not lose many men, and it feared no disorder from marching. This method of fighting was especially suited to the French, he declared, who were a nation of great impetuosity and vivacity which were just the qualities required for combat with armes blanches."

This fundamental connection between Mesnil-Durand's military theories and National Character is difficult to miss when Mesnil-Durand's titled his first study Projet d'un ordre françois en tactique [1755] (Project of a French order in tactics)

Every prominent supporter of the compromise between l'ordre profond and l'ordre mince and the Ordre Mixte did not deny the reality of French National Character or the power of the French. Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert in his Essai général de la Tactique [1772] (General Essay on Tactics) who I have already quoted.

The issue was so important, that Guilbert, in challenging the excessive emphasis on the French offensive spirit shown by Mesnil-Durand and his supporters, dedicated the first chapter of his Défense du système de guerre moderne (1779) to "National Character" [the chapter title], declaring:

"Even admitting that the French are born for offensive war, [we must]give them a battle order to compensate for their weaknesses."]

Which is what Guibert explains in the rest of his Défense, how to use the French natural traits while countering their limitations. I'll mention them as we go:

1. Their courage is motivated externally, they need ‘something to excite' them, it is "artificial", "vanity and emulation excite individual French soldier, and carry them forward to the boldest actions. Honour and habit keep it up to its proper pitch." Guibert recommended that there be more officers than seen in Continental armies as examples, and that soldiers should be recognized for their efforts. France, unlike Britain and the Allied nations, gave medals [those babbles] to enlisted men. [A marshal's baton in every knapsack] It is no accident that the French officer corps suffered an average 50% higher casualty rate than the British [6% to 4%]

Then, when the hail of enemy bullets or cannon shot began to slacken, an officer, common soldier, or, often a Representative of the People, would start to chant the ‘Victory Hymn'…The soldiers would begin to move forward as the drums beat the charge…the sky would ring to a thousand battle-cries constantly repeated: ‘En Avant! En Avant! Vive la Republique!'

Foy, Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule sous Napoleon, Volume I, 102-104. [The British never behaved in such a manner. At most it was a single controlled shout]

2. Unlike the Austrians, the French can not sustain fire from a formed line. Guilbert recommended individual fire rather than volley fire and of course suggested skirmish fire as a substitute. French infantry during the war were known for their single volley and then to individual fire, if they weren't simply dispersing instead of having a formed line as noted by several authors such as Elting.

From Duhesme – Essai sur l'infanterie légère (1814) Page 177

"These skirmishers, whose fire is so murderous,which, scattered on the front of our battlefields, precede the charge of our battalions like swarms of
furious wasps, whose cries, shots, and impetuosity are to the terrible charge‐step of our line of battle or of our columns, what the flash of lightning, the sound of lightning, are to the thick and devastating
cloud which they announce; these are new means of destruction which this last war has brought to light. This kind of fighting has always been particularly suited to the genius of our nation;…"

[The French have] A lively regard for honor, for competition and distinctions, the ability to learn quickly and to adapt easily to changing conditions and circumstances make French soldiers better skirmishers than any other nation.

-Scharnhorst, Essay on Infantry Tactics, 1811.

3. They can't simply stand immobile, like the Austrians, and watch whole ranks swept away. They need to move because of their ‘native intelligence."

Guilbert recommended speed over order, as opposed to the Prussians and British. He saw no reason to be overly concerned about disorder in advancing as order can be restored once the unit has arrived. Speed and movement were a natural French trait. So, on the battlefield and campaign, they are seen by other nations as superior in movement.

…The quickness and intelligence of the French soldiery, pointed out the necessity of an obedience to their officers, whom they considered as leading them to objects equally desirable to all: and thus actuated, far from having to receive orders, they readily anticipated them.

"The British Campaign or 1809" p.72 Maxwell, William H. Stories of the Peninsular War or Peninsular Sketches. 1870

4. The French are ‘impetuous.' They tend to be flighty or less consistent on the battlefield. For that reason, Guilbert recommended most strongly a second line and the expectation that the first line would give at some point.

