"Getting inside the enemy Decision Loop" Topic

First go got bugged !

In any systems analysis, very accurate, definative descriptions of the system are vital. I often hear discussions that refer to getting inside the enemy decision loop but have never really seen, or can give an accurate definition of what this entails.

Here are some thoughts on its definition.

It is the ablity of a general to plan and act in such a way that the enemy is unable to respond in a sufficiently short timescale to a new threat and hence is at a strategic or tactical disadvantage. Great waffle but not really of much use in a system design (one of the reasons we went away from this as a parameter in our game).

How is this achieved and what is within its remit and outside it?

Inside the remit, roughly in decending order of importance.:-

1) The commander of the friendly forces is more decisive and acts faster to respond to changing circumstances while the enemy procrastinates.

2) Better reconnisance- this propvides better understanding of the enemy forces and gives better understanding on the ground of the engaement. Hence changes in orders can be faster as reconissance is not required at that time OR the enemy will be delayed by not having such information. This could include surveylance and timeing systems from Timepieces and telescopes to full spectrum surveylance depending on the time period.

3) Communication systems. If you can communicate faster than the enemy then you can "out maneouvere" his forces as they are slower to respond. Not sure if the willingness of allies to operate under a single command structure is part of this (which it sort of is) or should be a seperate issue.

4) Having some level of force available for rapid response even if this weakens the direct front line strength (i.e holding reserves).

5) Being able to maneouvre faster on and off the battlefield and prepare positions for defence faster.

Outside the remit,not sure that this has a value order:-

1) Being able to fire faster is an advantage but not really a decision loop issue.

What would you add or change? At this stage it is important to not look at implementation within a game. Before you do that you need to understand what it is you are modelling.

I'm not sure "procrastinates" is exactly the word in the first item. In many of his campaigns, Napoleon did a great job being decisive and acting faster, while his opponents were still trying to figure out what was going on. He was also sowing confusion to keep them from figuring things out. The second and third points form a sort of feedback loop with 1.

Maybe it's just my background, but I can sort of grasp this on a strategic level, but much less on a tactical or even skirmish level.

Grelber

My understanding is that this is one of those terms which has broadly the same meaning to everyone but the deataiks often differ.
The decision loop is usually an ooda loop.
link

It's a sort of feedback loop. You have one. The enemy has one.
"Inside" pretty much just means faster. The inside track on a race course.

You observe the enemy.
Consider your friendly forces state and abilities.
Decide on a plan.
Implement that plan.

Acting decisively, quickly and or with surprise is likely to do well because the enemy are unable to ooda fast enough to respond efficiently.
Suppressing your enemy means even though he might have a great plan he just cannot act.

You want your loop raster than his.
Either act so fast he can't respond, disrupt his loop or ensure he already lost before he can act.

We used to talk about this as largely a staff function. Commanders are capable of acting without information, or of failing to act promptly when they have plenty of it, but it takes time to cut and transmit orders and overworked clerks can be a bottleneck. The classic cases are Austerlitz, with the Allied staff still writing out orders to the various columns with the French already attacking and invalidating those orders, and the run-up to Gettysburg. (By the time the Army of the Potomac had worked out all the positions to be taken on Pipe Clay Creek, the troops were already marching on Gettysburg.)

Many people in the Army felt the solution was a larger staff, but having served on staffs, I'm a little harder to convince. The trick seems to be to have enough people to break down the commander's intent into orders without spending days "coordinating" everything under the sun until the opportunity has passed.

Good luck with that. Patton observed in 1944 that the airborne army was itself a problem. He could have used a regiment of paratroops under his direct command to seize bridges, but by the time the idea went from him to SHAEF to the airborne staff, the bridges were either taken or blown.

Dr Piepenbrink speaks wise words that have been well corroborated by my personal experiences in the corporate environment. The most efficient means of neutering, undermining or killing any idea is to refer it to a large committee.

The OODA Loop concept is very complex, with far-reaching applications to almost any organized competitive human undertaking … at least from my strictly layperson's perspective. Try web-searching "John Boyd OODA Loop". Boyd conceived the concept and lectured and wrote extensively on the subject.

