"Prussian Cavalry 1813" Topic

I need some help with Prussian Cavalry in the 1813-15 period. Specifically, what if any distinctions are there between National Cavalry and Landwehr cavalry? For gaming purposes should they be treated inter-changeably? From a historical perspective, how did they perform?

Thanks

Talking of which several manufacturers seem to make Landwehr lancers, but I remember reading somewhere that lancers needed more training than sword-armed cavalry, so would Landwehr lancers be competent?

The National Cavalry Regiments would probably be better mounted than the Lanswehr, and, being volunteer outfits, maybe a bit better motivated.

As for the comptency of Landwehr uhlans, probably pretty low, at first. There was a sword shortage and it's easier to make lances than swords. This is the cavalry analog to the 'pikes until we can find you muskets' solution with the infantry. But, since the Landwehr horse were not originally intended as battlefield cavalry anyway, but rather to take the scouting and picket duties off the regulars and volunteers, it is probably less critical than it might be.

By the 1813 Fall campaign, and certainly by 1814, it would appear that at least some the Landwehr cavalry had had time to learn to use their lances with some proficiency.

So far as I can learn, all the LW cav in the Waterloo campaign were lancers.

NATIONAL CAVALRY
National Cavalry should be considered equivalent to the regulars. In 1815, they became regular Hussar and Uhlan Regiments.

At the beginning of 1813, three volunteer cavalry regiments that supplied horses and equipment at their own or the provinces expense . Those members of the National Cavalry Regiments wealthy enough to clothe and equip themselves were formed into Freiwilliger Jäger detachments or Elite companies. These were later formed into volunteer detachments in line with the practice of the rest of the army. In 1815, the National Cavalry was re-designated and number in the line.

East Prussian Cavalry Regiment
On 8 February 1813, Yorck raised the East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment. This regiment was planned to contain 1000 men raised in East Prussia, West Prussia and Lithuania at the expense of the Province of East Prussia. The AKO of 27 March 1813, redefined its organisation 300 to 400 men in 3 squadrons. In April, a depot squadron of 80 men was raised. In May 1813, the Freiwilliger Jäger detachment of 117 men was organised as the fifth squadron. The regiment had by now 16 officers, 43 NCOs, 14 trumpeters, 3 surgeons, 3 blacksmiths and 546 men. By the end of July, the Regiment joined the main army. On 10 August 1813, the depot with 3 officers, 15 NCOs and 135 men was in East Prussia.

In 1813, the regiment fought at Katzbach (26 August), Wartenberg (3 October), and Leipzig (16-19 October).

On 5 September 1813, the East Prussian Cavalry Regiment near Topfenberg was leading the Advance Guard under Obertst Katzeler of I Corps was broken by a volley of carbines from French Light Cavalry. This disorganised the Brandenburg Hussars who were ready to charge and the I/II/Jäger/Brandenburg Hussars collapsed in disorder after several discharges of cannister. Only the intervention of the III/IV squadrons under Major Knoblich stopped the French cavalry enveloping the two wings of Prussian cavalry and destroying them.

In 1814, re-titled the Prussian National Cavalry Regiment fought at Montmirail (11 February), Laon (9-10 March) and Paris (30-31 March).. In March 1815, the I/ to III/ squadrons became the II/ to IV/ squadrons of the Garde Hussars. The IV/ squadron became the IV/4th Ulanen Regiment.

Pommeranian National Cavalry Regiment
On 25 February 1813, the Pomeranian National Cavalry (later re-titled National Light Cavalry) was formed by Oberstleutnant von Sydow in Stargard at the expense of the Province of Pomerania. It had 29.2% landowners, 12.5% craftsmen and 16.7% farmers, hunters and foresters. Each of the three squadrons had an elite company following the French manner. The formation was completed on 25 July 1813. On 10 August 1813, the depot in Pommerania had 1 officer and 61 men.

Fought at Wittstock, Gross Beeren, Dennewitz (6 September 1813), Leipzig, Arnhem, Fort St. Andre and Herzogenbosch. It also took part in the siege of Wittenberg and Soissons, and the blockade of Lille.

In March 1815, I/ became part of the Garde Dragoons and the II/ to IV/ became the I/ to III/4th Uhlan Regiment.

