"How best to represent artillery." Topic

A discussion on the FoGN board that encompassed other sets and general doctrine.
TMP link

For info in FoGN units are regiments/brigades. A artillery unit is either 12-20 guns (small) or 21-30 (large). An individual gun base can be attached to a unit outside of this. It does not act as true artillery base, but increases the unit's firepower.

Units are organised into Divisions, often a division's artillery is a separate unit.

Would it be more in period to parcel out that unit as individual attachments?

I would think so. Having such large gun 'units', the game basically has you pushing around grand batteries all the time--the norm on the battlefield, rather than that size concentration of artillery being more unusual. For instance, at Friedland,Sénarmont has to ask for permission from Victor, the corps commander, to group divisional and corps artillery into a 'unit' of 36 guns.

the grouping also forces the rules to downplay the firepower of such concentrations to make the game playable. [Besides, the groups size ranges don't make much sense when artillery was grouped into 4, 6, 8 and 12 gun batteries.]

If you are going to represent regiments and brigades of infantry and cavalry as units, then I think artillery batteries should be represented, whether as attachments or separate units. grouping 20-30 guns into a single unit should be something the player does rather than the rules making that concentration of artillery the norm.

Grand batteries were the exception, so I would not want them as the rule. My Russian batteries are 12, Prussian 8 and British 6.

I like Bluechers approach for the most part(combined btrys) but would like to see some of the units cut into single btrys even if not dispersed to the brigade stand. It is easily done with a house rule or if you consider use stands as battalions instead of brigades. Just divide the dice, if still using brigades. They dry up a bit quicker but that can be fiddled with too.

@Last

Thx for the link to the old discussion.

I really miss Bob Coggins.

McLaddie wrote:

Having such large gun 'units', the game basically has you pushing around grand batteries all the time--the norm on the battlefield, rather than that size concentration of artillery being more unusual. For instance, at Friedland, Sénarmont has to ask for permission from Victor, the corps commander, to group divisional and corps artillery into a 'unit' of 36 guns.

Friedland was an improvised battle. What about 100+ gun battery at Wagram?
On the eve of the battle of Borodino, Napoleon's artillery was organized in large batteries, each battery consisted of the artillery of one corps, including the artillery of its divisions, under command of the commander of the corps artillery. In each battery, the howitzers were detached from the artillery companies and combined together in a group within the battery.

Concerning representation of artillery batteries in wargaming, I think the most difficult problem is not how to represent them with models, but how to simulate different performance depending on a certain organization, a certain command structure, and a certain tactical doctrine.

I'd still expect the default smallest unit you move around to be an infantry battalion, artillery battery, or cavalry regiment.

With the option to clump things into bigger units.

Friedland was an improvised battle. What about 100+ gun battery at Wagram?

What is an 'improvised battle'?

What about the 102-gun Grand Battery at Wagram commanded by General Lauriston?

At Friedland, Senarmont, Victor's artillery chief (I Corps) saw an opportunity after Ney's repulse and after attached artillery to Dupont's advance in the center. Senarmont secured Victor's permission to employ the entire corps artillery contingent (36 guns) and formed them into two fifteen-gun batteries with six pieces in reserve and advanced on the Russian center. The 25-minute cannonade from the 30 guns destroyed the Russian center and was the de facto main attack of the action.

On the eve of the battle of Borodino, Napoleon's artillery was organized in large batteries, each battery consisted of the artillery of one corps, including the artillery of its divisions, under command of the commander of the corps artillery. In each battery, the howitzers were detached from the artillery companies and combined together in a group within the battery.

Napoleon detached howitzers from a number of artillery companies in order to mass their fire at designated targets.

French corps artillery was organized with gun companies attached to its divisions plus a corps artillery reserve. The commander of the corps artillery was the corps artillery chief, normally a general of artillery.

The French Grand Battery at Borodino was organized with the Guard artillery, the army artillery reserve, and reinforced by other artillery units, usually from at least one corps, when needed.

Grand batteries were the exception…

I would agree, especially on the allied side. The French employed them, many times offensively, when the situation presented itself, such as at Friedland, Lutzen, Wagram, Raab, Ocana, Ligny, Borodino, and Waterloo.

The two spectacular examples of the French use of artillery in the offense are Friedland and Lutzen. Short range artillery fire was devastating.

Brechtel198 wrote:

What is an 'improvised battle'?

I mean that Napoleon did not expect a big battle that day. His army was on the march to Königsberg, when he was informed that the Russians appeared at Friedland on the western bank of the Alle River. He ordered his troops to march to Friedland, and the battle was fought the same day.
At Borodino, he had enough time to prepare his army to a big battle. He composed a detailed plan of the battle and ordered to organize the artillery in large batteries. Senarmon't battery at Friedland was an improvisation, it was organized right in the course of the battle. Corps batteries at Borodino were organized before the battle.

Brechtel198 wrote:

At Friedland, Senarmont, Victor's artillery chief (I Corps) saw an opportunity after Ney's repulse and after attached artillery to Dupont's advance in the center. Senarmont secured Victor's permission to employ the entire corps artillery contingent (36 guns) and formed them into two fifteen-gun batteries with six pieces in reserve and advanced on the Russian center. The 25-minute cannonade from the 30 guns destroyed the Russian center and was the de facto main attack of the action.

