"With Zeal and with Bayonets Only" Topic

Yes 42nd, a number of us have been pointing out this distinction [repeatedly] when different lt. infantry tactics were being used, and at times – or on different parts of the AWI battlefield. :)))

Nec aspera terrent

In regards to the reference prior to the 17th and 42nd Lights, and some Jagers, under Ewald – I believe they were the advance guard in front of the entire wing advancing on Birmingham Hill, so in effect, they were skirmishing. I believe there is a reference that the 17th (and likely the 42nd) Lights reformed on the flank of one of the Light battalions.

Ewald went on, apparently just with his Jagers, to the evening fight with Greene.

The 17th and 42nd were both assigned to the 1st LI Bn under Lt Col Abercromby hence "Lt. Col. Abercromby ordered the 17th light company to form on the right of the battalion, the 42nd, on the left."

Earlier in the day, the both the 17th and 42nd LI coys had been detached to support Ewald's jägers at the head of Howe's flanking manoeuvre.

Ewald later wrote: "I had hardly marched half an hour when I ran into a warning post of the enemy, who withdrew from one favourable position to another, under constant skirmishing until around noontime."

After crossing the Brandywine and having led the army up an unguarded defile, while the army formed up and rested, Ewald with the two LI coys still attached, was ordered onward and about 3.30 saw ahead a force posted behind a village atop a crescent-shaped hill feature and, after consulting with the two LI company commanders [Mcpherson, 42nd (the senior); Scott, 17th], resolved to attack.

"I drew up at once and deployed the jägers, asking Mcpherson and Scott to support me on both flanks, and ordered the mounted jägers to follow the foot jägers in the centre."

Ewald's accompanying sketch shows a curved screen of foot jägers in skirmish order supported by a company of LI, in more compact formation, on either side of the road, with the horse jägers between them, coming up the road itself.

While Ewald was deliberating, the enemy had been given time to prepare and his advance was met with heavy fire which forced his men to pull back and seek cover, as described in the anonymous officer's account quoted earlier.

Having driven back and forth several times on the approach road to Osborne Hill, it is quite hilly and there are a number of defiles there today.

If you haven't ever visited the site, I highly recommend it. There is also a walking trail around the area as well.

I was headed out of New York for PA just after the 139th anniversary and I got called back for some pointless BS meeting. I never had another opportunity before it was time to fly back.

Skirmishing is one of the actions that is most misunderstood and often given short-shrift in 18th and 19th Century military narratives. As Jean Colin writes in his famous study of infantry tactics, L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siècle: la tactiques [The Infantry in the 18th Century: Tactics] 1907:

"To study the methods of combat with only the official documents or the combined accounts of battles, one risks distorting the character of them. It is a general fact in the history of wars, for example, that the skirmishers have played a role, often essential, always important, yet one seldom mentioned."

Spring starts his chapter on "Bushfighting" with the Section on "British Light Infantry Training in the early 1770's with this opening sentence:

At annual regimental reviews in Britain and Ireland during the 1770's, it was common for the light companies (sometimes augmented by the grenadier company) to deploy as skirmishers, operating as a screen for the battalion's front or flanks.

He then writes about General Townshend light infantry instructions in 1772 and General Howe's in 1774. He writes how Howe's training spread to other regiments. [the description of his training sounds just like the light companies' actions in the example I gave.]
There are six examples subsequently given of this training being carried out before the Revolution. Then he gives Townshend's commentary on the poor showing of the light companies in 1775 in the very practices outlined by those various Instructions.

The rest of the chapter provides numerous examples of the British light infantry carrying out skirmish actions in skirmish fashion relying on fire such as the 24th battalion at Freeman's farm. These examples actually outnumber the examples given for bayonet charges in the bush.

Yet, he comes to the conclusions he does regarding British light infantry. I do think that as 42flanker says, it applies more to the light infantry acting as battlions rather than independent companies.

Townshend's Instructions dealt with how individual men (or files of men) were to behave; Howe's training was aimed at getting companies from different regiments (with different interpretations of the 1764 Manual) to act together and with greater speed. The two complemented each other, but were not dealing with the same thing.

"it applies more to the light infantry acting as battlions rather than independent companies."

In general, during the AWI the light companies of infantry regiments were, in most cases I think, combined into composite LI battalions, rather than acting as skirmishers for their parent battalions.

Without wishing to stick my neck out, having not read Spring's book for a while, how many of his examples relate to an individual LI company deployed on its own as the battalion skirmish line?

@42flanker – I think part of the point of the composite flank battalions was to keep the "skirmishing experts" in one place and ensure that they occupied positions (eg outposts, picket lines etc) where that expertise could best be employed on a day-to-day basis. In theory that left the line battalions with no organic group(s) capable of skirmishing, but in fact that was not the case.

Even in 1775, quite a few British line battalions had organised groups of marksmen from the centre companies to handle skirmishing duties. Barker remarks on the 4th Foot using theirs to drive away enemy snipers from houses and bushes around Lexington green during the withdrawal from Concord, after Smith's command had reached the safety of Percy's relief column. The Company of Select Marksmen in Burgoyne's army was initially raised from the best shots among the battalion companies before leaving Canada, and after Bennington, received more men from those companies to replace the casualties lost there.

That is interesting- and April 1775 seems early for that process to hav developed. So, the battalion skirmishers thebest of the rest' or was there some notion of keeping back a portion of suitable men for regimental use?

Townshend's Instructions dealt with how individual men (or files of men) were to behave; Howe's training was aimed at getting companies from different regiments (with different interpretations of the 1764 Manual) to act together and with greater speed. The two complemented each other, but were not dealing with the same thing.

Super: True. Townsehend's instructions were for a single company and Howe's on groups of companies, but as Spring writes about Howe's instructions:

While Townshend's tactical isnturctions focused on how a single light company might operate in action, Howe's Slaisbury drill was by contrast designed for maneuvering a number of light companies in concert as a composite light battalion.

But the two were more than simply complementary… At the bottom of page 247 he notes that Howe's companies were to maneuver by forming files, the methods Townshend had in his instructions.

Without wishing to stick my neck out, having not read Spring's book for a while, how many of his examples relate to an individual LI company deployed on its own as the battalion skirmish line?

42flanker:

Good point. The chapter on 'Bushfighting' has three parts. The first [pp 245-251] is on the training for light infantry developed before 1776 including Gage's orders in New England for light infantry exercises and observers seeing it practiced. It is pretty standard light infantry methodology seen in the French and Indian War by such units as the 60th.[my observation]

The Second part [pp. 251-255]ends with Spring detailing action during the early war such as Bunker Hill and Concord. the former doesn't have light infantry performing, the latter it is obvious that light actions did occur because Townshend himself writes about Colonel Smith's March from Concord: "As to the loss of the flanking parties I do not wonder at it--for it is not a short coat or half gaiters that makes a light infantryman…"

Spring has the section on "The Light Infantry Combat Role in America." He states

Unfortunately, British light infantry were arguably incapable of performing in such a tactical role [as German Jagers in skirmishing]when hostilities commenced in 1775, nor did they adopt this method of fighting as the war progressed. Instead the British flank battalions generally fought in the line of battle, employing much the same open and shallow linear formations and the same aggressive bayonet-oriented tactics as the rest of the infantry.

This is not quite his ending conclusion. what is is his first engagement, the Battle of Long Island, Major Charles Stuart is quoted as boasting:

The enemy thought they were invincible in the woods, and they were amazed to see that we were bold enough to attack them in their own way…"

The Americans' way?

He then gives three quotes of officers [two light infantry] from 1778-9 agreeing that "the British bayonet will ever make its way" in the woods.

The next paragraph states with:

There is some evidence that early British tactical successes against the rebels in the woods derived in part from improvised training in elementary bushfighting tactics. After three pages of how troops were taught to use cover in the woods, he ends the section with the 24th battalion at Freeman's Farm "…took to the woods before them, firing after them [in their?] own manner from behind trees, and twice repulsed their repeated reinforcements without assistance." So, there actually three examples of actual fighting given, and two have the British using as light infantry flankers at Concord and the 24th using skirmish tactics at Freeman's farm.

The last and longest section is titled "The…Woods Rendered Our Bayonets or Little Use." [pp.255-262] It starts with "If the British and German regulars in AMerica do not seem to have been as helpess in bushfighting and in the petite guerre as historians have commonly implied, one must nevertheless not exaggerate their proficiency.

The rest of the pages are examples of line troops,not light infantry being harrassed by Rebel militia and riflemen while bayonet charges are used to keep them at bay--unsuccessfully.

I don't think anyone would argue that the British were not as good as the Americans at skirmishing or 'bushfighting', but that isn't the issue. The question is what tactics were used however successfully or not. While bayonet charges were certainly something that the British employed, with mixed success, their learning about and use of actual light infantry skirmish practices was not given a reasonable, let alone compete presentation by Spring.

That is my assessment form all the examples Spring did and didn't use that were available to him. That doesn't negate all the other great work he did. Even so, he didn't do the British Light infantry justice.

That is interesting- and April 1775 seems early for that process to have developed. So, the battalion skirmishers 'the best of the rest' or was there some notion of keeping back a portion of suitable men for regimental use?

