"Analysis of British Strategic Bombing - WW2" Topic

First posting attempt fell victim to "the bug".

I'm on a roll here. A really in depth analysis and critique of the British strategic bombing effort in WW2 – presented in great depth and detail – nearly 500 pages.

Well worth a look!

Go here – PDF link

B

Excellent.

Thanks for sharing.

I think I've seen it, but will re-read to double-check.

Blutarski thanks for the link. Very interesting. It argues what I have thought for a while that the RAF's strategic bombing campaign was a waste of resources.

I can't remember the specific values, but I do remember reading a comparison of US versus RAF strategic bombing. Basically, the US took the "daylight" hours and the RAF the night. And US accuracy was based on getting really close to the intended target (I want to say 100 yards), while the RAF was considered on target if the bombs fell within half a mile.

Again, the numbers are to vague to remember exactly, but I was left thinking that the US bombing campaign was actually very successful in destroying the ability of the enemy to produce war materials. And the RAF … not so much.

And US accuracy was based on getting really close to the intended target (I want to say 100 yards), while the RAF was considered on target if the bombs fell within half a mile.

As with most US v Commonwealth comparisons that is complete fiction. US bombing accuracy was no better than the RAF results. The difference was the RAF admitted what it was doing whilst the USAAF pretended it was bombing 'Marshalling Yards'.

From Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe by Richard G. Davis. Smithsonian Institution Press, , 1994:

A summary in a working paper from a USSTAF file, "Review of Bombing
Results," shows a similar dichotomy according to time period. From January
1944 through January 1945, the Eighth dropped 45,036 tons on "towns and
cities." From February 1945 through the end of the war, this summary
showed not a single ton of bombs falling on a city area. Unless the Eighth had
developed a perfect technique for bombing through overcast, such a result was
simply impossible. Obviously, the word had come down to deemphasize reports
on civilian damage. For instance, when Anderson cabled Arnold about USSTAF's
press policy on the Dresden controversy in February 1945, he noted, "Public rela-
tions officers have been advised to take exceptional care that the military nature
of targets attacked in the future be specified and emphasized in all cases. As in
the past the statement that an attack was made on such and such a city will be
avoided; specific targets will be described."

I was left thinking that the US bombing campaign was actually very successful in destroying the ability of the enemy to produce war materials. And the RAF … not so much.

Another myth.

Tonnage by target.

RAF Tons

Industrial Towns…………………………430,747
Troops and defences…………………..122,532
Transportation…………………………..137,793
Naval……………………………………….46,728
Oil…………………………………………..97,914
AC factories/Airfields……………………25,977
Specific Industries………………………19,964
Military Installations…………………….64,522
Misc…………………………………………9,137
Total……………………………………955,044

. .
US European and Mediterranean Theater of Operations


Marshalling Yards………………….315,307
Oil Installations……………………..126,191
Airdrome and Airfields……………117,727
Railroads, Roads and Bridges…..70,569
Military Installations………………..70,171
Other Specific Industries…………..70,126
Aircraft Factories …………………….58,763
Total ………………………………….1,096,794

Note the RAF 'Area Bombing' total and compare it to the US 'Marshalling Yards' numbers'

mkenny; I must be missing something. Your quote doesn't support your later statement. Do you have anything that says that when the US claims it was bombing marshaling yards it was really area bombing? The US did have a sustained campaign against German transportation after all.

And yet there's plenty of articles that say how effective the RAF were, the Germans were definitely none too keen.

So roughly a third of all the tonnage dropped by US bombers was on 'marshalling yards'?

Either the German marshalling yards were MASSIVE and covered half the country or the Air Force kept missing…

And yet there's plenty of articles that say how effective the RAF were, the Germans were definitely none too keen.

Understandable they were not keen when your cities are being bombed and people killed. Neither were the British keen on the Blitz, but it didn't have a significant effect of war production. The cost as the paper points out was huge. 4 engined bombers don't come cheap and then you need airfields, crew, spares, mechanics, fuel, bombs, airfield defence etc.

Yea, area bombing really is pretty much a waste, with perhaps the exception of some of the large fires that were started.

During much of the war, the bombers were lucky to get within 3 – 5 miles of the target, at night.

Some suggest that area bombing actually had a net positive effect on production. The reason given being the populace were more motivated. The blitz spirit.

I must be missing something. Your quote doesn't support your later statement. Do you have anything that says that when the US claims it was bombing marshaling yards it was really area bombing?

The following shows how the category of USAAF targets was changed after the war to remove 'City Areas' and substitute 'Marshalling Yards'.

From Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe by Richard G. Davis. Smithsonian Institution Press, , 1994.

A further look at Eighth Air Force operations has revealed two egregious
examples of the gap between bombing practice and stated bombing policy: the
target categories "city areas" and "marshaling yards." The two most cited Eighth
Air Force statistical summaries that cover the entire war do not list a target cate-
gory "city areas" or "towns and cities." Both summaries were prepared from
the same set of data within a month of the end of the war in Europe.
Monthly statistical summaries of the Eighth's operations prepared during the
war, almost contemporaneously with the events they recorded, tell a different
story. The Eighth Air Force Monthly Statistical Summary of Operations, gener-
ated at the end of each month from May 1944 to April 1945, listed a "city areas"
target category. For calendar year 1944, the summary reported that the Eighth
dropped 43,611 tons on "city areas." Nor did these reports make any bones
about their targets. The report for the May 8, 1944, Berlin raid baldly states,
"Berlin city area attacked. Bombing raid done through 10/10 undercast on PFF
markers. Believed that the center of Berlin was well hit." After reaching a
high of 9,886 tons (41 percent incendiaries) in July 1944, when the Eighth con-
ducted a series of H2X raids on Munich, the monthly "city area" totals steadily
declined to 383 tons in December.

The myth of US precision bombing has always been just that, a myth. One which continues even to this day. The Norden bombsight was a decent one, but it never delivered the on the claims made for it (And definitely not worth the $1,500,000 USD it cost – half what the entire Manhattan project cost incidentally). The US government have obviously always been keen to portray themselves as minimising civilian casualties, but daytime bombing was in practice, no more accurate than night bombing. Visibility, enemy activity etc all ensured that high altitude daytime bombing was as equally inaccurate as daylight attacks. The bomber barons were well aware of this, and although it was politically desirable to maintain the fiction, adapted their tactics to replicate British night attacks. For example, when the US bombed Dresden, they used exactly the same mix of incendiaries to HE that the British had the night before, hardly indicative of even a pretence of increased accuracy.

Area bombing of cities (i.e. civilian) targets was the straw that broke the camels back.

The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood, are the objects of our profound solicitude. … However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable.

Germany was overrun before the Allied bombing campaign was effective. It is therefore not the case study to end the argument of strategic bombing effectiveness.
Wars are not won. Wars are lost by the side which loses more than it can afford before the other side does. While this thesis accounts the air war's costing for Britain (and I admit not having read it cover to cover in the interests of making a timely response), it does not give a similar analysis of Germany's costs. That wars are expensive is understood. But it is the ratio of the protagonists costs that is the deciding factor. That is the comparison that must be made to determine if any campaign was worth it.

Area bombing of cities (i.e. civilian) targets was the straw that broke the camels back.

I think that remains to be proven. Germany didn't give up until it had been overrun. It begs the question whether the enormous resources expended on the bombing campaign could have been better utilised.

It begs the question whether the enormous resources expended on the bombing campaign could have been better utilised.

You mean the enormous resources used to counter the bombing campaign?
Like the 1 million strong Flak Arm or the huge amount of ammunition production diverted to AA defence?

I'm away from home at the moment, so I don't have access to my books. But I do remember reading that the German high command did say how effective the RAF bomber offensive was, the precision of the RAF was increased massively in 1944, mainly due to the pathfinder force. I would quote Harris, but that may not be particularly impartial. What I do know is that, until 1945, the bomber offensive was the only way to affect German manufacturing capacity and it showed the German people that the war wasn't going their way. It was at a very high cost to Aircrew, but until D Day there was no other way to take the fight to the enemy. The argument about daylight vs night bombing is one that will go on until the end of time.

The onset of heavy bombing raids in the first quarter of 1943 caused steel production to fall by 200,000 tons. Since the Germans had planned for steel production to actually increase during this period there was a net loss against planned allocation of almost 400,000 tons. The Germans had to immediately cut their ammunition programme such that a doubling of production in 1942 was followed by only a 20% increase in 1943. Sustained bombing of the Ruhr also resulted in a sub-components crisis of all kinds.

Adam Tooze, "The Wages of Destruction"

How else were the Allies going to have such an effect upon German production in 1943?

You mean the enormous resources used to counter the bombing campaign?
Like the 1 million strong Flak Arm or the huge amount of ammunition production diverted to AA defence?