Also try searching "Pierre Sprey OODA Loop"

B

link

UshCha:

It is complicated, but What I would add are two things:

1. Planning Parameters: Does the battle plan provide time for the unexpected so that each force can achieve its orders.

2. The ability/willingness of subordinates to act without direct orders having a well-grounded idea of their responsibilities and decision-making parameters. Part of this has to do with training and doctrine.

To use an example that Dr. Piepenbirnk mentioned: Austerlitz.

On #1. While the Allies were slow to get the orders to their commands [translating them from German to Russian in some cases] But that is not all. Liechtenstein, seeing that his cavalry was positioned wrong when he does receive the plan, moves his troops through the third and second columns of infantry and creates a logjam that takes Kutuzov and the Tzar an hour to unraval, that and the mud the third column had to traverse, slowing them, All the planned attacks began at the designated times. The time of attack provided enough time for some serious issues to be countered within the plan's parameters.

#2. Przebyszewski while attacking west, he saw the French marching up the Pratzen Heights on his right flank. When his officers suggested that he needs to react to that, he simple said that his orders were to attack west. Part of the reason that Napoleon could be said to have gotten inside the Allied Decision-Loop is the lack of initiative the commanders felt they had. Other commanders like Kamensky and Grand Duke Constantine, felt more freedom to address the French advance, though it wasn't part of the plan. That lack of every officer being on the same page, not in communication, but understanding of their job and its parameters created the disjointed responses.

On the other hand, Napoleon had no 'communication loop' going on at all for the first two hours of the battle.

After he released Soult to advance, he confidently let the plan run and wondered the Battlefield. It wasn't until later that he ordered responses to Constantine and Bagration's advances. Because of planning, he had the reserves to call on, your #4. That is forethought rather than strictly a 'decision loop'. It is more like decisions in preparing outside the battlefield decision loop described.

Intriguingly, I learned about the OODA loop only this month, in a political context. Won't go there, but I immediately recognized the absolute truth of it; if you're deciding and acting faster than your opponent, you've got a huge advantage.

As for gaming, to some extent one must admit that there are two OODA loops in play. One is the actual OODA loop of the players themselves, which though in a game may not actually have a real time component certainly does in the concept of "being several moves ahead," that is, quickly assessing the situation and taking actions to drive the progress of the game in a desired direction and pattern, while also being able to adjust on the fly. The second is any OODA loop artificially inserted by the rules to reflect the limitations or advantages of a given force, unit, or what-have-ye. These might be anything from the speed or maneuverability of the forces to outright limitations on the force's capacity or likeliness to follow orders, or on the number of actions the various elements can take in a game turn. Without limiting to these examples, all are OODA considerations inserted into the game's mechanics.

The game designer can and should do absolutely nothing about the first type of loop, save to ensure that a player is indeed able to establish one; that is, the player can Observe the situation, Orient himself to have one or preferably more responses, Decide on what to do, and Act. This is the burden on the designer to allow the players to play the game. This is fad mental, as it places the necessary, even crucial restrictions on the second sorts of OODA loops which form the mechanics of the game and the force differentiation. This may well mean that the designer has to give up cherished or even perfectly logical notions as to what one "should" do in a given tactical situation, or even moreso what the actual commanders may have done, assuming a known historical (or fixed source) action. Forcing a player to act according to a historical script might be accurate, but it also removes him from his own OODA loop and produces a situation that has ceased to be a game, or at least an enjoyable one. Thus, the secondary "mechanical" OODA loop must be subordinate in the design to the primary OODA loop of the players. Allowing the players to "do something crazy," may be just the ticket, and is actually an acknowledgement of the OODA loop principle. After all, perhaps if the actual commanders had altered their own OODA process, the battle would have turned out differently.

So one must weigh whether the secondary artificial OODA limitations make for a good game, or simply put a burden on the player that remove the fun. A delicate balance, to be certain!

Parzival, A very astute analysis. I am of the same opinion as you the players part is just that and cannot be replaced by any form of mechanism. The secondary Mechanical loop is within the designers remit. Some games do better at the secondary loop than others. DBM for all its very simple mechanisms do allow the stage of maneuover before battle, and even sometimes within battle to get reserves into place in a timely manner. This is to me a key part. Providing a game where the players can get at least reserves into play fast. Withdrawing committed forces is much slower but may be possible if not too heavily committed. Again if this can be done credibly its another way of getting inside the opponents decision loop.

