"John Hussey's two books on Waterloo" Topic

Lobau would have delivered the death blow to Wellington's army, the Prussian intervened because they had the opinion, in case they delay longer – there would be a crisis.
Honestly, thinking, in case Napoleon all knows this, he even leaves the initiative to the Prussian to intervene at their convenience?? Well – Napoleon wasn't as good as he was in 1805 – 07 – but he was no fool.
So, the fictitious capture of the Prussian messenger, (which the Prussians never speak about, nor the captured death hussar, who weren't at this side of the battle, nor the alleged spotting, form point of vue of Napoleon not possible – all that are propaganda tricks so that Napoleon could claim he knew (how shame full to him to be outwitted by geriatric Blücher).
When Jerome mentions the Prussians he get laughed about by Boney claiming that the beaten army needs a least two days to recover.

If Napoleon didn't know the Prussians were approaching, why didn't he attack Wellington with everything? Why was he in such a hurry to break Wellington's line quickly, if there was no need for haste?

The French attack didn't seem to be done in a hurry, though Napoleon was probably a little impatient because the French had been forced by the weather to bivouac wherever they could find a place. Waterloo has some similarities to Eylau (including the failure of the initial attack and the cavalry being sent in since they were the only force available) where the French had to obtain their position in line in the morning, though unfortunately for Napoleon he didn't have Davout coming in on the flank, though at least he had initial parity with the opposing army. Since no further troops were coming up, unlike Jena, Eylau and Friedland, the plan of attack looked normal enough – a strong attack to overwhelm a portion of the defense, with a follow-up force behind them (Lobau) and the Guard in reserve.

When you have that many negatives in any sentence…….you have to be stone cold sober to read it. Napoleon didn't know, so why didn't he…ah yes…I get it.

You would have to say that he did not hold much back against either side of the Brussels/Charleroi Chausee. Reille's were progressively fed in against Hgmt. d'Erlon's entire Corps attacked the East wing. Lobau's were held back but not immediately rushed off towards St Lambert etc.

Napoleon knew someone was coming. Did he have any idea in what strength? Did he assume they would be far too late, whatever? How could the Prussians possibly rally like this after Ligny? He had to gamble, if he was to beat a divided force, twice his size potentially.

What he did send East was a small contingent, largely for observation, not a blocking force. Light cavalry, who even then, did not aggressively scout forwards against the advancing Prussians.

He did not know, remember his break fast say 90 : 10 for him.

When the Prussians intervened – it struck like lightning surprise.

For Boney the Prussians were beaten so decisively at Ligny that they would at least need two days to reform

Napoleon's original (loosely) plan of campaign was to push the Prussians as far as Gembloux, pushing them away from the Allied army, then turn on Wellington. His instructions to Grouchy were to go to Gembloux and observe the line of retreat of the Prussians, figuring it was either towards Namur or north to join with the Allied army, possibly in the neighborhood of Tirlemont or Brussels. He hadn't expected either army to stand until they had at least reached Brussels.

Yes indeed.

90:10 was what you'd expect him to say to his commanders on the morning of battle. Two days was right – I and II Corps weren't fit to fight on the 18th which is why they were largely kept out of it.

So why did Napoleon keep 10,000 men on his right when he thought Wellington had 90,000 men (i.e. the Hal / Tubize detachment not being known) to his front?

I was reading through Pierre de Wit's website ( waterloo-campaign.nl ) . Here's his take. Staring out on the pdf ( 18 June, The first grand offensive, Part 1 ) about 1:30 Napoleon ordered the 6th Corps to leave it's position along the chaussee and follow the 1st Corps as a reserve, arriving on the intermediate ridge between the two armies ( "sur la crête du ravin que sépare les deux armées" ) , and formed regimental squares in time to ward off the British cavalry that had routed the 1st Corps. "Durutte confirms that Lobau placed himself in rear of his own division the moment the 1st corps was facing defeat, and clearly situates this some time before the Prussians emerged on his right." "Chef de bataillon Rullière ( 95th regiment ) confirms the presence of the 6th corps in rear of his own during the attack of the 1st corps."

Moving to Pierre's pdf ( 18 June, The second French offensive and the intervention of the Prussian army, Part 4 )