The 10th Foot was also encouraging marksmanship by firing at floating barrels in Boston harbour. I think that they were "the best of the rest" as you say – the SCM in Canada was chosen that way. No evidence that the Light Bobs were plundered for "a few good men".

Regarding "skirmishing," this is an interesting discussion.

link

Could this be the longest thread ever for the American Revolution board?

And no eye-gouging or hair-pulling!

Yet!

How dare you!

Virginia T:
That is a great article at the link with several great points about Mid-18th century skirmish practices. He does start out with a erroneous assumption:

In fact, it appears that a form of skirmisher, often called "flanquers", "flanqueur," or sometimes "Blänkerer" by French and German speakers, or Flankers, by the English speakers, developed during the eighteenth century. This is often controversial, as many military history enthusiasts believe that eighteenth-century soldiers were not trustworthy enough to fight in this fashion and that they would desert if fighting in this style….We may be able to see the first inklings of the use of skirmishers in Europe during the mid-eighteenth century.

The error is thinking that there was some beginning ['a hint'] of skirmish practices in the mid-18th century. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Here is a quote from an English treatise on military instructions.
The section on skirmishing begins [he is very loquacious so I am editing a bit, particularly with spelling] begins:

Certain Orders, Directions and brief for Harquebuziers, piquers, and battles, when they are in skirmish with their enemies in the field.

Skirmishing both on horseback and on foot do begin upon such, and so many…infinite occasions when two puissant armies that are enemies one to the other are in the field… I have handled the ordering… of bands of harquebuziers entering into skirmishing…

The author goes on in several sections to describe how files are extended and two or three men per file, how they all make sure to have one man loaded at any time during the skirmish. Then how to control small and large groups [he calls 'little societies'] of skirmishers fighting in front of the formed troops in battles and skirmishing alone. He recommends that novices should be led out to skirmish by skilled and experienced infantry men. He also claims that what he advocates is known and used by the Italians, Spaniards and other nations.

The treatise also gives the various orders to call out to skirmishes including retreating behind the main line:
"Wing, Wing, soldiers to the right or Retire, Retire, and Front soldiers."

When was this written? In , Smythe, "Instructions, obseruations and Orders Mylitarie" (1595)

or

ANIMA'DVERSIONS OF VVARRE; OR, A MILITARIE MAGAZINE OF THE TRVEST RVLES, AND ABLEST INSTRVCTIONS, FOR THE MA∣NAGING OF WARRE. COMPOSED, OF THE MOST REFINED DISCIPLINE, AND Choice Experiments that these late Netherlandish, and Swedish Warres have Produced.
With divers new inventions, both of Fortifications and Stratagems. As also Sundry Collections taken out of the most approved Authors, ancient and moderne, either in
• Greeke.
• Latine.
• Italian.
• French.
• Spanish.
• Dutch,
or English.In two Bookes.
By ROBERT WARD, Gentleman and Commander. 1639.

Thirty pages are dedicated to describing how to skirmish and why with many of the same points made by Smythe forty years before.

And here is an example from a battle in 1645:

(Austin Woolrych, "Battles of the English Civil War," Pan Books Ltd, London; 1969). It is part of the description of the Royalists as they took up position for the battle on Marston Moor:

"The second feature was the obstacle, a long ditch or drain, which divided the Moor from the fields. It was close behind this that Rupert stationed his cavalry, and such infantry as he had with him, to deny the Moor to his
opponents. From about eh center eastwards, the ditch was apparently deep and lined by a hedge, but it was shallower and less formidable towards its western end, where it curved round to peter out near the junction of Kendal Lane with the Tockwith-Marston Road. Rupert lined this ditch with musketeers, choosing his own and Lord Byron's regiments of foot for the task. Such a screen was often thrown out before an army's main front; it was known as a 'forlorn hope', and its job was to harass and disrupt an enemy attack as far as it could before falling back on its main body. Posted as it was in this instance, it made the ditch a nasty obstacle to tackle – especially for the cavalry – before coming to grips with the main royalist forces close behind it."

[p.67]

Whether the British were good or mediocre at skirmishing during the American Revolution, it was a known and common practice long before the 1750's.

Fascinating. Thank you for posting that.

The statement you quote, McLaddie- "We may be able to see the first inklings of the use of skirmishers in Europe during the mid-eighteenth century" does indeed suggest a limited perspective.

However, the re-discovery of skirmishing in the mid-C18th as indicated by that quotation is to some extent explained by the developments in infantry drills and tactics seen during the C17th and early C18th: the formations and drills for 'pike and shot' developed by Maurice of Nassau at the end of the C16th, together with the training of troops by Colonel Martinet for Louis XIV and by Anhault-Dessau for King Frederick William of Prussia.

From these evolved the infantry soldier of the C18th armed with musket and bayonet alone, trained to manoeuvre and fight in tight,rigid formations maintained by brutal discipline; the 'military automaton' of public perception- which, for many, it seems, is still the enduring image of the British soldier in America (Ironically, it is the German von Steuben's work with Washington's army that produced a force capable of holding their own against British troops in the open field).

It is fair to say that troops trained in such a manner would be less likely to be deployed as skirmishers. The concern over troops deserting can only have been part of the reason. In the first half of the C18th the bulk of infantry were simply not trained to fulfill that function. Cavalry or dragoons (under a range of names) might be tasked to hold a particular post or pass, or cover an obstacle. The lack of discplined infantry to carry out such a role would limit a commander's options. It is surely not accidental that in the 1760s and 70s we see units of Light Infantry, Chasseurs, Jäger, et al., being formed in European armies. It suggests that a perceived need was being addressed; how effectively, is another matter.

There always tended to be bodies of 'light troops,' mostly irregular, of varying reliability and effectiveness operating on the fringes of armies; the 'Croats' or Grenzers of the Austrian army being but one early example. However, I don't believe these corps tended to operate in conjunction with regular troops on the battlefield. We are told that Frederick the Great fairly despised such troops (The Highlanders of the Black Watch in its early incarnation occupied a sort of middle ground).

Meanwhile, light cavalry (frequently of Balkan origin as well) had been used from the C15th onwards in a number of armies to carry out skirmishing and screening roles.

Surely, the key difference, with regard to British troops from the 1750s onwards, is that regular troops, drilled to fight in compact bodies on the European battlefield, were being trained by energetic officers to adapt to the circumstances of fighting in America. This led, gradually, to a more flexible use of infantry on the battlefield in America and Europe; both as designated light infantry and within standard battalions.

However, the re-discovery of skirmishing in the mid-C18th as indicated by that quotation is to some extent explained by the developments in infantry drills and tactics seen during the C17th and early C18th: the formations and drills for 'pike and shot' developed by Maurice of Nassau at the end of the C16th, together with the training of troops by Colonel Martinet for Louis XIV and by Anhault-Dessau for King Frederick William of Prussia.

From these evolved the infantry soldier of the C18th armed with musket and bayonet alone, trained to manoeuvre and fight in tight,rigid formations maintained by brutal discipline; the 'military automaton' of public perception- which, for many, it seems, is still the enduring image of the British soldier in America (Ironically, it is the German von Steuben's work with Washington's army that produced a force capable of holding their own against British troops in the open field).

42flanker:

I don't think there is any irony there. While the British were learning to deal with American Militia, the Americans were learning to deal with British formed troops. Neither alone were war-winning approaches in the AWI.

I do agree with your assessment of the focus of 18th Century military men, though the notion of the military 'automaton' was more a French Revolutionary perception of Allied troops, the Frenchmen on the other hand, being free and independent…which is why skirmishing was seen as the tactic of "The New Man."

When men had to be rigorously trained in the Enlightenment's geometry and precision maneuvers, when volley fire had become so much more effective, those trained men became very valuable…and the worry was that asked to train in a completely different form of warfare might 'ruin them' for formed combat. The fear of men deserting was real…one reason many light units during this time were 'volunteers' such as the French lights…presumably more willing to stay.

However, there was no 're-discovery' of skirmishing in the mid-C18th--in any way. It was never forgotten, being seen on every battlefield during the 1700s--with regular troops.[not just frei-corps types] I know that is a bald statement, but it is one I am willing to back up.

At the beginning of the 17th Century you have these books that detailed skirmish practices, for instance:

"When advancing towards the enemy, one has to detach men from the infantry to try to surpress men and horses of the enemy artillery".

That is the opening of the discussion on skirmishing in the Swedish work:

RULES FOR THE BATTLE", 1709 by Esben Moens….

That 'detaching' men from the infantry to suppress the enemy suggests line infantry, not specialists or rabble, which is exactly what you see the Swedish army do at Battle of Poltava.

a number of books had been written about Addressing skirmishing by 1750. Prominent in Britain were:

The Art of War. In four parts. Containing, I. The duties of officers of horse. II. Of officers of foot. III. Of a soldier in general. London, 1707.

Militia discipline, Breton, London, 1717

The New Art of War. Containing I. The duties of officers of horse and foot. … III. The practice of war by all great generals; … To which are … London, 1726.

