"US D-Day landing, less slaughter possible?" Topic

Whenever I see this topic I always wonder if there's been something new and authoritative brought into the public domain in recent years, particularly something that casts doubt over the official histories. Seriously, I don't know, it's been a long time since I wandered around a bookshop with a decent military history section. There are about a half dozen aspects that come to mind I'd like to bring in but I can't sit here typing all night. In bullet points then -

1. I can see the logic in comparing Tarawa with Omaha, and extrapolating from that the dreaded 'lessons were not learned. I think there are though enough differences between the enemy faced, the geography and hydrology and the operational factors governing both assaults. It's certainly something worth expanding on.

2. There were a lot of failures at Omaha. It reminds me a bit of a four-engine aircraft losing one engine after another until it's struggling to stay up on just one. Omaha was supposed to benefit from a aerial bombardment before H-Hour. The Army history says that 13,000 bombs were dropped by 329 B-24s, none of which hit the beach defences proper; the bombers were targeting through overcast using instruments only so the release was delayed to give a safety margin. That also benefited the defenders. First engine gone.

Then came the naval bombardment, which was only to last for about 40 minutes from what I can see. Here it appears that the layout of the German defences was successful in minimising the impact of the bombardment. The Navy report mentions the majority of the German weapons being sited to sweep the beaches, targeting the assault troops, rather than trying to engage the ships bringing them in. I get the impression the Navy knew they didn't have enough guns and enough time to do the job required. When the eight US and three RN destroyers closed to provide direct fire (800 yards at the closest being quoted) German defences were destroyed. Communications also were slow to be established with the SCFPs of the JASCO, which meant the Navy couldn't correct its fire. That failure of the shore bombardment I count as engine number two dying.

Then the saga of the DDs. One half of the force did not swim and was landed conventionally in good order. The other half did swam, then swamped and sank. The Army history counts five of the 32 as reaching the beaches (re the Navy report above that would suggests only two swam to the shore). That then denudes a half of the attacking force of its intended armoured support. Engine number three now starting to shudder.

That's three unlinked but important elements of the plan each failing to a degree. All that's left is engine number four, the assault infantry and engineers, reduced to trying to do the job with small arms and explosives, a good amount of which was salvaged.

3. Amtracs. This does get a lot of attention these days because it seems so logical. You're putting troops down on a defended shoreline, so instead of disgorging them from Higgins boats lift them in armoured vehicles that can take a portion of the way with some degree of protection.

This is a more complicated subject than I used to give it credit for. LVTs only offered marginal protection against small arms fire, I don't think they could stand up to anything from 20-mm up that the Germans could field in beach defence. The way the USMC used them varied. Looking back on an old discussion somewhere I was reminded that the two Mar Divs on Saipan used their LVTs differently, one being aggressive in wanting them to take troops off the beach to an early objective line, while the other felt the fire encountered was too heavy so dismounted the troops on the beach.

There are other factors at play as well. As touched on, LCTs would be needed to take in the LVTs, and could not therefore carry out their other roles without more being assigned. I think an LCT could carry about six LVTs, and six LVTs could carry about the assault portion of a USMC Rifle Coy, so you do need around one LCT for each Rifle Coy and Wpns Coy, so at least three for an Assault Bn I think, with six Aslt Bns, making say 18? (It's late so these figures may make no sense on review). O Force had 24 LSTs being used for more than just tanks I understand. So you either need to double your LST allocation or turn the majority of it over to LVT carriage.

I've heard it argued both ways, that the beaches meant the LVTs would founder on the shingle, and also that they could've taken troops further under some cover than they actually had to go with none. Personally I'm not sold, but I can't write it off entirely.

As noted above, DUKWs were not used in the assault role by either Army or Marines, they carried in guns, ammn and stores.

Gary

There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding and misinformation regarding wartime LVTs and their usage.
For example:
> LVT(2) cargo carriers were in fact armored against automatic weapons fire up to HMG caliber.
> The cargo carriers in an assault landing were always escorted in by a close cover escort of armored assault amphibians with (initially) 37mm AT gun and (later) 75mm close-support howitzers which served to suppress and/or KO enemy beach-line defensive posts.
> From Tarawa onward, LVTs were ubiquitous in all amphibious assault landings in the PTO, irrespective of whether or not there was a reef line.
> While the initial task of the LVT cargo carriers was to deliver its troops and their equipment directly onto dry land, their follow-on responsibility was to ferry ammunition/supplies from the supply ship lying offshors directly to the troops fighting beyond the beach; they would have been very useful in certain locales behind the Normandy beacheads in terms of ferrying troops and supplies across the large areas of marshland behind the landing beaches which had been flooded by the Germsns.

The following (available as a free PFD download on the web) is a good reference source:
ALLIGATORS, BUFFALOES, AND BUSHMASTERS – THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LVT THROUGH WORLD WAR I1
by Major Alfred Dunlop Bailey, USMC (Retired)

Occasional Paper
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Sure. LVTs wouldn't have to be part if the initial assault either – it's possible to use faster shipping (LCIs, etc.)
s to dash in to land the first wave, then use LVTs to follow that up and perhaps move supplies and troops a bit inland if an opportunity arises.

Yes, just like the DUKWs …

And as the MAJ said,

they would have been very useful in certain locales behind the Normandy beacheads in terms of ferrying troops and supplies across the large areas of marshland behind the landing beaches which had been flooded by the Germsns.

Their were 2 to 3 hundred (sources vary) LVTs in England by D-Day and at least some were used to ferry supplies from the ships to the beaches.

Not all LVT-2 were armored, only the LVT(A)s are armored and that armor is only 0.25" & 0.5"

All LVTs armored or not were ordered to stay within 500yds of the beach. As usual not always followed.

These quotes are from various sources;

"At D-Day they'd only have LVT-2s (and 2 LVT(A)-2s), which have a water speed of only 7.5 mph, a little over half the speed of the LCVP, which would mean they'd be under fire for longer, and be more affected by the currents. Also, at Omaha several LCVPs were recorded as sunk by rough seas, so how many of the LVTs would make it is up for debate."

"The track design was for mud. Sand, loose gravel, etc… It was wholly unsuitable for paved roads or other hard ground. The other more important point is the nominal maximum speed was only 11kph on land, barely 7mph for those who can't convert. The machine was a boat that could crawl over obstacles. Like mud flats."

This last is from a Marine Corps document on the employment of LVTs

776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, SOP for amphibious operations.
Limitations.
1. In swampy ground the amtank has less mobility than the medium tank M-4.
2. Its power train is inadequate for land operation; which if not kept to a minimum, will result in wholesale breakdowns an immobilization o the unit.
3. Its armor will stop no projectiles larger than Cal.30

Then there is this;

Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall Richard C. Anderson Jr has an appendix on the "offer", and another on the possible usefulness of "Funnies" in general at Omaha.

That U.S. Army Ground Forces was resistant to unique organisations intended for specific tasks is incontrovertible. In this case, however, it made little difference. There simply weren't sufficient British-made specialist vehicles to support the American operations, whether they were American- or British- manned.
…
So although an "offer" of the special equipment developed by the 79th Armoured Division was made to the U.S. Army, it was not "refused", and in fact, a large number of various types were asked for but, for various reasons, not supplied.
…
the simple fact was that any such offer was premature, since the concepts were still being worked out and the production was barely adequate to fulfil Commonwealth requirements, let alone American ones."

Review of Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall Richard C. Anderson Jr
"Over my years as a "tank nut" I have read several accounts of the use of specialized armored vehicles to support Operation Neptune, the invasion phase of Operation Overlord. This book sets a new standard. Well researched and well written. Anderson goes beyond the basic premise, he not only looks at the British development and use of specialized armor but puts the equipmenmt in context by looking at the assault plans, the German defenses and the rushed preparations for battle. The author also looks at the American use of specialized tanks and debunks the common belief that the US Army was too arrogant to use the British-designed equipment. Citing reports and looking at the tactical situation he points out that there 1) although the American leaders were interested, there were barely enough special vehicles to meet Commonwealth needs and 2) the terrain on Omaha Beach would have negated much of their use anyway. The book brings up a lot of new information, such as that the "British" Amoured Vehicle Royal Engineers was the brainchild of a Canadian officer, or that there were only six of the Crocodile flamethrower tanks deployed on DDay. This book will be of interest to the reader interested in DDay and to the historian interested in military vehicles. I'm glad I bought this one."