A significant amount of that expenditure would have been made without spending so much on the bombing campaign. Britain had a large night fighter force, large numbers of AA guns, an extensive radar network and spent a lot on AI radar development and yet was subject to pin prick raids after 1941. As it was we put a very large number of eggs in one very expensive basket. Maybe if some of that money had been spent on tank development we would have had a decent tank design before 1945. Maybe if Costal Command had received a greater priority we would have lost less shipping to U boats, which also required resources to replace the loss shipping. Maybe if some bombers had been prized out of bomber command and used as transports 1st Airborne could have been landed on Arnhem directly and the whole lift been done in one day.

Sustained bombing of the Ruhr also resulted in a sub-components crisis of all kinds.

And yet record production levels were hit at the peak of the bombing campaign, so it certainly didn't cripple German industry.

Maybe if Costal Command had received a greater priority we would have lost less shipping to U boats,

It was the bombing that forced the new U-Boats being developed in 1944 to be built in sections off-site and that meant a very poor fit when all the parts were assembled. They had so many problems that they never had any impact on the war. It was the bombing of the railways and canals that kept the coal at the mines at not at the steelworks in late 1944. The notion that your industry can be bombed round the clock without any effect on production is patently absurd. Read up on the bombing of the MAN factories and the Jan 1945 raids effectively ended serious Panther production The earlier raids in October 1944 completely destroyed the truck assembly lines. It was the bombing that ended the Maus development.

Who said it had no effect? It certainly didn't cripple German industry though. More tanks were produced in ‘44 than any of the other years. I would also suggest that January ‘45 was a bit late to end Panther production! If they had achieved that in January ‘44 I would have been more impressed. Of course had Market Garden succeeded the MAN factory might well have been overrun before January ‘45 anyway. As for ending Maus development that certainly had a major impact on winning the war – not! :-)
As for the Type XXI my understanding for the use of prefab sections was to speed up construction times. The problems of poor fit were due to Speer's use of firms inexperienced in this type of construction.

"…daytime bombing was in practice, no more accurate than night bombing".

Sorry Keith, that is just completely wrong.

Daylight bombing was far more accurate than night-time bombing, especially during the early to mid-war period, and remained so until the end of the war.

That's why the RAF started bombing during daylight again, at the very end of the war, as the German defenses were crippled by losses and a lack of fuel for their aircraft.

Daylight bombing was far more accurate than night-time bombing, especially during the early to mid-war period, and remained so until the end of the war.

In perfect weather it was. Problem was the weather was rarely perfect. If you cant see it then you cant accurately hit it.
Normandy is an example where short-bombing caused havoc to Allied troops

Report on bombing accuracy, Eighth Air Force Sept-Dec 1944
During the past two years substantial progress has been made in the development of techniques for achieving a reasonably high degree of accuracy under conditions of fairly good visibility. Several factors combine, however, particularly in this theater, to limit severely the volume of bombing which can be done under these conditions.In general, the factors which contribute to poor visibility so far as day light bombing is concerned are three: (1) the weather, i.e., cloud. cover and haze, (2) enemy action, i.e., smoke screens, and (3) our own bombing,i.e., smoke from preceding bomb falls and fires caused by them.

Under Conditions of Good Visibility
The extent to which our overall accuracy fell off in the last four months of 1944 is roughly indicated by the following: whereas for the three summer months of June, July, and August an estimated 40% of all bombs dropped under conditions of good visibility fell within 1000 feet of pre-assigned aiming points, on the same basis, for the period 1 September through 31 December 1944 the figure dropped to approximately 30%.

From Jentz VK45.02 to Tiger II pages 59-60

Henschel finally solved most of the start-up problems and were meeting and exceeding their monthly production goals when they were hit by a series of five bombing raids on 22, 27, and 28 September and 2 and 7 October 1944. A total of 2906 tons of high explosive and 1792 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped, the Henschel plant being the intended target. These raids destroyed 95 percent of the total floor area of the Henschel plant. Another bombing raid on the plant on 15 December further deIayed recovery. In addition, heavy area bombing raids on Kassel and vicinity on 22/23 October, 30 December and 1 January resulted in further disruptions to Tiger II production.
In his report dated 31 December 1944 on the production of tanks beginning in 1940 up to 31 December 1944, Dr. Blaicher, the Chairman of the Hauptauschuss Panzerkampfwagen (Main Committee Armored Fighting Vehicles) under the Speer's Ministry for Armaments and War Production, Ieft behind a realistic picture of the problems then facing the industry:

