"PBEM players wanted for 1815 campaign" Topic
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paul in rhb | 20 Feb 2018 2:53 a.m. PST |
Hi. I am running a campaign based on June 1815 and wondered if anyone would like to be part of it. I have the 3 main leaders but am needing people to play the role of corps commanders. It is a simple campaign and wont need lots of time.. just regular input on decision making re troop actions and the sending of messages to army leaders etc. (in a similar style to my 1644 ECW of a few years ago) Battle plans will also need drawing up when encounters with the enemy happen. The main attraction is the fog of war the campaign will provide. Maps are done, orders from wellington, blucher and napoleon are just about ready.. so chaps to implement the orders are needed. No cost involved just a willingness to write emails/orders on a regular basis. contact me paul@navigatorpr.com and let me know if you have a preference for any of the sides involved.. British, Prussian or French |
4th Cuirassier | 20 Feb 2018 9:05 a.m. PST |
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khanscom | 20 Feb 2018 3:19 p.m. PST |
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Ironwolf | 21 Feb 2018 12:07 a.m. PST |
Sending an e-mail. Quick question, I'm guessing we will be getting some type of feedback on how battles turn out, scout reports or such things?? |
paul in rhb | 21 Feb 2018 11:13 a.m. PST |
Hi I have had about 20 replies and have emailed everyone. Many thanks as am very impressed.. all positions are now filled. And I have 2-3 leftovers on a waiting list also The plan is that corps commanders issue orders to their divisions, receive reports, act accordingly and generally keep their c in c informed… the aim is to create a fog of war campaign ! time will tell how things go |
Gregor6262 | 21 Feb 2018 3:32 p.m. PST |
This sounds fascinating. Please keep us updated on progress. |
Ironwolf | 21 Feb 2018 11:40 p.m. PST |
paul in rhb, Do you have a webpage and some other way us bystanders can follow along? If not, I hope you post updates on here every once in awhile. Thanky Sir. |
paul in rhb | 27 Feb 2018 3:09 p.m. PST |
Hi Thanks for the comments chaps. I have emailed all the chaps who did not get a place but I now have one more spot open. It might not be a big spot but it will be interesting. Drop me an email please if you would like to be included. Am not sure i will get round to doing a web page/blog but will see how things go. If not i will try do an update at a suitable juncture- with maybe an outline of whether the game is working or not. Cheers paul@navigatorpr.com |
paul in rhb | 27 Feb 2018 3:26 p.m. PST |
Amazing slot filled in record time… thanks.. all positions are now filled. cheers p |
4th Cuirassier | 28 Feb 2018 4:47 a.m. PST |
I'll be interested to see how this goes. I've long thought the best way to do solo games (if you favour an obscure era or ruleset for example) would be like this, i.e. get others to manoeuvre the forces, and you then just implement what they want to do. The problem I always have with games – all of them, not just solo – is that there tends to be a side or unit that I favour, usually because it's the best painted. This distorts what that side then does because I either want them to win, or not get shot up, or whatever. I've long wanted to do the thing where you don't actually fight the battles, but just sit in another room, issue broad directives, and wait for the results to be reported. |
paul in rhb | 04 Mar 2018 8:15 a.m. PST |
well… did you email me? its fascinating seeing 23 players sending orders in and being the only one with the other all picture.. |
paul in rhb | 05 Mar 2018 2:36 a.m. PST |
hi again.. a position has opened up in the campaign if anyone is interested in joining in.. its early doors so its a good time to join message me please at paul@navigatorpr.com |
paul in rhb | 09 Mar 2018 12:21 p.m. PST |
all sorted for now thanks |
paul in rhb | 14 May 2018 1:54 p.m. PST |
well we have got to the end of the first day 15th june.. am not sure either side knows what's going exactly! Napoleon has some sort of plan and Wellington is still trying to work out what it is !! or knows what's happening and has positioned his troops accordingly. Will do a report at some point . |
Kokolores | 15 May 2018 6:53 a.m. PST |
I am one of the players involved in this campaign and I can say I am enjoying it immensely. Thank you for organising the game, Paul! |
leofwine 3 | 16 May 2018 1:43 a.m. PST |
Me too, any clues what formation you are leading Kokolores? Paul is doing a grand job! |
Kokolores | 16 May 2018 4:24 a.m. PST |
I am the commander of the French Imperial Guard. How about you? |
paul in rhb | 16 May 2018 11:31 a.m. PST |
Ha.. lets keep players anonymous if we can …. all will be revealed later am sure…cheers |
Osterreicher | 16 May 2018 2:12 p.m. PST |
Paul, was I supposed to keep it to myself that I'm commanding Guards Armoured? |
4th Cuirassier | 17 May 2018 4:08 a.m. PST |
Just don't tell anyone the French have a unit of Daleks. |
paul in rhb | 17 May 2018 9:06 a.m. PST |
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Please delete me | 17 May 2018 10:23 a.m. PST |
If a commander is suddenly "recalled or killed", I would happily accept a command if offered!! |
paul in rhb | 17 May 2018 4:30 p.m. PST |
thanks.will kep you in mind.. one nearly did get killed/captured and i would have felt bad for the player.. fortunately the dice rolled kind and the commander escape harm… he had blundered alone with a small escort into a town occupied by the enemy |
paul in rhb | 14 Jun 2018 2:50 a.m. PST |
one slot maybe available… cant totally promise yet but anyone interested please let me know asap.. we are just past dawn on 16 june and the action is hotting up… 23 players all committed really well ( except one who may have hot footed it away from the impending battle -hence the need fr a stand in) paul@navigatorpr.com |
leofwine 3 | 14 Jun 2018 4:57 a.m. PST |
I bet its that bloody Milhaud. Him and his cavalry have not been where they are supposed to be the whole campaign so far. That's donkey wallopers for you, leave the grunts to do all the work! |
4th Cuirassier | 14 Jun 2018 9:45 a.m. PST |
Get involved, it's a blast. I normally only get this WTAF-is-happening? feeling at work. |
paul in rhb | 14 Jun 2018 3:31 p.m. PST |
he's resurfaced so no one else needed… things will start moving again soon..cheers p |
Please delete me | 22 Jun 2018 4:58 a.m. PST |
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paul in rhb | 25 Sep 2018 8:03 a.m. PST |