Silesia National Cavalry Regiment
On 9 February 1813, Graf Henckel von Donnersmark (former commander of the 1st (Henckel) Cuirassier Regiment in 1806) formed a cavalry regiment of volunteers from Silesia at the provinces expense. Initially known either as the ‘Schlesische Garde-Kavallerie' or the ‘Schlesische Garde-Polk.' By the end of May 1813, the first squadron had four officers and 109 men. By the end of July had a two squadrons, a depot and a Freiwillige Jäger detachment of 3 officers and 50 men.

In 1813, I & II sq/ Silesian National Cavalry Regiment (189 men) under von Starkenfels fought at Dresden (26-27 August) and Kulm (30 August). On 10 August, the depot squadron in Silesia had 3 officers and 50 men. At the end of October, this had joined the rest of the regiment as its third squadron to fight at Leipzig (16-18 October). In 1814, the now re-titled National Hussar Regiment joined by a fourth squadron fought at La Rothier, Laon (9-10 March) and Paris (30-31 March).

In March 1815, 2 squadrons became part of the Garde Hussar and the remaining two became part of the 7th Hussars. In 1821, the Garde Ulanen Regiment became the Garde Kürassier Regiment.

Elbe-National Kavallerie Regiment
On 1 December 1813, with the overrunning of Westphalia by the allies, the Elb-National-Husaren-Regiment was formed. Two squadrons were organised quickly but the third was not organised until 30 January 1814. Two Freiwilliger Jäger squadrons were quickly organised. In February 1814, the regiment of five squadrons served in the blockade force of GL von Hirschfeld. On 20 February 1814, Major von Lebedur formerly of the Prussian Garde du Corps became the regimental commander. On 15 March 1815, the I/ to III/ squadrons became part of the 10th Hussars and the Freiwilliger Jäger squadrons were disbanded.

Certainly they were better than the Landwehr cavalry in both horses, equipment and the pick of the men. Volunteers were confined to the Freiwilligen Jager detachments. Even then they may not have been strictly volunteers. It was better to serve in these regiments than in the infantry especially the Landwehr.

A unit to look at is the Mecklenburg Hussars who took an Eagle. This was very proficient unit.

Landwehr Cavalry improved through the campaign. They were armed with lances. Alas all three ranks were armed rather than Polish practice of just the first rank. Very mixed the battle performance. Charged as well as the regulars and other times took to their heals. In 1815, most of the Landwehr cavalry had given up the lance.

Stephen

The Mecklenburger Hussars were not, strictly speaking, a Prussian unit. They were the cavalry arm of the Grand Duchies of M.-Strelitz and M.-Schwerin (which were evidently presided over by different branches of the Grand Ducal family but shared a government). It was raised as a regular unit (the other regular forces being one battery of field artillery, a Fussgarde battalion, and the Kontingentsregiment [aka 8me Regiment d'Infanterie de la Confederation du Rhin]). Early in 1813, the Mecklenburg government paced its forces at the disposal of the King of Prussia.

Yes but they fought as an integral part of the Prussian Army.

In early 1813, Mecklenburg-Strelitz became one of the first German states to leave the Confederation of the Rhine aligning itself with Prussia. Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz was the father of the late Queen Louise of Prussia and a Prussian general who later commanded VII (Guard) Corps in 1815. On 2 April 1813, he formed a hussar regiment from volunteers aged between 17 and 30 years under the command of Obertstleutnant (Lt. Colonel) von Warburg. By July, the regiment had completed its formation and joined Yorck's I Prussian Army Corps as the cavalry regiment for the 2nd Brigade led by Duke Charles. On 10 August 1813, this unit mustered 450 hussars in four squadrons and 60 Freiwilligen Jäger. At Goldberg (22 August 1813), the swift action of Oberst von Warburg leading the III & IV squadrons rescued the II/3rd (2nd East Prussian) IR from being cut off by French cavalry and then assaulted the cavalry attacking the I/1st (1st East Prussian) IR.

At Leipzig (16-19 October 1813), a squadron of the Mecklenburg Hussars charged the French 1st and 3rd Marine Artillery Regiments from Marmont's VI Corps formed square just north of Mockern while infantry from the 7th Brigade struck the square frontally. The three squadrons in reserve took the French in the rear and Private Timm captured the Eagle of the 1st Marine Artillery Regiment. Over 700 prisoners were captured. It is sometimes in error referred to as that from the Seamen of the Imperial Guard, which did not exist. Private Timm was sent to Blücher and then to the monarchs which bestowed upon him high medals.

Stephen

Summerfield, what is your source for the info that the LDW Kavellerie regts had abandoned the lance by 1815? I've never read this before?