"This is fad mental…" in my post above should be "This is fundamental…"

Not sure what "fad mental" is, but I think I've seen people dressed that way.
:-p

The Decision Loop in a game is the players' with all the OODA parameters.

As Parzival notes, that is different from the OODA tools the game system provides the players based on what the military organization and circumstances could provide.

Those 'restrictions' on the player are going to be the limits to the military organzation's ability to:

1. Provide the player/CinC with information and the ability to respond to his decisions, and

2. Represent the ability of subordinates to respond to their OODA, including the restrictions they have to work under regarding how much initiative they have or are willing to take within the structure of their army.

As Parzival notes, the Players' ability to respond to OODA is there problem, not the designer's.

the representation of what the military system can provide the CinC/player in the way of OODA support is definitely the designer's preview.

The decision loop can be simulated at a reasonable level of complexity but Order Chits pioneered by John Hill and Frank Chadwick or DBX's PIP system.

Thomas J. Thomas
Fame and Glory Games

Modelling the functioning of an OODA Loop is not IMO a simple exercise. There is a galaxy of nuance involved – leadership philosophy, organizational psychology, fighting doctrine, force organization, training, communication technology and procedure, even civilian political interference.

My suggestion is to approach with thoughtful care.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

The one thing almost every post has in common is timing.

When pilots discuss the OODA Loop and air combat they are talking about fractions of a second. It takes about 1/4 of a second to notice a situation to respond to it if you are prepared. The better trained you are the quicker you'll respond. Thinking about what to do for a split second can get you killed. Not knowing the full capabilities of your aircraft and how to use them will get the same result.

All of the various issues for both sides can be assigned a timing value and then decide who is quicker on the draw. Friction and breakdown of C&C increases the timing of an event.

I think anything that is binary (act or don't act) is pretty hard to reflect timing depending on the amount of time a turn is.

Wolfhag

The decision loop can be simulated at a reasonable level of complexity but Order Chits pioneered by John Hill and Frank Chadwick or DBX's PIP system.

Thomas:

I can't agree with that. It presents the OODA as the luck of the draw. While chance could impact the OODA, it was hardly a 'pick a card, any card' set of events. Consider what Wolfhag wrote:

The one thing almost every post has in common is timing.

When pilots discuss the OODA Loop and air combat they are talking about fractions of a second. It takes about 1/4 of a second to notice a situation to respond to it if you are prepared. The better trained you are the quicker you'll respond.

It would be not be simulating that experience by reducing the chances of gaining the advantage of training by a chit draw.

All of the various issues for both sides can be assigned a timing value and then decide who is quicker on the draw. Friction and breakdown of C&C increases the timing of an event.

Even if you put twice as many chits for Red Army as Blue, it is still reducing the entire system to chance… which negates a good deal of the whole OODA process/importance and ultimately control the military had over such things.

In certain periods of warfare the reason the CinC was at the front was to have the Situational Awareness to go through his loop and act before an enemy CinC in the rear had enough time to make adjustments and have the friction created by a delay in sending, receiving and interpreting orders. There is no delay in issuing orders in the front but of course, forces him to rely on the ability and initiative of commanders elsewhere on the battlefield.

Let us take Alexander the Great as an example. At the head of his Companion Cavalry on the front line, he performs a maneuver to extend his line. The enemy responds by extending their line. Maybe because the troops are not used to this type of maneuver, the poor terrain or some C&C delays by subunit commanders a small gap in their lines open up.

Alexander, being at the front, has the SA to notice this and no delay in ordering a charge into the gap as there is little or no friction or interference from the enemy to delay him. While he is exploiting the gap the enemy CinC who notices his gap being exploited orders his reserves on that flank to engage him. However, because of the delay time in getting a messenger to the flank and they start to engage Alexander, his light troops have also exploited and enlarged the gap and are in a position to block the reserves from attacking Alexander creating friction and a delay in executing their loop. Now Alexander is free (no friction or delay) to cause havoc in the enemy rear and targets the enemy CinC and his bodyguard in a ferocious charge. Game over.

Alexander created an opening and had the SA to notice it and act before the enemy CinC noticed it being exploited. If he were in the rear it would never have happened. At every step of the battle, Alexander was ahead of the enemy CinC because he was inside their order and execution loop having a minimum of friction and delay.