Discussions of the important difficulties in the year 1944
While during 1943 the influence of hostile air attacks was not yet very noticeable in the tank industry and the more important suppliers and contractors, in 1944 there was no single tank-producing – plant which did not suffer directly and above all indirectly to a considerable extent. Insufficient supply of supplied parts, particularly aggravated by the longish transport bans, must be counted as an additional difficulty for all firms during the whole year, but especially in the Iast four months.
Fried. Krupp, Essen: Through the attack of 25 October 1944 the production of Pz.Kpfw.IV armor components in particular was hindered considerably. Production in the Tiger workshops and rolling miIls was also considerably obstructed by continuous air attacks on Essen.
Damage to the AFV plants
Tiger production at Henschel, Kassell : Extreme dfficulties have been caused by the somewhat complicated power supply and the Iabor situation through repeated air attacks on Kassel. Production seriously obstructed by three severe attacks in September 1944 and three further attacks causing a Iong-term stoppage of power.

General disturbing influences
Considerable loss of man-hours through air-raid warnings was added to these difficulties in the various districts. Individual statistics are not available at the moment. MIAG, Braunsweig, for instance, lost about 300,000 man-hours through direct and indirect effects of enemy attacks and through warnings in October 1944. Considerable dispersion was undertaken by all firms to avoid total Iosses through these enemy attacks. A further deterioration of the development of production, and especially the catastrophic aggravation of the transport situation, became a disturbing factor to this policy of dispersing stores and dumps and the supply of components with the production plant as an organic whole.
It should be especially stressed that the internal factory conditions created by the effects of the enemy attacks brought with them an extraordinary strain on the managerial and administrative staff, and that the extremely Iarge reduction of German Iabor, which is decisive in dealing with the catastrophes, has badly retarded reconstruction and the overcoming of the dfficulties during the current year. When repeated and regular production breakdowns occurred, which in some plants Iasted the whole year round, the changeover from a state of improvisation to an organic condition of production could hardly be achieved, in spite of the most strenuous efforts of the management. The extraordinary extent of the stoppages throughout the whole of the armaments industry caused all external assistance in overcoming these dfficulties to diminish more and more, and the firms were Iargely dependent on helping themselves.
Added to these Iocal difficulties was the Iarge number of stoppages of deliveries on the part of suppliers and subcontractors. The production situation was made extremely difficult by the severe interruptions of communications and the disruption of the supply of components which became increasingly worse. This was caused by the transport situation, which is deteriorating on a catastrophic scale.
At this moment one can no Ionger speak of planned production at all. On principle, I would Iike to mention that tank production has to deal with a maximum of difficulties such as no other branch of production can boast, by reason of the target demanded on the one hand, and on the other hand through the addition of all the difficulties of the branches of other main committees connected with it. To mention that a Panther possesses 26,000 parts will be sufficient to prove this statement.

mkenny; I'm tracking now. Thanks

I think when considering this topic it is vital to avoid exaggeration.

From the research I did on this topic a while ago I came to the following opinion.

The bombing had SOME impact on the Germans.

A lot of the value was displacement of resources away from the fronts to defend the Reich.

The cost of the bombing for the Allies was enormous. Just huge.

With hindsight, it might have been better to employ those resources in another way.

However, when they started putting resources into aerial bombing, they did not know how ineffective it would be. And – there was simply no other way to attack Germany in 1941-43. So they did what they could.

Also – the London Blitz was, I understand, far more damaging to British Morale than was admitted at the time or since. The UK government were apparently actually worried about a potential revolt. Therefore, they imagined a similar result could be provoked in Germany.

Looking back we can see that it did not and organising any resistance inside Germany was virtually impossible. The Nazis had an iron grip on the state.

It's well known now that the USAAF precision bombing doctrine did not work. Internal documents admit this but for PR they kept talking about it.

The RAF Bomber Command were quicker to admit they could barely find the target city and went over to area bombing quite early. The US nearly went over to night bombing too, but did not in the end.

The RAF bombed in daylight too when they had control of the air. This was probably their most effective use.

The crews knew they were killing civilians in vast numbers and it upset them. Their commanders also knew it but they had a mission to complete and believed if it could shorten the war and save lives it was a price worth paying.

It's not fair to criticize the people making the decisions or carrying out the orders from the vantage point we now enjoy.

It's a bit like the A-bombing of Japan. It was probably no help in ending the war, but those making the decisions can be excused for thinking it would.

