"Was MacArthur's campaign necessary?" Topic

My opinion is no. He could have held the Malay Barrier at less cost in life and the war would still have been won.

But he's the "American Caesar" and must take the offensive to the Japs and fulfill his promise that he shall return. Never let fear of sustaining casualties get in the way of glory in battle. Not every general is a Montgomery.

No. In fact one can argue the Italian Campaign, and Burma Campaign were equally superfluous to Allied Victory. But Generals had to be paid and arms and supplies used up. Can't have them lying around unused. No matter if thousands of soldiers and tens of thousands of civilians must die to assuage the leaders blood lust. Oh … and I could also add the Brits Terror Bombing of Germany as another wasted effort. Cheers!

Allow me to dissent. What did Clausewitz say about politics and war?
We were at war because the Philippines were taken away from us.
So we had to take them back.
Sure, we could efficiently advance up the Central Pacific, taking islands that nobody ever heard of. What guarantee did we have that taking Truk would get the Philippines back?
Hindsight is wonderful, particularly 70+ years after the fact. So is our strategy.

A qualified 'Yes'. No one at the time could tell if the 'Atomic Bomb' was going to be a practical weapon so there was going to have to be preparation for taking the War to the Japanese at some stage. So the 'island hopping' campaigns were overall necessary, both from a propaganda view and as a back up to continuing air attacks on Japanese industry.

I was going to continue, but I was getting old & cynical..and possibly Modern Political, so time I stopped.

I'm with Winston on this. Hard to renege on promises made to the Philippine people.

I also agree with Winston. Island hopping in the central pacific with a final attack on Formosa wasn't going to cut it with the American public.

I don't think the suggestion that Big Mac's campaign might not have been necessary has any relationship to "Island hopping … with a final attack on Formosa".

The path towards an invasion of Japan was through the Central Pacific, not through the Philippines.

The path to winning the war was not through taking back the Philippines.

The path to taking back the Philippines could indeed be through winning the war.

Through this simple tautological examination, the thing to focus on should have been the drive through the central Pacific.

But …

As with Italy, as with the bombing campaign, the great advantage that the allies had was material, logistics, and wealth. Face-to-face was not the allies best advantage. So many faces to face was. Putting more soldiers into combat, in more places, on more fronts, fully supported with all the modern weapons and supplies they needed, was a strategy that played to the Allies' advantage, and played against the Axis' weaknesses.

If the other guy can only provide 1/3rd the supplies that you can provide, then attack him on 3 different fronts. You will either face out-numbered troops, or you will face under-supplied troops, or you won't face any opposition on some fronts.

Or so the thinking went, I believe.

From this perspective, there is real advantage to bringing the enemy to battle everywhere that you can.

And particularly if you envision an invasion of Japan as the end game (harkening back to "No one at the time could tell if the 'Atomic Bomb' was going to be a practical weapon…"), then pinning-down and even chewing up large numbers of his troops and his supplies in the Philippines, in combat that was far closer to the Allies' major bases of support, makes some sense. As does Burma.

So I can see the sense.

But … I still think it would probably have gone just as well, or better, if there was more focus. I have spent too much of my career working in companies who thought their breadth was their great strength, and found that they are frequently outmaneuvered by more focused opponents.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

A qualified 'Yes'. No one at the time could tell if the 'Atomic Bomb' was going to be a practical weapon so there was going to have to be preparation for taking the War to the Japanese at some stage.

No one at the time had even heard of the Atomic Bomb. It's not as if we were hedging bets, hoping it would work. Nobody knew it existed. MacArthur and Nimitz were not exactly being treated to visitors like Oppenheimer to give them an update.
How late in the war did we even knew that it would work?

Let me also remind people here on TMP that both the OFM and I have long been on record thinking that MacArthur was an incompetent blowhard. Had I been Roosevelt, I would have fired him.

Yes. It kept him as far from Washington DC as possible.