"One of Napoleon's aide de camps, colonel Bernard, had been sent out ( probably around 3.30 p.m. ) with an escort to find out about the Prussian advance. As he had witnessed from a covered position that the forces moving up were actually Prussian skirmishers, he returned to general headquarters where Napoleon was informed about the situation. By the time Bernard got there, it didn't take long before Lobau changed his position. Cf. The account of colonel Van Saxen Weimar, who spoke with Bernard in or after 1825. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.265 4 Gourgaud explicitly states it was 4.30 p.m., after Lobau first had reconnoitred the position at the same time as that Domon and Subervie were detached. In: La campagne etc. p.76, 79, 80 Von Hiller says Lobau moved at the time he arrived on the battlefield with his brigade. Cf. Hiller, Von Denkwürdigkeiten p.246 Gneisenau also confirms that the French reserves moved the moment the first Prussian units left the wood. In a letter to Hardenberg, dated 22nd June 1815. In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.531 Cf. the official Prussian report. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.486 Janin, sous-chef d'état-major of Lobau's corps, also confirms that his corps moved from the intermediate ridge to the right as the Prussians were already in touch with the extreme right French wing, and after a personal check-up there by Durrieu first and Janin and Lobau himself a little later. In: Coppens, B. Les mensonges etc. p.242 Durutte also makes it clear that Lobau got in his right rear after the attack of the 1st corps, so after 3 p.m. Cf. Durutte, général – Mouvemens [sic] de la 4e division du 1er corps d'armée, le 15 Juin jusqu'au 18 au soir."

"It is also captain Von Rettberg, commander of a battery of Hanoverian artillery, who could see from his position a considerable French force move out from the intermediate ridge [in his mind at 4 p.m.] to oppose the Prussians, who were just arriving. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.229-234 The same was the case with captain Gardiner ( battery Gardiner ) , who perceived from his position [he says at 5 p.m.] "the heads of several reserve columns starting forward one beyond the other as far as the eye could discern and their supports of artillery covering their formation to meet the Prussian attack."

IIRC, two or three brigades of II Corps we're engaged on the 18th, and one of the I Corps. I don't think the elements of these Corps that didn't engage were held back because they hadn't recovered from Ligny but because they simply didn't make it in time.

My post above is addressing when the 6th Corps was aware of the Prussians, but it doesn't actually address when Napoleon was aware of them. Subervie and Jacquinot had patrols out in the Lasne valley that bumped into Prussian patrols around 9:30. Supposedly Ney had sent instructions to Lobau in the morning:

"The English are massed on the Mont Saint Jean, that means in front of the forest of Soignes. In case the Prussians pull back beyond Brussels and Soignes, restrict yourself in sending thousand horsemen in pursuit and come to join us with your forces. However, in case they attempt to come in front of the forest at that Mont Saint Jean, form a screen and bar their road. "

(Note 28) De Wit writes that, "The handwriting of the main text is different as of Ney's signature. The document was discovered in October 2013 by the author on the website of Lord Russborough's Annex, a fine art gallery in Port Hope, Ontario, Canada where it was offered for sale. Not long after it was sold back to the descendants of Ney. According to Russborough the document was handed down in the papers of a French emigré to Canada. In 1980 it was purchased by then wellknown Toronto dealer in manuscripts Marskell & sons (now deceased). From 1982 until 2011 it was in the hands of a private collector in Port Hope, from whom Russbourogh purchased it."

Lobau sent Domon's division to the right to observe any threat. This is on the June 18 page, Napoleon's preparations, General headquarters. (When I paste the links, they don't work.)

So it does bring into question what reason or reasons the 6th Corps was moved over to the right of the line. That we will probably never know.

@ Mserafin

I and II Corps were nearer than any of IV Corps, which was sent because it was the least beaten up despite the much longer march. Unless I and II Corps were substantially unfit to fight this was a very poor choice of marching order and yet another unforced Prussian error.

Bulow certainly did not manage his corps very well up till the battle of Waterloo. His chief of staff, von Valentini, was noted to favor formalities and proper provisioning of bivouacs rather than being adaptable to circumstances. The march from Dion-le-mont to Wavre wasn't the quickest. But also keep in mind when the Prussians started out on the 18th, they didn't know how Wellington was going to fare during the day. The initial objective was Chapelle St. Lambert, where the Prussian army could still retreat to the north if Wellington had been defeated.

the Prussians encountered nobody – not even out posts, Bülow himself – as well as the whole Prussian army, was more than surprised that they could assemble unmolested their units.
A hussar officers serving in the advance guard confirms this.

Here the report of the officer of the 2. Schlesisches Husaren-Regiment – in a private letter written on 24 July 1815 (in German only, and printed in Fraktur, sorry):

link

for Michael Westman

Quant au Colonel Combes-Brassard, l'autre sous-chef d'état-major du 6e corps, il écrit : « Le 6e corps, formant la réserve, marcha pour soutenir l'attaque à droite. Ce corps était composé entièrement d'infanterie. Il était trois heures et demie, un feu infernal s'étendait sur toute la ligne des deux armées. Le 6e corps achevait de se déployer en réserve sur toute la droite de l'armée, lorsque, me rendant à la extrémité de notre droite, je reconnus des têtes de colonnes qui débouchaient du côté de Vavres, par Ohain et Saint-Lambert.
Ces colonnes étaient prussiennes. Leur arrivée se produisait sans que l'Empereur eût donné aucun ordre. Nous étions tournes. (Fußnote 9, Combes-Brassard. Notices sur la bataille de Mont-Saint-Jean (récit rédigé le 22 juin 1815, dans Souvenirs et Correspondance sur la bataille de Waterloo, Librairie historique Teissèdre, Paris 2000. ) » Coppens, S. 242

And here Marbot's letter of 26 June 1815, with a slight difference to what he wrote in his memoirs years later:

Laon, 26 juin 1815.