"Hearing nothing else so flattering to their unbounded vanity, they become so puffed up by this eternal stimulant, as to be fully convinced of its truth, which, in con sequence, makes their first attack tremendous. Buonaparte, being aware of this weak point in their character, fed it in every way, and the object of wearing a paltry piece of enamel gained him many battles. But this sort of created courage is not capable of standing a severe test, and the French have always been, in their military character, more Gauls than Franks; and what Caesar said of the former, eighteen centuries ago, is still applicable to the races now occupying their fine country." Maxwell P.71

Now, I could go on with lots of similar quotes from every nation as well as examples given by contemporaries [The Military Character of the Different European Armies Engaged in the Late War is filled with what the authors believe are examples and proofs of the National Characteristics.

So, let's ask what kind of tactics would seem to fit with the French Characteristics? What behaviors would we see? A lack of volley fire, a reliance on shock combat, some disorder compared to the British, who were said to "neither require brandy nor self-conceit to be brave; their courage is innate; it is a national instinct…it is of a quiet, stern nature."

I know not any reason for supposing that the English officers are less willing than the French to lead, but it is I think universally allowed that the English soldiers are more willing to follow. Our nation may boast beyond any other people in the world, of a kind of epidemic bravery diffused equally among the ranks…,

The French author who has lately published the Art of War, remarks how much soldiers area animated when they see all their dangers shared by those who were born to be their masters, and whom they consider as beings of a different rank. The Englishman despises such motives of courage; he was born without a master, and looks not on any man,…

Page 203
"The Military Character of the Different European Armies Engaged in the Late War."

Again, the French Army conclusions in 1800 about the British. And of course, the impetuous, ‘externally motivated' French soldier as opposed to the internally motivated, more orderly British.

Let's take just one combat example for a start, though this same scene is repeated many times over in other battles as described by both French and British veterans.

Mélanges … (Mixtures) by Georges marquis de Chambray. Published by Pillet ainé, 1840. 535 pages:
link

Chapter 2 "Maneuvers and methods of warfare of the French infantry. Maneuvers and methods of warfare of the English infantry."
Pp 336-340

On the eve of the battle of Talavera, several deserters of an English regiment, composed of foreigners, arrived at the outposts of a French regiment, which had a large number of old soldiers, and said that many of their comrades were like them Willing to desert, if they found the opportunity.

The next day the French regiment was in the presence of the English regiment, to which the deserters belonged. The troops were deployed on both sides. The French loaded their arms according to their use. Having reached a short distance, and the English line remaining motionless, some hesitation appeared in the march. The officers and non-commissioned officers shouted to the soldiers in front, walk, do not fire; some even cried, "they will give way."

The forward movement is thus restored, and it was only a very small distance of the English line, when a fire started in two rows brought destruction within of the French line, stopped Its motion, and produced some disorder. The forward movement is thus restored, and it was only a very small distance of the English line, when a fire started in two rows brought destruction within of the French line, stopped its motion, and produced some disorder.

As officers shouted to the soldiers in front not to fire, some fired despite the cry. The English, suddenly ceasing their fire, charged with the bayonet. Their order, the impulse, their resolution of fighting with the bayonet was gone. On the contrary, the French, the ranks thinned and disunited, and the surprise caused by the unexpected charge of the enemy; The French had to flee. This flight, however, was not the result of fear, but of necessity; the French regiment rallied behind the second line, went to new forward and valiantly fought the rest of the day.

Such circumstances will always bring about the same results; because the most impetuous courage may fail to succumb if it is supported by of good methods of war.

When the French infantry overturns that which is opposed to it, it pursues it with great vivacity, and it needs rather to be moderate than excited. Sometimes, carried away by her ardor, she breaks her ranks; And in several cases, it was vigorously repulsed by the second line of the enemy, for having pursued the first line too vividly and too far after having overthrown it.

Italics mine.

And this approach did succeed at times, the French preference for the column attack:

Colonel Waller, (British 2nd Division) witnessed a French attack against Picton's "Fighting Division" in 1810 at Bussaco:

"At this moment were seen the heads of the several columns, three I think, in number and deploying into line with the most beautiful precision, celerity and gallantry. As they formed on the plateau, they were cannonaded from our position and the regiment of Portuguese… threw in some volleys of musketry into the enemy's columns in a flank direction, but the (Portugese) regiment was quickly driven into the position … the (French) columns advanced in despite of a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from our troops in position in the rocks, and overcoming all opposition although repeatedly charged by Lightburne's Brigade, or rather the whole of Picton's Division, they advanced and fairly drove the British right wing from the rocky part of this position.")