The same year as Bland's A Treatise of Military Discipline was first published (1727), described the very the things the French military had started to experimenting with: small numbers of infantrymen fighting in open order while the remainder of the battalion remained in the traditional closed order formation. For the first time in many years, the French military found itself faced with a lengthy period of peace, and it relied upon "camps of instructions" to train its troops. One of the interesting aspects of the French camp of instruction of 1727 was the experimentation with light infantry tactics on the battlefield.

The idea of forming a platoon-sized piquet (50 men) in each battalion to serve as a type of second grenadier company had already gained popularity by the War of the Spanish Succession. Now, the idea of scattering the grenadiers and the piquet in front of the battalion to occupy advantageous terrain such as a hedge, mill or the border of woods gained some acceptance. This was in part due to the fact that skilled infantrymen now could fire one to two shots per minute and individual fire (as opposed to volley fire) could have a more significant effect. In one of the exercises, the battalion's grenadiers were spread out in front of the battalion to fire at the enemy. After firing, they retired around the left and right flanks of the battalion to start reloading at its rear.

And we shouldn't forget Frederick the Great's, Instruction für die Frei-Regimenter oder leichten Infanterie-Regimenter Werke which came out in 1750 as a 'secret' military work.

de La Croix Traite de la petite guerre 1752 and de Grandmaison, La Petite guerre 1756 were both used by Frederick in his course for staff officers.

In 1811, Scharnhorst would say that there is nothing regarding skirmish practices not found in those two books.

There is a reason that Spring could write at the beginning of his chapter on "Bushfighting":

At annual regimental reviews in Britain and Ireland during the 1770's it was common for the light company (sometimes augmented by the grenadier company) to deploy as skirmishers, operating as a screen for the battalions's front or flanks.

The British didn't need to remember skirmish practices. Townshend could write up his instructions in 1772 "incorporated sound advice from many themes" which by Townshend's account included Bland's work. Spring notes that even though Dundas' 1792 work had little on skirmishing,

This is not to say [as some historians have censoriously pronounced) that the army "forgot" everything about bushfighting that it had learned so painfully against the Canadians and Indians during the French and Indian War;…"

The British, even in Bland's writing, saw bayonet charges as decisive. as the British forte. It is not surprising that the British, when faced with American woodland fighting, would resort to what they saw as their army's strength… and forego skirmish tactics [firefights] that they weren't good at and the Americans were. That doesn't mean they had forgotten how to skirmish… which they obviously hadn't.

Oops. That last paragraph above in the post is mine, not Spring's.

The idea that skirmishing is being rediscovered at some point is one that is seen a number of times in European writing. Here is one a friend provided that I think is a striking example:

We may be able to see the first inklings of the use of skirmishers in Europe during the mid-eighteenth century. A Hungarian officer reported that at the Battle of Mollwitz, "Our infantry had advanced a platoon of men in front of each battalion, to attack the enemy first, and be supported by us, yet this was not observed, and robbed us of the only means of striking such as well-trained enemy…." There are other examples of such detached platoons, but it is not clear if these men were operating in loose order.

Anon. Sammlung ungeduckter Nachrichten, Vol. 1, 35. 1782 by Gottlob Naumann. Vol. 4, 568.

link

Because it is skirmishing, it rarely is 'clear' what the troops are doing, which is one reason it isn't written about as often…or as 'clearly.'

"Yet, he comes to the conclusions he does regarding British light infantry. I do think that as 42flanker says, it applies more to the light infantry acting as battlions rather than independent companies."

And yet, every account I've read thus far about the LI attack at Brandywine creates the impression of each company doing its own thing, rather than acting as a coherent "battalion" attack.

"And yet, every account I've read thus far about the LI attack at Brandywine creates the impression of each company doing its own thing, rather than acting as a coherent "battalion" attack."

I agree, it was Springer that seems to come to that conclusion, or at least suggests that with the examples he gives.

The LI attack at Brandywine creates the impression of each company doing its own thing, rather than acting as a coherent "battalion" attack

I think it might be when one reads in isolation the accounts of the two L.I.companies acting in support Ewald's jägers, advancing along the road to the foot of Birmingham Hill, that it seems that way.

I think it might be when one reads in isolation the accounts of the two L.I.companies acting in support Ewald's jägers, advancing along the road to the foot of Birmingham Hill, that it seems that way.

42flanker:

I think that is the general issue with skirmisher accounts. First, light infantry could and did act as both formed troops and lights, in battalion and company-sized actions. Second, Of course, the company captains will report on their actions in relationship to the formed battle line. That's what they do. Note that the action I quoted, the following occurred:

1. Two companies from different regiments were the advance guard under Ewald. So, they weren't with their regiments and were acting as light infantry, fairly conventional for 'advanced guards.'

2. There are at least two points where the author/captain takes independent action against the enemy as a company, not in conjunction with the other regiment's lights.

3. There are at least two instances of other companies [not regiments] coming to support or join the author's company.

4. There are two occasions where the lights rejoin or link up with the main line, only to separate again as a company.

5. Note that unlike the account you give from Ewald, the author seems unaware of the other companies of jagers, only the mounted jagers. He also doesn't coordinate with Eward [or vice versa] after the first order to cover the flanks… that is the light company's mission. [Which is noted at different times.

This is just one account, but it does establish that light companies did act independently of their battalions, whether line regiment or composite lights AND it wasn't seen as something unusual.

1. Two companies from different regiments were the advance guard under Ewald. So, they weren't with their regiments and were acting as light infantry, fairly conventional for 'advanced guards.'

2. There are at least two points where the author/captain takes independent action against the enemy as a company, not in conjunction with the other regiment's lights.

McLaddie, I am confused reading these, since your reference to regiments suggests you weren't aware that the light companies present were were not permantly detached, and I am pretty sure that is not the case.

It seems to me that the 17th weren't operating independently of their battalion as such but, rather, there was a certain flexibility within the battalion that allowed company commanders to adapt to terrain and enemy fire.

After supporting Ewald,the 42nd & 17th return to their battalion (1st LI) as the leading formations of the main British attack come up and Lt Col Abercromby directs the 17th LI to form on the right end of the line. Nearbye, either next in line or behind them in support- it's not entirely clear- are the light companies of the 4th King's Own, 33rd and 38th.(*It seems customary precedence is not being observedBUT SEE BELOW).

The battalion advances in open order. The 17th LI coy finds itself blocked by a high wall at the church and veering right into the roadway takes them into the field of fire of the enemy guns on Birmingham Hill. They move out of the fall of shot to the foot of the hill but find they can't advance any further. They are joined by the men of the 38th & 33 LI coys, presumably also sheltering from 'grapeshot' in the lee of the hill. This has the effect of dividing the 1st LI in two. The rest of the battalion, (less heavily engaged, it would seem) are some distance to the left on the other side of the church. The LI coy of the 4th K.O. is in view, if not close at hand. There is stalemate in this section of the field as "tremendous fire from both lines" holds the opposing forces in check.

The group of 3 or 4 1st LI coys on the right, edging up Birmingham Hill, seek support from the 2nd British Grenadier battalion to their right rear, who are evidently operating in a similarly loose manner, since the grenadiers of the 43rd Regt, on the left end of 2nd Gdr Bn, are free to come up in support of 1st LI (fetched by Major Stuart of their regiment who has no authority on the field other than force of character).

As the grenadiers arrive, the American line buckles and they accompany the 4 coys of the 1st LI assaulting up the hill through the now abandoned guns. At the top the mounted Colonel Abercomby arrives to reorganise his battalion before moving on.

To me this illustrates not merely how the 1st LI operated in that particular phase of that particular battle, but also, perhaps, the looser style in which both the LI and the Grenadier battalions of the Reserve as a whole were operating during that period of the war. The grenadiers' advance was broken up by successive fences and would have required a certain looseness of formation if they were not to lose all cohesion entirely.

(*PRECEDENCE?: UNLESS the 1st formed up somthing like this-

42nd, 5th, 23rd, 27th, 22nd,10th, 4th, 17th
--------------28th, 35th, 40th, 38th, 33rd-------------

I think Spring deals with precedence at some point in the book (I don't have it to hand) and refers to it being, in a word, ignored when it suited – which was most of the time.

That would seem to be the case

So it's not that the concept of skirmishing was "new." After all, there are all sorts of examples of it during the 30 Years War, some of them quite intricate (especially some of the Swedish efforts).

The question is "what did they do in the 18th century" and what impact, specifically, did it have on the AWI? While the British may have figured things out, eventually, during the F&I they obviously had to re-learn some things in 1775. This is not new.

Great discussion on Birmingham Hill. I keep learning new things…

Very interesting topic. Based in part on my reading of secondary sources, but more on extensive primary research in contemporary letters and papers by a friend of mine:

1. FWIW, what modern readers call "skirmishing" was referred to by both sides in the AWI as "Indian-style".

2. My friend's research solidly support Spring's thesis that the British never used Indian-style in pitched battles, the sole exception being the Hessian Jaegers. However, advanced guards, fights between picquets, and small "affairs of posts" saw Indian-style fighting used by both sides.

3. As I believe we all know by now, the rebels were in general no different. The two exceptions are the over-mountain men, who always fought Indian-style, and some (not all) of the rebel rifle companies, . Kings Mountain shows how effective they could be in the right terrain, but they would have been soundly beaten by good troops in open terrain, even without cavalry.

