"Options at the Battle of Leyte Gulf" Topic

"Background: In 1944 U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur commanded the Southwest Pacific Area, and U.S. Navy Admiral Chester Nimitz commanded the Pacific Ocean Areas. In October, U.S. forces remained firmly on the strategic offensive in the Pacific and the Island of Leyte was their next target

KING II was the U.S. codename for the seizure of Leyte via amphibious assault, and there were command issues due to the long-standing division of the Pacific into two theaters of operation. After almost three years of war, these two forces were converging and neither the Army nor the Navy was willing to allow one joint commander. The Army would not accept Nimitz because MacArthur was senior to him, and the Navy did not believe MacArthur sufficiently understood sea power to command its fleet carriers[5]. This led to the unwieldy compromise of U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet working directly for MacArthur and U.S. Navy Admiral William Halsey's Third Fleet reporting to Nimitz. In KING II, Halsey was to "cover and support the Leyte Operation[6]." The desire to destroy the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers was why Nimitz included the following in the plan: "In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet is offered or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task[7]." Thus, the plan was a confusing compromise between services with inherent divided command and control and tasks…."
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