"Has history misjudged the generals of World War One?" Topic

"Almost a million men from Britain and her Empire were killed during the First World War – a devastating statistic for which Britain's wartime military leaders have borne the brunt of the blame.

The stereotype is that the ordinary soldiers were lions led by donkeys – the donkeys being incompetent, uncaring generals, responsible for thousands of unnecessary deaths.

There were 1,252 of these officers in the very highest ranks of the British Army during World War One, from administrators and medical consultants to men who commanded the army in battle. They faced situations that no British military leader had ever encountered before. And ultimately, they delivered victory for Britain and her allies. So has history misjudged the generals of World War One?…."
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Amicalement
Armand

The "misjudging" arose from the perception that generals in their safe and comfy ivory towers sent their men (who toiled miserably in trenches) into meat-grinders and expended them like so much capital in the cold and clinical calculus of war.

Unless revisionists can alter this popular narrative, their reputations won't change.

The simple answer: NO.
There was a complete lack of imagination on the allied side.
And the British, in particular, with their experience in the Boer War, are inexcusable because they had first hand knowledge of what modern weapons could do.

And in the end, as they taught me in the Army, the leaders are responsible.

Glup…!

Amicalement
Armand

Another case of what seems tech evolving without tactics following closely behind. It has happened often thru out history before.

And I have to agree with Pan Merck as well … As it appears the UK, the French, etc., kept generally doing the same thing almost year after year. With as we know little gains to show for it. Just many large butcher's bills …

The simple answer is,…….. YES!

On the whole military command is conservative. To say there was a complete lack of imagination on the Allied side flies in the face of the available evidence. Read the works of Paddy Griffith for a more measured perspective.

On the flip side, the military tends to be very quick to discard ideas that don't work.

There was a great article in a Wargames Illustrated about the Russo-Japanese War, and why the observers there 'missed' the horrible slaughter that came in WW1. The article basically boils down to, "you could almost always get around the side of the defensive positions in the RJW. But there was a solid line of defenses from the Alps to the Channel in WW1, no way to get around the flanks of it."

There were constant attempts to develop tactics and new weapons to break the stalemate.

They did about as well as they could.

Yes, the Allies had the Tank …

The Germans had Stosstruppen …

The two key innovations of WWI were the tank and the stormtrooper. Both were underutilized and did not have a decisive impact on the war's outcome. WWI's fixed and immobile nature never changed. The technology and doctrine of both sides were conducive to static defensive warfare and stalemate.

I don't know if the generals underestimated or ignored the artillery's effectiveness against massed infantry assaults. If so it was a gross miscalculation.

So while we may conclude that the generals of WWI lacked imagination, it can also be argued that they were limited by the resources and hamstrung by the realities at the time.

The issue of heavy casualties was a reflection of war fought between major nations, none of whom would back down. The same problem was seen in the American Civil War. Had Great Britain and the USA had to perform the role of the Soviet Union in WW2 then we would not be having this discussion. Rather we would be praising the WW1 generals for the lower numbers of casualties by comparison with WW2. It is the nature of this type of warfare.

There were huge numbers of innovations during the war. Even more important (and frequently overlooked), was the massive ramping of the war effort. The shell shortages in late 1914 and throughout 1915 had a very serious effect on tactics. The generals were hamstrung to deliver the full offensive capability that they knew was needed.

Every time there was an innovation, the enemy detected it and reacted accordingly. This process went on constantly, nullifying any potential major advantage. You only have to read the detailed intelligence reviews and then the operations orders to understand how this process worked.

The issue was (and still is) that major wars between committed opponents leads to massive loss of life. If we think it was the generals who were at fault or that it was something to do with static warfare (the highest casualty rates in WW1 were during the mobile warfare phases) or some other seemingly WW1-specific issue then we run the risk of thinking that articulate generals with cool ideas (who stand in front of videos showing smart bombs 'surprising' the enemy by coming down the ventilation shaft) are the way to 'win' wars.

Robert

The same problem was seen in the American Civil War.

True and also as the ACW progressed some tech evolved, e.g. metal shell casings, magazines on some SA, breach loading guns, Gatling Guns, etc.

The tactics evolved to some point. As you see later in the ACW, more entrenchments and fortifications are seen. A response to the "better" weapons tech. A little vision of things to come in the future, e.g. WWI. It became more a paramount paradigm, with the improved weapons, soldiers had to use more cover & concealment to survive.

Then as today as an Infantrymen you want to get something solid between you and the incoming projectiles. And/or make it harder for your enemy to see you/make you a target.

But in both ACW, WWI, etc., massed Infantry formations in many cases advancing in the open occurred far too often. For a number of reasons …

There were huge numbers of innovations during the war.

Beside Tanks and Stosstruppen … the wide use of aircraft, for Recon, CAP and CAS. And of course the mass use of the Machine Guns … Plus the Flame Thrower … And even improved battlefield communications …

Every time there was an innovation, the enemy detected it and reacted accordingly

Measure then Counter Measure followed by Counter-Counter Measure. E.g. ECM then ECCM today …

In the clamour to mock the British (this self-flagellation seems to be a peculiarly British trait) Generals of WW1 it is often forgotten that these 'donkeys' won the war. Not only that, but unlike the French, the British army did not suffer a serious mutiny. When Haig was buried, tens of thousands of veterans lined the route to pay their respects to 'the man who won the war'.