Unfortunately I don't own a copy of this book and with my current situation won't be able to buy one for the foreseeable future. If anybody does have it and could find and post his sources I would appreciate it.

Good intel jdginaz ! But yes not all were armored and let's admit it. An M3 Stuart 37mm or short 75mm M8 HMC turret were really in not that much firepower. But better than not having it …

GHQ has some good pics of some … link

The track design was for mud. Sand, loose gravel, etc… It was wholly unsuitable for paved roads or other hard ground. The other more important point is the nominal maximum speed was only 11kph on land, barely 7mph for those who can't convert.

That may be the case for the earlier LVT-1, but the LVT-2 could do 20 mph and the LVT-4 could do about 25 mph.

They weren't race cars, but they could move faster than 7 mph…!

And they COULD travel over hard ground, it just caused bad wear on the tracks. The design wasn't like that of a modern AFV with rubber track pads; instead, it had raised "paddles" that helped drive the vehicle through the water. You can see them well here:

That can travel over hard ground, it just wears the metal. You couldn't do it for extended periods of time, but for a dash on D+1 to help make the beachhead deeper you're fine.

Never said the couldn't, but I'll point this out again,

"2. Its power train is inadequate for land operation; which if not kept to a minimum, will result in wholesale breakdowns an immobilization o the unit."

That is from an official USMC publication on the SOP for use of LVT including LVT-2s

Those swimming attachments look like they bend and/or break and wouldn't last long traveling on hard ground.

I always thought that was a good tread design for amtracs …

If anybody is still interested here is some information on the LVTs used at Tarawa from;

"Alligators, Buffaloes, and Bushmasters: The History of the Development of the LVT through World War II"

Speed land/water, armor cab/body,
LVT(1) – 12/6-7, none
LVT(2) – 20/7.5, .5/.25
LVT(A)1/2 same as LVT(2)

Some LVT(1)s had a 1.5 square of 3/8th inch boiler plate added to the cab front.

There were 42 LVT(1)s in the first wave, 24 LVT(2)s in the second wave and 21 LVT(2)s in the third.

8 LVTs were lost on initial approach to the beach and after picking up more troops and returning. 15 more sank due to numerous holes from machine gun fire. (Later wooden plugs were added to the LVTs to plug the holes from MGs.)

It seems that the LVTs only encountered MG fire on the approach to the beach at least that is all that is mentioned in the document. Though one LVT was lost to a naval mine.

Later General H. Smith noted that the average mechanical life of LVTs was 200 hrs.

By the end of the 3rd day at Tarawa there were only 19 LVT(1)s of 75 and 16 of 50 LVT(2)s functioning.

Recommendation after Tarawa was for 300 LVTs for each Marine Division with a replacement rate of 75% for LVT(1)s and 30% for LVT(2)s.

After reading this I don't see how LVTs would have reduced the casualties at Omaha Beach. In fact it looks to me like they might have made then worse due to their slow approach speed, half that of the LCVPs, leading to more time where they could be targeted at sea. Then once on land they would have been even more vulnerable to the numerous German guns. And with little to no armor, non-self-sealing fuel tanks and with them on both sides of the track any troops inside would be especially vulnerable.

The inadequate power train was related to LVT(1) alone (146hp Hercules 6-cylinder in-line); problem was resolved in LVT(2) series and following by adoption of the M5 light tank powertrain (250hp Continental 7-cylinder radial). these were much more reliable.

LVTs were never intended for extended land operation. they were amphibious assault vehicles designed to traverse a body of water and deliver passengers, supplies a close support in a dry state. Nevertheless, it was not uncommon for them to operate well beyond the beach.

LVT(1)s were unarmored vehicles built of mild steel. Their design had been frozen at the outbreak of the war in order to facilitate mass production. The much improved FMC LVT(2) had already been developed by late 1941, but did not supplant the LVT(1) in mass production until early 1943. A total of 1,225 LVT(1)s were built

Production of unarmored LVT(2) cargo carrier with mild steel hull commenced in early 1943, with 2,963 total units produced. Production of the LVT(A)2 of armored steel commenced in Spring 1943, with a total of 450 built at the request of the US Army.

The LVT(A)1 37mm close-support vehicle, based on the LVT(2) design but constructed of armor steel, commenced production in summer 1943 with a total of 509 built. The 37mm gun was replaced by the 75mm howitzer and turret of the M8 light close-support light tank. Production of this new model, known as the LVT(A)4, commenced in early 1944 with a total of 1,890 produced.

The Borg-Warner LVT(3) with stern ramp started production in 1944, with a total of 2,962 built; its combat introduction took place in assault on Okinawa.

The FMC LVT(4) with rear ramp and forward-mounted engine commenced production in December 1943 with 8,348 units ultimately produced.

- – -

After Tarawa (beginning of 1944) removable applique armor kits for bow and sides of the cargo carriers were introduced for use by craft in the initial assault waves; these armor kits would be removed after the beachhead had been secured in order to increase their cargo capacity in the logistical role. This is not to say that these kits were necessarily employed with complete ubiquity, but they were employed. Even at Tarawa, certain LVT(1) units fitted ad hoc steel protection to their vehicles.

FWIW.

B

jdginaz – I suggest that the later action reports provided in Bailey's document are worth reading as well.

With respect to LCVPs -
>Those employed by the US Army at Normandy were unarmored and built with plywood sides. 81 of these craft were lost on the day of the landing, of which 55 were lost at Omaha Beach.
They could indeed make 9-10 knots in smooth water, but they were unable to ride over any shallow sand bars that lay off the beach; it was not unknown for an LCVP to strand on a sandbar, drop its ramp and disembark its heavily laden passengers into overhead depths of water; many drowned as a consequence. Even if an LCVP dropped its ramp close to the beach, the troops were still forced to wade through as much as 100 yards of surf, followed by 200-300 yards of fire-swept beach in order to reach cover.

By comparison, an LVT (much smaller target) could make 7+ mph in smooth water, traverse any sub-surface sandbar encountered, then cross the 300-400 yard zone of shallow surf and open beach at 10mph. Meanwhile its close-support companions could accompany the LVTs and immediately assist the LVTs in getting ashore without having to first get jockeyed out of a big LCT one at a time in serial fashion.

Just sayin' …..

B

Interesting article on the experience of the first wave going ashore at Omaha Beach.

link

B

Another decent source – "Across the Reed – The Amphibious Tracked Vehicle at War", Victor J Croizat, Blandford Press, 1989.

B

There's a very long report from the LVT Group used at Saipan.

This included four Marine Bns (three with tractors and one with armored amphibians) and four Army Bns (three tractor and one amtank). The six tractor Bns were using a mix of LVT-2 and LVT-4 and LVT-2(A). Of something like 590 tractors approx. 160 were armoured models. Each Bn has a description of its armour related improvisations, most referring to BuShips (Bureau of Ships?) Plan of improvised armor for LVTs. This was presumably the 'applique' kits described above.

Re the LVTs cargo, the report notes the BuShips Plan 'proved very satisfactory, and was highly effective against small arms fire at mid ranges. The added weight…did not materially effect operation or endanger the freeboard of the vehicle. The added weight…added more strain to the already overloaded clutch and transmission, but maximum armor protection is desirable…'

After Kwajalein, 10th Mar Trac Bn conducted firing tests on a scrap vehicle.

"The present type of attached plate undoubtedly saved some men. Tests were conducted on a scrap vehicle with .30 and .50 calibre machine guns using armor piercing and explosive bullets. The bow plate prevented any penetration at 150 to 200 yards of either calibre projectile. The cab armor did not stop .50-cal armor piercing fired at 45 degree angle from 200 yards while the side armor did not prevent penetration of all types of projectiles at same range and angle of impact. Enemy small arms fire did not penetrate any of the plate. It is however recommended that better weight distribution be made; the present armor makes the vehicle bow heavy. At present the sides of the cab, pontoons and engine are extremely vulnerable to all types of fire."