This came from Hofschroer (1984) Prussian Landwehr and Landsturm, RAFM that I looked up. Now I will need to do more digging to find out whether this is correct. This recollection was borne out by various army lists (Newbury in particular)

So far all the other English landguage reference have lances for Landwehr Cavalry in 1815 (this all comes from Nash). Need to check with Pietche and some German sources.

Should know but unclear. Sorry for the confusion.

Stephen

Haythornthwaite's Uniforms of Waterloo in Colour shows most Prussian LW cavalry with lances (except officers, of course), though only a few regiments are actually depicted, and some are not even mentioned in the text. The only LW trooper depicted without a lance in the plates in one from the Neumark LW cavalry, but in the text it mentions the same regiment having lance-pennons of white over black — and pennon colors for several LW regiments are mentioned in the text. (Tho, of course, this doesnt necessarily mean that they were actually carrying lances.)

Interestingly, it also depicts one uhlan without a lance: a trooper of the 7th Uhlans — which regiment was made up of the former Hellwig's Streifkorps and Von Schill's Hussars. The figure representing an ex-Hellwig's trooper has a lance and wears a czapka, but the ex-Von Schill's trooper wears a colpak and pelise and carries no lance. So perhaps he was an uhlan in name only (?).

Some of the newly-created Prussian uhlan and hussar regts in 1815 were composed of National Kavallerie Regts or foreign tropps which had been incorporated into the regular Prussian army after 1814. As a result, some Uhlans hadn't yet been issued lances or proper uhlan uniforms. And some hussars were dressed in non-hussar dress. It's a very complicated topic.

Do you want any pointers to this subject.

Stephen

The Elberfeld manuscript

link

shows several Landwehr cavalrymen of 1815 who are armed with lances.

Generally, in the Prussian army you always have to go down to the regimentalor even battalion/squadron/battery level to find out reliable details about uniforms and equipment.

Unfortunately, Haythornthwaite, Nash and Rawkins aren't very reliable on Prussian uniforms (but Pericoli, uniforms of 1815, and Bourdier, l'Armée prussienne de Waterloo, are even worse).

The best works currently available on Prussian uniforms are the Men-at-arms by Peter Hofschröer, as he is able to read (and understand) German.

Oliver

"The figure representing an ex-Hellwig's trooper has a lance and wears a czapka"

This last is almost certainly wrong, since the Hellwig'sche had worn British hussar busby's, and the only Prussian regiment authorized czapka's was the Garde Uhlan Regiment. Of course, this individual may have copped off a dead or captured French Lancier …

The ex-Hellwig trooper is taken from an eye witness, the painter of the Elberfeld manuscript, it is image 50c, with the title "Ulanen. 5/11 1815."

So what we know is that at least one man (probably more, mightbe all men) of the "7. Ulanen-Regiment" was equipped with czapka and lance by November 1815, but this doesn't give any clue for the 1815 campaign.

Unfortunately, I haven't got access to the regimental history of the 7th Ulanen, sometimes the regimental histories contain very useful information.

Czapkas for Ulanen were generally introduced in the Prussian army by an order of 11th March 1815 – this is the date of the order, of course the actual date of introduction varied from regiment to regiment.

For example the 6th Ulanen-Regiment got its "new Ulanen uniform" on 19th January 1816 (regimental history by Bothe, p. 162). After May 1815, this regiment was composed of four squadrons (without the Bremen squadron, which arrived only in June): 354 men from Lützow's cavalry, mixed with 103 men from the former cavalry of the Russo-German Legion; officers were allowed to wear the uniforms of their former regiments: Ulanen uniform, or brown, red, green, blue or black hussar uniforms.

Cheers,

Oliver

Thank you Oliver but I was quoting Peter Hofshroer about the lances and Landwehr cavalry. Alas his text seems to have been edited for the men at arms series. Information on the National Cavalry was sadly missing.

Stephen

Stephen, if you check for example Mila, § 1333, you will find that all the Prussian Landwehr cavalry regiments were equipped as lancers until 1852.

One more reason not to rely on modern secondary works …

Cheers,

Oliver

Paul, concerning your question, the commander of the 3rd Landwehr-Kavallerie-Regiment, von der Marwitz, wrote about his regiment:

"The handling of weapons, being a mechanical ability, can be enforced. Therefore, in the beginning, the men were harassed with it the whole day, first on foot, then on horseback, and really after four weeks arrived at a proficiency which hasn't been achieved by some old [= line]regiments. The men gained a special love and confidence in their lances […]"

All depended on the regimental or squadron commander, of course.