While reverse slope tactics were certainly used with affect, the example Chambray uses was too often the case. We don't see such tactics by the British, no surprise. And the terrain and slopes didn't stop the French in Waller's account.

The belief in a French national character can help explain why the French continued to rely on the column far too often, particularly in the Pennisula when the formation and tactics was so often met with utter failure, the very scene described by Chambray.

The French reliance on movement and speed instead of order, their preference for skirmishing and independent fire rather than a series of controlled volleys like the British and their Allies, the continued use of columns when French and Allied nations admitted that the line was the combat formation—they all speak to decisions made based in part by a belief in a French National Character, conceived of eighty years before it was used as Guilbert's template for a new ‘French' system of battle.

And back to the thread question:

"When can a commander ignore orders"

That too can be addressed by National Characteristics. Some nations, like the French were built on the 'rewards' system of advancement by achievement rather than purely seniority or wealth and noble birth. The French officers would be far more likely to 'take the initiative' to shine before their superiors in the hopes of advancement.
In military systems where there were punishments for not following orders, but few rewards or chances for advancement, those officers would be far more likely to 'simply follow orders.'

Again, it would really need a statistical study to determine how much difference there was between the various national systems in that regard and the results in following orders.

McLaddie,

Many thanks for taking the time to do that. I remain however…unconvinced.

1a – I have previously quoted examples where contemporary writers felt that the British and the Russians were particularly suited to attack with the "arme blanche". How to choose between them?

1b – I guess it is interesting that they believed that Frenchmen were motivated differently to other soldiers but without knowing what the effect of that was, it is of perhaps marginal concern to the writing of wargames rules. I struggle to accept anything on the basis of French casualty rates because of the numerous Peninsular War examples of French senior officers lying about their own soldier casualties (i.e. their self-declared losses don't match with their casualty returns) . I don't know that the work has been done yet to untangle those lies.

2 – Your example doesn't follow from your headline. Regardless, these are empirical questions: did in fact French infantry perform less well than others when they had to take fire? Muir's "Tactics and Experience…" makes clear that all nations went to individual fire and slightly dispersed lines in prolonged firefights. Duhesme's comments come across as so much hot air, not backed up by empirical experience: if those tactics had been that effective, then the French would never have lost an infantry combat. Happily they lost tons, so we can give this kind of thing a stiff ignoring.

3 – Yes, Guibert was talking in the aftermath of the SYW after the French took a fairly comprehensive hammering. In any case, such things are empirical: did in fact French soldiers move faster? Were they more 'natively intelligent' (and remember we are talking about the whole of the C18, so nothing to do with the revolution per se)?

4 –

So, let's ask what kind of tactics would seem to fit with the French Characteristics? What behaviors would we see? A lack of volley fire, a reliance on shock combat, some disorder compared to the British, who were said to "neither require brandy nor self-conceit to be brave; their courage is innate; it is a national instinct…it is of a quiet, stern nature."

I thought Paddy Griffith had killed this one off years ago. He pointed out that bayonet charges – shock combat – were integral to the British tactical system of the period; and also apparently to the Russian.

Anyway, I think we may be justly suspicious of a theory of 'national character' that draws a straight line from the Gauls of the 1st century BC to infantry (who may be in reality Dutch or Italian) of the Napoleon's army.

When the French infantry overturns that which is opposed to it, it pursues it with great vivacity, and it needs rather to be moderate than excited. Sometimes, carried away by her ardor, she breaks her ranks; And in several cases, it was vigorously repulsed by the second line of the enemy, for having pursued the first line too vividly and too far after having overthrown it.

This is slightly amusing, since if one replaces 'French' with 'British' (the Guards, the Light Dragoons) or 'German' (the KGL) this works just as well for the same battle .

With the Bussaco example, I will just ask – what happened next? Right after this moment you mentioned?

I feel my fundamental question still has not been answered: how, mechanically, do you feel that any/all of this should be incorporated into Napoleonic rules? Should they be framed in terms of bonuses and minuses? Or in restrictions on behaviour? Or something else?