Not a joke. FDR wanted to keep him out of US politics, where he would have been both a pest and the likely Republican nominee.

And if Big Mac return home he might ask a lot of questions about being left to die on Bataan to "lay down a bunt", So we could invade North Africa.

"Big Mac" had a lot to answer for his mishandling of the early Philippines campaign. He pretty much bungled himself right into Bataan and to top it off he didn't make any effort to move food and supplies into Bataan leading to reduced rations and short supplies of just about every needed material. He was not left in the Philippines "to lay down a bunt", there was very little available to come to his army's rescue. With most of the US and British navies on the bottom of the Pacific he was pretty much on his own.

Easy way out for Roosevelt. Allow him to surrender on Bataan.

Yes. It was a symbolic morale booster victory and a strategic victory. It lessened the threat to Australia with the first part which was New Guiana.

I have been reading "The Fleet at Flood Tide" by James D. Hornfischer. I highly recommend the book. I recently came across his points on this question. This is the pertinent paragraph

"The divided Pacific command structure, in spite of the bitter interservice schism that it encouraged, had been profoundly useful. The parallel offensives of MacArthur and Nimitz had confused the Japanese high command and enabled the Americans to seize a foothold in the Marianas, unopposed initially by the Japanese fleet. Now U.S. control of the Marianas, a commanding central strongpoint, gave Tokyo a continuous waking nightmare: Allied forces threatened an arc of potential targets that were too widely dispersed for the Japanese to defend effectively. From the Marianas, as attack could be pressed to the southwest against the Palaus, to the west toward Formosa, or the the north toward Iwo Jima."
page 342

The ultimate travesty WRT MacArthur was awarding him the Medal of Honor – after having him abandon his command.

It wasn't an easy way out. It's easy for us to not know this because I bet most of us weren't alive then. Is there anyone here who was alive and sensible in 1942? I have my doubts.

MacArthur was lionized in the US press during the opening months as were the defenders of Wake. Wake and the Philippines were the main theaters during the opening weeks and months of the war and they were heavily covered by the press. Also, MacArthur was a real WAR HERO from WWI and was a household name by January 1942. Roosevelt could no more sack MacArthur than Bush could have sacked Schwartzkopff. This was especially true after First Bataan was complete with the destruction of most effective Japanese forces in Bataan (right after the Points and Pockets battles). To the American, and allied for that matter, public MacArthur was winning where others were losing. Giving up MacArthur would have been a terribly foolish political gaf.

Also, MacArthur's "I shall return" promise was taken up by the AMERICAN people. Wierdly, the US public may have had a longer memory back then. Certainly longer than the current 24 hours or less news cycle that exists now. They were VERY AWARE that thousands of US POWs were being held in the Philippines and that many of them were still THERE. This was not a battle intended to push the strategic offensive. It was half Saving Private Ryan and half Remember the Alamo! It was bring our boys home and make the bastards pay. The US public wholeheartedly supported it too. It wasn't just done to assuage the good general's healthy ego. It was done because the American public wanted to see it done.

"I shall return" wasn't just MacArthur's promise. It was America's. It was done to avenge the thousands of soldiers who gave their all for a nation that was powerless at the time to help them.

Here are some clips that might give you a clue about the public's opinion at the time.

They Were Expendable

YouTube link

Back to Bataan

YouTube link

Seriously! This tail end of a fictional movie is showing what appear to be Bataan/Corregidor survivors who were rescued in the Philippines. And did you hear the "march of freedom" line? Yeah, it sounds corny as all get out but that was the feeling in the US at the time.

War can be cold logic, supply lines, and proper application of force. But it can also be psychological too. It can be moral and public feeling. Heck, why was such a huge battle fought for STALINGRAD???? Why not just fall back to the far side of the Volga and use the river as a moat? That would make for sounder a strategy, no?

Don't forget, it was Napoleon himself that said "the moral is to the physical as three to one."