Well worth reading the likes of Gary Sheffield and Gordon Corrigan to get a view of the war which is rather more accurate than that gleaned from watching 'Blackadder Goes Forth'.

The military is often mocked for 'learning to fight the last war' – though surely learning the lessons of the last conflict fought is not really a bad starting point. In terms of the British experience gained from fighting (and winning, by the way) the Boer War, however, it's difficult to see how fighting the Boers on the veldt would help give too many lessons in facing the Prussians in a mass industrialised war. Contrary to popular myth, the British infantry were well versed in marksmanship / the use of loose-order formations / special units etc long before the Boer War: just look at the (highly successful) tactics adopted at Elandslaagte – one of the very first battles of the war.

This article is worth a read: link

Indeed, from a British point of view, probably the biggest thing to come out of the Boer War was the notion that Mounted Infantry (MI) were a war-winning tool. Obviously, things didn't quite work out like that on the Western Front.

Good points Green Leader …

There were two schools of opinion in the British Army re mounted infantry after the war. These schools formed around two very powerful individuals: Generals Roberts and Wolseley. One school pushed the notion that cavalry should be done away with in favour of mounted infantry units. The other school won out, however, due in no small part to the influence of General French. The cause to retain cavalry was helped by a series of publications from Germany, which clearly showed the evolution of cavalry tactics in that country. The German revisions were consistent with the efforts of key and influential cavalry tacticians in England. General Erskine published a book that pointed this out, as one example of the intensity with which the debate was conducted. As with the naval arms race, the British could afford to be outshone by their German counterparts.

With respect to the cavalry, the key lesson of the Boer War was the need for better horsemanship. This, combined with the emphasis on marksmanship and musketry (the massed use of marksmen at the squadron level), meant that the British cavalry performed at a very high level throughout the opening weeks of the war, up to and including the First Battle of Ypres.

Robert

Robert

Interesting and well made points.

I would suggest, however, that the need for better horsemanship was more directed at the MI, rather than the cavalry? Reading the thoughts of the likes of Haig / French on the matter, their issue with MI was that they were not trained to ride as well as a cavalry trooper or, perhaps more importantly, to take care of their horses as well.

Haig (who was, of course, a passionate supporter of the cavalry, and thus cannot be considered unbiased) wrote this in the early part of the Boer War:

‘The one thing required here is ‘cavalry'! I think the country ought to be alive now to the fact (which we have always pointed out) that we don't keep up enough of this arm in peace time. The mounted infantry craze is now I trust exploded. So far they have proved useless, and are not likely to be of use until they learn to ride.'

In March 1900, he was open minded enough to acknowledge the failings of the cavalry in this letter to a highly placed friend:

‘I trust to you to insist on a large and efficient cavalry being kept up in time of peace. At least two divisions complete. All that is wanted is that our cavalry should pay more attention to shooting. The idea of MI alone is to my mind exploded. Why have we, cavalry, had success against the Boers? Because we can charge in the open as well as act dismounted. The Boers can only do the latter. You must rub this fact into those wretched individuals who pretend to rule the Empire!'

And this a little later:

[calling a mounted infantry man who was a poor horseman useful in combat was akin to saying] ‘an armed motorcyclist who lacked the ability to balance was a useful battlefield weapon'.

Another interesting article on that same blog:

link

The 'General Erskine' you refer to – is that perhaps not the Erskine Childers referred to in this article? I know he was not a General, but I cannot find a book by a General Erskine on the subject?

EDIT:
Or perhaps Maj-Gen George Elphinstone Erskine of the Bombay Cavalry? Can you provide a link to his book?

This has been argued over for about a century – maybe we can solve it in this thread!

Yes, it was Erskine Childers rather than Maj-General Erskine – apologies for the mix-up. Childers (to get the surname right) wrote 'War and the Arme Blanche' in 1910, arguing against the use of the sword and lance as supplements to the rifle. The first book set out the case for mounted infantry. A year later he published 'German influence on British Cavalry', with a foreword by General Sir John French. Both books illustrate, as was the case in Germany, how some of the military debates of the time were played out in the public domain.

The British cavalry suffered heavy losses of horses during the campaign in South Africa. The lessons learned were taken onboard during the intervening period and resulted in high levels of operational capability and availability throughout August until the end of October 1914, at which time the dedicated cavalry functions were rendered null until the next phase of mobile warfare. The lessons learned, and the associated improvements in horsemanship, were not made known in the debates mentioned above. Haig's comment has to be seen in the context of the debate, rather than the changes that were going on within the cavalry – many of which Haig was responsible for, directly and indirectly.

Robert

Erskine Childers (as I am sure you know) was an interesting fellow – he wrote 'Riddle of the Sands' too, and then fought against the British army in the Irish Civil War (or whatever the correct name for that is), and ended up being shot by firing squad.

In the clamour to mock the British (this self-flagellation seems to be a peculiarly British trait) Generals of WW1 it is often forgotten that these 'donkeys' won the war.

I'm not mocking the British, but I think it's a simplification to claim the Allies won WW1 due to the strategic and tactical acumen of the British field command. If I was to give credit to the Brits, it would be to the Royal Navy for their blockading the German ports. By the end of the war, the German army was poorly supplied, especially with food..

Basically Germany lost a war of attrition. It was, to a large extent, a numbers game. Too many enemies and not enough replacements. The American involvement at the end simply hastened the demise.