Were I to write Horse&Musket rules around national characteristics (and keep in mind that I play Flames of War, which in v2 and v3 had quite a set of National Special Rules), I'd probably write the French to have a slightly better chance to charge (probably via a re-roll on a morale check to do so) and an equally-reduced chance to hold (probably by requiring a re-roll of successful morale after getting shot up or after combat).

Re-rolls can be a finer adjustment than a +1 modifier, depending on what dice you use for the rest of your mechanics. 5+ (on a d6) re-rolling fails is actually slightly better than a straight 4+ (55% chance of success instead of 50%), and 4+ re-roll fails is not slightly better than a straight 3+ (75% chance of success instead of 67%).

1a – I have previously quoted examples where contemporary writers felt that the British and the Russians were particularly suited to attack with the "arme blanche". How to choose between them?

Whirlwind:

And why do you have to 'choose between them?' They all believed what they believed.

1b – I guess it is interesting that they believed that Frenchmen were motivated differently to other soldiers but without knowing what the effect of that was, it is of perhaps marginal concern to the writing of wargames rules.

I can understand you being unconvinced. However, if your response is "but without knowing what the effect of that was," I am at a loss to know what you see as 'effects.'
I have given you some examples of how that belief influenced French doctrine, their 'New System", organization, tactics and battlefield behavior. In this forum, I can only scratch the surface and dumping more quotes and period commentary obviously isn't going to add anything.

The bottom line that while you believe that National Characteristics "is of perhaps marginal concern to the writing of wargames rules," I would think it is obvious that military men of the time thought National Characteristics were important. For instance, in the text written to train French officers, vetted by a committee of French marshals and Napoleon, it states:

Hence it follows, that the organization of the army of any one powerful nation, affords a general insight into the formation of all European armies, regard however being paid to modifications existing in all armies from the National Character and government.

de Vernon, A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification, v1 (1805) – as translated and published in the US in 1817; p.29

2 – Your example doesn't follow from your headline.

True, in some respects, but I was hoping you would connect what was earlier posted and then noted in other places of this post such as Guilbert's ideas on how to mitigate that weakness in delivering formed volleys by other methods such as individual fire and skirmishing. It is obvious that the French attack Chambray gives as too common didn't rely on volley fire.

Regardless, these are empirical questions: did in fact French infantry perform less well than others when they had to take fire?

No, it is an historical question. I was attempting to establish what the contemporaries believed were true empirically, not empirically prove that the French did perform less well. Every French military author for 160 years stated it as fact…and developed tactics around it regardless of whether the French in fact did perform less well. There is the self-fulfilling prophecy aspect to this too.

Muir's "Tactics and Experience…" makes clear that all nations went to individual fire and slightly dispersed lines in prolonged firefights.

But did they do that as a purposeful practice based on some pre-conceived notion or did it just happen in 'prolonged firefights?'

Duhesme's comments come across as so much hot air, not backed up by empirical experience: if those tactics had been that effective, then the French would never have lost an infantry combat. Happily they lost tons, so we can give this kind of thing a stiff ignoring.

I thought you might feel that way, which is why I added Scharnhorst's comments too. And again, you feel the only way that the French could believe in National Characteristics is if you find evidence convincing for those characteristics, even though contemporary veterans like Scharnhorst and Duhesme were convinced regardless.

I thought Paddy Griffith had killed this one off years ago. He pointed out that bayonet charges – shock combat – were integral to the British tactical system of the period; and also apparently to the Russian.

Not really. Read his The Art of War of Revolutionary France, particularly on the French attitudes towards the bayonet. In the example of Chambray's above, the British used both volleys and the bayonet to the best effect, but it is obvious that the French advance and tactics were also relying the bayonet. Which they continued to do, as in the Bussaco example I gave--sometimes successfully, and then not. The French don't have to be universally successful in attacks to establish that they believed in the French aggressiveness and the attack as a natural trait--and based their tactics on that belief.

how, mechanically, do you feel that any/all of this should be incorporated into Napoleonic rules? Should they be framed in terms of bonuses and minuses? Or in restrictions on behaviour?

First of all, the question is how the belief in National Characteristics shaped the decisions made on the battlefield, so that French armies/troops/commanders act more like the French did during the Napoleonic Wars.

I outlined where the French could and were different:

Command
Organization
Doctrine
Tactics
Common Beliefs as to what the French were and were not good at in war.