The initial opening may have been there for only 30 seconds, enough for his wedge-shaped cavalry to get into a gap only a dozen yards wide and force it wider as they went through. The light infantry is able to follow close enough to exploit and support.

The enemy may have had an opportunity to delay Alexander which would have the effect of throwing off his timing by creating friction and allow the enemy CinC to match Alexanders loop but that did not happen.

That's how I see timing playing a part in the battle and the decision loops of the opposing commanders. There are other ways to parse the action but I don't think they can create quite the same feel and effect but I'm no expert in ancient war games.

Wolfhag

At the head of his Companion Cavalry on the front line, he performs a maneuver to extend his line.</q.

Wolfhag:
Battle of Gaugamela, Alexander was at the far right of his entire army line with his Companions, and the reason he could extend the line quickly was that the entire line had to follow his lead…the Companions being the regulating unit. However, the phalanxes were slower than his cavalry.

Alexander, being at the front, has the SA to notice this and no delay in ordering a charge into the gap as there is little or no friction or interference from the enemy to delay him.

Darius was in the center, but close to the front, close enough and high enough on his chariot for Alexander to see. From all accounts Darius didn't seem to have any problems seeing what was happening. There is no indication that he had difficulty commanding his army, other than the fact it was three+ times the size of the Macedonians.

The enemy may have had an opportunity to delay Alexander which would have the effect of throwing off his timing by creating friction and allow the enemy CinC to match Alexanders loop but that did not happen.

Alexander received at least to messages from his left flank commander during the battle, so Alexander 1. wasn't continually engaged and 2. didn't have any knowledge of what was happening on his left flank…which was being outflanked, particularly because of the dust.

It is obvious that 200,000 troops are going to be slower to respond that 40,000 well-trained veterans, but there wasn't any effort to 'throw off' Alexander's 'timing'.
There isn't anything to suggest that Alexander had a better OODA than Darius, just a better plan with better troops.

McLaddie,
I appreciate the feedback. My narrative was not really historical, just "based on a true story" to make my example of timing. That's why I didn't use any other names.

The info is very informative none the less and is appreciated as others could draw their own conclusions from a more historical narrative.

Thanks,
Wolfhag

OK so we are getting to a common consensus on what we think getting inside the decision loop is. So I am now going to move onto the factors in a game which can mimic some of these factors. I am going to stick to the more global movement of troop type issues, not the very tight loops as depicted on Wolfhags post of 26 Feb 2:40 pm.
So to continue, I am (Horror of Horrors) going to be a bit arbitrary in looking at how we do this in a game. I have to agree with Thomas Thomas to a large extent. DBX did get this right at least the way we played it. While waiting to get a "good score" is a bit arbitrary, the pace of the game with equal standard armies (we covered many of the English civil war actions and battles) so not a great deal of difference in troops) is such that you can "wait" for the right score without too much worry and then launch an exploitation of troops in reserve to get them somewhere fast. The "rationing" of the die makes the general chose his moments carefully. If the "good score" was too prevalent both sides could conform with no significant effort. Having played lots of rules this set was by far the best I had ever seen to date covering this issue.

Now why was it so much better than its predecessors? As this is a vehicle for analysis I will be considering only regular armies in DBX, I cannot speak for irregular armies as I have no useful knowledge of such and hence will leave that to better informed and the aim is to look at why the mechanism worked.

Our analysis was that this came from the following:-

1) Potential disparity in speed of travel across the battlefield when unengaged and in an appropriate formation for the travel envisaged. For infantry this could be at an extreme 5 times faster (100 paces for regular dense formation troops within 200 paces) and 5 march moves at 100 paces if of road and 10 times if moving on road.
2) The distance limit to movement in march prevented unrealistically rapid withdrawal without enemy interference. In addition the combat system itself generated "disorder" by breaking up groups so again forming up to a column if not in a single group slowed the system up making it representative.

Up until DBX, certainly in my experience, the only fast movement in the rules I saw were a bit faster on road and a reserve move typically double (sometimes triple move) outside some defined range to the enemy. This disparity in speed was insufficient to gain the advantages of the DBM move and was on a simple element by element basis so did not force the initial planning stage required by DBM to exploit a march move, and as the reserve move was feely available it allowed the enemy to react very quickly with no planning beforehand.