4. The main way in which the British adapted to American conditions was not to adopt Indian-style, but to open up their files. As the war went on, and especially in the South, they increasingly used open or extended files in place of shoulder-to-shoulder close order. The one created an arm's-length gap between each file, the other created a gap of several paces. Thus extended files were not dissimilar to what we wargamers often call "open order" but they were still formed, and moved and fought in formation.

Thus, AWI rules for pitched battles should restrict Indian-style fighting to jaegers, over-mountain men, some rifle companies, and – of course – Indians.

My friend's research solidly support Spring's thesis that the British never used Indian-style in pitched battles, the sole exception being the Hessian Jaegers. However, advanced guards, fights between picquets, and small "affairs of posts" saw Indian-style fighting used by both sides.

Rawdon: I don't know what research your friend did so I can't comment, but the conclusion that the British *never* used 'indian-syle' methods in a pitched battle except… advanced guards etc. is sort of saying that they never did it except when they did.

Brandywine was a pitched battle with an advanced guard in fairly open terrain [compared to woods like Freeman's Farm and actions that were very much like small "affairs of posts" are described by the account I gave.

I think that a lot of 'indian-style' fighting gets misrepresented or simply overlooked while looking for the 'one thing' that was always done, as if there was no thought of matching tactics to circumstances.

Even Johann Eward of the Hessian Jagers that you say was the sole exception writes in his Treatise on Partisan Warfare, writes on page 78:

If the advance guard should unexpectedly meet an enemy party, there is no need to challenge it. Instead it has to attack the enemy immediately with the sword, but, if the enemy retreats, never pursue it. An unexpected attack startles the enemy, and the leader of the corps gains time to deploy his corps in good order and to wait for daybreak. In the same manner the officer of the fusiliers has to react if he forms the advance guard in wooded or mountainous areas and meets the enemy. He must not give fire but only use the bayonet. If the commanding officer of Robinson's Corps had acted this way during the march from Hood's Fort and Petersburg in Virginia, the Americans, who had deployed on a crossroad, would have been able to apply their fire as well as they did.

Now, if someone accomplished in 'indian-style' gives that recommendation to an advanced guard, one has to assume it is for that specific situation… in Partisan Warfare. and it is still a given today in the military that when ambushed or surprised, the unit best acts as Ewald suggests.

Point being, that the British did more than what Spring suggests, particularly when they realized that Ewald's approach above didn't always work…as Spring points out in his section "The…Woods Rendered Our Bayonets of Little Use."

I can explain further below in the post to 42Flanker.

42 flanker:

Yep, I did say regiment when I meant battalion [Those often being the same thing with British regiments in the field.

I read through your description over several times. I think I see why you say what you do. Here are my observations:

First, keep in mind that captains of companies among formed troops had few if any decisions to make during this period, particularly in line of battle. The same is true of battalion commanders.

Christopher Duffy, in his The Military Experience of the Age of Reason quotes both a German and French writer/general in 1785:

In battle, an officer of the infantry can make not the slightest movement of his company or division [2 co.s] on his own initiative…Whether in general actions or formal sieges, the individual officer is lost in the crowd of combatants, and he kills or is killed without any hope of sharing in the glory which is desired as greedily by every military man.

This is true even into Napoleonic times. Read Col. Napier's description of his actions during the Battle of Corunna. He does three things [if you can call them command decisions] during the entire battle: Checks the order of his troops, checks to see that the flanks of his battalion/regiment [the 52nd] are still connected to the battle line and asks general Moore if he can send out the grenadiers to support his light infantry. He is later ordered to charge with his regiment and clear Elvina of the French.

So, IF the Light companies at Brandywine are operating in conjunction with the battalion and/or battle line whether in loose files or close, company captains are NOT making individual decisions. They have none to make. Yet that is exactly what you see the author of the account describe:

"….Upon the Troops getting again in motion the advanced guard was composed of the 17th and 42nd Light companies and Capt. Evalts troop of mounted yagers…. having advanced less than a mile Capt. Evalt [Ewald] proposed charging a party of dragoons on the road, provided we secured his left flank.

So, Ewald advances up the road aand the two companies secure is left flank. [Neither were on the right flank according to this account]

-this was assented to, and the two companies quitted the road for this purpose to gain an orchard on the left flank; received a fire from about 200 men in the orchard, which did no execution; companies ran up to the fence and halted, as it was evident tho' the enemy fell back they were well supported.

This suggests loose order and the companies decide to halt for their own reasons… Ewald seems to be forgotten by now.

-Lord Cornwalis Aid de camp came to order the advanced guard to halt. -looked back and saw the line nearly formed and presently advancing.

Okay, they halted and then are ordered not to advance any further. They are in front of the battle line forming:

-Right of the road Guards – 2nd batts. B. Grens. left of the road Batts. of yagers. 2 Batts. of light infantry. 2nd line – Hessian Grens. on the right. -brigade of British on the left. -reserve Brigade of British.-

Here is the battleline with TWO light battalions, Robert Abercromby commanding the 1st battalion, of 14 light companies and Major John Maitland, the 2nd Light on the left of the road next to two battalions of Jagers.. and the Grenadiers on the Right of the road. And of course, there is a second line.

As soon as the line approached the advanced guard Lt. Col. Abercromby ordered the 17th light company to form on the right of the battalion, the 42nd, on the left.

So, the order to form on the battalion, so now they are acting as a part of the battalion and the battle line. The company of the 42nd is on the far left flank of the army, the 17th at the juncture between the two light battalions.

-As soon as the line came up to Dilworth Church the enemy opened fire from five field pieces; the church yard wall being opposite the 17th light company, the captain determined to get over the fence into the road, and calling to the men to follow ran down the road and lodged the men without loss at the foot of the hill on which the guns were firing. .

This would be an unsupportable action by a company captain, to ‘determine' to act independently of his battalion--if considered in formation with them, down the road [which is basically perpendicular to the formation in the middle of the line…not in front of his battalion. So the captain is placing his company in front of the middle of the battleline…by whose order? Where are the other 12 companies of the 1st Light Battalion and does that seem to be a concern of the captain at the moment? No.

The hedge on the left side of the road much cut with the grape shot.-by a bend of the hill had a view of part of the enemy's line opposite the grenadiers and opened a fire from about half the company on it; no more being able to form on the space; presently joined by the 38th company some of their gallant soldiers wanted to ascend the hill immediately; objected as too imprudent; the 33rd company joined immediately afterwards, and the men of the three companies calling out up the hill; at their cannon, ascended the hill and had a glimpse of the enemy's line as far as the eye could reach to the right and left.

So, half the 17th Light Company is now next to the Grenadiers and firing with half the company on the enemy line--because of an obstructed LOS. The 17th is joined by another company, the 33rd. [Where is the Light Battalion, the battleline?]. And why would the soldiers of the 38th even think they could decide to ascend the hill, let alone decide for themselves that it was imprudent? Then they devolve to calling out at the enemy artillery.

-some firing might have taken place on the left, but as yet the heavy fire of the musketry was not begun. -enemys guns too far back on the heights to annoy us, their line advancing on us, we were compelled to throw ourselves on our knees and bellies, and keep up a fire from the slope of the hill.

Now the three companies are on the right, only some firing ‘might' have occurred on the left. And take cover to fire up the hill. They can't be acting ‘in conjunction' with the Light Battalions. They are on the far left of the road in line with the Jagers. No wonder the author can only same that some firing ‘might' have happened there. They are nowhere close.

-enemy repeatedly attempted to come on, but were always drove back by our fire altho' their General (Lincoln) very much exerted himself At this time a most tremendous fire of musketry opened from both lines.

Hmmm, no bayonet charges. Laying down or kneeling and driving back the enemy with their fire. Where are the Grenadiers?

-Looking back to see how far the grenadier line was off from which alone we could receive immediate support,…

So the three companies are some distance in front of the Grenadiers and are not looking for support from
anything on the left of the road from their own battalion or the other lights and Jagers.

…to my surprise I saw close to me major Stuart of the 43rd whose regt. being at [stationed at] Rhode Island attended the army as a spectator; recollecting the 43rd grenadier company was the left of their line, [close to the road] we persuaded Major Stuart to run down the hill and prevail on that company to hasten to our support;

Considering the military at this time, asking an observing officer to persuade a major to break the battleline to send a grenadier company to support them--unheard of IF they are supposedly part of the lights or meant to support the formed battleine whic is formed up… unless there was some belief that is was 'allowed' to simply request support from companies…pieces of the battleline.

he did go, but before he could return, to my inexpressible joy, saw Captain Cochrane of the 4th company on my left throw up his cap and cry Victory.and looking round saw the 43rd company hastening to our relief;

This action was very much companies moving in and out of coordination with each other without much direction from anyone. They certainly weren't a part of the battle line. And why not the entire Lt battalion instead of pieces of it in a seemingly uncoordinated way.

-we dashed forwards passed the five pieces of cannon which the enemy had adbandoned and made some few prisoners, enemy running away from us, with too much speed to be overtaken.

Now this is again, an action on the prerogative of the three companies--not some order from the main lines or a battalion commander.