23 players, 7 months of action. It has now finished. We used the map from the Napoleon board game supplemented by some great maps from the US army from the 1930s. Battle reports follow. A short campaign history – 15 June Umpire's report I will leave each side to tell their own plan and narrative. The map will arrows on shows the day's movements. On the French left 2 infantry corps and the IVa cuirassier corps pushed up the Ghent road forcing back a British light cavalry screen. By 11am the cuirassier corps was charging over the bridge into Oudenaarde which was defended only by the light cavalry. (The towns on this road and Ghent were undefended by the British) Due to 2 calamitous pieces of bad luck one French cuirassier division was routed and the other also fled back to Rennaix. Ghent could well have fallen by early afternoon but as it was the VI infantry corps plodded into it by nightfall. News of its fall would later cause potential desertions amongst the Dutch Belgian troops. II corps turned right and pushed cautiously but unopposed through Ath. By nightfall they just missed contacting the British guards division and a Dutch infantry division who decided to evacuate Engheim in the nick of time. The Prince of Orange made a slow retreat with his corps after waiting all day for orders from Wellington. Had the 2 divisions stood at Engheim the French II corps would have been in trouble. The 3rd Dutch division at Ninove also was paralysed and could maybe have saved Ghent earlier in the day. Early in the day a couple of key messages from Orange to Wellington went missing. The French imperial Guard pushed unopposed, except by a light cavalry screen through Mons and Soignes. By 3pm they were outside Braine le Compte and immediately attacked the 1st Dutch infantry division stationed there. By a cruel irony the Dutch had been ordered to retreat but a delay in implementing the order meant they pinned in position by the French Guard. An almost orderly withdrawal followed but casualties were taken. The division was battered and retreated to Waterloo. The Battle of Braine Le Compte The Dutch infantry were deployed and as the message to withdraw arrived, at 3pm, the commander was seeing the French imperial guard arrive just a mile or so from Braine. The order to withdraw took some time to organise and by 4pm things were in a position to action. However by 3.30 the young guard were advancing to the eastern hill. Their progress was slow but by 3.45 first contact had been made and the dutch flankers regiment was immediate broken by 2 young guard battalions. By 3.45 french artillery was in position to start bombarding the town. And by 4pm an assault on Braine was beginning to be launched by the chasseurs of the guard As the attack was launched it was noticed that the Dutch had begun withdrawing their 2 other infantry brigades from the town and retreating to wards Nivelles. The 3rd brigade of dutch infantry in the woods and the light dragoon brigade were left as a rear guard as the French attack developed. By 4.15 the Chassuers of the guard had occupied Braine and the guard LC swept behind the town to attack the British cavalry. By 4.30 the young guard had cleared the woods and the dutch infantry brigade was routing in disarray with heavy casualties. By 4.30 the 3 British cavalry regiments had routed with heavy casualties towards Hal . The town and environs was completely in French hands and by 4.30 the corps was either around the town or marching close towards it. The Guard Light cavalry took no casualties but is blown and needs to rest and reform.. The Young guard took slight casualties. The Imperial Guard held its position but sent cavalry towards Hal and in pursuit towards Nivelles. Wellington had been touring his men and almost rode into Braine in time for the battle. Instead he chose to ride to Hal and arrived there just as the Reserve Corps (who had relocated on their own initiative from Brussels) were marching out of town towards Braine. On meeting the French cavalry the corps turned round and hastily retired into a defensive position at Hal. The French pursuit into Nivelles almost struck gold. Uxbridge the British Cavalry commander had toured Charleroi and decided to scout out Nivelles and its environs. He had sent the cavalry corps to Waterloo from Quatre Bras late in the afternoon. He scouted into Nivelles with a small escort and arrived exactly at the same time as French Guard cavalry pursuing the Dutch infantry. Fortunately for Uxbridge he escaped unhurt retiring but then reoccupying the town at nightfall as the French withdrew. In an irony of orders the British Cavalry corps withdrew from Quatre Bras to Waterloo whilst the British II corps relocated from Waterloo via Quatre Bras to just outside Nivelles by nightfall. In the other key development in the British sector, the French III and IV infantry corps made a painfully slow advance through Bianche to Roeulx. Much time was wasted in the slow advance along difficult roads. Vandamme exercised extreme caution and notified Napoleon that he would march via Soignes to Braine having heard the gunfire. Napoleon jumped on his horse and rode like the wind to Roeulx. It is expected that the 2 corps will push north in the morning. It is likely several hours were lost through cautious marching and the opportunity to place both corps near Nivelles by nightfall could be pivotal for the campaign. The British seem unsure where to fight an impending battle – Nivelles, Waterloo or Hal. The French have had the difficult balancing act of pushing forward aggressively whilst trying to keep their corps close together. Leading with the Imperial Guard was certainly interesting! But the decision to send all the Cuirassiers on various flanking duties means the French only have their guard cavalry to rely on. Time will tell if this is a mistake. The Prussian sector has been reduced to a size show, but on of critical significance. The French sent the 4 divisions of their I infantry corps to 4 different locations. Three cavalry corps were also sent far and wide up and over the river. This meant that early on Charleroi and Namur were put under some visible pressure. The Prussians sat waiting to see if attacks would progress and it seemed that it was only by late afternoon that the growing realisation of a French holding action was confirmed. Whist the Prussian IV corps stood at Charleroi, whilst sending one brigade to Quatre Bras, The II corps only set out late in the day to strike south of Namur. Their extremely cautious advance missed the opportunity to break a small French force in front of them. The I French Cavalry corps rode to Rocheford and had a stand off for most of the day before being forced back to Givet. The only other notable action was at Diant where a Prussian brigade attempted to cross the river in mid afternoon. Their advance was repulsed by the French 3rd division. The Battle of Dinant At 4pm, the !st Prussian brigade got over the bridge at Dinant unscathed and both 12th and 24th regiments attacked up the hill to the defending French. French artillery took its toll and broke one battalion of the 24th but otherwise the charge went in.. The 12th charge in the centre broke a French artillery battery but on the right the 24th was flung back. The left saw the 12th also repulsed in their initial charge uphill. By 4.45 a French battalion hiding in woods on the Prussian left charged the Prussian artillery by the river but was also repulsed. French brought a reserve battalion of the 46th to plug the hole in the centre and this was duly charged by 2 battalions of the 12th. But the charge despite contacting the French was broken and the 2 battalions retired. But on the Prussian left the remaining battalion of the 12th broke a French battalion only to be charged in the flank by French reinforcements of the 45th who had manouvered through the woods. With several battalions retiring or fleeing the Prussian advance turned and retired over the bridge and by 5.15 the French were reorganizing their positions and awaiting the next move. The Prussians retired in good order into Dinant. Whilst this was happening the Prussian III corps spend the day marching slowly west. Blucher himself also rode west and sat alone in Quatre Bras by the end of the day alongside a forlorn 13th Brigade. Would his troops play a part in any major engagement tomorrow? |