Mkenny look at the dates of those reports. All October through to December ‘44. Are you seriously suggesting that by then the production of a few more tanks would have swung the war for the Germans? They didn't have the fuel for them anyway.
German AFV production figures by year.
1939 370
1940 1,888
1941 3,623
1942 5,530
1943 11,601
1944 18,956
1945 4,406
You will note that they produced as many AFV's in ‘44/45 as they did for the other 5 years combined.
The conventional narrative is that as the allies won the war and the bombing campaign was a major effort by the allies that means the bombing campaign had a significant impact on the allied victory. No one disputes it had an impact, the question remains is did that impact justify the huge amount of resources invested in it and could you have had an even bigger impact by siphoning off some of those resources and using them elsewhere? The Soviets managed to do a massive amount of damage to the German war machine without any strategic bombing at all and in fact did a lot of it before the strategic bombing got really going at all. Once you look at how much the bomber lobby promised and how much the resources allocated to it took from other areas it bears questioning. The bomber lobby promised they would bring Germany to its knees, I see no evidence of that promise being fulfilled. Meteor tank engine production had to wait on Rover building a new factory to produce them as the RAF had a total monopoly on Merlin production by Rolls Royce. They also had a monopoly on aluminium alloys. The list goes on.

They didn't have the fuel for them anyway.

Why did they have no fuel?

When it comes to German war-time production the common picture is a mix of misunderstandings, some blatant lies and a massive effort to keep things going at any cost.

If we understand that production does go up at the height of the bombardment this doesn't mean bombardment doesn't have an impact, but that the Germans are finally abandoning their leisurely, haphazard approach to production and achieving a greater level of rationalisation and cutting corners whenever possible.

This means that rather than have about 30% spare parts, they go to 10% and in some cases simply forego spare parts completely. Yes you have more tanks going to the front lines, but crews have to sacrifice one in so many tanks just to have spare parts to repair all the ones that are already suffering from being moved into the combat area. Cutting corners means that you lose some benefits like certain vision ports or find yourself with reduced internal space because moving the armour plates into new configuration makes production much simpler.

It is also highly important to note that while German industry makes huge leaps and bounds into making production much more efficient the reality is that for a long time the industry was for a part increasing efficiency to pocket more money and not necessarily producing more.

And then along comes Speer. Aside from conning Hitler, he's the guy who has near total control over the narrative of the fall of the Third Reich and told the Allies "Yes, Hitler was mad, incompetent and it was only minor geniuses like me who helped to keep things going, I'm awfully sorry, but I hope you will not blame me for doing my duty ?"

Speer facilitated the transfer or large amounts of money to German industry that mysteriously vanished at the end of the war and it was only the hard work of the German people to rebuild that got us the "Wirtschaftswunder" A true miracle indeed …

There are some truly odd things going on with German production, one of the ironies is that the only real production line for tanks, the Niebelungenwerke which according to many should have been the model to allow Germany to produce much larger numbers of tanks (further diluting the already critically limited fuel pool) was seriously hampered by bombardments. It was the secondary lines, set up by the military so they could switch production at a moment's notice that allowed production to remain going as they could produce almost anything, so if certain machines broke down, they would simply produce parts and assemble them elsewhere, it caused some logistics problems, but it helped keeping production going, combined with rationalization that was being implemented since 1938 or even earlier they were able to continue to produce planes, tanks etc in significant numbers. Again very little of which had to do with Speer.

Bombarding Germany is often said to be ineffective, but it caused huge problems, yes production rose, but it was at the cost of everything else. They often could clear one railroad line and get it working again, but that meant that the 7:15 to Baden-Baden would be a bit late say until about 1946. Millions were displaced, huge areas were damaged and a huge amount of manpower had to be used to contain and fix the damage, every man employed to rebuild dams or clearing vital railroads isn't producing weapons or driving a tank. Germany only has so many resources to go round. It may not have the impact people like Harris would have promised, but it certainly didn't make life any easier. The need to have so many Flak and fighters defending Germany helped to reduce the number of available planes and guns in Russia.

Another key issue is that German production until the critical days of 1943-1944 was never seen as a huge priority. Fuel problems means that factories had to cut production or were closed for certain periods since priority was given to the military's vehicles.

Germany was often criticized for not switching to a war-time economy. Ironically the Germans didn't really plan for this. US production in WWI was so poor that the War Department had a long talk with US industry after 1918 and established that in case of another major war, they should be able to switch very quickly to producing military equipment. This was possible because the US had the latest in manufacturing equipment. Germany's own economic development had stalled since 1914. Many branches of industry were ill-adapted to switch production or even provide military production in the first place. Germany was so far behind in car production that tank production was mostly done in "tank factories" rather than the production lines of Detroit as was the case in the US.

If you have heard people like David Fletcher describe British production as mainly one based on highly skilled craftsmen pretty much hand-building every tank and the US having a highly mechanised, standardized production, Germany was somewhere in the middle. They had some highly advanced production methods, but almost all production was bottlenecked because certain critical components had to be fitted by craftsmen.