-The men being blown we halted and formed to a fence, and were immediately joined by the 2nd grenadiers to our right [His own battalion left away to the left;] as soon as the men were fit to go on, out of gratitude to Major Stuart we desired to elect him our chief and meant to have gone on under his command, but before we could move Col. Abercromby galloped to us, and we joined the battalion. –

The three companies, men and captains, wanted to put Major Stuart in charge and continue forward without any orders??? They felt they could make this decision?

Abercromby gallops over and corrals them, having the companies to join the battalion before they went haring off… which obviously they weren't joined to on the left side of the road.

What is described is not a formed or coordinated battalion action in the usual 18th century sense of those terms, but rather companies acting independently of their battalion at different points of the battle [when they weren't being asked to rejoin their battalion.]

The 17th and other companies weren't even in front of their battalion, but instead in front of the right flank grenadier battalions. They were obviously at times acting independently of both the battle line and their parent battalion in a pitched battle. And remember, this is in 1777, the same year as Saratoga.

I am not suggesting that this is the only way the British lights fought or that British lights didn't employ the bayonet. I am suggesting that Spring's conclusions doesn't fit the example I gave at all and suggesting such a 'johnny one-note' approach throughout the war by the British isn't supported by the evidence.

McLaddie I have to say that the number of assumptions and differences of interpretation you make with which I disagree are too many to list here, at least at present. I do think you may have made several misreadings.

I don't believe it a question of the light companies mentioned being independent of their battalion. They are part of the battalion still, but that portion of it on the right end of a loose battle formation, separated from the rest of the battalion by the obstruction of the meeting house, and the evidence clearly suggests that the light battalions operated in that loose-knit way. At no point is the deployment presented as remarkable; merely a response to the circumstances of terrain and enemy fire. Nor is the autonomy of the company commanders presented as an extraordinary measure, but simply how they were expected to do their job. The improvisational liaison with the Grenadiers of the 43rd, taking advantage of Major Stuart's presence, is part of that autonomy, and also indicates the relationship that had built up between the Lights and the Grenadiers in the year since Howe's army arrived off New York. Could they make that decision? Evidently they could.

The right wing portion of 1LI was not in front of 2nd Grenadiers, they were ahead of them and to their left, effectively in echelon. It is not clear from McGuire's narrative, which is the one I have to hand, how that relationship came about but it would seem to be in part because of the fences the Grenadiers had to negotiate on their way towards the American position.

There was no bayonet charge by the men of 1st LI while the enemy fire was too heavy. When that fire faltered as a result of success farther to their right, then the men of 1LI duly charged up the hill to take the guns which they found had been abandoned by the time they reached them.

Yep, different interpretations of that one account. Well, from the account, I would say that:

1. Those companies where not near their own battalion a good portion of the time and obviously apart from the two times they were recalled, operated independently according to the narrator. They certainly were 'a part' of the battalion, but they weren't acting as such… If they had been there would have been no recall by Abercromby--twice. Note that the first time the company is recalled to the left of the line, it is the company captain that decides to act:

-As soon as the line came up to Dilworth Church the enemy opened fire from five field pieces; the church yard wall being opposite the 17th light company, the captain determined to get over the fence into the road, and calling to the men to follow ran down the road and lodged the men without loss at the foot of the hill on which the guns were firing.

Now, the First Light Battalion was on the far left, the 17th, the road ran down the middle of the battle line, so by deciding to run down the road to the foot of the hill…now ahead of the battle line. To do that, the 17th had to cross in front of the 2nd Lt Battalion and the two Jager battalions to reach the road. The 17th is still part of the 1st Battalion, but it certainly isn't maneuvering with it at all at this point.

2. The captains were at times making decisions wholly unrelated to the actions or location of their parent battalion, let alone the left flank…regardless of the obstacles.

3. It doesn't matter if the battle line/battalions were in a loose formation or a tight one. That is just spaces between files, not a different command structure or method of moving *together.* IF the battalions are moving and acting as a discrete unit or part of a battle line.

4. The right wing portion of 1LI was not in front of 2nd Grenadiers, they were ahead of them and to their left, effectively in echelon. If the 17th Lt company had to 'look back' to see where the Grenadiers were, I think whether at *some point* they were in echelon doesn't matter.

5. The 'charge up the hill' says nothing about bayonets, which is a notable oversight if it was indeed considered one by the participants. But assuming it was, it was only after a lot of firing at different targets including the guns.

6."At no point is the deployment presented as remarkable; merely a response to the circumstances of terrain and enemy fire. Nor is the autonomy of the company commanders presented as an extraordinary measure, but simply how they were expected to do their job."

Presented by whom? I never said it was an extraordinary measure. The narrator does present it as very 'normal' for the company captains to decide things for the company without reference to the battle line and operating or contemplating operating as multiple companies under majors and other captains.

That was the whole point… it wasn't presented as remarkable or out of the ordinary, and the narrator wouldn't have written what he did if it represented gross insubordination…which it would have been if the order had been to remain with the 1st battalion and act as a member company with it.

I think that when generals gave their descriptions of the battle and battle lines, the very fluid, multiple activities of skirmishers in front and on the flanks are not often described other than possibly mentioning that skirmishers were sent out… they were seen as minor actions, however necessary and not something that CinCs followed very closely. The battle line control and success was their focus… which is why Colin believes that skirmishing is so often overlooked in battle reports and narratives.

McLaddie you seem to be making some unfounded assumptions, and have a mistaken notion of the order in which Cornwallis' troops formed up and the timing of that manoeuvre, which means that some of what you say makes little sense.

I suggest you read, or re-read, a commentary like Thomas McGuire's. Until you have a clear image of who was doing what where, there is no point discussing other points.

I suggest you read, or re-read, a commentary like Thomas McGuire's. Until you have a clear image of who was doing what where, there is no point discussing other points.

The only assumptions I am making is that the author is describing what HE knew. So how does McGuire's version differ and why should we believe him over the author?

What the author describes is internally makes sense…what doesn't make sense is the differences you see between McGuire and the author.

42flanker:

I have both McGuire and more recent Michael Harris book on the battle. I'll get back to you once I see why you don't believe the author's account, even though he was there, not McGuire, who spent one chapter of his book on the entire battle.

I think there are explanations for any difference between McGuire's account of the battle and the author.

"The main way in which the British adapted to American conditions was not to adopt Indian-style, but to open up their files."

Well, they certainly did it at Freeman's Farm. The 24th advanced into the woods and "treed," driving off Dearborn at one point.

I think open files, that is formed at "order" was standard for most British formations during the war, but there were no doubt exceptions depending on the circumstances.

You are correct for the American Revolution.

I have tried to look at regulations, manuals and instructions from the Seven Years' War though to the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

"Order" for troops in America during that Revolution was an 18-inch interval between files. This was introduced in Boston in February 1776 by Howe, though more established by him at Halifax later during the year for the regiments when formed in battalions and for the grenadiers. This allowed all infantry to move with less delay than in the "old days" when the troops formed shoulder to shoulder, even if only "lightly touching".

Howe's light infantry instructions of 1774 had a slightly wider interval (24 inches) with open order meaning intervals were two paces or 48 inches and extended order of six feet (or more).

An quick note: pace distances changed during the 18th Century. Before 1757 a pace was three feet (36 inches), from 1757 one pace equaled two feet (24 inches) – thus the American Revolution – and after 1792 a pace was thirty inches (30 inches).

When the light companies were acting by themselves (not formed with their battalion – whether parent regiment or a combined light infantry battalion), they acted in formation though with greater intervals between files than when formed with the battalion.

However wide the intervals, it was foreseen that the troops would maintain the ranks for each files (two men per file – the idea for open or extended order being the two men of the same file are never unloaded together – something Ewald required of his Jägers).

It was this (let me use the word) innovation of opening files that provided the flexibility to take on the dispersed Americans (and Indians or other irregular enemies – think insurrections) posted in woods or otherwise fighting in cover.

Now, to be rather thorough (pedantic), allow me to post some additional information.

In 1781, General Phillips included a reminder for training in various formations in his orders while operating in Virginia. He wished the units in his command to be able to be in order, open order and in two, three or four ranks. He uses different terms than Howe had used. Phillips use terms in line with the regulations for distances between files: "order" is referred to as "closer" or "compact" while open order is referred to as "common open order".

Phillips "common open order" conforms to the 18 inches Howe designated as "being the Order in wch they are to Engage the Enemy".

Phillips "closer" or "compact" order are in line with a four-inch interval between files in the Drill Manual for 1764. In a technical sense this manual was still the official regulation (two "bookends" for the period are a copy printed in Boston in 1774 and one printed in New York in 1780).

The 1764 Drill Manual came after the end of the Seven Years' War. It may be useful to point out that in 1757, at the start of the Seven Years' War, "order" was for the files to be "lightly touching". By 1792 and confirmed in 1802, the "order" became "lightly touching" and, for light infantry, "open order" became "arm stretched" or – roughly 24 inches – and extended order was maintained for them.

At that time, a "new" interval was in the regulations "loose order" of 6-inch intervals, primarily for the light companies when not formed with the battalion. In 1807, this was removed.