Any account from an LVT equipped unit seems to spend more time bemoaning the lack of spare parts and maintenance facilities. These machines look to have been an absolute nightmare to keep running. The grousers were vulnerable to damage out of the water, I think 79th Armd Div made similar comments on their experience in NW Europe.

I definitely got my LCT/LST/LSDs mixed up. At least one type of LST looks to have been able to carry 17 LVTs, far more than I'd stated.

Gary

Blutarski – I'll try toget back to you on this latest tomorrow but more likely Friday. I'll be kind of busy tomorrow and will need a little time to read and digest everything.

I'm finding all this very interesting and learning/re-learning all this is great. I haven't read much PTO stuff since High School, that was my PTO phase. I bought and read all the Bantam books on the Island hopping campaign plus a bunch of other books from the small local library. When that ran out. I went to the desert war and then on to the ETO and other than "Bataan: Our Last Stand and "Shattered Sword" I haven't been back.

The inadequate power train was related to LVT(1) alone (146hp Hercules 6-cylinder in-line); problem was resolved in LVT(2) series and following by adoption of the M5 light tank powertrain (250hp Continental 7-cylinder radial). these were much more reliable.

Ok but the LVT1 was the version that would have been available for D-Day. Need to remember we have to consider what was available to the D-Day planners and during the time of the planning LVTs were going to the PTO to create the new LVT assault battalions.

LVTs were never intended for extended land operation. they were amphibious assault vehicles designed to traverse a body of water and deliver passengers, supplies a close support in a dry state. Nevertheless, it was not uncommon for them to operate well beyond the beach.

That is true but other posters here are suggesting using them to carry troops inland beyond their abilities. There were standing orders not to take them off the beaches but yes it was done and is it didn't always go well.

Remember this from the SOP For Amphibious Operations published 20 March 1945.

"2. Its power train is inadequate for land operation; which if not kept to a minimum, will result in wholesale breakdowns an immobilization o the unit."

So it seem that maybe not all the powertrains weaknesses were fixed.

LVT(1)s were unarmored vehicles built of mild steel. Their design had been frozen at the outbreak of the war in order to facilitate mass production. The much improved FMC LVT(2) had already been developed by late 1941, but did not supplant the LVT(1) in mass production until early 1943. A total of 1,225 LVT(1)s were built

So were the LVT2s the only armored LVTs were the LVT(A)s and LVT(A)-2s that were built t the Army's request. But again not available in any numbers for D-Day and the LTV(A)-2s were built for the Army to equip Assault Battalions in the PTO. Again not available for use in Normandy.

The LVT(A)1 37mm close-support vehicle, based on the LVT(2) design but constructed of armor steel, commenced production in summer 1943 with a total of 509 built. The 37mm gun was replaced by the 75mm howitzer and turret of the M8 light close-support light tank. Production of this new model, known as the LVT(A)4, commenced in early 1944 with a total of 1,890 produced.

The armor on the amtanks was the same as on the LVT(A)2, 0.25" hull and 0.5" on the cab. The key here is began in early 1944 and those went to the PTO for use in Operation Forager. So not available for D-Day. The LVT(A)-1 with the 37mm was found to be inadequate for use against Japanese emplacements during the Marshalls landings. In the PTO the M3 GMC was used for direct fire on Japanese bunkers instead.

The Borg-Warner LVT(3) with stern ramp started production in 1944, with a total of 2,962 built; its combat introduction took place in assault on Okinawa.
The FMC LVT(4) with rear ramp and forward-mounted engine commenced production in December 1943 with 8,348 units ultimately produced

Too late for D-Day.

After Tarawa (beginning of 1944) removable applique armor kits for bow and sides of the cargo carriers were introduced for use by craft in the initial assault waves;….

Yes and they were 0.5" for the cab and 0.25" for the body. That is the only armor on the LVTs except for the Army's LVT(a)-2. Not of much use against the German guns at Normandy. That is about the equivalent to the armor on Half-Tracks.

By comparison, an LVT (much smaller target) could make 7+ mph in smooth water, traverse any sub-surface sandbar encountered, then cross the 300-400 yard zone of shallow surf and open beach at 10mph. Meanwhile its close-support companions could accompany the LVTs and immediately assist the LVTs in getting ashore without having to first get jockeyed out of a big LCT one at a time in serial fashion.

The congestion form having twice (18 troops in the LVT vs. 36 in the LCVP) as many targets in the water would tend to counter the smaller aspect somewhat. But there wasn't any smooth water at Omaha. So more than twice the time in the approach.

The Howitzer on the -4 would have of little value on the beach, beside that fact that the -4s wouldn't have lasted any longer that the carriers. The Germans had a lot on guns covering the beach capable for killing the LVTs of any type without problem. Meanwhile the Germans in the infantry positions on the bluff would be able to fire down into the troop compartment just like they did to the LCVPs.

Nearly every German weapon would be a serious threat to any LVT that arrived on the beach, they wouldn't have lasted long. Having the troops inside the carriers with the side mounted fuel tanks would make them death traps when hit.

Nearly every German weapon would be a serious threat to any LVT that arrived on the beach, they wouldn't have lasted long. Having the troops inside the carriers with the side mounted fuel tanks would make them death traps when hit.

I'm getting the idea you think that I think the LVTS were of no use. That's not true I think they were quite good for the PTO. I just don't believe they would have been the answer for what happened at Omaha Beach.

jdginaz wrote – "the LVT1 was the version that would have been available for D-Day."

Not sure how you come to that conclusion. The Saipan landing in mid-June 1944 involved six battalions totalling 600x LVT(2) and LVT(4) + two battalions of LVT(A)4 (136 vehicles). These new model LVTs were clearly therefore available by June 1944. Their absence from the Normandy landing planning must therefore be viewed as a resource allocation decision at senior command level and not as any lack of availability.

Bailey's account of LVT performance at Saipan is worth reviewing. On the environmental front, the LVTs landed in 12-15ft surf, losing only one or two vehicles per battalion in doing so. On the combat front, a well planned and executed fire support program got the LVTs ashore with minimal losses from enemy fire.

From Bailey -
"Mortar and antiboat fire increased as the LVTs moved from the reef towards the shore, although the first two waves suffered only light losses from this fire.
The third and fourth waves came under more accurate fire and losses increased to about one to two LVTs per battalion. Despite the efforts of the Japanese, the first waves hit the beach between 8:38 A.M., and the following three waves of LVTs came in five to nine munute intervals. The relatively light losses were due in part to the spot armoring of the cargo LVTs with 1/4 and 3/8-inch armor on the hull, and 1/2-inch armor on the cab and bow. Although some did penetrate, many rounds as well as much schrapnel were turned."

Blutarski note – "antiboat fire" included fire from numerous 20cm/8in caliber howitzers sited for direct fire upon the beaches.

I confess to having some difficulty understanding why you view the amphibious assault landing conditions in the PTO as being "easier" than those encountered at Normandy. The density of defenses at Tarawa on the one mile of landing frontage was awesome (The Japanese defenses on Betio were surveyed in great detail after the battle; the results are available via the CARL Digital Library). As for Saipan, I recommend the book "Hold the Marianas – The Japanese Defense of the Islands" by C Colt Denfeld, which gives a good accounting of the numbers and natures of troops and weapons defending Saipan; it also provides very good descriptions of the construction of the physical defensive positions. The Japanese knew their business.

FWIW.

B

Not sure how you come to that conclusion. The Saipan landing in mid-June 1944 involved six battalions totalling 600x LVT(2) and LVT(4) + two battalions of LVT(A)4 (136 vehicles). These new model LVTs were clearly therefore available by June 1944. Their absence from the Normandy landing planning must therefore be viewed as a resource allocation decision at senior command level and not as any lack of availability.