I am sorry, I read this "artillery tale" many times, but I still see no reasons to call the cannonade of Senarmont's battery "the de facto main attack of the action". Two French infantry officers in Dupont's division, Félix Jean Marie Girod de l'Ain (9th Light Infantry Regiment) and François Vigo-Roussillon (32nd Line Infantry Regiment) describe intense infantry fighting at that point. Both officers mention Senarmont's battery, but none of them calls its cannonade "the de facto main attack of the action", they describe the action in such a way, that the infantry decided the outcome of the fighting. Girod de l'Ain belonged to the 1st battalion of the 9th Light Infantry Regiment, he wrote that this battalion supported Senarmont's battery and suffered much from Russian artillery fire directed at the battery. Vigo-Roussillon wrote that the 32nd Line Infantry Regiment fought against Russian infantry in the area between the French and Russian batteries. Dupont's infantry pushed the Russian infantry back to Fridland and entered the town, not Senarmont's artillery.

I am sorry, I read this "artillery tale" many times, but I still see no reasons to call the cannonade of Senarmont's battery "the de facto main attack of the action". Two French infantry officers in Dupont's division, Félix Jean Marie Girod de l'Ain (9th Light Infantry Regiment) and François Vigo-Roussillon (32nd Line Infantry Regiment) describe intense infantry fighting at that point. Both officers mention Senarmont's battery, but none of them calls its cannonade "the de facto main attack of the action", they describe the action in such a way, that the infantry decided the outcome of the fighting. Girod de l'Ain belonged to the 1st battalion of the 9th Light Infantry Regiment, he wrote that this battalion supported Senarmont's battery and suffered much from Russian artillery fire directed at the battery. Vigo-Roussillon wrote that the 32nd Line Infantry Regiment fought against Russian infantry in the area between the French and Russian batteries. Dupont's infantry pushed the Russian infantry back to Fridland and entered the town, not Senarmont's artillery.

You are incorrect. And to label Senarmont's action an ‘artillery tale' is to mischaracterize and seemingly belittle what actually occurred.

Perhaps a brief summary will help:

Friedland began early on 14 June with Lannes delaying action against Bennigsen. He sent couriers to Napoleon to keep him abreast of the action and to request reinforcements. Once the army was assembled, Ney was designated to be the main attack on the French right flank against Bagration. This attack was defeated and Ney's corps was routed with the exception of two regiments that stood firm.

Dupont advanced on his own initiative in the center supported by Captain Ricci's artillery battery. The 9th Leger was in square behind Ricci. Senarmont, the chief of artillery of I Corps to who both Dupont and Ricci belonged, saw an opportunity for his artillery and secured permission from the corps commander, Victor, to advance with the entire corps compliment of artillery, 36 pieces. He formed two batteries of fifteen guns each on either side of Dupont and kept the other 6 pieces in reserve. As the artillery advanced against the Russian center, they outpaced Dupont and advanced alone and on their own, stopping to fire as they advanced by bounds.

Senarmont finally stopped 120 yards from the Russian position. By now, the artillery was in one 30 gun battery because of the terrain and they opened fire on the Russian infantry and knocked over 4,000 of them in 25 minutes, destroying the Russian center.

They were attacked on their left flank by Russian cavalry and seeing the danger, Senarmont shifted the guns and fired two quick volleys of canister which ruined the Russian cavalry charge. Dupont defeated the Russian infantry to his front and the Russians broke and headed into Friedland and the bridges to get across the river.

Senarmont continued to advance as did Dupont. Ney had also rallied his corps and attacked again, and the Russians were driven into the burning town.

With the main attack defeated, Senarmont seized the initiative with his artillery and became the main French attack, supported by Dupont and later Ney. That is why I characterized Senarmont's action as the ‘de facto main attack.' It wasn't planned, but was a tactical improvisation by Senarmont. Victor had no idea what he was going to do and neither did Napoleon. Napoleon actually sent General Mouton to find out what was going on and Senarmont bluntly told him to go away. When he reported back to Napoleon, he told Mouton to let it be.

For Senarmont's action at Friedland, the I Corps after-action report as well as Senarmont's own after-action report are valuable primary source material, as is Senarmont's letter to his brother written 12 days after the action. Senarmont walked the area of the action and saw the heavy Russian losses and it should be noted that it is easy to tell dead from artillery rounds against those killed by musket fire. Artillery wounds can be quite spectacular. After the battle of New Orleans in January 1815 the British remarked that it was easy to identify those killed by artillery fire because of the shattering effect on the human body by artillery fire.

Further references are Yermelov's memoirs in which he remarks on the heavy Russian casualties from French artillery fire and there are excellent secondary accounts of the action by James Arnold (who used both Girod de l'Ain and Vigo-Roussillon as references), John Elting, and AF Becke, all of whom agree that Senarmont's artillery attack was if not the decisive action of the day, was a decisive action of the day.

Artillery fire by either canister or roundshot is very deadly at close range.

It should also be noted that Senarmont's large battery caused more damage and casualties to the Russians during that phase of the action than Dupont's infantry did. Senarmont's artillery action definitely allowed Dupont to continue the attack and gave Ney time to reorganize his corps for a renewed attack.

Deep joy, Senarmont at Friedland again. Read about it here folks: TMP link (which contains further links to previous discussions).

Didn't Sam Mustafa's Grande Armee use a combination of both? Some batteries were considered attached to brigades (and thus invisible, represented in the brigade's combat factors) and others were amalgamated?

Never tried Grand Armee but Blücher uses that very approach.

Back in 1981 our research on artillery resulted in the fact that the deployment area for a battery was much deeper than the frontage distance. Such factors will result in reserves moving behind batteries are further from the front lines.

For a French artillery company that is incorrect. The gun companies only had one caisson per piece with them. The other assigned caissons were with the trains and would rotate to the gun company when ammunition had to be resupplied.

French artillery by Almark, shows more than one support piece in its diagram.

If there is more than one caisson per piece in the battery position, then it is incorrect. All of the caissons but one were either with the parcs or were involved in shuttling ammunition forward replacing empty caisson going to the rear to be refilled.

I wouldn't count on Almark being a definitive resource for French artillery practice.