I see no point going further until these points are agreed or disputed. It should be noted that at this point relating the mechanism to the real world has largely been ignored. I reality I can come up with lots of arguments but at this point it is a mechanism issue.

DBX did get this right at least the way we played it. While waiting to get a "good score" is a bit arbitrary, the pace of the game with equal standard armies (we covered many of the English civil war actions and battles) so not a great deal of difference in troops)is such that you can "wait" for the right score without too much worry and then launch an exploitation of troops in reserve to get them somewhere fast.

[if you get the right draws]

UshCha: I've got to ask. It that dynamic I italicized your idea of how commanders experience and employ the OODA process? That is not my impression at all. It certainly isn't either Alexander's at Gaugamela, Napoleon at Austerlitz, or even the battles of the English Civil War….even WWII.

UshCha: This has happened several times now, IS and IF have been translated to IT. A bug in the system?

Anyway, my question: "IS the dynamic I italicized match your idea of how commanders experience and employ the OODA process?"

McLaddie.
In terms of moving troops in certain circumstances yes. It I will agree does not cover the rapid explotation of a 30 second gap in an enemy lines seen at close range. However I suspect normal rules may come to play here. This is more akin the the Wolfhag issue eleuded to.

Certainly In the many cations of the ECW most of which are not that big did show this mechanism to work well in providing plausible refights.

re the is /if issue. no its not a bug.

I'm not really sure what I'm about to say is pertinent to where the discussion is going but I'll throw in my 2 cents.

Any game design attempts to portray some type of interactivity and timing of events between opponents because that is what really happens during a battle. Move-counter move, attack-counterattack, etc. Depending on the level of the game and what the designer wants to concentrate and portray he starts using various tools to give the right feel and feedback to the players. Attempting to exploit a gap open for 30 seconds or assaulting a German MG42 position while he is changing barrels is not pertinent in division level game.

The majority of the tools at hand seem to be abstractions to solve the problem of not having a workable timing mechanism that the game will revolve around. Structured or semi-structured turns, reactions, random activations, command interrupts, etc seem to be ways to overcome the fact that there is no interactive timing mechanism that matches the "lowest common denominator" of action.

In a 1:1 game like a Wild West shootout a "lowest common denominator" timing element would involve one-second timing, for air-air combat it may be fractions of a second, for the ACW it may be a units rate of fire to interact with the movement which could then help determine command interaction, delays, and friction. By using a finite timing mechanism you can portray an action failing because friction or slowed performance caused a delay and not because of failing a reaction roll or because the player failed to pull the right chit out of a bag or some other abstracted game mechanic. However, some of these mechanics are what players like best so I'm not saying they are not relevant to the overall game experience. People play for the different reasons and experiences and to fit their expectations and not to please me.

I think the design begins with the time and distance scale of the game and what I'll call the "Lowest Common Denominator Timing Increment" (I just made that up). That action or timing increment should be used as a turn timing mechanism. Now you can measure how far a unit can travel during that time and how many times he can be fired at based on the rate of fire of the enemy (opportunity fire problem is solved). You can determine how quickly a unit can change a formation and friction will make it take longer as friction generates delays. Better trained and drilled troops will act more quickly than poor troops getting inside their loop unless friction (caused by enemy fire, poor sub-commander initiative, environmental factors, poor command, etc) causes a delay that allows the poor troops to match or get inside their opponent thus seizing the initiative from their enemy. Now you can eliminate initiative rules as the initiative is mostly about timing.

Placing your units in the wrong position at the start of a battle may mean they don't arrive in time to help. The question is how do you reflect that "time" without a finite timing element? You really can't.

I found binary reaction results and random activations are not a way to faithfully portray the timing in a decision loop, especially in 1:1 encounters. They can, however, give a good "feel" to the player, have their specific strategies and be fun.

Personally, I think units are always "active" on a battlefield. Their effectiveness will depend on how quickly (that's where the timing element comes in) they can react and respond to the enemy and how friction can delay it and good training, C&C, and leadership quickens it.