I think that is exactly what he means. Only unarmoured LVT-1's and 2's were actually available in the ETO in June ‘44 in small numbers and would have been the only ones that could have been added to the assault. The newer versions were being shipped to the PTO as a priority as they had to deal with reefs and sandbars etc. Hard to argue that was the wrong decision given how tough the Japanese defences were as you point out. Also even if sufficient had been produced of the newer models given that they didn't start production until December ‘43/January ‘44 that is a very short lead time to get sufficient shipped over to the U.K. and the troops trained in their use. By the end of ‘44 newer LVT's were arriving in the ETO and used successfully, for example, by 4th Commando Brigade at Walcheren. Both the LVT-3 and LVT-4 were unarmoured as built, but add on armour kits were produced. The LVT-4 didn't make it into combat until June ‘44 and the LVT-3 until April ‘45.

Hi Fred -
To my mind, the unanswered question is this -

If Germany was the priority and Overlord was the essential first step in the Western Allies' campaign to recov Europe, why was the ETO not given preference in allocation of LVT assets?

The only answer I can come to is that the tactical value of the amphibious LVT was not fully appreciated by Overlord planners. This is not, in retrospect, completely surprising when it is considered that the first real employment of LVTs in a major operation did not occur until November 1943 … only seven months before D Day … and it was a USMC operation that did not involve the Army. On the other hand, the directive authorizing seizure of the Marianas was issued in March 1944, only 90 days prior to the actual landing upon Saipan taking place.

Lots of moving parts in this issue; it is complicated.

B

+1 to Blutarski

If US war strategy decision making was at all rational (and most evidence is that it was more rational than most participants in the war), the decision matrix would look something like this:

Strategic:
Defeat of Germany is more urgent than defeat of Japan.
Therefore ETO is higher priority than PTO

Operational:
Establishing bridgehead in France is critical must-not-fail operation. There is no alternative if success is to be achieved in ETO.
Taking Saipan is one among several operations in PTO. Two directions of attack, many islands can be taken in island-hopping campaign. No one island is critical.

Tactical:
There is no practical way to fully isolate Neptune landings from German reinforcements. Therefore it is essential that a robust beach head is established on D-Day. The first wave must clear the beach defenses so that following waves can push inland.
The island of Saipan can be fully isolated. No reinforcements will be possible for the Japanese. Speed of action is important only as it affects total cost (casualties and resources) of the invasion.

Add to that the historical inter-service seniority. The Army gets first pick, and Marines get the leftovers. Ask any Marine Corps historian… There is no other way to explain taking the Johnson rifle, the Reising sub-machine gun, or the M4A2 Sherman into combat in the Pacific.

In my reading it is clear -- if ETO wanted LVTs, ETO would have gotten LVTs. Yes there is a lead-time component. The priority would have had to be set months in advance. But if it had been set, it would have been met.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Fred has it right, the production of LVTs was going to the PTO.

Bailey's account of LVT performance at Saipan is worth reviewing. On the environmental front, the LVTs landed in 12-15ft surf, losing only one or two vehicles per battalion in doing so. On the combat front, a well planned and executed fire support program got the LVTs ashore with minimal losses from enemy fire.

Handling surf head on is different that waves running perpendicular to their direction of travel.

Remember we are discussing possible reasons why they weren't used for D-Day not how well the LVTs worked for landings that the D-Day planners couldn't know about. Since the Saipan landings didn't happen until June ‘44 the only information the D-Day planners would have had available was what had happened at Tarawa. The effectiveness of the fire support at Saipan was more effective due a study of the failures at Tarawa and as we know the bombardment on Omaha wasn't effective so the LVTs wouldn't have had that help to protect them.

I confess to having some difficulty understanding why you view the amphibious assault landing conditions in the PTO as being "easier" than those encountered at Normandy.

I've never said they were easier. I just pointed out they were different.

I have read however on a couple of different forums that there is supposed to have been a study comparing the defenses of the two landing that concludes that the defenses at Tarawa were less dense that those at Omaha. Unfortunately they didn't include any details on the study so I haven't been able to find it so I know for certain if it really exists or not.

Here is the info on the defenses from "The Battle for Tarawa" by Capt James R. Stockman, USMC. Published by the Historical Section of the Marine Corps.

Beach defense and antiboat
10 – 75mm type 41 copy of a Krupp gun first entered Japanese service in 1908
6 – 70mm Type 92 Battalion gun
9 – 37mm Field Gun
14 – 37mm guns on Light Tanks
31 – 13mm and 7.7mm MGs

Sadly I don't have a list of what the Germans had on Omaha Beach with which to compare.

If Germany was the priority and Overlord was the essential first step in the Western Allies' campaign to recov Europe, why was the ETO not given preference in allocation of LVT assets?

In my opinion this is why.

There is little reason to send them to the ETO. As far as they knew there would only be one maybe two invasions where they could be of use. D-Day and maybe the south of France (at this time it's not certain if it would happen and in early "44 they didn't know they would be needed for Walcheren or for Rhine crossings).

They did however know that there would be many more invasions in the PTO and that they would be very useful and needed there and there was a demand in that theater for them in order to create Assault Battalions. So why give Europe priority for them where there was little perceived need instead of the PTO where there was a demonstrated need for them.

An important part of war is to use your usually limited assets as effectively as posable. It seems obvious to me that giving LVT priority to the PTO was the smart thing to do.

Defeat of Germany is more urgent than defeat of Japan.
Therefore ETO is higher priority than PTO

While that was the initial plan, once the pushback in the PTO began the PTO pretty much got whatever they needed.

Those swimming attachments look like they bend and/or break and wouldn't last long traveling on hard ground.

They won't.

I was an AAV crewman myself; I worked on AAVP-7A1s. When I was a Sgt. I taught at the MOS School. In the early 90's the Battalion had a restored LVT-3 that they kept as a side-project. They'd drive it for dog-and-pony shows, reenlistments, change of command ceremonies, that sort of thing. They took that 'track over concrete and hard ground, and never had any problems.

In my reading it is clear -- if ETO wanted LVTs, ETO would have gotten LVTs. Yes there is a lead-time component. The priority would have had to be set months in advance. But if it had been set, it would have been met.

So you are saying the US screwed up on that one?

So you are saying the US screwed up on that one?

The question in the OP was:

I am wondering -within the limit of hindsight- whether the Allies could have achieved the landings with less casualties. … If lessons are to be learned, what could the americans have done better?

I think what the Americans could have done better was to bring a battalion or two of Amtraks and Amtanks, to go along with the DD Shermans.

In WW2, the presence of armor reduced the casualties of infantry. Don't know if it's still as true today as it was then. I suspect it is, but haven't seen any numbers. But the numbers I have seen, from research and analysis done by the Dupuy folks, is that during WW2, when armor made it to the battlefield, the probability of success went up, and the number of casualties went down. Pretty simple, really.

One of the issues at Omaha, not the only issue, but one of the issues, was that the armor didn't make it to the battlefield. More kinds of armor trying to get to the beach by more methods of approach would have increased the chances of having a useful amount of armor on the beach at Omaha.

Hard to be so specific as saying they screwed up. Usually "screwed up" is applied when you can identify someone who gives an answer to a question that is obviously or egregiously wrong. In this case I think it is simply more likely no one asked the question in the first place. Errors of omission are the hardest to avoid, the hardest to apportion blame for, and the hardest to resolve. Hard to say who got the wrong answer if no one asked the question.

But within all of those qualifiers, yes, I think the US Army could have done better at Omaha. Not only do I think it is visible in hindsight, but I also think it should have been possible to address in advance.