paul in rhb | 25 Sep 2018 8:06 a.m. PST |
A short campaign history – 16 June Umpire's report As dawn broke on ‘day two' most leaders were up and about exhorting their men on to greater efforts than yesterday. On the French right hostilities resumed early. The Prussian first corp pushed across the river into Givet, forcing the I French cavalry corps back towards Phillipeville. The retreat of the French lasted all morning but by mid afternoon, fresh infantry support had arrived from Laneffe. The French counter attacked and forced the Prussians to retreat back to Givet. A battle took place at the bridge between Givet and Dinant as the Prussians attempting to force a crossing. The defending French infantry division was broken but not before supporting cavalry of the II Cavalry corps had put most of the Prussians to flight too. This left the French cavalry to with draw cross country to Phillipeville whilst the Prussians withdrew to Dinant. The French infantry division opposite Dinant attempted to force the crossing but were repulsed and settled down to keep the Prussians within the town. Von Pirche's II Prussian corp began a long slow advance from Namur and Arete. Kellerman's III cav corp and an infantry division from I corps slowly retreated through Fosse in front of superior forces. With Kellerman's men retreating to Laneffe the Prussians turned east and headed for Charleroi. During mid morning the Prussian IV corps in Charleroi decided to march west to Bianche. By lunchtime it was outside the town and was soon ensconced inside. This of course meant Charleroi had been left undefended. The French infantry commander outside Charleroi eventually noticed the situation and rapidly pushed his division over the bridges and into the town. By a quirk of fate and timing, Kellerman had ridden to the town to assess the situation. He chose to enter the town and almost as soon as he crossed the bridge, the Prussian II corp of von Pirch arrived from its march from Fosse. After an hour of negotiations, Von Pirch launched an all out assault. After a 90 minute fight, the French evacuated the town and by 4pm Charleroi was back in Prussian hands. French Left flank IV cavalry corps and VI infantry corp under Ney's command rose in Ghent and began a long day's march towards Brussels. Marching unopposed the force was headed by Milhaud's cavalry. It arrived in Brussels in mid afternoon at the same time as several Nassau regiments sent belately by Reserve corp to protect the city. On seeing the French the Nassau troops broke and ran leaving the city in French hands by 3pm. Reille's III corp continued its advance towards Hal. William of Orange, keen to follow Wellington's orders to the letter, continued to pull all his troops back. His Dutch brigade was initially sent to guard the bridges at Alost but soon had their orders countermanded. By late morning the French II corps was outside Hal faced off by the British Reserve Corps and parts of I corp too. William also arrived with several divisions and deployed facing the French. The British outnumbered the French 2:1 but seemed paralysed not knowing whether to strike or whether to march to assist Wellington. A moment of humour broke the ice when William redeployed his entire line to counteract a force of blue coated troops marching towards his rear up the Ninove road. Initially mistaken as French, it was discovered in the nick of time that the troops were actually the Dutch division under Williams command. By lunchtime Picton decidied to send his corps to Wellington at Waterloo, followed by William's I corps. The Brunswick division was left to shield Hal and the column of march from the French. 2 British divisions made it over the Hal bridges before the French realised what was happening. Then Reille's II corps was suddenly launched forward against the British. William's corp was in a long line of march waiting to cross the bridges which were currently occupied by Picton's cavalry and artillery. Several British divisions, hit in the flank, were routed before the French were beaten off. The Brunswickers performed miracles and never buckled. However, the shame of seeing the British guards division run for its life will be borne forever more by its commander. By mid afternoon the French had suffered heavy losses and with drew a safe distance towards Engheim, leaving the British to nurse their losses and decided what to do next. Reille had held 2 British corps up for several critical hours whilst also damaging severely William's corps. The 2 infantry divisions sent from Hal by Picton arrived into Waterloo in mid afternoon and too late to play a part in the day's decisive action. The centre The Imperial Guard at Braine was slow to rise for the morning's activities, despite Drouot's best intentions. Would this delay be fatal? It did allow the Hill's British II corp to stake out a position in the hills just a few miles from Braine. Uncertain of what to do next, Hill attempted to communicate with Wellington and Uxbridge, the British cavalry commander to draw together a strategy. As the Imperial Guard final advanced towards Nivelles from Braine road, Hill's blocking force decided discretion was the better part of valour. In conjuction with Uxbridge Hill decided to retire his force cross country to a well chosen defensive spot south west of waterloo. Hill's retirement was extremely slow and cautious. This gave Drouot uncertainty as he initially set off in persuit and then decided to try and link up with Napoleons advance through Nivelles. Druout then changed his mind and relaunched his guard column at the British corss country. Marching faster than Hill, and with cavalry leading the way, The guard finally caught up with the British at a farm called Laid Patard by the early afternoon. Hill was forced to turn and stand. Napoleon, Vandamme and Gerard started the day at Roulx. Vandamme's cautious advance left nothing to chance. This allowed Uxbridge to send his forward cavalry units towards the town, whilst saving his heavy brigades at Waterloo. Skirmishing took place where eventually the weight of numbers pushed the British cavalry back into Nivelles. Uxbridge rode into the town with the French not too far behind. Who should he meet at a tavern in the centre but Blucher himself! The Prussian general had ridden ahead of his army to try and discover what was happening. The 2 generals had a surprised and stilted conversation, mainly about German sausages and the weather, before being forced to flee to avoid capture by advancing French cavalry. Vandamme and Napoleon entered Nivelles closely behind the retiring British cavalry. They spurned the opportunity to persue the Prussians. Vandamme showing his usual caution paused to await news of proceedings elsewhere. Eventually it was decided to march towards