Oh, yes, almost forgot. Phillips died before his troops could operate with Cornwallis. Still, his training took hold. At Green Spring on the 5th of July 1781, Pennsylvania Major Ebenezer Denny noted in his Journal, "Saw the British light infantry, distinctly, advancing at arm's-length distance, and their second line in close order, with shouldered musket, just in front of their camp their infantry only engaged."

Yes, there is often a confusion between 'loose', 'open' and 'extended'. We also often expect distances to be uniform across time and armies… but as Ralpher points out, that isn't the case.

Loose Order: 11 to 18 inches between files
Open Order: two feet [Howe's instruction in forming up]
Extended Order: five to 50 yards between files

When files did extend to five yards or further, that was what was called a 'chain', where skirmishers operated in pairs. Skirmishers had been doing that since the 1500s. One loaded, one firing.

Open order wasn't an 'innovation.' It was in use before the SYW. Applying it across the board for the British Army in the Colonies as the SOP, was simply using the known tools to handle exactly the tactical situations they had been designed to deal with.

Keep in mind what that required. A battalion of 400 had
a front of about:

Close order in two ranks [22 inches shoulder to shoulder:
66 yards.
Loose Order [11 inches interals+ 22 inches]:
183 yards
Open Order [2 feet +22 inches]:
255 yards
Extended Order [5 yards +22 inches]:
1000 yards

And of course if these 400 had formed units on their flanks that could be a problem… and of course, in extending the line out from close ranks, the outer files had to move much further sidewards to accomplish the extension, whether loose, open or extended line…

Which is why it was far easier to have the troops simply form up in open order than attempted after troops had formed up.

At Brandywine, The Hessian Colonel von Donop was skeptical:

"I cannot yet reassure myself that infantry with its files four feet apart [two feet on either side in open order] can capture entrenchments or hold its ground against cavalry."

Flanker42:

Okay, I've gone over McGuire's and Harris' books. First off, I can see where I screwed up and how I confused you.
I had the order of the Jager Corps and Light Infantry battalions line of battle reversed…with the Jager closer to the road. The 17th was up against the fence on the Birmingham Road. Mea Culpa and my apologies. That is what I get for not paying attention.

However, McGuire and Harris' works amply establish the points I was trying to make:

1. the light infantry did not rely primarily on the bayonet attacking "by battalion", even in 1777, less than a year into the war. Instead companies engaged in skirmish fire in numerous places for long periods of time during the battle of Brandywine. For instance, McGuire notes that at Brandywine the Guard Grenadier's Light Company deployed and screened in front of the Guards as well as deploying 'flankers.' There are quite a few instances, which seem to outnumber the two where the bayonet was employed… by company.

McGuire quotes Lt. Hale of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers observing that in contrast to the Hessians, the British

…Light Infantry accustomed to fight from tree to tree, or charge even in the woods…

McGuire then notes a comment by a Quaker observer that the

'Rushing forward'described by townsend was how light troops in squads and companies moved into action--at a trot."

Not in battalions?

Townsend was watching the light companies come forward of the battleline about 4:30 pm.

2. British light infantry at Brandywine in both columns, Cornwallis's and Knyphausen's operated as independent companies in several places.

This instance is a perfect example again:

-As soon as the line came up to Dilworth Church the enemy opened fire from five field pieces; the church yard wall being opposite the 17th light company, the captain determined to get over the fence into the road, and calling to the men to follow ran down the road and lodged the men without loss at the foot of the hill on which the guns were firing.

McGuire says the high wall prevented the company from keeping up with the Battalion. Harris says that the Rebel 3rd Virginia was defending the wall and stopped the 1st Light Battalion.

Now whether this wall was an obstacle or the 17th couldn't make headway against the Virginians, according to regulations and common practice, Abercrombie would have either expected the 17th to fall back and follow after the rest of the battalion on the left [that was the PRIME responsibility of a company in a battleline: keep connected on both flanks to other companies.] That folding back is what companies did when facing obstacles. If the company did anything else it would have had to be at the direction of that battalion chief.

What happens instead is that Captain Scott decides to do something else without consulting Abercrombie:

The 17th Light crosses over the hedge/fence away from the rest of the battalion into the road and because of artillery fire on such an exposed place runs up the road to the base of the hill… the rest of the battalion is far behind and to the far left fighting its own battle in conjunction with the 2nd Light Battalion. The 4th and 38th Companies somehow think this is a good idea and follow suit. [Again, Abercrombie is not mentioned, unlike the recalls and placement in the battleline.] It is Scott's decision that divides the 1st Light Battalion.

Both McGuire and Harris note how isolated the companies are. Other procedural expectations are operating here, quite different from a typical 18th Century line battalion in a battle line.

3. During the battle, the Light infantry companies did not operate 'in battalions' like the line infantry, yet were able to call on individual line and grenadier companies [not battalions] for support.

This is quite different from typical 18th Century procedures. Individual companies did not go around requesting support from other companies in the middle of a battle without reference to their parent battalions …particularly line infantry.

There a lot more examples of these three points from the books. The Books are The Philadelphia Campaign vol I by THomas J. McGUire 2006 and Brandywine by Michael C. Harris 2014

It should be noted that the officer of the 17th is quoted extensively in both books as well as Captain Ewald's Diary of the American War

Flanker42:

Okay, I've gone over McGuire's and Harris' books. First off, I can see where I screwed up and how I confused you.
I had the order of the Jager Corps and Light Infantry battalions line of battle reversed…with the Jager closer to the road. The 17th was up against the fence on the Birmingham Road. Mea Culpa and my apologies. That is what I get for not paying attention.

Yes. The 1st LI were centre left with their right flank (17th LI coy) against the road.

A couple of points.

However, McGuire and Harris' works amply establish the points I was trying to make:

1. the light infantry did not rely primarily on the bayonet attacking "by battalion", even in 1777, less than a year into the war. Instead companies engaged in skirmish fire in numerous places for long periods of time during the battle of Brandywine. For instance, McGuire notes that at Brandywine the Guard Grenadier's Light Company deployed and screened in front of the Guards as well as deploying 'flankers.' There are quite a few instances, which seem to outnumber the two where the bayonet was employed… by company.

McGuire quotes Lt. Hale of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers observing that in contrast to the Hessians, the British

…Light Infantry accustomed to fight from tree to tree, or charge even in the woods…
McGuire then notes a comment by a Quaker observer that the

'Rushing forward'described by townsend was how light troops in squads and companies moved into action--at a trot."
Not in battalions?

Townsend was watching the light companies come forward of the battleline about 4:30 pm.

Townsend's phrase quoted in McGuire- 'Rushing forward'- is in reference to the speed of the LI's advance, not how they were formed. Maguire's rather unhelpful reference to 'squads and companies' is a red herring (he is not always strong on contemporary military minutiae). That was not Townsend's observation.

Similarly, McGuire quotes Hale's comment in relation to the stately marching rate of Hessian infantry, not the 1st LI's tactics at Brandywine. There were no trees or substantial bodies of woodland on the slopes above Birmingham Meeting House, which indeed was part of their problem that day.

In any case, the passage from Spring that sparked this discussion, bearing in mind that his observation is substantially qualified- "sometimes"- "not commonly" "primary tactic," etc., does not describe the LI fighting only in formed battalions as opposed to more extended formations, or suggest they were in fact entirely conventional in formation or tactics.

"Although light infantrymen were sometimes trained to use trees as cover, on the battelfield they did not commonly perform as genuine skirmishers by utilizing their initiative to exploit the terrain to their advantage and to over come the enemy by means of accurate, independently delivered fire. Instead, like the grenadiers and line infantry, the light battalions' primary tactic was to hustle the unsteady rebels into flight with vigorous bayonet rushes."

That seems to me to be a long way from saying that the 1st, or 2nd, LI was "a typical 18th Century line battalion in a battle line" using "typical 18th Century procedures."

Surely, what the Brandywine episode shows us is the 1st LI advancing as part of Cornwallis' forward line but then "utilizing their initiative to exploit the terrain to their advantage and to over come the enemy by means of accurate, independently delivered fire**" – precisely because at that point on the field they were not opposed by 'unsteady rebels', but by infantry, supported by artillery, who were making a stand and delivering an unexpected weight of fire across open ground.

This meant the enemy were not going to be 'hustled into flight'; not without heavy casualties; at least not immediately. That did, however, happen farther on the American left, where the ‘rebels' had been unsettled by clumsy command decisions, and the subsequent crumbling unstitched the defence on Birmingham Hill, which allowed the advance to proceed at point of bayonet, until they met the American rearguard.

{**It's not clear to what extent "accurate, independently delivered fire" was being brought to bear by the 1st LI from under Birmingham Hill. Soldiers were evidently engaging the enemy with independent fire. Whether it was accurate or effective is another matter.}

2. British light infantry at Brandywine in both columns, Cornwallis's and Knyphausen's operated as independent companies in several places.

This instance is a perfect example again:

-As soon as the line came up to Dilworth Church the enemy opened fire from five field pieces; the church yard wall being opposite the 17th light company, the captain determined to get over the fence into the road, and calling to the men to follow ran down the road and lodged the men without loss at the foot of the hill on which the guns were firing.
McGuire says the high wall prevented the company from keeping up with the Battalion. Harris says that the Rebel 3rd Virginia was defending the wall and stopped the 1st Light Battalion.

