"Skirmishers" Topic

wu Tian:

Excellent. Thank you for that. I am not sure which 'author' you are referencing above. The list of needs and procedures that Radetzky is making is specifically for the Army of Bohemia before Leipzig. Here is your quote translated

5. A general rule is that all troops should never be dissolved at the same time, but always keep a reserve. Because of dissolution en tirailleur, one remark could not be superfluous: that such are carried out in very limited numbers, for we, the Russians and the Austrians, do not understand Tirailliren.

Here, what is being remarked on is the large scale 'dissolution' of all troops of a unit into skirmishers, the "Tirailliren".

In relation to Hondschoote, von Winterfeldt referred to 'an excellent French study on this including tactics' – I presume that this is V. Dupuis, La Campagne de 1793 à l'Armée du Nord et des Ardennes, de Valenciennes à Hondschoote, Paris, Librairie Militaire R. Chapelot et Ce, 1906- in my opinion, this is by far the best study of the battle and the training and tactics of the Armée du Nord in the second half of 1793. It can be downloaded from: link

'5. A general rule [is?] that all troops should never be dissolved [dispersed?] at the same time, but [some?] should always be kept in reserve.'

@Wu Tian
I can see that Radetzky is suggesting that whole units should not be deployed in open/dispersed formation and that a formed support should be maintained, but what does he mean by 'resolution en tirailleurs'?

Sorry Bill – you beat me to it!

;-)

@McLaddie
As to that author, I mean the one who wrote Beiträge zur geschichte der befreiungskriege.

PS: The roughly same quote could be found in the Austrian General Staff's work Befreiungskrieg 1813 und 1814. Band 5. Feldzug von Leipzig, p. 406.

Ohne Anschrift, Hauptquartier Pegau, 15. Oktober (K. A., F. A. 1813, Hauptarmee, X, 436b). Unter den taktischen Anweisungen ist folgende sehr be zeichnend: „Wegen Auflösung en Tirailleurs könnte eine Bemerkung nicht überflüssig werden, daß solche sehr in beschränkter Zahl bestimmt werden, denn wir beide, Russen und Österreicher, verstehen die Manier des Tiraillierens nicht "

@Allan F Mountford
Bill did have a very good answer.

Wu Tian:

Much appreciated. It is great to have multiple sources for the same information. I am continually amazed by the ever-increasing accessibility of primary sources through the internet.

Rothenberg and Chandler were writing in the 1960s-1980s. There was no internet. They only had access to sources if they bought the book, went to the library, or the less likely, got a primary work through inter-library loan. The only other option was to quote someone else's book and hope the context was correct, which is what you see with the Radeskty quote. Limited access forced authors to sometimes make more of a single source than was justified.

Rothenberg and Chandler both had about 200 books and sources in their bibliographies.

I have access to all of them either with pdfs on my computer or through the internet. I have about 5,000 more in my 'library.' I know several Napoleonic enthusiasts that have double that number.

That doesn't make me a better scholar than Rothenberg and Chandler, but I do have constant access to far more resources, something they could only dream of.

This access is creating a new era for historians, but also for historical wargamers. And this discussion is a good example of how that can work.

@Wu Tian:
are you in China? Im in Nanjign. Where are you?

Frank

Just a comment on Russian skirmishers or Jaeger battalions. I believe that a few British observers attached to the main Russian army at Napoloneon's invasion carry a lot of weight in the British/American opinion about them. But at that time, quite a number of line regiments were converted to or renamed "Jaeger" regiments, but without any training. Obviously, they performed the new tasks poorly. I would imagine that the Russian forces that had been fighting the Swedes in the forests of the north and those who had been fighting the Turks in the Balkans were quite expert, but were out of view.

I would imagine that the Russian forces that had been fighting the Swedes in the forests of the north and those who had been fighting the Turks in the Balkans were quite expert, but were out of view.

Yes indeed, a Swiss officer fighting at the Beresina – against such units

Jahrbuch des historischen Vereins des Kantons Glarus. Viertes Heft, Zürich & Glarus, 1868
Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem russischen Feldzuge vom Jahr 1812

Bei der Bersina
„Das feindliche zweite Treffen, welches nun gegen uns in's Gefecht kam, hatte kaum eine halbe Stunde sein Feuer begonnen, so waren die Polen bis auf uns zurückgedrängt, die wir in unsere Linie aufnahmen und somit auch unser Feuer wieder begangen – Wir erstaunten über die feindlichen, wohl angebrachten Schüsse; hätte wir Scharfschützen gegenüber gehabt, sie hätten uns wohl nicht mehr schaden können.
Legler, S. 45

We were impressed about the well aimed enemy fire, had we have had sharpshooters against us, the couldn't have done us more harm – Russian Jäger showing their skill picked up in the war against the Ottomans.

Indeed there is much too much influence by the few British observers and it is usual forgotten to consult other sources.

Langeron, who was a corps commander in the Army of the Danube in 1812, wrote that soldiers of the 12th and 22nd jager regiments were accustomed to fight individually on the Kuban River border line and against the Circassians, so they were good skirmishers (tirailleurs), and that at the battle on the Berezina they inflicted many casualties among the enemy.

Langeron A. de, Mémoires de Langeron, général d'infanterie dans l'armée Russe. Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814. Paris, 1902, p.74-75.

@Frank Wang

Yes, I am in Hangzhou, China. I travel to Nanjing frequently. Nice to meet a countryman here.