Fortunately Omaha beach was not a defeat. But the US Army could have done better … could have achieved victory at a lower cost in lives.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Some quick notes -
1 – At Tarawa, the first three assault waves carried ashore in LVTs suffered only light casualties according to at least one report I came across.
2 – It appears that both LVT(1)s and LVT(2)s participated in the Tarawa landing.
3 – The heavy weapon density per beach frontage at Tarawa appears to have been MUCH greater than that of the German defense at Omaha Beach.
4 – Whereas the LVTs at Saipan lost < 2pct to swamping in 15ft+ surf, the LCVPs at Omaha suffered a loss by swamping of about 5pct (10 out of about 185) in ~4ft seas (w/ max wave height of 6ft).
5 – considering the great survival rate of the tanks that were delivered right to shore versus the disaster that befell those DD tanks launched out at sea and expected to traverse 6,000 yds to shore, the notion of the DD tank as a practical amphibious vehicle has to be called into question.
6 – I wonder what the results might have been if the 13,000 bombs that were dropped behind the German beach defenses had instead been dropped upon the beach obstacles below the low tide line. With the magnifying effect of a pressure wave passing through the water, they might have succeeded in destroying a good portion of the beach obstacles that proved such a problem. On the other hand, some would undoubtedly have fallen upon the beach proper and produced impressive craters in the sand.

B

But within all of those qualifiers, yes, I think the US Army could have done better at Omaha. Not only do I think it is visible in hindsight, but I also think it should have been possible to address in advance.

Wow! I have put this day in my diary. Mark admits US could have done something better. It will be known henceforth as Mark Day. I shall campaign for it to be made a public holiday in your honour Mark! :-)

These figures for weapons and defences on both Utah and Omaha are from Annex B1 of the Report of United States Fleet Task Force One Two Two 25th July 1944 (Naval Cmdr Western TF). The report state a combination of photo interpretation and post landing reconnaissance was used.

Omaha – length 7500 yards

8 Casemates occupied by 75mm or better.
35 Pillboxes occupied by guns smaller than 75.
4 Open field positions 75mm or better.
10 Anti-tank – 37mm to 75mm.
65 Positions less than 37mm (MG).
6 Mortars (Infantry)
38 Rocket pits bearing on the beach, 4x 32cm rockets per pit.

Utah – length 9600 yards

9 Casemates occupied by 75mm or better.
25 Pillboxes occupied by guns smaller than 75.
2 Open field positions 75mm or better.
14 Anti-tank – 37mm to 75mm.
65 Positions less than 37mm (MG).
0 Mortars (Infantry)
0 Rocket pits bearing on the beach.

"German 88mm…consistently found in concrete casemates three to four feet thick, and sited to fire laterally across the beach…Some casemates had two firing slits, and the gun could be fired up or down the beach."

"75mm…mostly obsolete captured weapons…Some were in casemates similar to 88s but most of them were in simple open emplacements."

"German 50mm…on both field and pivot mounts, and in both pillboxes and open positions. In one case on Omaha a 50mm field gun was hidden underground…and run out only to fire."

"47 and 37mm tank turrets…Most of these were old French tank turrets with short barrelled weapons. They were mounted over concrete "Tobruk Pits" sunk flush with the ground. On Omaha they were used rather sparingly…"

"Infantry mortars, 50mm, 80mm and 81mm…The usual emplacement for a mortar was a concrete pedestal in an open Tobruk Pit, though some were fired from shallow bowl shaped concrete emplacements and from other open emplacements… Panoramas of the field of fire were painted around the inside of the coping of such pits so that fire could be laid on a designated spot on the beach without observation." Note the report says a number of mortar pits were misinterpreted as MG nests because they resembled direct fire positions.

"Machine guns…found in concrete and timber pillboxes and in open positions. They were sited for direct fire on the beach, for perimeter defense of strongpoints, and for AA protection."

"Rockets were located several hundred yards behind both beaches in hedgerows…in groups of 38 firing pits with 4 rockets to a pit."

Beaches and Terrain

"Omaha beach… is 7500yards in length and is composed of firm sand and shingle. The gradient is in general flat up to mean level (13ft) then increasingly steep. Sand bars…exist within the tidal area. Except for its western end, the beach is backed by a low wave cut embankment, faced by a masonry wall for part of its length. Behind this embankment a level sandy grass covered shelf extends about 100 yards to an 80 foot grassy bluff broken by four natural valley exits through which run roads."

Web resources give a couple of maps showing placement of defences; note I don't know how accurate they can be considered.

link

link

The latter offers quite a bit of detail and also asks for a donation!

Gary

Re the LVTs at Tarawa, this from Cmdr Transports Division 4 to C-in-C US Pac Fleet, 4 Dec 1943.

"The first wave of fifty (50) LVT(1)s was formed and dispatched from transport area to rendezvous area at 0540…the second and third waves, composed of fifty (50) LVT(2)s, which were transported from Samoa in LSTs, were formed and dispatched following the first wave."

"The first three waves left the rendezvous area at 0636 as scheduled, but arrived at the line of departure as 0825, thirty-nine (39) minutes late. Overloading, wind, sea and an ebb tide, together with the poor mechanical condition of a number of the leading amptracs combined to slow the first wave to a speed of two and one-half knots. This was one-half knots below the allowed speed which was based on information received from Marine HQ to the effect the amptracs could make a speed of four and one-half knots in fully loaded condition."

"The first wave landed at 0913. The second wave almost simultaneously with the first wave, the LVT(2)s being about one-half knots faster than the LVT(1)s. The third wave land three minutes after the second wave. All waves were under heavy fire. Ninety-five per cent (95%) of the amphibious tractors reached the reef, and it is estimated that at least eighty-five percent (85%) reached the beach.

The fourth and succeeding waves, which were in LCVPs and LCM(3)s could not pass over the reef, and thereafter. troops and equipment were put ashore either at the pier or in amphibious tractors and on rafts…"

From the 'lessons learned'

c). That the speed of the LVT(1) and the LVT(2)s is too slow.

D. That the LVT should not be overloaded.

E). That the LVTs require more and heavier armor and that protection must be given the gunners.

G). That a new LVT must be designed…with a ramp in the stern

H). That amphibious tanks are necessary to insure the absolute success of amphibious operations employing LVTs…

Gary

"D-Day through german eyes."

For what it's worth.
I am certain this is a work of fiction.

If you are going to analyse writing style the one to look at is the style of the interviewees.
And by one I mean one.
It's all the same.
That just doesn't happen when you interview people.

The first books sells so he suddenly finds another book's worth.

More Sven Hassel than Guy Sajer IMO.

Good intel there Star Fury …

I think what the Americans could have done better was to bring a battalion or two of Amtraks and Amtanks, to go along with the DD Shermans.

First, the only amtanks being built at that time was the LVT(A)-1 with the Stuart turret and the 37mm gun would have been of little use at Omaha and since there wasn't any stabilization on the gun they would have had a rather difficult time "shooting in" the LVTs in the rough seas. While the turret on the LVT(A)-1s had 51mm of armor the rest of the LVTs armor was the same as the LVT(A)s 0.25 hull and 0.5 cab so would have been easy kills for the German guns.

Next there wasn't a battalion or two available to use as they were going to the PTO to get the Assault Battalions ready for the Marshall landings. You may say that if the D-Day planners wanted then they would get them, but I don't believe that would have happened. The ETO officially got priority but I seriously doubt the Pentagon would have permitted the delay of operations leading to the capture of Saipan. Not to mention the possible delay needed for training the troops & crews for D-Day

One of the issues at Omaha, not the only issue, but one of the issues, was that the armor didn't make it to the battlefield. More kinds of armor trying to get to the beach by more methods of approach would have increased the chances of having a useful amount of armor on the beach at Omaha. Of course there is the question of, did they have enough extra shipping to any additional vehicles across the channel.

Why add an additional type of vehicle with all the special equipment & personal that would be needed for their support to the mix? Adding more M4s would be better especially when you take into account the better gun and armor. At least the M4s would have more likely lasted long enough to do some good.

1 – At Tarawa, the first three assault waves carried ashore in LVTs suffered only light casualties according to at least one report I came across.

8 were knocked out on the way in ( they were still getting covering fire from the ships until they got close to the beach) and 15 more sank on the way to the reef and back due to bullet holes received from MG fire.

2 – It appears that both LVT(1)s and LVT(2)s participated in the Tarawa landing.

As I noted above 24 in the second wave and 21 in the 3rd

3 – The heavy weapon density per beach frontage at Tarawa appears to have been MUCH greater than that of the German defense at Omaha Beach.