I think in larger battles using the abstracted turn and activation mechanics can portray the ebb and flow that takes place in larger battles like Ushcha said. Friction and random actions can come to dominate the decisions on both sides at battalion level and above. I cannot speak to using a finite timing element above a 1:1 game as I have not attempted it.

So it appears to me the discussion is going towards using traditional abstracted gameplay mechanisms to portray a real-life decision loop without a finite timing element.

That's not a bad discussion to have as all games are really a WIP as is the entire hobby. I think that most discussions that revolve around preferences for abstracted game mechanics normally fail to find common ground.

Wolfhag

Observe
Orient
Decide
Act

A military friend of mine refers to this from the perspective of a DAT [Dumb-Ass Tanker]

"If I can see it,…I can shoot at it. If I can shoot at it,…I can Hit it! If I can hit it,…I can Kill it!"

Now any game system that reduces that OODA process to pure chance isn't portraying reality. I agree that it can be a fun game mechanic, but it certainly isn't representative of what's going on or the actual options and decisions open to a tanker or an army commander.

I think that most discussions that revolve around preferences for abstracted game mechanics normally fail to find common ground.

I think that is because often the abstract game mechanics are grounded in any specific sources, which means a real problem with finding common ground…i.e. ground that all sides recognize.

"If I can see it,…I can shoot at it. If I can shoot at it,…I can Hit it! If I can hit it,…I can Kill it!"

That's exactly how I have it play out. The entire cycle can take 5-20 turns/seconds to accomplish depending on observation delays (variable with a die roll), engagement decisions/tactics (player decisions), weapons platform performance (turret rotation and RoF) and crew training. These are the timing elements.

If the DAT is going to take 10 turns/seconds to go through his loop but an unknown enemy has him in his sights and fires in 8 turns/seconds the DAT is KIA before he can get the shot off. There is a small chance of a SNAFU saving him as nothing is 100% guaranteed. Seconds really do count! Sometimes in the game, even fractions of a second make the difference.

The players do have a risk-reward decision to get the shot off sooner but with an accuracy penalty to reflect Battlesight and Burst on Target gunnery tactics.

In larger scale games players could choose to have a leader lead from the front to react sooner but with a delay in other areas he is not directly influencing. Players risk-reward decisions can matter more than relying on die rolls.

Wolfhag

If the DAT is going to take 10 turns/seconds to go through his loop but an unknown enemy has him in his sights and fires in 8 turns/seconds the DAT is KIA before he can get the shot off. There is a small chance of a SNAFU saving him as nothing is 100% guaranteed. Seconds really do count! Sometimes in the game, even fractions of a second make the difference.

That's more like the OODA… SNAFU's happen, but chance isn't the 'entire shooting match.' The game, the interesting decisions are what one does when the player know the differences between the loading and targeting of each tank.

I think that is because often the abstract game mechanics are grounded in any specific sources, which means a real problem with finding common ground…i.e. ground that all sides recognize.

Typing too fast. That is I think that is because often the abstract game mechanics are NOT grounded in any specific sources, which means a real problem with finding common ground…i.e. ground that all sides recognize.

AAAGH, I did fail McLaddie is correct we have not really gone far enough in the definition of the problem to sensibly define a common solution. In the real world of say defining databases the key issue is not the design but the definition of the requirements. Clearly as you folk have ponted out we have not done that at all well. I will have another think and try and come up with a better approach.

It should not be too difficult. Maybe we should start by defining the components of the OODA Loop and what game mechanics people feel that best duplicate what they simulate. We don't need to have an adversarial discussion.

Example: Observation in my system uses Situational Awareness Checks that replaces spotting and reaction rules. Units that are better positioned to respond (like overwatch) and with better crews that are unbuttoned and not suppressed will react the quickest and normally without a delay. This will give them an advantage is getting to the "Act" part of the loop over others not as well prepared or trained.

UshCha, I know in your game you use rules like "Gaze" that simulate Observation. Maybe if we stated what we use or prefer we could come to some common understanding and agreement.

In your first post, you state 5 actions a commander takes and in some of them you mention timing which is pertinent to the loop. Which of those 5 are O, O, D or A and why?

Wolfhag

UshCha:

Well, as you originally wrote:

In any systems analysis, very accurate, definitive descriptions of the system are vital. I often hear discussions that refer to getting inside the enemy decision loop but have never really seen, or can give an accurate definition of what this entails.