All wargames cover some of those differences, without exception. Those kinds of 'special rules' that Lion mentions. Most ignore a good portion of the rest.

Perhaps if we look at just the thread question, it would be more manageable.

Hi McLaddie,

To take things in order:

1 – I think that, almost by definition, in wargames rules you end up putting numbers or restrictions on things. If one gives the French bonuses for something, you are creating a model where they do stuff better. If you are forcing them to do something in cinrcumstances where others would have free choice, then you are creating a model where they are disadvantaged. If it doesn't actually matter in the model, then why include it at all. Which leads me on to point 2…

2 – One can imagine – I don't know if this is true, but it is not self-contradictory – that the different ways of inspiring French troops have an effect size of 0 on things that matter to wargame rules. So if they are inspired by appeals to glory, but another nation's troops are inspired by fear of the lash, then one might end up in the same place.

3 – I continue to agree with you that (some) military men think that 'national characteristics' were important. I can agree with that whilst thinking that in practice other factors dwarf such characteristics.

4 – The different French approach to prolonged fire is a good example of the kind of thing I am talking about. It could be true that the French theorists were more advanced in understanding than the doctrine writers of other countries, so the theorists embraced what actually happened whilst the others opposed it – but if in fact all troops ended up doing the same thing, then it isn't of significance in a set of wargames rules . Conversely, if it does make a significant difference, then how do we account for that? Who gets the advantage?

5 –

you feel the only way that the French could believe in National Characteristics is if you find evidence convincing for those characteristics, even though contemporary veterans like Scharnhorst and Duhesme were convinced regardless.

Not true, it is the other way around. I believe that contemporary veterans could believe something to be true but that belief not to reflect reality. And the stuff you have provided actually reinforces that – the beliefs that the French and the Russians and the British were all 'the best' and 'most suited' to bayonet fighting have all been attested. If I knew more German, Hungarian, Polish or Swedish, maybe I could expand this list…

6 – I wholeheartedly agree that the French do not have to succeed in every attack to prove that they were "attack-minded". What I do ask is – is this true? Given the strategic frameworks of the campaigns which they fought, the relative strengths and characters of the generals, did they attack more or less than one might expect? Were they more successful than one might expect? If not…how should this show up in our games?

7 -

To take things in order:

1 – I think that, almost by definition, in wargames rules you end up putting numbers or restrictions on things. If one gives the French bonuses for something, you are creating a model where they do stuff better. If you are forcing them to do something in circumstances where others would have free choice, then you are creating a model where they are disadvantaged. If it doesn't actually matter in the model, then why include it at all.

Hi Whirlwind:

Whether it matters or not in the model is entirely up to the designer, I would think. I would suggest before we go all 'game think' on this, where it is adding + or – modifiers or forcing players to do something the contemporaries would be free to ignore, we need to get a better handle on the actual 'effects' of a belief in National Character.

Whatever the result, my goal would be what most folks voted for with wargame 'constraints:

66% said "The rules should allow me to try the 'what ifs' of the period that didn't happen, but not allow counter-factual tactics"

2 – One can imagine – I don't know if this is true, but it is not self-contradictory – that the different ways of inspiring French troops have an effect size of 0 on things that matter to wargame rules. So if they are inspired by appeals to glory, but another nation's troops are inspired by fear of the lash, then one might end up in the same place.

actually, you don't if France suffered nearly twice the officer losses as say, Russia, and 50% more than Britain in that effort to 'inspire' the troops. Most British accounts note the French officers out in front attempting to inspire the troops, but Russian troops suffered higher casualty rates for their 'uninspired' immobility.

Those would seem to be important issues in resolving combat.

3 – I continue to agree with you that (some) military men think that 'national characteristics' were important. I can agree with that whilst thinking that in practice other factors dwarf such characteristics.

I have found only two types of commentary, explanations based on national characteristics and those who don't mention it, but seem to allude to it, like Chambray, probably because it was a widely held belief:

When the French infantry overturns that which is opposed to it, it pursues it with great vivacity, and it needs rather to be moderate than excited. Sometimes, carried away by her ardor, she breaks her ranks; And in several cases, it was vigorously repulsed by the second line of the enemy, for having pursued the first line too vividly and too far after having overthrown it.