Taking the Philippines was necessary to cut the supply line to the East Indies. Oil, rubber, etc. were all being shipped to the Home Islands. Cutting that supply line was another major nail in the coffin of the IJA/IJN in 45.

Macarthur abandoned his command ? OK, so he CHOSE
TO FOLLOW THE ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT – if that's
'abandonment' then all the abandoned should have laid it
at FDR's feet.

And some did.

The real issue with his leaving is that it triggered
the surrender of the forces on Mindanao, when they were
ordered to do so by Wainwright. That may have been
necessary I don't know what terms Wainwright was given
by the Japanese, but total surrender was probably on
the table. The Japanese were not in such good case
after the PI campaign, certainly not capable of quickly
over-running Mindanao.

Well, Ed, if there was anything MacArthur was very good at, it was following a President's orders. Ask Truman.

MacArthur's "I shall return" promise was taken up by the AMERICAN people.

This is a perspective I've never quite understood.

There seems to be an implication that defeating Japan would not result in returning to the Philippines.

I can hardly imagine a scenario where the US wins the war against Japan, and leaves the Philippines under Japanese occupation.

Several times during the war decision-makers were confronted by some decision that was articulated as a "morale obligation", but decided on the basis of "the best way to deliver on the obligation is not to divert resources to it, but rather to win the war as fast as we can".

So why does the "I shall return" promise seem to bind the US to invading the Philippines and destroying half of Luzon in a campaign that, at least arguably, might have prolonged the war?

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

There seems to be an implication that defeating Japan would not result in returning to the Philippines

After how many more years of occupation? (bomb, what bomb).

Then there's the, can we trust the Americans in the future reason for keeping a promise.

I'm sure King though it wasn't necessary, after taking back New Guinea and closing off Rabul.

Don't know why someone would think Burma was unneeded. Defend India, keep supplies flowing to China, where most of the Japanese army was.

The only way to guarantee you take back the Philippines is to … take back the Philippines.
Thinking they will fall into your lap after beating a stubborn foe in the Aleutians or Marshall Islands is odd.
"OK. We lose. You can have them back." Right.

To beat the Japanese, you have to go where they are. The Philippines were not like Truk or Rabaul, easily bypassed. Unfortunately.

Winston, not sure I understand your MacA versus
Truman point.

MacA's Inchon gambit probably saved what was left
of our forces in Korea after the administration's
'cut to the bone' cost reductions caused serious
damage to the 'muscle' of forces deployed world-
wide, not just in Asia. Nothing new there, we have
frequently gone in harm's way being woefully un- or
underprepared.

Granted, not Truman's doing but as he said, the
buck stopped with him.

MacA's oversized ego would not let him do the
right thing after Inchon (retire and let the
younger guys handle it) hence the COMINCH needed
to show him (and other long-service senior officers)
that the civilian authority is supreme.

Ed

Inchon had nothing to do with Truman's firing of MacArthur. There were a multitude of reasons. Keeping it simple Truman believed MacArthur was not being candid with the President on his assessments because he was afraid Truman would overrule his general. Moving into North Korea MacArthur had told the President that despite warnings and indications to the contrary China would not intervene in the fighting. MacArthur saw war with China as inevitable and had reason to believe China would intervene.

MacArthur also took his disagreements with Truman public, something no active duty office does. Among other disagreements he had with Truman is he favored bombing China as a strategy in the Korean conflict and advocated possible use of nuclear weapons. These were areas Truman was quite clear with MacArthur on. All of these were commented on by MacArthur to the press.

There is no doubt MacArthur had no respect for Truman and harbored ambitions to become the next commander-in-chief. While his firing raised public ire it quickly died out. MacArthur's political ambitions died with a poor and not well received speech at the 1952 Republican convention.