Je ne reviens pas de notre défaite!… On nous a fait manœuvrer comme des citrouilles. J'ai été, avec mon régiment, flanqueur de droite de l'armée pendant presque toute la bataille. On m'assurait que le maréchal Grouchy allait arriver sur ce point, qui n'était gardé que par mon régiment, trois pièces de canon et un bataillon d'infanterie légère, ce qui était trop faible. Au lieu du maréchal Grouchy, c'est le corps de Blücher qui a débouché!… Jugez de la manière dont nous avons été arrangés!… Nous avons été enfoncés, et l'ennemi a été sur-le-champ sur nos derrières!… … On aurait pu remédier au mal, mais personne n'a donné d'ordres. Les gros généraux ont été à Paris faire de mauvais discours. Les petits perdent la tête, et cela va mal… J'ai reçu un coup de lance dans le côté ; ma blessure est assez forte, mais j'ai voulu rester pour donner le bon exemple. Si chacun eût fait de même, cela irait encore, mais les soldats désertent à l'intérieur; personne ne les arrête, et il y a dans ce pays-ci, quoi qu'on dise, 50 000 hommes qu'on pourrait réunir; mais alors il faudrait peine de mort contre tout homme qui quitte son poste et contre ceux qui donnent permission de le quitter. Tout le monde donne des congés, et les diligences sont pleines d'officiers qui s'en vont. Jugez si les soldats sont en reste! Il n'y en aura pas un dans huit jours, si la peine de mort ne les retient… Si les Chambres veulent, elles peuvent nous sauver; mais il faut des moyens prompts et des lois sévères… On n'envoie pas un bœuf, pas de vivres, rien…; de sorte que les soldats pillent la pauvre France comme ils faisaient en Russie… Je suis aux avant-postes, sous Laon; on nous a fait promettre de ne pas tirer, et tout est tranquille…

1789-1815.com/marbot_1815.htm

And Dupuy, 7e régiment de hussards:

Le 18 à quatre heures du matin, nous étions à cheval et vers huit heures, après avoir fait rafraîchir nos chevaux quelques instants, nous nous rendîmes sur le champ de bataille. Notre régiment fut détaché de la division et, avec trois escadrons de chasseurs, prit position à l'extrême droite, n'ayant pas d'ennemis devant nous.

Le combat s'engagea à notre gauche sur toute la ligne. Dès midi, la panique s'empara de quelques régiments d'infanterie du 1er corps d'armée et le sauve-qui-peut y fut prononcé. Ils fuyaient dans le plus grand désordre, je courus à eux avec un peloton de hussards pour les arrêter. Voyant parmi les fuyards un porte-drapeau avec son aigle, je lui dis de me la remettre; il l'avançait déjà pour ma la donner, lorsque la réflexion me vint : "Je ne veux pas vous déshonorer, monsieur, lui dis-je, déployez votre drapeau et portez vous en avant, en criant avec moi Vive l'Empereur !" Il le fit sur le champ, le brave homme ! Bientôt les soldats s'arrêtèrent et, dans peu d'instants, grâce à ses efforts et aux nôtres, près de trois mille hommes étaient réunis et avaient fait volte-face.

Cette fuite était d'autant plus étonnante et extraordinaire que l'ennemi ne poursuivait pas ; mais par qui le malveillant sauve-qui-peut avait-il été prononcé ? On l'ignorait.

Jusque vers quatre heures, nous restâmes paisibles spectateurs de la bataille. Dans ce moment le général Domon vint à moi ; le feu des Anglais était à peu près cessé ; il me dit que l'affaire était gagnée, que l'armée ennemie était en retraite, que nous étions là pour faire jonction avec le corps du maréchal Grouchy et que nous serions le soir à Bruxelles ; il partit.

Peu de moments après, au lieu de faire jonction avec les troupes du maréchal Grouchy comme nous nous y attendions, nous reçûmes l'attaque d'un régiment de hulans prussiens. Nous le repoussâmes vigoureusement et lui donnâmes la chasse, mais nous fûmes forcés à la retraite par le feu à mitraille de six pièces de canon, derrière lesquelles les hulans se replièrent.

Le colonel Marbot avait été blessé d'un coup de lance à la poitrine, dans l'attaque des Prussiens.

Attaqués alors par l'infanterie, nous nous reployâmes sur le centre en battant en retraite.