Finally there is a critical factor and that is nazi Germany's own policies coming back to shoot them in the foot. Their misogynistic ideology forced them to rely on slave labour, many of which were quite simply incompetent for the task assigned to them, unwilling to do any good work or in many cases were actively sabotaging whenever they could. Yes, the Germans ended up using far more women in industry than we usually give them credit for, but they never felt the urge to switch production in the same way Britain or the US had done.

Germany's wartime production is a fascinating mix of amazing problem solving capacity, systematic complacency, corruption, negligence, incredible creativity, misplaced priorities, political maneuvering, open sabotage and a knack for producing some of the most advanced designs the world had seen until then.

Why did they have no fuel?

Probably the main reason is the Soviets had taken the Ploesti oil fields the last major source of oil for the Germans and were starting to overrun some of the synthetic oil plants in Poland. That aggravated the chronic shortage of fuel Germany had. Once they lost Russian imports at the start of Barbarossa they had a problem. They survived on what they had stockpiled for about 18 months after that the situation just got worse as time went on.

It's a bit like the A-bombing of Japan. It was probably no help in ending the war,

I say again: "Area bombing of cities (i.e. civilian) targets was the straw that broke the camels back."
The quotation:

by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable.

is from The Jewel Voice Broadcast link . The recording made by Emperor Hirohito announcing surrender. In which he had previously said:

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Yes, a bombing campaign did end WW2. [In all fairness I must also mention the the blockade maintained by the submarine force against Japan]

Germany was overrun before the Allied bombing campaign ended that part of the war. In 1942, '43, and before the weather turned good in '44, from the air was the only way the western allies could attack Germany. Without that attack drawing forces away from the eastern front, it is likely that Russia would have collapsed and then once more:

The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us.

with unknown consequences.

Looked at from the strategic picture the bombing campaign bought the time, until American land armies were able to reach the field. Without that delay, it is possible that:

then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.

The air war was a delaying action and as such it was successful.

Looked at from the strategic picture the bombing campaign bought the time, until American land armies were able to reach the field.

I think that is overstating it. The American armies were in action in North Africa, long before the bombing campaign had any appreciable effect.

Without that attack drawing forces away from the eastern front, it is likely that Russia would have collapsed?

Again grossly overstating the effects of bombing. The Russians were safe long before the bombing did anything.

As for the Jewel Voice broadcast I think the atomic bombs were a way the Japanese could surrender and save face. The 2 attacks did no more damage than regular raids, but the Emperor could claim in effect that the Americans were not fighting fair and so he had no choice, but to surrender.

The RAF's bombing campaign was not without its critics, but Harris was prepared to pull stunts to grab attention. The first 1,000 bomber raid was a way of grabbing the headlines after the poor accuracy of RAF bombing had lead to calls for the force to be split up and the resources used for other pressing areas, like the battle of the Atlantic.

Germany's military would have been a lot stronger, without the bombing campaigns by the Brits and Americans.

Defenses against that did siphon off a lot of resources, and personnel that could have been committed elsewhere.

Without the bombing campaigns, their production rates might have been significantly higher.

The bombing raids, both strategic and tactical, did a lot to reduce fuel availability for the German war machine, which really helped cause much of the collapse of German defenses towards the end of the war.

Germany's military would have been a lot stronger, without the bombing campaigns by the Brits and Americans.

It would have been stronger, but how much stronger is up for debate. As has been pointed out production levels of things like tanks and p,anes shot up late war despite the bombing. The significant destruction didn't really happen until late in ‘44 by which time the war was almost over.

Defenses against that did siphon off a lot of resources, and personnel that could have been committed elsewhere.

Again you don't need to mount such a massive campaign to force your opponent to commit resources to defence. The corollary of course is that allied forces would have been a lot stronger elsewhere too. You are also tying up a lot of your own forces in what is a method of attack with limited effectiveness.

The only real research I have done in this area is how it effected the civilian population. With a broad brush, as long as the bombing wasn't to heavy, with support and relief from the state heavy people responded with defiance and calls for revenge. When the heavy raids started, with German skies dominated, massive destruction and no effective response from the state it had a crushing effect on morale. German cities stop functioning, no transport, people not going to work. Party members were attacked in the streets after heavy bombing raids with nazi badges and symbols discarded and abused.

As to the night time / day time argument.I cant remember any mention in reports about the civilian response to bombing raids of any differing comments about daytime v night time raids. In short, you may want to claim daytime raids accurately targeted marshalling yards in the middle of cities but for the poor sods being bombed they did not notice a difference.