Note that he says "French infantry, not any infantry. This is in line with French "impulsiveness and ardor" already noted. …generally the overwhelming majority mention it at some point or another.

4 – The different French approach to prolonged fire is a good example of the kind of thing I am talking about. It could be true that the French theorists were more advanced in understanding than the doctrine writers of other countries, so the theorists embraced what actually happened whilst the others opposed it – but if in fact all troops ended up doing the same thing, then it isn't of significance in a set of wargames rules.

Perhaps it isn't significant, unless you note what the French did such as Foy, that the British had far more disciplined fire. The French might volley once, but you don't see three volleys and then a bayonet charge. With the French it was purposeful battle fire, with other nations it was when they lost control of the infantry's fire.

Conversely, if it does make a significant difference, then how do we account for that? Who gets the advantage?

Well, which side has more fire control?

5-Not true, it is the other way around. I believe that contemporary veterans could believe something to be true but that belief not to reflect reality. And the stuff you have provided actually reinforces that – the beliefs that the French and the Russians and the British were all 'the best' and 'most suited' to bayonet fighting have all been attested. If I knew more German, Hungarian, Polish or Swedish, maybe I could expand this list.

You may have missed the difference. You won't find British and Russian military men saying that their men are naturally offensive minded or the best use of them is to go on the offensive, only that the bayonet is their natural weapon of choice. What is interesting with the British is those sentiments are most often found regarding defensive actions, such as Talavera. None of the countries you list don't say that about their troops except maybe the Sweds, and I say maybe because I have only found one writer saying that and I have no evidence that the entire Swedish army organization and doctrine was built around it.

6 – I wholeheartedly agree that the French do not have to succeed in every attack to prove that they were "attack-minded". What I do ask is – is this true?

Okay, which campaigns and battles fought by the French were defensive in nature compared to offensive. As I pointed out, even in 1813 and 1814, the choice were offensive battles even when obviously on the defensive. That is generally true for Northern Spain, Southern France. And defensive battles such as Vittoria and Ortez were not all that successful, where Soult's offensives certainly were far more successful, if incomplete.

Given the strategic frameworks of the campaigns which they fought, the relative strengths and characters of the generals, did they attack more or less than one might expect? Were they more successful than one might expect? If not…how should this show up in our games?

IF the French were more offensively minded, and that can be determined statistically through several battles, then
there could be several possible effects:

1. French subordinates will show more initiative outside orders and it will be offensive in nature. Whatever AI the game provides would have this element.

2. French commands with 'defense' orders will more likely either be at a disadvantage or choose to be aggressively counter-attacking rather than waiting for the enemy. Here the commander can mitigate that 'tendency.'

3. In scenarios where the French are 'on the defensive', there should be French expectations of attacks.

4. As the entire French system of battle was predicated on offensive action, game mechanics could reflect that.

5. When the French are successful in a combat, they could be more likely to pursue 'impulsively' than other nations.

Note that none of those possible game mechanics [just a few of the possible mechanics to reflect national characteristics] require the French to have some +1 bonus in attacks or some major disadvantage in fire fights or defensive actions.

The French belief in National Characteristic didn't necessarily make them better troops in attacking than other nations. What it did do is circumscribe their organization, strategies, tactics and command choices on the battlefield.

Battles are really hard to apply statistics to.

You need at least 30 events to even start to get enough events to get an approximation of accurate numbers. (that's +-15% accuracy, IIRC)

And they need to be similar. Similar terrain, similar forces, similar times.

Otherwise, you're violating the first rule of statistics (Compare like with like), and all that does is give you garbage.

Totally agree with LitS, especially in connection with quality of the opposed forces. The French soldier, in a broad sense, might be pre-disposed to a bold advance; but, if his battalion consists of raw troops in their very first battle, any potential advantage to be drawn from a nationalistic pre-disposition to boldness may perhaps be overcome in certain conditions by other baser psychological factors stemming, for example, from the untrained, unseasoned nature of the unit.

This is IMO a highly complicated topic that defies simplistic assessments. We should tread carefully here.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

Totally agree with LitS, especially in connection with quality of the opposed forces. The French soldier, in a broad sense, might be pre-disposed to a bold advance; but, if his battalion consists of raw troops in their very first battle, any potential advantage to be drawn from a nationalistic pre-disposition to boldness may perhaps be overcome in certain conditions by other baser psychological factors stemming, for example, from the untrained, unseasoned nature of the unit.