Unlike Europe where the Germans were able to shuffle troops around the various fronts, once the submarine campaign swung into high gear the Japanese tended to run out of ways to move troops around. Thus it could be argued that comparing the European campaign (where Italy drew German troops off from elsewhere) to the Pacific campaign (where Japanese troops on New Guinea for example could not get to someplace more important) isn't really valid. After the Guadalcanal campaign Japanese troops on the periphery of their empire were effectively neutralized without having to fight them. It is a valid argument to make. The Burma Campaign did draw Japanese troops off from elsewhere.

As noted hindsight is generally always 20/20. However if you added up all the errors made by all sides in WWII, they'd probably out number the correct decisions, I'd imagine

If you could actually even clearly see all the right vs. all the wrong courses of action …

So why does the "I shall return" promise seem to bind the US to invading the Philippines and destroying half of Luzon in a campaign that, at least arguably, might have prolonged the war?

That's one of those things that those of us who are alive now just can't get. The American people were in a frenzy after Pearl Harbor and were determined that Japan would pay. If you're into fantasy gaming it's like the Dwarves and their book of grudges. In fact, Europe seemed like a DIVERSION to many people. The Germans didn't attack Pearl Harbor, the Japanese did!

Also, the Philippines weren't an obscure island to Americans. It was a colony that had thousands of AMERICANS on it. It was a part of the US at time even if it was scheduled to go independent in just a few years. It also contained thousands of AMERICAN service men and women (well, maybe just a few of the ladies but you get the idea). These people, both civilian and military, were basically abandoned to their fate after putting up a valiant fight that was detailed in the papers for weeks on end. MacArthur's "I Shall Return" was a promise he made and really had the blessing of the American people. It was the only way to avenge the loss of so many people. See that verb- AVENGE. That's what the public wanted- to avenge that loss.

While a lot of folks say that it destroyed the Philippines that's not the view that I get from most Filipinos that I know. They saw it as their homeland being liberated from a hated foe who had abused and murdered them for years. There was a full on rebellion going on when US troops hit the beach at Luzon and many of these rebels were organized into regular style formations that helped liberate the islands. So it wasn't like Luzon was being peacefully being occupied by the Japanese against a pacifist population. There was bitter fighting occuring on the island and the arrival of US forces tipped the balance and allowed the Filipinos to liberate their homes from the Japanese.

Plus there were the POWs… you simply can't discount with cold logic their importance. The American people were deeply angered about their capture and subsequent treatment. If there was ANY chance of saving them then the public demanded that it be done. Go back and look at "Back to Bataan", a 1945 movie that stressed how US POWs were liberated in Luzon. People might give the "Saving Private Ryan" argument about why so many should be risked for so few. A person in 1944 would point out that we left those guys out to dry in '41 after they gave their all and they SUFFERED dearly for it. That person would argue that it was the LEAST we could do as a nation for them and the valiant Filipinos.

It's so easy to not know this stuff in 2018 or to discount it. You want to understand why this happened then you need to understand the American people at this time. MacArthur did have a part in this because he influenced the public but he didn't DECIDE it for them. They made that choice themselves and were determined to see it through. Cold logic be damned!

"Cold logic" demands that you take back what was taken from you.

It was a morale/propaganda campaign.

"The morale is to the material, as three is to one."

A guy who won a few battles said that once.

Marc, where did I suggest that the Inchon invasion had
anything to do with MacA's being fired by Truman ?

MacA in a very limited way was a genius – but also was
possessed of an outsized ego and had, as you say, little
if any respect for any politician, Give 'em Hell Harry
included.

For his part, Truman may have, in addition to sending
a message to long-serving senior flag officers as to
who was in charge, been looking to put his own stamp
on his presidency. Remember, he was a compromise
VP nominee and was opposed by many Democrats at the
convention. Even Roosevelt himself was not happy
with the replacement of Henry Wallace, long-time friend
of FDR, by the senator from Missouri.

BTW, as to your assertion that taking disagreements with
the President is something no serving officer does -
you are of course familiar with Abe Lincoln versus
George McClellan ? In addition to that one, MacA and FDR
who were friends and who had worked together in getting
the CCC up and running, had a bitter confrontation over
FDR's initial proposal to cut 51 % of the military budget
in (IIRC) 1934. MacA was public in his support of FDR's
New Deal, but also with his criticism of 'isolationism
and pacifism' and challenged the President on those
issues.