If that is the case, you certainly can't represent something that you have really never seen. Blutarski and Sabre6 have provided definitions

As Wolfhag says, it shouldn't be too difficult.

All you really need to do is pick the sources YOU want to use as the template for the OODA or whatever constitutes 'getting inside the enemy's decision loop'. You got the idea from someplace and there must be real world examples that such concepts are based on. [I would think…] Just one source will do if that is what you want to model.

So, identify those for us, so we can all see what sources you are wanting to model with game mechanics, THEN we can
all talk about how that can reasonably be represented.

Folks may think that is not important to represent, they might disagree with the conclusions of the source or you, but that is another issue. You've picked the sources you want to simulate and want to know about ideas from reasonably

Here is another example of how I'm using timing with decision loops. I use the "Time & Action" concept for running the game. A player reacts and then determines how many game turns it will take to get his shot off by adding up the timing of different actions. Play progresses by announcing each game turn in succession. All players that have scheduled an action for the current turn perform it. If there is no action we announce the next turn, etc.

Below is a better version of the Panther and T-34/85 data cards that show the differences between the timing variables, crew types and weapons platform performance.

‌

It all starts with Situational Awareness

Step 1: Reaction and Situational Awareness Check
Look at the "SA Check" box on the upper left of the card. The number to the left is for unbuttoned TC's, to the right for buttoned up. Roll a D20 and subtract the value. If it is <= 0 the TC spots the threat right away and can start to take action. If the D20 result is > the value that is the number of turns of delay before the TC can notice and take action. You can see the flank and rear areas will generate a greater delay as will be buttoned up. There are also crew modifiers to the D20 roll enabling better crews to have an advantage.

Step 2: Turret Rotation Time.
This is getting the gun on the target. If both tanks need to rotate 30 degrees the T-34 will pick up 2 seconds/turns because of faster turret rotation (30 degrees versus 9 degrees). However, if the Panther was in a good overwatch position he would only need 1 turn/second. You can see how being in a position to respond is important.

Step 3: Shooting Aim Times and Accuracy Modifiers
This is the type of fire control to use which determines the basic accuracy that can be modified by a player's risk-reward choice of aim times. Any value with a tan background is a timing value. Any value with an --> to the right is an accuracy penalty, <-- is an accuracy bonus.

You can see that a German Ace crew using 3 turns of Ranging fire aim time has a 200m accuracy penalty (uses accuracy values 200m beyond the target). A Russian Trained crew must spend 8 turns/seconds aiming and will have a 100m accuracy penalty. The German basically matches the Russians chances of hitting but he'll get the shot off 5 seconds/turns before the Russian with everything else being equal.

You can see that an unbuttoned TC has a clear timing advantage over a buttoned-up TC. In the front aspect, he'll have a maximum of 4 seconds/turns. The buttoned-up T-34 can have up to 12 turns if rolling a 20. However, if the T-34 was able to maneuver into the Panthers 4 o'clock or 8 o'clock they'd both have a value of 8 for their SA Check. The T-34 has evened the playing field by maneuvering. The Panther will need to spend 11-12 turns to get his turret on the T-34 and shooting the quickest he can take 3 additional turns. The T-34 with a Trained crew could take the full 8 turns of aim time and get the shot off first.

In this situation, if the Panther rolled a 20 for his SA check he has a 12 turn delay before noticing the T-34. If the T-34 fired within 12 turns the Panthers first clue the T-34 is stalking him would be an 85mm AP round bouncing around the inside of his compartment.

Well, that's how I've been playing it and so far the playtesters like it and it's pretty easy to grasp the "Time & Action" concept which eliminates the need for traditional game turns, activations and opportunity fire rules and exceptions.

I also posted a Powerpoint about SA and the OODA and how it's used by the players in the game.
link

Wolfhag

Wolfhag:

I think it is important that you've explained where you got all this information concerning timing that make the decision-loops valid and not just a pile of guesses.

McLaddie,
I'll see what I can do.