Waterloo. In one of those quirky twists of fate Vandammes corps arrived at Laid Patard just behind the Imperial Guard. This gave the French 2 full corps against the British. Meanwhile in Waterloo, Wellington had been trying to make sense of the French movements. In late morning he initially sent the heavy cavalry reserve brigades off to Hal to force a victory there. But 30 minutes later he changed his mind, recalled them and then sent them south to join Uxbridge and Hill. These arrived and were hidden behind the hilly terrain at Laid Patard, unseen by the French. Wellington also set off to Hal and then changed his mind. He arrived at Laid Patard just as battle was joined and so was unable to influence dispositions or the outcome. Gerard's IV corps at Rouelx saved the best manoeuvre for the dawn's new light. The general decided to march cross country parallel to the main Rouelx- Nivelles road in order to emerge east of Nivelles on the Nivelles- Quatre Bras highway. His march was slow and tedious. Napoleon and Vandamme lost sight of his column and had no news of his fate. At the same time an infantry brigade from the Prussian IV corps had been sent to Nivelles via Quatre Bras. Blucher also hoped that the Prussian III corps would arrive at Quatre Bras around lunchtime. The infantry brigade arrived outside Nivelles just as Blucher was riding east for his life. He prepared them for battle if the French persued out of Nivelles. But nothing happened. So he turned round and began the march back to Qautre Bras. He had only gone a couple of miles when whose force should arrive on the main road? Gerard by a quirk of fate had arrived to cut Blucher off from Quatre Bras. But the advanced cavalry guard of Prussian III corp had also marched towards Nivelles and was to the east of Gerard. He had put himself between 2 Prussian forces. At the battle of Thines, despite being outnumbered significantly in cavalry, Gerard managed to put the Prussain infantry brigade to flight and also hang on against the Prussian cavalry. By lunch time Blucher was hiding in a corn field to the north east of Nivelles before disguising himself as a Belgium peasant and returning to Quatre Bras riding a donkey ( or so the French reports would have us believe) The first 2 infantry brigades of the Prussian III corp had arrived in Quatre Bras as the battle at Thines raged. They were sent forward immediately to engage Gerard but his 2 infantry divisions were able to repulse the Prussians. Both sides lost heavily and retired to assess their heavy damages. 2 further brigades from III corps arrived in Quatre Bras at 4pmish just as Blucher arrived there too. 4pm onwards the critical time The French achieved a crushing victory at Laid Patard. Only Uxbridge's heavy cavalry escaped to Waterloo where it joined the 2 infantry divisions of Picton. Picton, Hill Uxbridge and Wellington held a conference. Things did not look good. News was coming in that Brussels had fallen and the French were expected to arrive from the south at any moment. It was also feared that girlfriends, wives, lovers and special friends were about to be dishonoured by the dastardly French now rampaging through Brussels. Unbeknown to all, Ney had ordered his cavalry and infantry at Brussels to march to Hal. But shortly after the advance had started he received news of the French victory at Laid Patard. He changed the direction of march towards Waterloo. This cost an hour of marching time but also meant that any British retreat north to the city was doomed to failure. |
paul in rhb | 25 Sep 2018 8:10 a.m. PST |
The Battle of Waterloo 16 June 1815 The name Waterloo will forever be known as the pivotal turning point in the affairs of Britain and France. For it was in this small Belgian village at 6.30pm on the 16 June that the might of the British army was struck down and the famed Wellington met, as we all now know, his ‘Waterloo.' It is even likely that in 200 year's time songs will still be sung across Europe about how at Waterloo, Wellington did surrender. In reality his fate has never been clear and it is unknown whether he survived the battle. Was he killed, captured or escaped to live his life out in India or Ireland. What is known is that following the 2pm rebuff at Laid Patard the remnantsof the British army huddled around Waterloo from 4pm on 16 June. Wellington and Uxbridge between them conspired to send several thousand Hanoverain Landwehr off towards Wavre to secure lines of communication. This left the remaining British army to consist of 2 weak British divisions and British and Dutch household Guard cavalry. Vandamme's untouched corps arrived outside the village around 4.15 and by 5pm had deployed and launched the first attacks. The British line stood firm and little headway was made. Dutch carabineers also held off French cavalry on the British right flank. For 45 minutes the French battered themselves against the solid British line. 2 British regiments in Waterloo threw back double their number. 24 French battalions launched repeated attacks against the much smaller British army. Little by little weight of numbers started to grind down the British. Suddenly at 5.45pm a British regiment broke, stricken by a large number of casualties. Gaps began appearing in the line and a small number of stragglers began to melt slowly away. By 6.15 French numbers were beginning to manoeuvre round British flanks. And then disaster struck. The Dutch heavy brigade had fought well but finally gave way after over an hour of fighting. The British guards cavalry brigade also charged forward into the French infantry in a final attempt to throw back the French. Square was formed but that did not stop the Guards units crashing into the French infantry. One by one the pride of the British army was thrown back. The chance was lost for a British victory and by 6.30 many British infantry units were wavering. Rumours then began swirling the battlefield that French cuirassiers had been seen riding from Brussels on the main road to Waterloo and were just 30 minutes away from the Battlefield. Trapped in an ever closing vice it was clear the British could not hope to win. The appearance of the French Imperial Guard half a mile to the south was the final blow. Confusion reigned. British infantry ran in all directions. Some surrendered, some fought till they were shot down. What was very clear was that Vandamme had won the final victory for Napoleon in the campaign that is now called Napoleon's finest hour. Dispositions 6.30pm onwards At 6.30pm the hopes of Europe for a victory over Napoleon and many years of peace and prosperity were dashed by Wellington's defeat. Vandamme corps and Druout's Imperial Guard stood undefeated at Waterloo. Milhaud's cuirassier corps had ridden from Brussels to arrive at Waterloo at the vital moment. Lobau's VI corp would also following Milhaud from Brussels and arrive by 8pm. The remains of Reille's III corps licked its wounds at Hal, watching as at 5.30pm William of Orange led his remaining division, the Brunswick divison and Reserve corps cavalry towards Waterloo. William's arrival at Waterloo just before darkness fell at 9pm meant his troops marched straight into the waiting arms of the victorious French army. A long captivity