"Analysis of British Strategic Bombing - WW2" Topic

Of course if he had been smart he should have come up with the ideas himself. It is the sort of thing you would expect the head of a bomber force to do – come up with ideas to use his bombers to maximum effect!

If you look you will find papers that show that though the targeting of railways in France was destructive the 'slack' in the system was such that civilian traffic disappeared whilst military trains were still able to run. One man's magic bullet is another mans waste of resources. Only in hindsight can you tell the two apart.

If you look you will find papers that show that though the targeting of railways in France was destructive the 'slack' in the system was such that civilian traffic disappeared whilst military trains were still able to run.

Except it wasn't just trains that were targeted it was the whole transport infrastructure. And of course taking the slack out of the system is important when your enemy is faced with a large increase in traffic to transport and supply reinforcements to the combat zone. Plus of course there is still the oil offensive which he thought a waste of time, although at least he had the grace to grudgingly admit he had been proven wrong on that one.

Except it wasn't just trains that were targeted it was the whole transport infrastructure

The rail infrastructure south of Normandy was left relatively intact. It was intended to be used by the advancing Allies.

Fred Cartwright – so you are really arguing that the RAF spent too much on their Lancaster bomber fleet in total and that if the resources devoted to it from 1943 to 1945 had been shared around a bit, things would have been better? In other words they had reached the point of diminishing returns but did not see it?

Isn't an argument like that just as speculative as the strategy that was being followed? I mean, the RN needed a functional Coastal Command in 1940. You could make any number of arguments, like it would have even better for those resources to be used making sure that the Centurion tank was able to be put into service by 1944?

Point is, these resources aren't nearly so malleable as we wargamers, armchair generals or thesis writing boffins, would like them to be.

The Poms were playing to their strengths by using strategic bombing at night because their tank design programme was crap and had been crap since about 1936. Coastal Command was also crap and the aircraft the British used were generally unsound and didn't have the range required for the Atlantic anyway – Coastal Command needed the Liberator, which it did get in 1941. So, given that options available, wasn't strategic bombing the only offensive one that was possible, at the time these decisions had to be made? Which was mid 1941, for any of them to be any good.

because their tank design programme was crap and had been crap since about 1936.

are you sure?

link

‘The Poms were playing to their strengths by using strategic bombing at night because their tank design programme was crap"

What utter nonsense.

No one has ever developed a design programme, let alone an entire military strategy, on the basis that "we are not very good at building A lets build Y"