The significant destruction didn't really happen until late in ‘44 by which time the war was almost over.

The destruction of the German armies in the East and The West in August of 1944 was the killer blow. The losses in tanks, vehicles and equipment were enormous. It was the inability to fully replace that equipment that made the following 8 months far easier than it could have been. As has been pointed out earlier everything was focused on getting finished product out of the door so the lack of spare parts was crippling. Hundreds of German tanks were sitting in workshops because of a lack of replacement engines and transmissions. It was not a specific shortfall that led to the defeat rather a shortage of everything. Bombing did not win the war single-handed and I see no one claiming it did so am puzzled by the repeated attempts to show it didn't.

Lots of misconceptions and misunderstandings here. Let's start with waste of resources. The strategic decisions to have, or not have, a strategic bombing force were made before the war. The US and UK opted in, others like Germany and USSR did not. Once going down that path, or not, you suddenly dont just change direction and say well this isn't working so let's make more Pershing tanks! Other types of aircraft perhaps. Battleships not likely. Second, regarding results, when the targets were chosen correctly the results were impressive. Witness the results on German "mobility" in the months before Normandy and the results of the targeting of German POL output. Area bombing of cities, by day or night, was a bankrupt strategy as the London Blitz proved as early as 1941-42. Third, while German production peaked in 1944, one must ask what it would have been without the bombing offensive. Probably much higher. Enough to win the war perhaps not. Enough to lengthen the war and make sure the first A Bomb was used on Berlin, perhaps. In short, bombing was never going to win the war, like Bomber Harris advocated, but it made a significant contribution. All that wins wars is a soldier with a rifle and bayonet standing on your turf. Cheers!

Bombing was expensive – that's the main point I have absorbed from the treatise under discussion, so far.

But how expensive would it have been to do no bombing of Germany and its industry? The poms had to start somewhere and the blunders and lessons of night bombing in 1940 and 1941 had to occur if there was to be anything like the successful raids of 1943 and 1944. The Germans had to deploy the best part of 1 million troops on AA, searchlight and radar installations – they built those massive Flak Towers – imagine if something like that had been built over Utah and Omaha Beaches? The Luftwaffe had to deploy half of its strength in fighting the bombers – what if these fighters had been sent to the Eastern Front? The Red Airforce would not have been so resurgent and with it the Jabo problem would have been solved.

Area bombing Germany by day and by night was a necessary evil in WW2 and an evolution of the tactics used by Haig in WW1. Instead of attrition in the trenches of Flanders, this time an attritional battle was fought every day and night (weather permitting) over Germany. Like WW1, it wasn't pretty, but it was certainly effective in terms of writing down the Luftwaffe.

Some other points – USAAF – was hideously inaccurate and anyone suggesting that they used "precision" should consider their efforts at Monte Cassino and Ploesti (Tidal Wave in 1943). They had nothing to compare with 617 Squadron nor the mosquito equipped 105 Squadron (and No 2 Group as a whole in Operation Oyster) and the precision attacks these units were capable of.

"As for the Jewel Voice broadcast I think the atomic bombs were a way the Japanese could surrender and save face. The 2 attacks did no more damage than regular raids, but the Emperor could claim in effect that the Americans were not fighting fair and so he had no choice, but to surrender."

I have to call shenanigans on this one. You're substituting your bias for what the emperor told his people. In this case I'm taking what the man said over what you think he felt.

But how expensive would it have been to do no bombing of Germany and its industry?

Once again no one has suggested don't do any bombing, it is a question of degree.

The US and UK opted in, others like Germany and USSR did not.

That is true the bombing lobbies certainly held sway in the RAF and USAAF.

Second, regarding results, when the targets were chosen correctly the results were impressive.

So a more target approach could have produced as good a result at less cost.

Once going down that path, or not, you suddenly dont just change direction and say well this isn't working so let's make more Pershing tanks!

But does that mean you just blindly follow down that path without critically reviewing the cost vs the benefit?

Witness the results on German "mobility" in the months before Normandy and the results of the targeting of German POL output.

Both of which had Harris had his way would never have happened.

Bombing did not win the war single-handed and I see no one claiming it did so am puzzled by the repeated attempts to show it didn't.