beckoned. Elsewhere Gerard's IV corp held Nivelles, protecting the French right flank. Blucher and Von Thielmann sat with the remains of the Prussian III corps at Quatre Bras, bemused and befuddled awaiting news. They watched as Kellerman marched a small band of men (a division from 1corp) passed Quatre Bras and towards Nivelles. The Prussian IV corp of Von dennewittz marched somewhere between Binche and Nivelles. Out of touch with Blucher it could well stumble into the victorious French. Von Pirch with his II Corps sat in Charleroi., whilst Von Ziethen's I corps was dispersed between Dinant and Givet and damaged to a considerable degree. The I and II French cavalry corps, and the remains of I corps sat linking Beaumont and Givet securing the French right flank. With the Prussians spread out their coordination was becoming increasingly difficult. Blucher had lost touch with most formations and his whereabouts was only known precisely by Von Thielmann. Prussian communications with Leige were now being threatened seriously. It would become clear as the night closed in that retreating to fight another day, probably with Russian assistance would be the prudent thing to do. Napoleon was the master of the field in Belgium. It would be several weeks before the next chapter in his illustrious military career would be written. |
Mike the Analyst | 25 Sep 2018 10:21 a.m. PST |
Thanks for running the campaign Paul, it has been a lot of fun. The fog of war aspects have been a real challenge for this player and I imagine for many others. |
Kokolores | 25 Sep 2018 11:05 a.m. PST |
Paul, This was one of the best wargames I have played so far. Thank you for all the work and effort you put into it! |
khanscom | 25 Sep 2018 4:36 p.m. PST |
An excellent way to spend 6 mos.! |
Osterreicher | 25 Sep 2018 5:39 p.m. PST |
Thanks Paul, lovely game. I especially enjoyed the fog of war, as commander of the French II. Cavalry Corps, I had no idea what was unfolding to our rear, and how we sort of helped. Glad you provided the detailed AAR so I could understand. cheers! |
Kevin in Albuquerque | 25 Sep 2018 5:48 p.m. PST |
Thanks, Paul, for the Game. I, for one, found the Fog of War immensely frustrating, which is probably the exact effect you wanted. Barely knowing what's in front of me and hardly knowing what's going on elsewhere. I could hear cannon fire in the distance but that was all. I, too, appreciated the AAR. Gerard, French IV Corps, last seen near Nivelles. |
Gwen01123 | 26 Sep 2018 1:42 a.m. PST |
Thanks too for a good game, Paul. The fog was fun, I had sometimes more intel on the other side than my own, and absolutely no idea what was going on on half the battlefield. Reille, French 2nd Corps, drinking Belgian wine in Hal. |
paul in rhb | 26 Sep 2018 3:40 a.m. PST |
Thanks for all the comments chaps… personally I would blame your fellow commanders for not keeping you informed of what was going on !! |
Mike the Analyst | 26 Sep 2018 5:18 a.m. PST |
Paul, your observation reflects the fact that we do not have 20 years experience as ADC, brigade and division commander before rising to the level of corps commander. I am sure we have all learned a lot from this campaign. Kellerman, commander of French III cavalry corps.
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khanscom | 26 Sep 2018 7:37 a.m. PST |
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Kokolores | 26 Sep 2018 12:09 p.m. PST |
khanscom, Your Campaign report was really great, thank you for writing it down! Drouot |
paul in rhb | 26 Sep 2018 2:33 p.m. PST |
1815 Campaign Journal (Impressions from the British Cavalry Corps) Based on the initial Order of Battle and dispositions, these are my impressions of the C-in-C's appreciation of the campaign to come. Initial deployments are not historical, the bulk of the Cavalry Corps posted well forward and to the east of its 1815 position. The center of gravity of the infantry corps lies decidedly to the west with the strongest I Corps covering the approaches to Ghent, with II Corps covering the western approaches to Brussels, and the weakest reserve in Brussels proper. Three cavalry brigades have been detached from the Cavalry Corps' historical order of battle, with two of these attached to I Corps and the third attached to II Corps. I note that all of these are British, possibly indicating a greater confidence in their combat ability when compared with the Netherlanders or Hanoverians (especially if an attack is expected toward Ghent). It also appears that the Brunswick cavalry has been retained by the reserve, though this is not indicated in the initial order of battle. From these deployments I suspect that the C-in-C considers the most likely French axis of attack to be along the westernmost highway to Ghent or through Mons (which would give the French an easy option to shift west toward Ghent or east toward Brussels as the campaign evolves). With an additional two brigades (also British) of the Cavalry Corps deployed considerably west of Charleroi for screening it seems that the C-in-C's focus is blocking a left hook of an attack toward the army's bases of operation. The Cavalry Corps orders from the C-in-C are primarily concerned with patrolling before I and II Corps and to make contact with the Prussians. Orders do not seem to indicate that I am to cooperate with them, but only to make contact; in accord with this an ADC has been sent east from Quatre Bras to locate the main Prussian body, while one of the distant brigades is ordered to establish a post at Binche. I doubt that there will be a Prussian presence here in any strength since it is at the westernmost point for Prussian deployment, but it will cover the bridges and give an early warning of a French attack. One brigade has been ordered to Charleroi from Quatre Bras; this city is also within the Prussian deployment area so may (since it lies on the main highway to Brussels) have a more substantial Prussian force. If not, then the cavalry brigade will at least create a speedbump for any French advance here. For the French, an attack toward Ghent makes some sense—it avoids a repeat of the historical plan, which might lead to a stereotyped (and probably successful) response. It also virtually forces the British army to fight while still distant from Prussian assistance or face the loss of its bases. Reports from the morning of the 15th indicate that the French have reached Charleroi; presumably coming from Philippeville or Beaumont, this would indicate a marching pace of about 2.5 mph. This is good information to know for later use. These units have deployed south of the Sambre and include both cavalry and infantry, suggesting the advance units of a corps. I'm a little surprised that there wasn't a more aggressive testing of the defences here, but perhaps the French general is a more methodical type. Given a little time a regiment of Hanoverians and a horse battery are ordered to Charleroi for support of the Netherlanders—two French divisions would likely be supported by two batteries of artillery (more if a full corps); presenting a "fierce face" may help give an appreciation of the opponent's style as well as slow any attempted advance northward. Since a corps' march from Charleroi to Quatre Bras would probably