Thank you Oliver. It was the book at hand at the time. Although contempory works can also be misleading. Especially French works upon other armies. I am specifically referring about the Prussian and Russian armies.

Stephen

Haythornthwaite's Uniforms of Waterloo in Colour says, regarding the 7th Uhlans, "The Hellwig detatchment wore English uniforms, of red dolmans with blue facings and white braid, together with either dark blue czapkas (as illustrated) or brown fur busbies with blue bags and white chords; some wore red pelisses with black fur trimming and white braid, and `barrelled' sashes of red and yellow. Lance-pennons wer either blue over red, or red over yellow."

By "either," in the above, it's impossible to know whether he means some wore busbies and some wore czapkas or just that he's not sure which they wore. Such are the vageries of the English language.

Don
I think you will find that both were worn. Those of the Helwig Freikorps may have kept their busbies. New drafts in the new uniform.

Stephen

That was my guess (that both were worn), but I wish H. had been more specific.

Remember that the Prussian Army of 1815 was one in transition. Many of the Freikorps and Foreiegn Troops were being brought into the line.

Uniforms over two years wear out and get replaced. Often in a ad-hock basis. Prussia was bankrupt and could not pay for supplies. There were many complaints about the Prussians being like locusts.

The officers would have the new uniform as they paid for these themselves. The drafts would either have a form of reserve uniform (overalls), what could be found at the depot and new regulation uniform.

It was not until after the 100 days that many units received their new uniforms. The Prussian Army marched into Paris in July in their old uniforms. Within a month they had acquired much material from French magazines and been supplied parts of the new regulation uniform. November 1815 most seem to have been outfitted. Many units did not have the new new uniforms and equipment until 1816-17.

The Army was only finally reorganised as envisaged in 1820. By then all the non-Prussian artillery had been replaced. The Prussian infantry hanger M1816 was in fact the French Briquet. Stocks were still high enough for Prussia not to produce this in quantity until the 1840s.

Stephen

Oliver, I find von der Marwitz's quote interesting. First of all, he was known as a conservative and an "Alte Arme" loyalist who must have inwardly writhed at times being attached to a Landwehr formation. Secondly, the notion that you could drill up a militia unit in 4 weeks to be better with their weapons than a regular unit makes you wonder a little about the quality of the Prussian regular army regts!

Drill is one thing, the ability to perform under fire is amother. Maintenance of muskets and equipment takes time to learn. Four weeks is a very short time.

This would be equivalent to basic training for National Servicemen.

The main problem with the Prussian Army of 1815 was a lack of suitable officers and NCOs. Many of the officers had been promoted from the Freiwilliger Jager so lacked a military education. Therefore it is back to the NCOs to be the cornerstone of the unit. Good NCOs are hard to find. The Landwehr did not have a regular cadre unlike the Reserve Regiments. Therefore it is learning from scratch the lessons of campiagning. The little things. Keeping socks dry. Setting up a camp so you kept dry and warm. Remember the Prussian Army were without tents from an AKO in 1808. If stationed for any time they would construct huts.

It is also to know what equipment to take with you and others to leave behind. There are many occasions that Landwehr were equiped with war material taken from prisoners and the battlefield. They were at the bottom of the pecking order.

The transition from Regular to Reserve to Landwehr had not as yet come into force (1814 Law) therefore there was not the type of reserve forces as envisaged. The standard of Landwehr officers in fact decreased to the 1820s as one year middle class officer volunteers were used.

Many Landwehr officers may have come from the new states that Prussia had acquired but the central authorities looked upon them as suspect especially those of the Rhineland (French territory for 20 years) and Silesian/Posen (Polish).

Like anything leadership and faith in those above you is so important. Most of the defections in late 1813 of the Confederation of the Rhine were led by the officers. The men just followed. The officers insighted the Saxon mutiny in 1815, although there was much discontent.

Remember the Landwehr of 1815 was different from 1813-14. It was re-raised. Blucher's Army was raised mainly in the new territories and hence it was unknown how they would perform. He had the same problem as Wellington in this respect. Not knowing whether the Dutch-Belgians would fight. Both to their credit performed well.

A very complex story and difficult to disentangle. It would be interesting to see if there are any views and facts out there.

Stephen

Just for the purposes of argument, Steve, wouldn't you agree that the British army's officers were also without a military education at this period?

Dear Hue
Yes. The British Army is still built upon the experience of the NCOs. There is a tradition to differ to the NCO for advice. This is unlike a number of nations.