You mean like the French troops from 1792-94? Maybe no advantage whatsoever, but that belief in French natural 'pre-disposition' may find them choosing to attack regardless. See Lynn's "Bayonets of the Republic" and the the chapter on "The Cult of the Bayonet."

This is IMO a highly complicated topic that defies simplistic assessments. We should tread carefully here.

Of course it is. That is why statistics are so valuable.

Battles are really hard to apply statistics to.

You need at least 30 events to even start to get enough events to get an approximation of accurate numbers. (that's +-15% accuracy, IIRC)

Lion:
sure, battles are. One of the first things you have to do is find the right thing to apply statistics to, to answer the questions you want.

The second thing is that statistics, depending on how well you can determine 'like compared to like', is not an either everything or nothing proposition. For instance,
let's compare battalions to battalions. Now, generally speaking the battalion was the basic building block of infantry maneuver and combat, even though they varied in size for a wide range of reasons.

Let's say I come up with 100 examples of battalion combat in either line or column across all nations. Lynn in his book found 100 examples of French combat formations for just the Armee du Nord in 1792-94, so we aren't talking about something impossible.

Those 100 are fairly random. We simply look at win/loss by who stayed and who left the field…even that can be a guesstimate depending on how 'left' is defined. But let's say we have a fairly easy determination of that.

We find out simple things, such as there is a higher percentage of 'staying' when defending terrain obstacles such as slopes or BUAs. Or that volley fire alone only drives off enemy troops in a small percentage of the time. Something else is required. Or that a high percentage of combats find one side or the other routs rather than simply 'withdraws.'

Those are very rough pieces of information, but even so, the information is far more useful than simply guessing and closer to the reality of battalion combat. It is information that can be used. That would be a step closer to reality…not arrival, just far more meaningful than 'feelings' or stating that it is impossible to know.

And they need to be similar. Similar terrain, similar forces, similar times.

"Similar" can be as rough or as finally tuned as you want…and obviously, the results will be equally rough or finally tuned… but as all wargames and simulations are build around such statistics and the probabilities needed, it would seem to be a real necessity regardless of the difficulty.

Otherwise, you're violating the first rule of statistics (Compare like with like), and all that does is give you garbage.

Again, it isn't an either/or issue… either you have exactly all parameters or its violating the first rule.
It is a continuum, garbage;[black] at one end and perfect comparison [white] at the other. To never do the statistical analysis guarantees that whatever you do is going to be garbage… With statistical analysis you move into the gray area away from black. Depending on how you frame your questions and 'likes', you can get some pretty useful 'grays'. Not perfect, but in the ball park with confidence.

The other thing that is important is 'testing' the validity of your statistical results. There are several ways to do that.

Subordinates are not automatons. They can be motivated by a desire for personal glory, a desire to preserve their command or a belief that the commander isn't fully aware of the situation. Then there are those situations where the subordinate doesn't understand what the commander wants him to do, or hasn't been provided with necessary guidance.

Back when I was able to pull off games with multiple players per side we would use different victory points for the commanders and his subordinates. If your side won you got points, but you also got points if you accomplished certain other objectives. We found it worked even better when the players couldn't share what their victory points were with each other. For example Jerome at Waterloo gets points for capturing the farm, giving him an inducement to use as much resources as he can get to try if needed to capture the position. The same also works for the CO, so Napoleon gets points if he can keep some or all of his valuable and expensive Guard out of the action. Another trick we would use is to provide individual players with intel (not always correct) which they were not allowed to share. For example the player on the right might be told that an enemy force might be coming down a road on his right flank between five and ten turns into the game. Now the commander on the right has to decide whether to hold troops in reserve to deal with that threat even though his CO might want him to push forward with all available troops. The idea was to motivate each player to act in his own interests and not simply act in the way that was best for his side.

Otherwise, you're violating the first rule of statistics (Compare like with like), and all that does is give you garbage.

Again, it isn't an either/or issue… either you have exactly all parameters or its violating the first rule.