Now whether this wall was an obstacle or the 17th couldn't make headway against the Virginians, according to regulations and common practice, Abercrombie would have either expected the 17th to fall back and follow after the rest of the battalion on the left [that was the PRIME responsibility of a company in a battleline: keep connected on both flanks to other companies.] That folding back is what companies did when facing obstacles. If the company did anything else it would have had to be at the direction of that battalion chief.

What happens instead is that Captain Scott decides to do something else without consulting Abercrombie:

The 17th Light crosses over the hedge/fence away from the rest of the battalion into the road and because of artillery fire on such an exposed place runs up the road to the base of the hill… the rest of the battalion is far behind and to the far left fighting its own battle in conjunction with the 2nd Light Battalion. The 4th and 38th Companies somehow think this is a good idea and follow suit. [Again, Abercrombie is not mentioned, unlike the recalls and placement in the battleline.] It is Scott's decision that divides the 1st Light Battalion.

Both McGuire and Harris note how isolated the companies are. Other procedural expectations are operating here, quite different from a typical 18th Century line battalion in a battle line.

3. During the battle, the Light infantry companies did not operate 'in battalions' like the line infantry, yet were able to call on individual line and grenadier companies [not battalions] for support.

I think you are exaggerating the separation of the 17th's LI coy on the right of the 1st LI. You say "the rest battalion was far behind and to the far left." How 'far to the left'? And why do you now say they were ‘behind' – indeed ‘far behind'? Where does the source say or indicate that?

Do we have evidence that there was any greater distance than the extent of the meeting house grounds between the companies grouped on the right wing of 1st LI and the rest of the battalion? We don't know where the light coys of the 38th, and 33rd appeared from. They may well have been sent by Abercromby. The fact that our man doesn't mention this is not an indication one way or other. We also don't know how far to the narrator's left Captain Cochrane with the light coy of the 4th King's Own were sheltering but it can't have been that far, if Cochrane's cry of "Victory" was heard above the battle noise- although that might have been the writer's colouring of an unmistakable gesture. Nonetheless, the identity of the officer and his company's blue facings were clear enough. (We might assume the 4th LI coy as the senior company had been at the right of the1st lst LI line when the 17th LI coy took the right flank as they advanced).

It seems to me the 17th LI coy et al were performing exactly as we might expect troops under Howe and Cornwallis to do at that stage of the war, and the episode does not in essence contradict Spring's observation.

Townsend's phrase quoted in McGuire- 'Rushing forward'- is in reference to the speed of the LI's advance, not how they were formed. Maguire's rather unhelpful reference to 'squads and companies' is a red herring (he is not always strong on contemporary military minutiae). That was not Townsend's observation.

42Flanker:

Oh, I know that McGuire's comment about squads and companies was his, not Townsend… And that such details are often misunderstood. However, McGuire had to get that idea from someplace… and how could it be from history if light battalions always worked as a single unit? McGuire's problem is that if they rushed forward in open order would make a two-rank line of 1,300 men stretch about 800 yards, which next to the 2nd Light battalion would have be about a mile of frontage… which would take in most all of the British battle line. So who was actually 'rushing forward' and how far long the line--where they even formed if rushing by Townsend?

Harris sees the same problem, stating that the Light Infantry were formed up in four ranks in open order to make them fit in the battle line.

Point being, what the light infantry was actually doing isn't clear to most writers and is often left unexplained and authors try to tie up loose ends with narratives that make sense even if unsupported.

In any case, the passage from Spring that sparked this discussion, bearing in mind that his observation is substantially qualified- "sometimes"- "not commonly" "primary tactic," etc., does not describe the LI fighting only in formed battalions as opposed to more extended formations, or suggest they were in fact entirely conventional in formation or tactics.

"Although light infantrymen were sometimes trained to use trees as cover, on the battelfield they did not commonly perform as genuine skirmishers by utilizing their initiative to exploit the terrain to their advantage and to over come the enemy by means of accurate, independently delivered fire. Instead, like the grenadiers and line infantry, the light battalions' primary tactic was to hustle the unsteady rebels into flight with vigorous bayonet rushes."

That is exactly what Captain Scott of the 17th did. That is what the 38th and 33rd companies did. What is also obvious, is that it wasn't in coordination with their Lt Battalion.

That seems to me to be a long way from saying that the 1st, or 2nd, LI was "a typical 18th Century line battalion in a battle line" using "typical 18th Century procedures."

IF the light infantry companies didn't operate on their own initative [the italicized comment above], whose initiative did they follow? The battalion commanders, just like the line. For any 18th century battalion to operate as a single unit, a battalion in line, open order or not, does not allow company commanders to make independent decisions to split from the parent battalion.

Surely, what the Brandywine episode shows us is the 1st LI advancing as part of Cornwallis' forward line but then "utilizing their initiative to exploit the terrain to their advantage and to over come the enemy by means of accurate, independently delivered fire**" – precisely because at that point on the field they were not opposed by 'unsteady rebels', but by infantry, supported by artillery, who were making a stand and delivering an unexpected weight of fire across open ground.

I don't quite follow this, but the 1st Lt did advance as part of Cornwallis's first line… until three companies decided they wouldn't advance with the rest of the battalion.

{**It's not clear to what extent "accurate, independently delivered fire" was being brought to bear by the 1st LI from under Birmingham Hill. Soldiers were evidently engaging the enemy with independent fire. Whether it was accurate or effective is another matter.}

Heavy fire is the way I think it is described. whether it was effective or accurate doesn't really matter if they were indeed using that method rather than bayonets.

I think you are exaggerating the separation of the 17th's LI coy on the right of the 1st LI. You say "the rest battalion was far behind and to the far left." How 'far to the left'? And why do you now say they were ‘behind' – indeed ‘far behind'? Where does the source say or indicate that?

The statement of the narrative was that the 17th Lt. company:
1. Ran from the hedge before the wall up the road to the hill under the Rebel guns. The 1st Light did not reach the hill until much later with more than the Church between the companies and the 1st Battalion.
2. The narrator states that the company was unsupported and in an exposed situation, with the Grenadiers behind them [still coming up]
3. Needing support calls on a Grenadier company, and received it from 43rd Grenadier company. Why, if they were close to the rest of the 1st Lt battalion, [close enough to hear 'Cochrane' call] why would they need support and why would they call on other units rather than the Lt Battalion companies?

The 1st Light Battalion, along with the 2nd Light battalion did finally make it to the slopes and drove away the Rebels. Once the Rebels are retreating, firing is dying down, the British left has come abreast of the right, THEN the man of the 4th is close enough to be heard and seen. [That is assuming they had kept linked to the rest of the 1st Battalion… which considering the behavior of the 17th, 33rd, and 38th is an assumption.]

Do we have evidence that there was any greater distance than the extent of the meeting house grounds between the companies grouped on the right wing of 1st LI and the rest of the battalion? We don't know where the light coys of the 38th, and 33rd appeared from.

I don't either, but the maps in both in McGuire's and Harris' books have the 1st Light several hundred yards left of the Rebel guns commanding the Birmingham Road that the 17th Ran up and sheltered near the guns.
McGuire's map shows the 4th Brigade right of the Lt Infantry at the end of the battle, having gone up the Birmingham road and the 2nd Grenadier Battalion on the right of the road [where the 48th Grenadier Company would come from.]Harris has the Jagers and Lt Battalions moving to the left in an attempt to out flank Stephan's Division and the 4th Brigade coming down between the jagers and lt battalions, but crossing over onto the right of the lt battalions.

This is 1777, the first year of the war and you have this kind of actions by light battalion companies AND the light companies of the Grenadiers [screening ahead of the formed battalions according to Harris.

Spring's conclusions don't fit the evidence early in the war, confuses successful tactics by all British infantry who bragged about with the primary tactics used by the light infantry, even when noting half way through the section on light infantry that bayonet attacks weren't that successful in woods.

The activities of light infantry are often overlooked or misconstrued because they don't fit the neat lines on maps and more numerous descriptions of what are the main actions of the formed troops.

McLaddie,

A few more comments.

If the light infantry companies didn't operate on their own initative [the italicized comment above], whose initiative did they follow? The battalion commanders, just like the line. For any 18th century battalion to operate as a single unit, a battalion in line, open order or not, does not allow company commanders to make independent decisions to split from the parent battalion.

Spring does not say "light infantry companies didn't operate on their own initative." He writes that on the battlefield light infantry (something of a generlisation) "did not commonly perform as genuine skirmishers by utilizing their initiative." Clearly, 'not commonly' does not mean ‘never.'

The 1st LI were not part of a skirmish line at Brandywine Creek. They were part of Cornwallis' main line of attack, comprising Light Infantry, Grenadiers and the Foot Guards (with jager in the woods on the left). They did, however, resort to skirmishing on the front of Birmingham Hill in the face of heavy enemy fire, an activity for which they were organised and trained.