It is despite the shortcomings of the military elite the armies of the Napoleonic Wars performed as they did.

I was trying to point out that there was not the experienced cadre to form units. It was not as the Landwehr had been envisaged.

Stephen

Huevans,

this remark of von der Marwitz is striking indeed, but it seems to be not without foundation. For example, the Schlesisches Cuirassier-Regiment, which was equipped with the Prussian "Pallasch" (straight sword for thrusting) used their weapons mainly for slashing at the enemy – as if they had sabers. On 16th October they were explicitely ordered to thrust instead.

In early 1813, von der Marwitz had asked to be assigned to the still to be raised Landwehr, "as the [line] regiments were overcrowded with officers". For him, the Landwehr was an instrument to "raise the spirit of the nation" and help to strengthen the identification of the common people with the Prussian state and their king.

And, of course, the Landwehr reinforced the regular army in a cheap way, and could be quite efficient if trained and used respecting its pecularities.

The equations which you find sometimes: "noblemen = conservatives = enemies of Scharnhorst = enemies of reforms = enemies of the Landwehr" are far too simplifying.

On 16th October they were explicitely ordered to thrust instead – On 16th October 1813 at Leipzig !

Thanks, Oliver. That's all very interesting. I believe though that v. d. Marwitz was known as a card-carrying conservative at the time – as opposed to the Scharnhorst-Genisenau clique who were the big reformers, or course.

Anyway, Marwitz seems an interesting dude. If you run across any more stuff about him, please post it.

von der Marwitz was mainly opposed to the king and the political reforms by Stein and Hardenberg.

His opinion about military reforms can be found in his 1837 memoirs (which were not to be published before his death).

According to him, the important tasks of military reform in 1807 were to reorganise the units of the army, find a new source for recruits (instead of mercenaries), and achieve a reform in tactics.

He criticises that after 1807, the king did not restore the famous regiments of the pre-1806 army, thus renouncing an easy means of strengthening the esprit de corps.

In his eyes, Scharnhorst's positive efforts (creating of an national army, production of cannons and muskets) had been idealised or overrated. Foreigners (= non-Prussians) could still be employed in the army after 1808, but there weren't many willing to do so, and even in 1813 foreigners were recruited in the Prussian army: a soldier is a soldier after all. And the weapon production was not effective enough, as in 1813, many weapons had to be bought from the British.

The only reform by Scharnhorst von der Marwitz does not criticise or downplay at all was the Krümper system.

He continues that the improvement of the artillery material was positive as well, but for the improvement of the artillery as a weapon in the field the disciplinary efforts by prince August and the tactical training by von Holtzendorf, von Schmidt and von Braun were equally important.

As Scharnhorst had a strong influence on the reform of the Prussian cavalry, von der Marwitz calls him "the murderer of the Prussian cavalry".

To open the officer corps for every citizen, regardless of birth, was just a political gesture towards the liberals. Before 1806, commoners had already been accepted as officers in the artillery and the hussars, and after 1808 the officer corps could still well be filled with men from the nobility, so there was no real need for this reform. In von der Marwitz's eyes, the traditions of nobility ensured that its members became good officers with character and a sense of honour, whereas in 99 percent of the cases the son of a merchant would always be a petty spirit.

To humane-ise the treatment of the common soldier was good, but abolishing all, even the mildest beatings, and introducing arrest as the lowest grade of punishment encouraged the lazy privates who "enjoyed" lungering around in prison and could not be forced any longer with painful punishments to do their duties. An increased formalism in military justice, founded on the principle of equality of all men, made it more difficult to arrive at immediate and individual (and thus just) punishments for culprits.

Terminating the system of company chiefs being responsible for all economic affairs of their company was good, but cutting down the salaries of higher ranking officers was a mistake, as it cut their possibilties to spend extra money for the sake of their company or regiment. For example, often they could no longer afford to invite junior officers for daily lunch, thus getting to know them better.

Introducing column tactics and skirmishers in the infantry was overall positive, though this was stressed too much and the advantage of the effective Prussian fire in line was unnecessarily given up – von der Marwitz refers to the British infantry as an example of what could have been achieved.

So von der Marwitz was not against military reforms per se, but, on the contrary, considerd many of them necessary as well. However, he often was in favour of different solutions than those found by the reformers; and he would not have broken so radically with the positive and useful traditions of the pre-1806 army.

Dear Oliver
Certainly this has been enlightening. Looking at von Marwitz in a different light. Very little has been written upon this it seems in English.

Stephen