You should only have one variable in your statistical analysis. One battalion is French, one battalion is British, terrain and opposition and supporting fire etc are all as close to identical as you can get them.

Otherwise your statistics don't say what you think they say.

McLaddie wrote – "You mean like the French troops from 1792-94? Maybe no advantage whatsoever, but that belief in French natural 'pre-disposition' may find them choosing to attack regardless."

Wasn't thinking of the passionate but raw soldiers of the Revolution, whose fervor could be harnessed once a suitable means of maneuvering them had been devised to mask their lack of drill expertise. I was thinking rather of unreliable raw levy troops of the later Napoleonic period, whose (presumably) more experienced officers retained tactical habits acquired earlier while in command of much better trained troops – something like DuPont in Spain.

B

You should only have one variable in your statistical analysis. One battalion is French, one battalion is British, terrain and opposition and supporting fire etc are all as close to identical as you can get them.
Otherwise your statistics don't say what you think they say.

Lion:

That isn't necessarily true. If we follow your suggested methodology, all we will have is what two battalions of identical sizes do against each other… and how often did that occur in battles?

There are other methods. Wargame folks seem to be very good at identifying the problems faced, which are certainly real ones, but there doesn't seem to be much said about or knowledge of the methods for addressing them.

It isn't like statisticians and simulation designers haven't faced those problems for a long, long time. Nothing new there. And it still remains, if you want to model Napoleonic warfare in a meaningful manner, you need statistical data for creating probability patterns that match the historical data.

For example, I have found that out of over 60 examples of battalion vs battalion firefights of all lengths of time across all nations, that only 2 actually saw one side retreat without something else taking place, halting yes, retreating, no less the battalion was outflanked, charged or enemy reinforcements arrived.

Now, there are a boat-load of variables that are not addressed in that crude data collection and certainly there is no matching of like to like other than the combat organization [the battalion] and the type of combat [close order firing]. IF any or all of those variables had been significant, making a large difference in outcome, you wouldn't have such a strong result: 97% of all outcomes. Instead, you would find the results all over the place, and certainly moving towards a wide variety of results [retreats,rout, mutual retreats, advances back and forth to mention a few], rather than just one. That can be used in a game system and is a dang-sight more 'realistic' than guessing or conventional wisdom. How many games systems can have one side or the other routing as a major result of a firefight?

That is one of the more fascinating things about statistics… conventional wisdom and antidotes don't necessarily prove to be true.

Wasn't thinking of the passionate but raw soldiers of the Revolution, whose fervor could be harnessed once a suitable means of maneuvering them had been devised to mask their lack of drill expertise. I was thinking rather of unreliable raw levy troops of the later Napoleonic period, whose (presumably) more experienced officers retained tactical habits acquired earlier while in command of much better trained troops – something like DuPont in Spain.

Perhaps, but Dupont had fought in the Revolutionary wars so he wasn't ignorant of such troops…or passions. And the unreliable, dispassionate troops like the Marie Louisa's of 1813/1814? A particular mindset, particular cultural belief can have an influence on decisions across a wide variety of circumstances.

Subordinates are not automatons. They can be motivated by a desire for personal glory, a desire to preserve their command or a belief that the commander isn't fully aware of the situation. Then there are those situations where the subordinate doesn't understand what the commander wants him to do, or hasn't been provided with necessary guidance.

Bill N:

No, they are automatons, though the military system may reward them for acting like an automaton. Or they may reward glory seekers, with different kinds of 'glory' and rewards. Regardless, military systems are designed to encourage and enforce uniform behavior, predictable behavior so the team can work together.

Depending on the military system, those expected behaviors should circumscribe the player's actions as well as provide them with the ability to 'think outside the box' that was available to contemporaries, particularly if they wanted to take risks.

Back when I was able to pull off games with multiple players per side we would use different victory points for the commanders and his subordinates. If your side won you got points, but you also got points if you accomplished certain other objectives.

I've played in similarly constructed games and have enjoyed it. However, I haven't seen a system that provides players with the opportunities and risks in line with the military system they are supposedly a part of. Usually, it is all vanilla, both sides having a similar
range of subordinate goals and dangers.

subordinates are automatons to an extend, when you deploy your division as French division commander you would deploy in two or three lines and then you will get an objective – sometimes even what tactical formation you have to use for your battalions.