take about three hours the additional time for deployment, combat, and recall could delay the threat to Quatre Bras until the 16th. A 10:30 a.m. report requires a little re- thinking; the Prussians DO have a presence at Charleroi (a reinforced brigade of probably about 8000). Orders to the cavalry present are still valid—the Prussians are prepared to defend Charleroi although I doubt that they can do more than cause a serious delay in any French advance. The Netherlanders can cover a retreat when it becomes necessary, and with the supports already dispatched should be sufficient for that purpose. The question that needs to be answered is "What does this French attack represent?". This could be the advance element of the main thrust; it might be a feint to draw more British units eastward away from a western attack; or it may only be intended to attract the Prussians, preventing them from moving west to assist the British while the main attack is toward the British bases. Events begin to accelerate—3rd Cav. Bde. reports that at 7 a.m. a corps (!) of French cuirassiers is passing through Leuze in the direction of Rennaix. Given the time that it took to receive this communication, it seems likely that these forces will have reached Rennaix or beyond before new orders can reach the 3rd. An interesting problem—what orders will be relevant then? I also am a little perplexed by the apparent naivete (?) of the French C-in-C—why would he lead an advance with his most potent reserve striking force? Having started the cuirassiers along the Conde- Ghent highway they are almost certainly committed to attack here since there are few roads (none good) leading eastward for any enveloping maneuvers. This certainly strengthens my feeling that the Charleroi force may be an intentional piece of bait for the Prussians. Early afternoon on the 15th a new communication from Wellington asks for more scouting to the south; having received no reports of French activity near Binche I'd already sent orders for this. Immediately after a courier from Binche reports the presence of 3 French corps! Looks like the 19th C. version of phone tag—unfortunately the courier sent to 6th Cav. Bde. via Binche is probably en route to death or captivity; luckily a second courier was sent by a more circuitous route and may arrive safely. More Prussians from IV Corps are marching toward Charleroi, so it looks like there will be a significant battle there and little likelihood that Quatre Bras will be threatened before midday on the 16th. I'll need to consult with the Prussian commanding at Charleroi to pin down his exact intentions once arrived. Meanwhile at Binche the presence of a large French concentration should indicate the main axis of attack; perhaps the cuirassiers are an expensive feint to draw British divisions toward the highway to Ghent with the main attack along the Binche- Nivelles axis with Brussels as the goal. A secondary attack along the Charleroi- Quatre Bras axis would allow both forces to converge at Waterloo; are there more corps available to follow up the one displayed before Charleroi? Interesting that I know more about the French and Prussian movements than I do about the British! By mid- afternoon on the 15th more information becomes available—captured documents reveal the Imperial Guard at Mons with the Guard Light Cavalry scouting further north and a warning order to a regiment south of Binche suggesting that it will be marching soon (but where?). Of concern is a communication from Wellington revealing that he has received no reports from cavalry brigades attached to I and II Corps. This is difficult to interpret: have all couriers been intercepted?, have the Corps commanders misunderstood their duty to feed information to the C- in- C so that he may direct them to the proper location for battle?, or are the players of these units less experienced in campaigning than I would have imagined? The debriefing should be fun when this is all revealed. In the meantime I've had confirmation that my reports are being received in a timely fashion. Prussian IV Corps is reinforcing Charleroi and Quatre Bras, intending to make a stand. I think this an appropriately aggressive stance, but I wonder whether the French are intended as a distraction only; they have not begun a battle though deployed for one. It seems to be a little late in the day to begin if there is to be an opportunity for a French pursuit if Charleroi falls. The Imperial Guard has been unmasked at Mons and has been aggressively advancing toward Braine le Compte, while the three corps reported near Binche have largely remained static. I've ordered the Hanoverian brigade to advance to Nivelles to receive the 6th brigade if they are forced to retreat; meanwhile the 6th has been ordered to reconnoiter toward Soignes for further information about the Guard. Nivelles is likely to be closer to any future action, as well as closer to the 3rd brigade, so Cavalry Corps HQ is ordered to relocate. Wellington's intentions are murky—the army (according to my received communications) has been ordered to assemble at either Quatre Bras or Waterloo; the cavalry is ordered to gather at Waterloo by sunset. This seems to me to be too far east since the Guard seems to be thrusting directly down the Mons- Brussels highway with (probably) our base in Brussels as the objective. I think that a battle might best be fought at Hal, protecting the base while letting the Prussians (whose most advanced elements have already reached the second main route to Brussels at Charleroi) protect the highway through Quatre Bras. While returning from Charleroi and advancing to Nivelles, it becomes apparent that the French are moving quickly—a Dutch division has just passed marching toward Waterloo, apparently being pursued by the Guard Horse Grenadiers. A close encounter that showed the mettle of the Hanoverians (they didn't run away!) but throws other plans into disarray; a further report indicates that the French are beginning to move north from Binche. Hill has two divisions at Quatre Bras that seem to be preparing to move on Nivelles—I'll have to speak with him about this; it may be possible to eject the French from Nivelles if the cavalry present is only a flank guard. In the meantime couriers have been dispatched to the 2nd Netherlands brigade to retire to Quatre Bras and for the 6th brigade to move east to the Charleroi- Brussels highway and force march to Quatre Bras, since they are unlikely to delay a French corps more significantly than traffic congestion would. This should allow me to concentrate 3 brigades and 2 horse batteries at or near Quatre Bras by morning (if not earlier). French cavalry has withdrawn from Nivelles—apparently these were nipping at the heels of the retiring Netherlands division that had recently passed through Nivelles. In consort with Hill Nivelles is reoccupied. Late- arriving reports show the Guard at Braine le Compte, II Corps at Ath, an unidentified corps moving on Rouelx, and a reinforced corps still before Charleroi. The cuirassiers previously reported at Leuze have been lost in the fog, as has I Corps. British positions (as far as I can determine) are Prussian IV Corps at Charleroi, 2nd Netherlands Bde.. 1 RHA battery, and 