I am puzzled as to why some don't see the alternatives. The conventional narrative is obviously deeply entrenched. To summarise.
(1) Area bombing of cities was a flawed strategy that didn't produce results commensurate with the cost or the losses sustained. A good example of that is the Battle of Berlin, which failed to inflict significant damage on the city and cost the RAF over a 1,000 bombers.
(2) A more critical, focussed approach could have produced almost the same results at less cost and allowed resources to be freed up for other things. Is that such a difficult concept to grasp?

(2) A more critical, focused approach could have produced almost the same results at less cost and allowed resources to be freed up for other things. Is that such a difficult concept to grasp?

Err did they not try a 'focused' approach and found the results were abysmal.
Was not area bombing a direct result of the limits of period bombing aids and enemy counter-measures?
Explain how Wellingtons in 1941 could do precision bombing of (for example) Oil installations?
Your case is 'we should not start from here' which is all well and good when you are using hindsight.

Switching more of the effort from high level lancs to low level raiding mosquitoes was feasible.
That would have been in 1943 of course.

IIRC there's a US study said targeting fuel and critical transport infrastructure was much more effective than cities.

There was an issue with the character of the people in charge. Harris was a stubborn ideologue who wanted to win the war by bombing Berlin and thereby secure his place in history and bomber command as a major force post war.

In the USAAF there were similar forces at work.

These people did not make decisions with an open mind, and singlemindedly pursued their strategies irrespective of the evidence. They had the evidence and they should have called a halt to the slaughter by spring 1944 at the latest.

By then losses were manageable, but still a drain.

The time to stop would have been 1943. But in fairness the evidence was not so clear. They could spin it and hide it.

The Germans I read somewhere held a meeting in 1943 and judged the bombing offensive would be discontinued since it was costing the allies far more than the damage it was causing.

Little did they realise the allies would continue against all reason.

With hindsight, extra manpower for infantry units [both US and UK ran short in 1944-45], extra long range aircraft for coastal command and more effective close air support to ground forces might have been better use of the resources.

FlaK units and fighters deployed in the front lines would have been dealt with by the air assets not poured into bombing and escorts.

Err did they not try a 'focused' approach and found the results were abysmal.

And that's a good reason to try a different approach that is even more abysmal?!

FlaK units and fighters deployed in the front lines would have been dealt with by the air assets not poured into bombing and escorts.

Which, in turn, would have been dealt with by the FlaK units and fighters that were no longer required to defend the Reich against Bomber Command. See, it's just a circular argument. Whatever offensive strategy the Allies adopted the Germans would have looked for something to counter it.

Fred Cartwright – Maybe the point is that it cost the Germans more than they could afford to defend against the RAF and USAAF bombing offensive? The "question of degree" argument you make cuts both ways as it was also arguable how much the Germans chose to devote in terms of resources to defend their Heimat. And when you think of the personalities of the German high command, you would have to conclude that they were actually more stubborn and far less rational than Bomber Harris ever was. Goering said call me Meyer if the Reich was ever bombed. No British or American airman said anything quite so ridiculous.

William Ulsterman – The argument is less about cost and more about cost effectiveness. As has been pointed out circular arguments cut all ways, but the bottom line is you have a finite amount of money and resources with which to defend your country and attack the enemy. A successful strategy seeks to maximise the investment in both. When it comes to defence it is clear to me that the concentration of effort in bomber command left the UK's defence critically short of aircraft, particularly in the first half of the war. It was recognised at the time as a poor choice and there were calls for aircraft to be diverted to Coastal Command, which Harris vehemently opposed and he wasn't above pulling headline grabbing stunts like the first 1,000 bomber raid to win his point with the war cabinet. I personally don't think it would have harmed the bomber offensive at all to divert more aircraft to Coastal Command in ‘41-43. When it comes to the attack things become more speculative, but I don't think it is unreasonable to suggest a strategy which could have enabled bomber command to keep the pressure on German defences and free up some resources to attack Germany in other ways, particularly in ‘43-45.
When it comes to Harris vs Goering in terms of rationality and stubbornness that is a tough call. Harris was pretty immune to rational arguments. He opposed both the attacks on transport in France prior to D-day and the offensive against oil, which he considered distractions from bomber command's role of laying waste to German cities.

He opposed both the attacks on transport in France prior to D-day and the offensive against oil, which he considered distractions from bomber command's role of laying waste to German cities.

'

'Opposed' as in in the end did as he was ordered and bombed France.

'Opposed' as in in the end did as he was ordered and bombed France.

Indeed he did, but as head of bomber command he should have been able to see the value of both operations and not have to be ordered to do them. Of course if he had been smart he should have come up with the ideas himself. It is the sort of thing you would expect the head of a bomber force to do – come up with ideas to use his bombers to maximum effect!