Captain Scott of the 17th was evidently a trusted LI commander, detached to form part of Howe's advance guard supporting Ewald and then sent by Abercromby to take the right flank of the 1st LI battalion when the battle line formed. His detour, therefore, was not the act of a rash hothead going off on a spree. He felt free to act on his initiative because, it would be reasonable to conclude, that was part of Abercromby's ethos as a Light Infantry commander, as well as the wider flank corps ethos fostered by Cornwallis and Howe. This is evident in the flexibility demonstrated by the 2nd Grenadier battalion with the men of the 43rd Regt. gren. coy. free to move up in support of the 1st LI.

Thus, the three 1st LI companies didn't just 'decide they wouldn't advance with the rest of the battalion'- the 17th LI coy, as you point out, used their initiative to negotiate an obstacle to their advance, It is then quite possible, even likely, that the 38th and 33rd did indeed join them "in coordination with their Lt Battalion."

What makes it obvious to you that this is not what happened?

"Heavy fire is the way I think it is described. whether it was effective or accurate doesn't really matter if they were indeed using that method rather than bayonets."

We are told that the 1st LI engaged in "a most tremendous fire of musketry from both lines." The decision not to advance at point of bayonet was not academic, therefore. The rebels to their front were not going to be hustled. First, the British had to ‘win the firefight'- in modern terms. If their fire was neither accurate or effective, that was unlikely to be achieved.

It would appear that, while the 1st LI were able to hold off successive American attacks, they were unable reduce the enemy fire sufficiently to be able to advance in their turn. When it was finally possible to advance, they did indeed make ‘a vigorous rush' in Spring's words, "dashed forwards" up the hill and past the guns until, with the enemy out of reach, they had to stop for breath.

if they were close to the rest of the 1st Lt battalion, [close enough to hear 'Cochrane' call] why would they need support and why would they call on other units rather than the Lt Battalion companies

The advancing line of the 1st LI had been interrupted by the meeting house precinct and by the artillery fire covering the adjacent road. Although the American brigade(s) to the 1st LI front, "their line advancing upon us," were held back by British fire, the three LI companies on the right evidently felt sufficiently exposed to seek 'immediate support' from the grenadier coy to their right rear. That was the swiftest means to cover their open flank until the 2nd Grenadiers as a whole came up. Meanwhile the other companies of 1st LI across the road to their left had their own battle to fight.

The 1st Light Battalion, along with the 2nd Light battalion did finally make it to the slopes and drove away the Rebels.

It was the Guards and Grenadiers on the right that initiated the withdrawal of the American line on Birmingham Hill.

Meanwhile both the 1st and 2nd LI battalions, rather than remaining at some point to the rear, had both advanced as far as the foot of the forward slopes and were struggling to make an impact on the enemy holding the high ground

"The 1st Light did not reach the hill until much later"

I am curious on what you base that conclusion.

As we know, the 17th LI coy had formed on the right wing of the advancing 1st LI battalion:

"As soon as the line came up to Dilworth Church the enemy opened fire from five field pieces"

At that point Capt Scott with his company found their way blocked by the high wall of the meeting house precinct andsimply moved sideways to avoid before ducking along the grape-swept road to the foot of the hill. These were not great distances. Meanwhile the rest of the 1st LI, with no obstacle to their front kept advancing until they also found cover at the foot of the hill.

what the light infantry was actually doing isn't clear to most writers and is often left unexplained and authors try to tie up loose ends with narratives that make sense even if unsupported.

Indeed.

By the way, September 1777 was well into the third year of the war.

Spring does not say "light infantry companies didn't operate on their own initative." He writes that on the battlefield light infantry (something of a generlisation) "did not commonly perform as genuine skirmishers by utilizing their initiative." Clearly, 'not commonly' does not mean ‘never.'

42Flanker:

There is the crux of the issue and what I disagree with: What was or was not 'common' performance by the light infantry. If you see BOTH practices during 'pitched battles', how do you say one is more common than the other?

If you want to say September 1777 was the third year of the war, that is Okay… but it wasn't until 1776 that the colonies declared their independence, so I would say it is semantics. The first major battle, one that involved light infantry [apart from Bunker Hill and Concord and Lexington*] was the Battle of Long Island and that was at the end of August 1776. So, a year later, we have the Battle of Brandywine. For Spring to make the conclusion he does, we would need consider the major battles and large skirmishes to make that conclusion.
McGuire writes:

…The actual tactics used by the British Army at this stage in the American war, which are largely misunderstood and repeatedly misrepresented in popular history. Lt. Loftus Cliffe of the 46th described some innovative tactics and maneuvers adopted by Capt. Matthew Johnson for his regiment's light company shortly after the Battle of Long Island.

"Johnson and his(46th)Company behaved amazingly, he goes thro his manoevers by a Whistle, [not innovative for light infantry at the time]for which he has often been laughed at, they either form to right or left or sqaut or rise by a perticular whistle which his men anre as well acquainted with as the Battalion with the word of Command, he being used to Woods fighting and having a quick Eye, had hisComapny down in the moment of the enemies present[i.e. the moment the enemy takes aim], & up again at the advantegious moment for their fire."

For their fire… Not a bayonet charge…

The 1st LI were not part of a skirmish line at Brandywine Creek.

And you know that how? McGuire says the Guard Grenadier Light company was sent out to screen in front of the Grenadiers. The Light Infantry 'rushes forward' according to Townsend which Spring then says in squads and companies. The Jager Corps on the left of the Lt Infantry send out skirmishers… What makes you so sure the two battalions of the Light Infantry didn't?

McGuire writes: "4:30, Jagers and Light Infantry-already in position about 200 yards ahead of the rest of the line, advanced quickly in open order."

Now, IF that is true, you have to ask some questions:
1. why are they 200 yard ahead of the rest of the line [like a skirmish screen would be] Particular when the Guards were also "200 yards ahead of the main[greadier battalions] and their light company was sent out as a screen…

It is also interesting that McGuire's map has the Jager Corps on the left, but writes that "that Ewald's Jagers fought dispersed along the whole line, yet describes them as fighting with the 1st Battalion…."

How did the Light Battalions form in Open Order without overlapping the rest of the line??? The main battle line, from the Jagers to the Guard is a little less than 1.5 miles wide. The maps show this, McGuire AND Harris state this. Now IF the Light Infantry battalions and Jagers were in open order in two ranks, that is well over a mile frontage. If they formed in four ranks as Harris suggests, that would bring them back to a reasonable front length, .75 miles but in an unusual formation, though one very amenable to deploying a skirmish screen…He writes:

The light bobs were arranged in files four men deep, with arm's-length between them. From this formation, the troops could quickly move into 'extended order," from five to fifty yards apart. This permitted the great flexibility that was the hallmark of light infantry tactics and enabled the men to spread out and take cover rapidly as the situation required,…

So, IF that is true, then the Lt Battalions, unlike the other formed troops were ready to act like 'genuine' Light Infantry as described by Spring--if on their own initiative they could break ranks and take cover….

If the 17th Light was free to move forward and was calling on COMPANIES around them for support… they could well see themselves as part of a skirmish line before the battle line.

That is speculation, but no more so than saying the Light Infantry didn't form a skirmish screen before the Lt Battalions like the Guards, but instead fought like line troops as a battalion.

"The 1st Light did not reach the hill until much later"

I am curious on what you base that conclusion.

McGuire quotes Engineer Captain Montresor, describing the advance of the Light infantry. [and remember this is after the 17th has run up the road.]

"Some skirmishing begun in the valley in which the enemy was drove…Upon gaining something further of the ascent the enemy begaan to amuse us with 2 guns.The chief engineer prassied the stand made by stephen's Division, as well as the mettle fo the light bobs: "the ground on the left being the most difficult the rebels disputed it with the Light Infantry with great spirit, particularly their officers, this spot was a ploughed hill and they covered by its summit and flanked by a wood; houever unfavourable the circumstances their ardour was such that they pushed in upon them under a very heavy fire."
The light troops were all now under heavy fire and were stopped in their tracks…

McGuire notes that the Jagers tried "to extend their left to break the deadlock of being pinned down…

Now where this was happening is behind where the 17th was located on the road… and the 33rd and 38th could have been attempting to outflank the right when they met up with the 17th.

Harris shows the same thing, and even has the 1st Light moves so far left that the 4th Brigade comes in between them and the road [and the 17th Company.] He has the 1st Light held up at the wall for 45 minutes [according to the 3rd Virginia.] Harris says of the 17th and companion companies.

"The new arrivals were far removed from immediate support on either flank… The remaining 12 companies of the 1st Light Infantry Battalion (including the attached company of the 42nd Highlanders), meanwhile, remained pinned down behind a fence running perpendicular to the Birmingham Road about 100 yards behind and to the left of the four advanced companies" [He is counting the 4th too]…The heavy fire and steady accumulate in of losses prompted the officers of the detached light companies on Birmingham Hill to cast their eyes about for assistance.

*The light infantry did act as a line battalion at Bunker hill, but during Lexington and Concord they were dispersed as flankers who attempted [usually unsuccessfully] to run down the colonial skirmishers.

Once again McLaddie, your post contains so many misreadings, misconstructions and garbling of the narrative, to reply would be arguing for arguing's sake, and take up far too much time

I can't help you Sundance. You're on your own.