6th Bde. at or on the way to Quatre Bras, Hanoverian Bde., 1 RHA battery, and 2 divisions of II Corps at Nivelles, remaining Cavalry Corps units and a battered Netherlands division of II Corps at Waterloo, 4th Cavalry Bde. and (possibly) Picton's Reserve Corps at Hal, 3rd Cavalry Bde. at Enghien, a Cavalry Bde. at Grammont, and I Corps and a Cavalry Bde. unaccounted for (but presumably west of Grammont). It appears certain that an engagement will occur at Hal by mid- morning; I expect that French II Corps will be moving on Enghien and Hal, but don't know whether the French will wait the 6- 8 hrs. that this march would require before attacking. If so, then Hill's II Corps would probably be able to reach Hal at about the same time… The nighttime hours bring a new perspective on our situation. Most importantly, Ghent has fallen—either the cuirassiers on the march from Leuze have met minimal to no resistance from infantry or they have been supported by one of the (as yet) un- located French corps (I or VI). Where has I Corps gotten itself to? I would have presumed (given its initial western location) that one of its primary duties would be the defense of the road to Ghent; alternately, if I Corps was to move eastward, why was not the Reserve moved from Brussels to Ghent? With information flooding in that indicated French forces concentrated along the Mons- Brussels axis with strong elements to the left (on the road to Ghent) and right (on the road to Nivelles), orders to concentrate the army at Quatre Bras or Waterloo appear unjustifiable. Skirmishing south of Nivelles on the morning of the 16th delays the French advancing on Nivelles for a bit, but without infantry support they cannot be held—this may have been sufficient time for Hill to withdraw his corps from west of Nivelles in some safety. Captured messages initially suggested that the Guard would move on Hal, and my own opinion was that a major engagement would take place at that city, but Drouot (I've heard little of Napoleon) apparently has read his Liddell- Hart and having placed Wellington on the "horns of a dilemma" (with British forces divided between Hal, Waterloo, and Nivelles) decided to move on Nivelles in concert with III and IV Corps from Rouelx. Hill has (I believe) no cavalry attached—it having been lost or forced to retire north from Braine le Compte—so cannot effectively disengage from the advancing French Guard. Wellington has at least ordered the remaining elements of the Cavalry Corps to Nivelles from Waterloo, rather than letting them continue toward Hal: these will be of service at Nivelles, but I wonder whether they might have been more useful at Hal. Prussians are present near Nivelles and the hope is that they will be able to support II Corps in the upcoming battle—already cannon- fire can be heard from both Hal and Nivelles, so it is possible that both cities will be attacked simultaneously, pinning down any potential reinforcements. Wellington is not in very good grace with Hill; a scathing note was passed through my hands for the C-in-C. With luck it may spur Wellington to more focused activity, but with forces apparently so dispersed, there may be little in practice that can be done. The Battle of du Laid Petard—no other option than to fight here; Hill can't outrun the Guard, and the support of an additional French line corps means that we can get no better than parity in cavalry strength (not promising if we were to attempt to screen a further retreat to Waterloo). The result was foregone given the disparity in numbers; Wellington arrives late and without additional troops. No support from the Prussians who seem to be heavily engaged (cannonfire heard from all directions). The cavalry fought well, as did Hill's corps. After retreating to Waterloo covered by the remaining reserve cavalry Wellington calls a council-of-war. To be brutally honest, it appears that he has completely lost control of the situation—initial instruction to make sure our maps are all right side up (?). Tossing around ideas might be useful, but recommending an immediate movement toward Brussels ignores the practical necessities of joining with the Prussians (given the parlous state of the army) or providing a rearguard of sufficient strength to hold off the Guard while recapturing Brussels. A success at Hal presents the possibility of concentrating our forces provided that we can survive at Waterloo until dawn. With Wellington ill and Hill having resigned, the best option seems to be to fortify Waterloo, allowing forces at Hal to retire to Wavre and join with the Prussians. Landwehr are ordered to move immediately to Wavre since French cavalry at Brussels might move upon that city in attempt to surround Waterloo and what remains of our army. |
khanscom | 26 Sep 2018 7:09 p.m. PST |
@Kokolores-- you were my bête noir for most of the campaign; Napoleon was a non- entity :-) |
Kokolores | 27 Sep 2018 8:50 a.m. PST |
khanscom, Thank you for your kind words, it was an honour to cross blades with such a worthy opponent like yourself. |
4th Cuirassier | 27 Sep 2018 9:42 a.m. PST |
This was a really, really interesting experience for me (I was Picton), as it's a loooong time since I've played any campaign. Back then, we all knew each other socially and had perfect information about dispositions and intentions all times. This time was much more like the real thing. The first thing I noticed and continued to notice throughout was that I didn't know anything about anything much at all. I knew roughly where the other Anglo-Allied corps started the campaign, but I didn't know what their movements were likely to be, or what our side's general intentions were, or where the Prussian formations were, or how we intended to co-operate with the Prussians, or what we thought the French might do. I also didn't know how far apart locations were. The campaign map we were using was adapted from a board game, which presented two issues. One was that it was essentially like a Tube map, i.e. topologically accurate but not a reliable guide to true distances. It also wasn't a reliable guide to terrain, because it showed Hal on the wrong bank of the river. At one point I received orders to destroy the Hal Senne bridges so as to prevent the French marching on Brussels via Hal, but in fact, they don't need the bridges to do so. Blowing the bridges would isolate everyone west of the Senne from everyone east of it. As a result, I found myself guessing at distances and guessing wrong. On day 1, French infantry managed to march from Condé to Ghent, a distance I estimate as 50 real-world miles. The next day, they covered the 35 real-world miles to Brussels in half a day. If I'd realised it was possible to march 100 miles in 2 days, I would have manoeuvred completely differently. I also didn't know what my fellow commanders were doing. I knew roughly where they were to start, and sent some initial communications, but I heard nothing of substance from any of them after movements started on the first day. Whether nobody communicated, or whether their communications were intercepted, I don't know. I didn't know where our outposts were, but I did get an early message from Hill suggesting that our outpost line was a bit "porous". So off my own bat I