Well now here is where it gets interesting. You suggest the beach defenses on Betio only needed to cover 1800 yds, Red 1/2/3 beaches. That would only be true if the Japanese somehow know that the Marines were going to land only at those beaches. As a matter of fact the Japanese believed that their anti-ship defenses facing the Lagoon i.e. Red 1/2/3 beaches, would be enough to prevent landing there. They thought the Marines would land on the western and southern. So in reality the Japanese had to spread their defenses over more than 3200 yds and that is if they knew that the were only considering the areas known as Red 1/2/3, Green and Black 1/2. The actual shore line of Betio is over 5000 to 7,500yds. The first number is the total width of the planned landing beaches and the second is the total shore where the island is wider than 200 yds.

So at Tarawa, guarding 5000yds to 7500yds there are
10 – 75m guns
19 – 37mm guns
31- MGs
2636 elite soldiers
1000 Japanese construction workers
1200 Korean construction workers
All dugin in trenches & emplacements some with concrete re-enforcement

At Omaha guarding 7500yds
8 – Casements with 75mmm or larger guns
35 – Pillboxes with guns smaller than 75mm
4 – 75 mm gun in open emplacements
10 – Anti- Tank guns 37mm to 75mm
35 to 65 amg emplacements
6 – Lt Mortars emplacements
38 – 45 rocket pits
7800 infantry of varying quality some very poor some very good.

Thank you Starfury Rider for that information very helpful . I found a couple of sites with the slightly larger numbers of MGs & Rockets

Okay so there is a comparison of Betio with Omaha. To me it doesn't look like the defenses on Betio were denser than those at Omaha. Certainly not "MUCH greater" than those at Omaha.

5 – considering the great survival rate of the tanks that were delivered right to shore versus the disaster that befell those DD tanks launched out at sea and expected to traverse 6,000yds to shore, the notion of the DD tank as a practical amphibious vehicle has to be called into question.

No argument form me.

6 – I wonder what the results might have been if the 13,000 bombs that were dropped behind the German beach defenses had instead been dropped upon the beach obstacles below the low tide line. With the magnifying effect of a pressure wave passing through the water, they might have succeeded in destroying a good portion of the beach obstacles that proved such a problem.

I think we all wonder that.

On the other hand, some would undoubtedly have fallen upon the beach proper and produced impressive craters in the sand.</q.>

That was actually part of the plan for, for the beach to be cratered to provide cover for the landing troops.

5 – considering the great survival rate of the tanks that were delivered right to shore versus the disaster that befell those DD tanks launched out at sea and expected to traverse 6,000 yds to shore, the notion of the DD tank as a practical amphibious vehicle has to be called into question.

I think that is stretching it a bit considering the much greater survival of DD tanks on the other landing zones and in subsequent operations. It is a technology that survived for another 50 years, although on light vehicles principally, but then I think the Sherman was probably at the top weight for a DD tank, and post war tanks got heavier. The only other way to get heavier tanks onto a beach without dropping them off a landing craft is with a snorkel and those are not without problems. Even those DD tanks that were delivered to the beach still kept their screens raised which assisted them in getting through the surf.

First, the only amtanks being built at that time was the LVT(A)-1 with the Stuart turret and the 37mm gun would have been of little use at Omaha and since there wasn't any stabilization on the gun they would have had a rather difficult time "shooting in" the LVTs in the rough seas.

By '44 the 37mm was a "tinker-toy". May have been of some use against IJF's AFVs, etc.

Even though the M5 LBT and M8 A/C were armed with those in the ETO. This was a situation of better than nothing, IMO. But could take on many of the German A/Cs, soft skins, etc., at that time …

From 79th Armd Div report, using bulletins from June to August 1944.

"DD tanks were launched on most beaches. They were generally successful; out of 130 launched over 80 touched down and fought on the beaches. This was achieved in spite of a seaway so heavy that a number of purely naval craft foundered; the short, steep sea, reported Force 4 to 6, and a strong cross current with the wind behind it gave a beam sea of the most difficult kind; conditions were far from ideal for amphibious craft.

…

"US Front – Of the three DD Battalions used, one launched its tanks and arrived on the beach successfully, one brought its tanks onto the beach in LCTs and the third launched its tanks losing all but two on the run in…

The US escape apparatus worked well, 73 out of 120 men are known to have been saved, but they did not have time to inflate their rubber boats."

Gary

The US escape apparatus worked well, 73 out of 120 men are known to have been saved, but they did not have time to inflate their rubber boats."

I was reading an account the other day that stated that all, but 5 crewman were rescued from the US DD's that sank at Omaha.
Not all were victims of the waves. One was swamped by a passing LCT and was sunk in a collision with an unspecified landing craft.

As an alternative to the use of DDs, 6th Mar Tank Bn used the T-6 floatation device for Okinawa. This was limited to their C Coy, and in part due to their transport ships being quite varied and not being able to get over the reef and beach for a dry landing.

C Coy was loaded in two LSTs and landed in two groups, each of two Pls (3 tks each) plus a HQ tank, and a dozer tank in one group. Looks like they lost the dozer tank (electrical failure) and one gun tank (snagged on coral, detached floats, then swerved into a pothole) on their run in. The Bn report notes they travelled approx. 7000 yards, and their recommendation was to reduce this as much as possible if T-6 tanks were to be used in an assault role.

I only had a quick look but 1st Mar Tank Bn looks to have had six T-6 equipped tanks, this from Hyperwar;

"The assault waves of tanks of the 1st Division, which landed from LCM's and LCT's, were all on the beach by noon with the exception of one that drowned out in a reef pothole. The commander of the LST transporting the six T-6 flotation equipped tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion, disregarding the operation plan, refused to let them be launched until H-plus 60 minutes and then set them in the water ten miles off the landing beaches. It was not until 1445, after more than five hours in the water, that these tanks got ashore and then two were lost crossing the reef because of the falling tide. The LSM's carrying the reserve tanks of the battalion had extreme difficulty grounding on the reef on L-Day, losing the first tank off the ramp in an unseen pothole. Of the four LSM's employed, two finally landed their cargo late on L-Day, another at noon on L-plus 1, and the last on 3 April."

link

Gary

Quick notes from 10th Amph Trac Bn, USMC, from the Kwajalein landings of early 1944;

140 LVT-2s deployed (included 30 attached from 11th Amph Trac Bn, USMC specifically for the operation).

Sunk – 23
Swamped or overturned on reefs – 6
Missing (probably sunk) – 7
Turned over to 4th Amph Trac Bn – 22
Left at Kwajalein for garrison – 20
Re-embarked – 62

On the "Q&A" the Bn reported the operational speed of tractors was "approximately 5 knots".

1st Armd Amph Trac Bn noted on the subject of grousers;

"The rough surface of the reef surrounding OKINAWA were the worst ever experienced by this battalion. As a result, 3500 grousers were repaired and replaced, 450 outside track links and 56 wheel bogies were replaced."

There are a few references I've seen that make me wonder if the grouser on later production models of LVT was redesigned to improve its operation.

Gary

US Assault Training Center document of Nov1943; (abbreviated). The subheadings and bullet points are hard to replicate in this format.

1. Organization of an Assault Division.

a. ASSAULT SECTION
1. One boat load (LCVP)
2. Keystone of entire assault division
3. Make-up of an assault section; mission: Reduce enemy pillbox
a. Section leader (Lt)
b. Riflemen (5)
c. Wire cutters (4)
d. LMG team (4)
e. 60-mm mortar team (4)
f. Rocket team, (2) rocket launchers, (4)
g. Flame thrower team (2)
h. Demolitions team (5)
j. Extra officer and weapons from heavy weapons company

(total 30 men assumed per LCVP, slightly less than 32 man capacity)

b. ASSAULT COMPANY
1. Assault sections (4)
2. Support sections (2)
a. Same as assault section except HMG with crew of 6 and 81-mm mortar with crew of 6 men.
3. Control is by SCR-536 (1 per section and 1 in company headquarters).

4. Tanks accompanying assault company, scale 8 tanks, with 75-mm guns, per assault company.
a. Tank Liaison officer with each assault company headquarters.
1. Has radio contact with all 8 tanks supporting the company and with Tank Company commanders (supporting the Assault Bn of Infantry).