As far as the NK attack on SK and Chinese intervention -
Hillenkoetter, CIA head at the time of NK's invasion of
SK, had TWO DAYS before the NK attack, testified before
Congress that the CIA would provide a warning if the
North was going to invade. He, of course, was a Truman
appointee, albeit a reluctant one.

Hillenkoetter told the Senate committee before which he
testified that it was not the CIA's job to analyze intel,
but merely to pass it along to 'high-ranking policy
makers.'

Part of MacA's issue with Truman (and with FDR) was that
he distrusted the OSS (forerunner of the CIA) and then
the CIA. He listened, unfortunately, to his own intel
chief Charles Willoughby. There are sources I've read
which claim Willoughby suppressed information passed to
him that the NK would invade the South, and did not
inform MacA.

Point of all the foregoing is that the info was there
but was ignored by all, including MacA's staff.

Another BTW – MacA's ego is legendary. Biographies of
his father which I've read claim his was even worse !

Love him or hate him or try to ignore him – MacA was an
extraordinary man. I'd recommend you read ALL the
biographies about him you can find – including the ones
which recount in detail his first marriage, his laison
with an Eurasian woman who was his mistress, the alleged
'bribes' paid to MacA and his staff in 1942 by Quezon
(actually payment for MacA's service as Field Marshal of
the Philippine Army and a payment which Eisenhower, part
of MacA's staff at the time, declined to accept).

Fascinating stuff.

70 years after the fact it's easy to look back and pick which campaigns, battles, decisions, etc. were seemingly unnecessary. However, we do it with the benefit of hindsight and being able to trace a line backwards to what succeeded and what did not.

Those making the decisions at the time were making decisions based on what they new at that time, which meant they were making decisions without knowing everything, or knowing what the enemy was doing, going to do, or how they would react.

In this case, a two pronged strategic attack against Japan made sense. A flanking move (the indirect approach) forces the enemy to commit resources both ways. If there had not been multiple lines against Japan, to include China, BTW, Japan could have concentrated its defense.

Maywood Illinois west of Chicago still has a Bataan Day march. A National Guard outfit from that area was sent to the Phillipines just in time to be lost.
People from that area expected us to invade the Phillipines before Europe! In my youth the old timers felt FDR listened too much to the Brits and delayed their boys return. They complained bitterly to the Illinois congressional delegation on the delay…I cannot conceive of their of the hue and cry if we failed to go at all…Cicero, Bellwood,Berwyn,Melrose park and Maywood were factory towns and Democratic strongholds…FDR needed them. They are just one part of the US. … Tgunner is right..the US public demanded it and FDR made sure MacArthur took it

Ed; I apologize if I misunderstood your comments about Inchon.

As to McClellan I never said it hadnt been done before. It is very much a reason to dismiss an officer. If a serving officer disagrees that much with Presidential policy the correct thing to do is resign and then you are free to criticize as much as you please.

And not disputing the information on the North attacking the South but the evidence that China would intervene if UN forces pushed into the North, especially if they approached the Yalu. It is widely believed Willoughby purposefully doctored evidence and downplayed proof of Chinese forces already in Korea, let alone the threat of a large scale incursion, to give MacArthur a free hand with his Korea strategy.

Winston was, of course, being facetious. He followed Presidential orders when it suited him to do so. An excellent book on the subject "The Truman-MacAruthur Controversy and the Korean War" by John W Spanier. As an undergrad actually had Dr Spanier as one of my professors. link

Marc, I've read Dr. Spanier's work as part of my
readings on MacA. Excellent scholarship – you were
fortunate to have studied under him.

As far as MacA's intel chief (Willoughby) – it is my
opinion that he should have been cashiered, but MacA
would have never allowed that.