Reload times:
This is what really affects the realistic rate of fire in the game. The Tiger and Panther reload times are in some books by Green and Jentz and from some trials the British did. The reload times can vary quite a bit depending what bin you are pulling the ammo from. Since most games are short enough that the rounds easiest to load would be used. I had some ideas for the T-34/85 and settled on 7 seconds after watching the loader in the movie "White Tiger". Some reload times mentioned an ideal times and times getting rounds from storage bins. Two-part ammo for 122 and 152mm guns is 22-25 seconds. Reload times and RoF for anti-guns was from watching wartime videos. Poor crews take longer as shown on the data cards.

Overall I found the RoF I'm using is about 60% of the maximum capability just throwing rounds down range.

Turret rotation:
The times were pretty easy to find. The Panthers and Tigers rotation was variable depending on engine RPM. I've tried to simplify that. It appears manual traverse for guns was 5-6 degrees per second.

Gunnery:
In the game, a ranging shot assumes a round already in the chamber. A bracketing shot assumes reload and 2-4 seconds reaiming after a miss. Ranged In is the quickest because less time is needed to sense the round and make corrections. Using Ranged In with minimum aim times simulates rapid fire.

I tried to validate the different timing elements with the realistic engagement times from training manuals, AAR's and first-person accounts. None of these agree exactly so I had to settle on a number. IIRC the German Tiger training attempted to have crews hit a moving target at 1200 meters with 1 of 3 rounds fired with the known range in 40 seconds. IIRC the US Sherman training required engaging a target 45 degrees off and shooting within 10-15 seconds.

For gunnery accuracy and to determine the base MPI I used various military or research articles on Error Budget like this one: PDF link

I put all of these variables into a spreadsheet program mostly from Bird & Livingston's book "WWII Ballistics". Establishing a mil value for the different errors at 1000m it was easy to generate values for every 100 meters. Aiming errors were adjusted based on optics quality and magnification. I used their book for most of the penetration and armor values too.

I'm using range estimation error for a rangefinder is 10%, ace 15%, veterans 20%, trained 25% and green 30%.

Precision aiming range for 5-6x was 800m and 2.5-4x at 500m. I checked this out taking my variable 2.5 to 7x rifle scope to the top of a hill and sighting in on vehicles, without being attached to the rifle.

I do have the range and trajectory tables for the German 88L56 that has all of the angle of descent, ToF, penetration, max ordinate, etc. So I know that one is pretty accurate. I also have some source info like that for the Russians too.

Switching targets is somewhat variable depending on any Engagement Delay, where the target is, turret rotation and aim time for the ranging shot. These variables create their own Fog of War for the player and his opponent. You can't predict any action down to the exact second.

Engagement and aim time for battlesight and precision firing was from US Cold War tank manuals showing a 3-second difference which is what I'm using.

There are also many good discussions on Tank-Net and other sites too.

The hit location table armor values include the compound armor values. From what I can find armor penetration is pretty complicated and variable. From the analysis of various tanks, aspects and armor angle most tanks have a few areas that can create a compound angle of 70+ degrees for a ricochet. All tanks have a weak spot that is vulnerable to almost any gun. Here is a short video of my explanation of the Panther A armor table.
YouTube link

As you can see there is almost nothing I've borrowed from other games, including Tractics. The Phoenix Command books do use a 2-second turn similar to how I use a 1-second turn for timing. The "Time & Action" concept allows for fitting in any tactic or weapon system with very few special rules and exceptions. This includes infantry, air, and artillery.

What I like about it is that you can actually watch the action unfold and flow as the movement arrows length shows the speed and rate of movement per turn without any calculations.

If anyone has specific questions or suggestions I'd be glad to hear them. My main goal was to reflect the timing differences between crew types and weapons platforms and not let the game get predictable. Timing and reaction is wht the loop is all about. Reaction variables are generated by the SA Check and delays.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag:
That certainly does the job in two pages. You write "My main goal was to reflect the timing differences between crew types and weapons platforms and not let the game get predictable."

I can play the game to find out what it does, how you did that, but only you--the designer--can tell me why you have it do what it does to represent reality/history. I can also see where you used guessmations instead of sources and military research: the error estimations for ace, veteran etc.

That's fine, as long as I know what is from sources like Bird & Livingston's book "WWII Ballistics" and what isn't from any source but your own estimations.

And obviously, not all the things that went into your simulation is mentioned, but the basics and primary sources are.