5. Field Artillery have forward observers with company commanders.
a. Control fire with SCR609 radios
1. "A" Channel to Bn; "B" channel to a battery
2. Wire line from Beach(leave guide at beach).

6. Allocate 2 chemical warfare mortars per company.

c. ASSAULT BATTALION.
1. Assault Companies (2)
2. Support Company (1)
3. FA Liaison Party with Bn HQ
4. Shore Fire Control Party (to fire guns of 1 battle, or cruiser or destroyer).

5. ENGINEER PLATOONS (2)
a. Clearing minefields, enlarging wire gaps, minor demolitions.

6. CHEMICAL WARFARE PLATOONS (2); 8 mortars, 8 landing craft
a. 4 in direct support (2 allocated per Co front)
b. 4 in general support

7. ANTITANK PLATOON
a. 57-mm or 37-mm self-propelled guns (???)

8. MEDICAL DETACHMENT
9. TANK COMPANY

d. ASSAULT REGIMENT
1. Assault Battalions (2)
2 Reserve Battalions (1)
a. Same as assault Battalions except all heavy (81-mm) mortars and Heavy machine guns (NO LMGs or 60-mm mortars)
3. Cannon Company
4. Anti-tank Company
5. Headquarters Company
a. Communications Platoon
b. Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon

6. ATTACHED UNITS
a. Battalion FA (organic of Division); 105mm guns, towed (12).
b. Battalion FA Self-propelled (18) 105-mm guns.
c. Collecting Company
d. Engineer Company
e. Chemical Warfare Service company (note 4.2-inch mortars)

Gary

Very interesting … obviously they were thinking about making an assault landing more effective, etc.

Well I guess this discussion is done. For me at least it's been interesting and I learned several new things. I would have liked to have seen Blutarski's rely to the last few posts. Thanks to all of posted.

Definitely very interesting … and yes, I did a learn somethings too !

Hi jdginaz -
Been busy re long Independence Day holiday weekend. Will respond in the next day or so.

One item – The LVT(A)1 37mm amphibious support amtrac did in fact have gyro-stabilization, as the turret used was lifted entirely from the M5 light tank production, gyro and all. It was the later LVT(A)3 75mm support amtrac that did not have gyro-stabilization, as the turret and gun were once again taken from the M8 gun motor carriage which did not feature gyro-stabilization.

B

Hope your enjoying the long weekend.

Your right I missed that the LVT(A)-1 did in fact have stabilization, but it was only for elevation.

JAPANESE DEFENSES ON BETIO ISLAND

Personnel -
1122 men – 3rd Special Base Force (ex 6th Yokosuka SNLF)
1497 men – 7th Sasebo SNLF (incl 200 officers and NCOs from Tateyama Naval Gunnery School)
1247 men – 111th Pioneers (about 25-30pct Japanese; balance Korean/Formosan laborers)
970 men – 4th Construction Unit (little or no combat value)

Total – 4836 men (different sources cite minor variations in numbers)

- – -

Heavy weapon emplacements identified by actual count in post-battle survey of the island -

CD – Coast Defense
4 x 8in
4 x 140mm
6 x 80mm

Multi-role – AA/CD/BD/AB
4 x 127mm dual-purpose twin-mount
8 x 75mm dual-purpose
27 x 13mm single-mount
4 x 13mm twin-mount

BD/AB – Beach Defense / Anti-boat
10 x 75mm
6 x 70mm
9 x 37mm
14 x 37mm (tank-mounted)
31 x 13mm single and twin mounts

- – -

Infantry defenses –
It was estimated that there were 500+ pill-boxes, bunkers, weapon emplacements, fighting positions and shelters on Betio. Allowing for the above-mentioned heavy weapon emplacements, air raid shelters, storage bunkers and command bunkers, an estimate of 250 infantry fighting positions seems reasonable.

It was impossible for the above-mentioned survey to determine number of rifle caliber automatic weapons and other man portable infantry support weapons due to the degree of overall destruction. Authors have relied upon the US Handbook of Japanese Military Forces (TM-E 30-480, 1 Oct 1944) to address the issue of SNLF TO&E. Over the course of the war, SNLF TO&Es evolved in response to the changing nature of their mission assignments. The following provides a indicates the scale of crew-served rifle caliber and other infantry support weapons available –

TO&E – Maizuru No. 2 Special Landing Force (as of November 1941)
Total personnel – 1,069 officers and men
55 x Light machine guns
12 x Heavy machine guns
33 x Grenade dischargers
10 x Flame throwers

TO&E – Yokosuka 7th Special Landing Force (reorganized with more heavy weapons)
Total personnel – 1,820 officers and men
24 x Light machine guns
12 x Heavy machine guns
41? x Grenade dischargers

- – -

3rd Special Base Force was approximately the size of Maizuru No. 2 Special Landing Force. 7th Sasebo SNLF was closer in numbers to Yokosuka 7th Special Landing Force and the attachment of the 200 naval gunnery specialists suggests that it was likely similarly organized in a heavy weapons configuration.

Taken together, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the approximately 2,600 combat troops in these two units, taken together, represented a number of infantry support weapons committed to the defense of the island as follows –

80 x Light machine guns
24 x Heavy machine guns
75 x Grenade dischargers
10 x Flame throwers

- – -

The overall periphery of the Betio shoreline in toto = approximately 9,200 yards. The averaged density of weapons was therefore more or less as follows –
1 x Coast defense gun every 650 yards
1 x Multi-role (AA/CD/BD/AB) weapon every 180 yards
1 x Beach Defense/Anti-boat weapon every 130 yards
1 x Light machine gun + grenade launcher every 100-120 yards
1 x Heavy machine gun every 400 yards

Or, put another way, every 1,000 yards of shoreline frontage would on average represent –
1.5 x Coast Defense guns
5.5 x Multi-role (AA/CD/BD/AB) weapons
6 x Beach Defense/Anti-boat weapon
9 x light machine guns + 8 grenade launchers
2.5 x heavy machine guns
1 x flame thrower

- – -

German Omaha beach defenses (presumed to be sited in a direct fire mode) per information taken from "Omaha Beachhead (6 June -13 June 1944)" are said to have consisted of –
12 x 75 to 88mm guns mounted in eight concrete bunker and four open emplacements.
35 x pillboxes for "lighter guns"
18 x 37 to 75mm anti-tank guns
- 65 pieces of "light artillery" distributed over 11,000 yards of beachhead frontage.

Japanese heavy weapons at Betio, by Stockman's figures, included (allowing for twin mounts) –
32 x 75 to 127mm guns
39 x 37 to 70mm guns
70 x 13mm guns
- 141 discrete guns distributed over 9,200 yards of overall shoreline frontage.

- – -

Japanese heavy artillery at Betio included the following –
4 x 8in
4 x 140mm
- in concrete protected emplacements.

German heavy artillery at Omaha Beach relied upon two distantly located mobile batteries –
4 x 155mm
4 x 105mm
- as the Pointe du Hoc battery was not operational at the time of the invasion.

- – -

Go here – link – for a good account of the situation confronting the German 352nd Infantry Division, which was responsible for defense of 100km of Normandy coastline including the Omaha beachhead.

FWIW.

B

Good historical info !

My understanding is that it was more about LSTs than LVTs. According to Wilmot (1998) it was Admiral Ernest King's overwhelming focus on the Pacific theatre that the Normandy landings never had access to enough landing craft. King had 31,123 landing craft at his disposal with only 2493 were allocated to Overlord.

The situation with the LSTs in particular was acute, with only 233 available for Overlord. In comparison, during the Saipan operation that was conducted concurrently, the US forces were allocated 87 LSTs to tackle one isolated Japanese division!

The question is this: if the D-Day planners had used multiple LSTs to land large numbers of Shermans in the first wave (without worrying about keeping the ships safe for reinforcing the beachhead as they had to do historically), would the number of casualties on Omaha been significantly reduced?