sent out some cavalry to thicken this screen. I heard nothing at all from any of these patrols until they rejoined the main body at the end of the day. I didn't hear anything from anyone else's patrols either – only old messages relayed from Wellington. At one point I even sent follow-on orders to my patrols to see if they could find any of our own men. The movements of I Corps to my west were a mystery all day, so I was reduced to sending light cavalry scouts to find our own troops. I didn't know where the enemy were most of the time. Towards the end of day 1, it became clear that somehow they had penetrated as far as Braine Le Comte, just south of Hal, where I was. The noise of battle told me this, not any message. This is 25 real-world miles from Beaumont, the nearest point from which they might have been marching, but they were still on for a battle at the end of that march. The next morning I Corps arrived at Hal, and it now seemed that I had enough force on hand to defeat the numerically inferior French to my front. I was about to attack them when they received reinforcements and I received orders – to reinforce towards Quatre Bras, where there was apparently a battle in full swing between outnumbered British and French troops. Winning at Hal could thus prove to be a Wavre-like i.e. irrelevant victory, whereas defeat at Quatre Bras would have left no intact Anglo-Allied formation between the French and Brussels. So I started moving east, only to be attacked at Hal. Things I would do differently: first, communications. Every commander should receive and send a sitrep to every other commander in standard form at least every 4 hours. This is the only way to know what is happening. Messages should be numbered, so you know if any have gone astray. Odd-numbered messages should be ignored as containing deliberate misinformation. So if I receive messages 1,2,3,5,6 and 8 I know I'm missing a genuine (#4) and a fake (#7) message. Second, general intentions. The commander should indicate where he intends to concentrate and fight – it wasn't clear to me whether we were aiming to fight at Nivelles, Hal, Quatre Bras, Waterloo, or all of the above. Probably the C in Cs should do the same. Third, standardised march distances and more reliable maps. You can use Google to work out distances on foot between modern-day locations. You can march longer if you like, but for every 10% more than a day's march, you lose 10% of the unit. A double march makes the unit 0% effective. There was apparently a battle at a place called Laid Petard but I can't find that on any map so I have no idea how relevant its outcome was to me. Fourth, I needed a better idea of how reconnaissance works. I sent out several patrols covering a variety of roads but never got much back from any of them. Fifth, when ordered to hold a certain position it was a bit of a guess how many men I needed to do so. It would be useful to know how wide the intended tabletop was and how wide a battalion of infantry would be. Of course some of the above is arguably realistic fog of war. Really great job by Paul corralling 23 people together, must have been hard work! |
Kevin in Albuquerque | 27 Sep 2018 10:45 a.m. PST |
I would like to add to Picton's report with my own (I was Gerard French 4th Corps), noting that I was on the opposite side. I too was subjected to a very real Fog of War, whether intentional or not. I had a vague idea of what the entire army was up to and a perfectly clear idea of what my role was. My role was to provide flank cover and support to the main thrusts to the west of me. I had absolutely no idea of the dispositions of the Allies other than some initial spy reports of general placements, which were of very little use to me. As a Corps commander I wanted to know what was in front of me and where it was coming from. I also had no idea of any French formation other than the Guard and III Corps, who were within ten miles most of the time. As for reporting to other players, some of us did, some didn't. As we got busier on Day Two, the reports pretty much ceased, though I got a nicely detailed note from Napoleon after the Battle of Thines. Here's why my reports stopped: I actually intercepted a Prussian courier with copies of my previous orders!. It seemed to me that it was too easy for the Allies to intercept my orders and too hard and time consuming for my fellow French commanders to get my reports. So I stopped. Better to deny the Allies any information than provide possibly useless and certainly untimely information to my fellows. When I conceived of the parallel march through the countryside to the NIV-QB highway to the right of Napoleon, I told no one, being very concerned about the interception of the reports, even though Napoleon and Vandamme were less than 10 miles away! The Prussians were just as close. Being on the attack was so much easier than trying to defend. All I had to do was find the enemy and attack. The Allies really had a difficult operational problem to solve, I do not envy them at all. I too heard the sound of cannon fire in the distance, but had my own problems with Prussian III and IV corps (btw, who might you be … you gave me all that I could handle, congrats are in order). I didn't have the map/march/distance issues Picton had, probably because I was on the attack. Everything seemed to work out numbers-wise for me. They were very long days for marching, beginning at 3:00 am. 3:00 am to 5:00 pm is 14 hours and at 2.5 mph you could easily do 35 miles. Force marching from Conde to Ghent along that marvelous highway is doable. Trying to force two French corps up a minor highway (Binche to Roeulx) was a nightmare. I was very wary of reconnaissance. So I dedicated large parts (multiple squadrons) of light cavalry regiments, even the entire regiment if the area was wide. It still took a very long time for information to get back to me, and I was with the central core of the troops at all times. 4th Corps was spread out on 15 June and reconcentrated on 16 June, but I always maintained a central core of forces that I was with, about two divisions worth. |
Kokolores | 27 Sep 2018 11:09 a.m. PST |
This is a really interesting point about the real world distances and the distances on the game map we used. I did not realise this. Then again, I was only using the game map when calculating distance and time. On the game map, the distance between Condé and Ghent is roughly 16 miles, which is a realistic distance for a day's march. |
Mike the Analyst | 27 Sep 2018 1:12 p.m. PST |
Remember when considering march distances for large bodies of troops you need to consider the road space needed. If a corps starts in a town and leaves by a single gate then it can be 2-3 hours before the final elements move off. To concentrate for battle you need to allow time for the rear elements to close up. |
Kokolores | 27 Sep 2018 1:51 p.m. PST |
At Antietam 1862 Hill´s Light Division marched 17 miles and decisively engaged the enemy. |
leofwine 3 | 28 Sep 2018 3:31 a.m. PST |
Marshall Lobau here commanding 6th Corps. Had great fun marching capturing both Ghent and Brussels even though barely a shot in anger was heard. Thanks for running a great game |
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