Hi rabbitohs -

Thjere is a good document available on the DTIC site related to the point you raised -

"The U.S. Navy in Operation Overlord under the Command of
Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk"

Soon after war broke out in Europe, Britain be9an
placing orders for more capable landing craft., such as the
newly developed Landing Craft Tank(LCT) and Landing Ship
Tank(LST). Joint research by Britain and the United States
eventually developed many different landing vessels. They
ranged in size from the platoon-sized Landing Craft
Vehicle/Personnel(LCVP) and Landing Craft Mechanized(LCM),
to the larger Landing Craft Infantry(LCI) and LCT, up to
even larger LSTs and Landing Ship Dock(LSD). Between these
extremes, the Allies built many other landing craft designed
to land troops, vehicles, and supplies or provide close fire
support for the beaches.
Manufacturing these new ships and craft and training
their crews became the key logistic consideration of
Overlord. Churchill's statement, "the destinies of two
great empires . . seemed to be tied up in some ed
things called LSTs," exemplifies the importance of landing
craft. The Combined Chiefs selected the United States to
build all the LCIs, LSTs, and LCVPs, because Britain's
already strained shipbuilding economy could not produce the
large LSTs and LCIs or thousands of the smaller LCVPs. On
the other hand, British yards built most of the Landing
Craft Tank (LCT) used in Normandy,. The United States and
Britain also built many other landing ships and craft used
by their individual forces, but the aforementioned classes
were the most heavily produced.
As D-day approached, Kirk did not know until an
uncomfortably late date exactly how many LSTs he could plan
to use in the assaults because the United States not only
had to provide for landings in the European Theater, but
also to support the expanding operations in the Pacific.
The United States built the LSTs and smaller craft used in
the Mediterranean during the First Landing Craft Program
from April 1942 to May 1943. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs
had instructed the War Production Board(WPB) to initiate
that program to give landing craft production priority over
other military and civil building programs. Once Marshall
and King realized that the British sere unwilling to launch
a Cross-Channel attack in 1943, King persuaded the President
to lower the priority for large landing ships so as to
increase the priority for competing destroyer escorts. Not
until after the Quebec Conference in August 1943 and
notification of the War Production Board in September, did
landing ships again receive the highest priority for tools,
material, and skilled manpower. Nonetheless, COSSAC found
it difficult to ensure the lift necessary for the three
assault divisions in its Outline Plan. The addition of Utah
and Sword beaches by Eisenhower and Montgomery in January
1944 raised additional questions concerning the availability
of amphibious lift. "Will the additional lift asked for
Overlord be provided?" Eisenhower asked the Joint Chiefs on
27 January, "All plans and training considerations hang on
the answer to this one question.
From previous operations the Allies not only realized
they needed specialized landing vessels, but also improved
fire support craft to accompany the landing craft to the
beaches. To this end, the British armed LCTs. British
ingenuity eventually produced the Landing Craft Gun
Large(LCG(L)) armed with two 4.7-inch Naval guns in two
turrets. They also built the LCT(A) which carried a 25-
pounder or 95mm gun. Additionally the British provided
Landing Craft Flack(LCF) to provide close-in antiaircraft
defenses against attacking German Air Force planes. The LCF
carried either eight 2-pounder antiaircraft guns and four
Oerlikon 20mm machine guns or four 2-pounders and eight
Oerlikons. The final close-support craft used by Kirk was
the Landing Craft Tank(Rocket). A "one shot" weapon, these
LCT(R)s carried either 960 or 1042 rocktets and withheld
their fire until as late as possible. The addition of two
divisions also increased the demand for production of these
fire support craft and the British eventually resorted to
building landing craft in town streets.7
To overcome the lack of landing craft, the Allies
resorted to many obvious and some drastic measures. For
instance, they successfully experimented with increased
loading of the craft they already possessed, which decreased
the number of landing craft needed. One method was
instructing the British on the American system of loading
the LST, which allowed them to carry considerably larger
numbers of troops and vehicles. The United States also
conducted successful trials to increase the loading of
amphibious craft aboard LSDs. The Navy also proposed
increasing the readiness of LSTs already in Britain. Ramsay
had only planned for only 90 percent of the LSTs in Britain
to be operational for Overlord. Readiness and operational
attrition were the sources of a major dispute between Ramsay
and Kirk, the Americans advancing a far more optimistic
figure than the Royal Navy was inclined to accept. Kirk
finally convinced Ramsay to plan for 95 percent of the
American LSTs to be ready. "I was very loath to gamble on
this and I only accepted higher figures for U.S. LST of 95
percent after Rear Admiral Kirk had argued them," Ramsay
recorded.:
Admiral Hall also proposed the "drying out" of LSTs to
decrease the time necessary to unload and thus decrease the
turnaround time to Britain. Using that method, Hall stated
he could "unload a thousand LSTs at a time over the open
beaches." He planned to "run them in there on a
half-falling tide, dry them out, run the equipment off, let
the tide come in, float them, and sail back to Britain to
embark another load." He reminded the British "That's what
they were built for." Ramsay feared that beaching the ships
would break their backs and forbade Hall to use this
method.
General Bradley suggested another method to make up for
the lack of LSTs and ensure an all-weather supply of
ammunition when some time before the invasioii he had talked
with Kirk and expressed concern over the Navy's ability to
supply ammunition to his divisions ashore. From LSTs, the
ammunition could roll onto the beaches in the same vehicles
in which it crossed the Channel. Lacking LSTs, however,
sailors would have to use cranes to lift the supplies off
conventional ships into smaller boats which would bring them
ashore. This "was not especially fast and nearly impossible
in the heavy seas," Kirk recalled. To overcome this
problem, Bradley suggested "the use of car ferries taken
from the Eastern Seaboard, towed to England, loaded to the
gunnels with ammunition, and grounded soon after D-day. "
The Navy eventually commandeered four ferries from the New
York, Boston, and Baltimore Harbors and towed them to
Britain.
After all other options had been examined, Eisenhower
had two final possibilities to furnish the lift for the two
added divisions. The first decision was quickly made in
January when he delayed D-day from May until June to allow
the additional month's production of landing craft in the
United States to provide landing craft for Overlord.
Eisenhower's second option required much more thought and
debate. He could also cancel the simultaneous invasion
planned for Soutnern France, code-named Operation Anvil,
which he wrote that he was "convinced" would be "of great
assistance to Overlord."'"
The question of canceling Anvil caused the United
States and Britain to change roles on Mediterranean
strategy. Throughout the war the Joint Chiefs had been
reluctant to increase American participation in the
Mediterranean whereas the British were unwilling to invade
Northern France. When faced with the Anvil question, the
British advocated the abandonment of Anvil for the sake of
Overlord and to continue the Italian offensive north of
Rome. Admiral Cooke related the American position on Anvil
when he wrote Kirk that Anvil mostly affected the buildup.
He wrote, "Herein is where Anvil is very important, not only
to divert German division[s], but to divert German
replacements, transportation, ammunition, etc." Cooke had
also been informed of a British proposal to stage a
demonstrnon off France's Mejtarrnnon rnrct- 4 nacr= of
Anvil but he wrote a "threat Anvil may divert German
divisions but it will not divert German replacement men and
materials.
The Joint Chiefs refused to cancel Anvil, but allowed
Eisenhower to decide it it should be delayed. On March 20
he signalled Marshall, "I firmly believe that Anvil as we
originally visualized it is no longer a possibility," and
ordered that Anvil be postponed to provide the necessary
LSTs for Overlord. Although American planning changed
considerably after Anvil's postponement, Cooke felt that the
British had never expected to carry out Anvil. "The British
had not given a list of ships associated with Anvil," Cooke
told King, "They were just ignoring the landing and had no
intentions of going through with it." Even counting one
month's additional deliveries, and the landing ships
originally assigned to Anvil, Kirk could only plan to have a
few, if any, reserve LSTs to replace losses on D-day."

B

More good intel !

The document also provides some good insights into how the bombardment plan evolved. Basically, it was in the hands of the RN and they were adamant about keeping a strong force at Scapa to counter any possible breakout attempts into the Atlantic by German raiders. Hence frugality was the rule in terms of allocation of ships to the bombardment mission for Normandy.

Worth a read.

B