Dans notre mouvement rétrograde, nous rencontrâmes le maréchal Soult, major général, qui nous fit placer près d'une batterie de la garde pour la soutenir ; le canon ennemi nous fit quelque mal.

Peu après, nous reçûmes l'ordre de nous porter en arrière, pour nous opposer à des tirailleurs prussiens.

Jusque là, nous pensions que la bataille était gagnée sur les autres points de la ligne ; mais lorsque, arrivés sur la grande route, nous la vîmes encombrée de fuyards, nous fûmes détrompés. Nous cherchâmes d'abord à les rallier, mais cela fut impossible, il fallut faire aussi retraite, mais du moins, nous la fîmes en ordre, marchant à quelques centaines de pas sur le côté de la route, jusqu'à ce que la nuit et les difficultés du chemin nous eussent forcés à y rentrer et à marcher pêle-mêle, avec les fuyards de toutes armes.

(…)

Il tint à peu de chose que les résultats de cette déplorable journée ne fussent bien différents !… Le désordre était déjà dans l'armée anglaise, lorsque le corps prussien, s'étant dérobé au maréchal Grouchy, arriva sur le champ de bataille et ramena la victoire plus qu'échappée, aux Anglais. Sans cette marche adroite, le pont de Waterloo construit sur la Tamise, l'eût été sur la Seine ! Ah ! du moins, d'après toute justice, on devrait voir sur ce monument la statue du général prussien ! …

1789-1815.com/dupuy.htm

Thanks v. Winterfeldt and Oliver. I was always aware of the reports from the 6th Corps, that at least anyone below Lobau was not aware of the Prussian approach. It didn't help that Lobau died and was not available to provide his report.

The part of the cavalry I got from Pierre's website, which I greatly admire. He did make some educated assumptions about times but it was interesting his comment about Domon's division being sent to the right when the 6th Corps moved up, confirmed by Bruno from Jacquinot's division, though Domon's position was just on Durutte's right and not towards the Lasne. (I also don't know if Pierre was making an educated guess as to the time.) The Ney letter was also interesting, if it was authentic.

I don't believe the French were aware of anything more than Prussian patrols, and Barbero's book was obviously wrong on stating French cavalry were combatting the Prussians near Chapelle St. Lambert. But I'm starting to wonder if the French were aware of the possibility of Prussian intervention based on the observation of Prussian patrols and took precautions on their right flank. Again Lobau could have shed some light on the subject. His divisions were further out on the right (behind Durutte's division) than I would have thought had they just been the second line of support. The 1st Corps' echeloned (from the left) attack would have had the object of penetrating the Allied line and push those forces east of the crossroads to the east, and that Bachelu's division was probably also supposed to move forward and push the forces opposite him the opposite direction. You would think that Lobau's divisions would have been closer to the highway to take advantage of the widening gap rather than more to the right.

But I'm starting to wonder if the French were aware of the possibility of Prussian intervention based on the observation of Prussian patrols and took precautions on their right flank.

The Prussian hussar officer states that he made his men hide in order not to attract the attention of the French.

Of course this doesn't guarantee they were not detected, but it reduces the probabilty that they were.

Auf das Gespräch mit den Chef d'escadron Dupuy habe ich mehrmals hingewiesen, gegen 16:00 geschah dann folgendes :

« Un peu plus tard, le comte de Lobau, commandant la droite à Waterloo, fit dire à l'Empereur qu'il était attaqué par les Prussiens. Napoléon ne voulait pas d'abord admettre que la chose fût possible. Lobau dit à M. de Caronne, un de ses officiers : « Faites un prisonnier et portez-le-lui, peut-être sera-t-il convaincu (…) (Fußnote 2, Bourdon de Vatry, cité dans les Mémoires du maréchal Grouchy, tome 4, 1874, page 108) » Coppens – S. 238

again, it shows the complete surprise of Boney – who was even reluctant to believe the Prussians were there.

General Kellerman about the work of Gourgaud

« Le général Kellermann a également rédigé une réfutation dans laquelle on peut dire : « C'était a dicté par Napoléon ; c'est sa manière ; lui seul a pu construire cet échafaudage C'est son apologie, c'est la critique ou la satire de ses lieutenant. Ainsi quand il est vainqueur, tout ce qui s'fait bien sans lui et même malgré lui, c'est à lui qu'il faut le rapporter ; la gloire n'en appartient qu'à lui seul. Et quand il et vaincu, c'est toujours la faute de ses lieutenants. (…) » Coppens, S. 352
On n'a pas besoin que l'auteur nous expliqué comment une seul bataille a suffi pour soumettre la nation française ; cela est facile à comprendre, quand on n'a qu'un armée et qu'on le perd, quand on a épuisé une nation jusque à son dernier homme, il n'y a plus résistance à opposer, il faut se soumettre.
Mais pourquoi la France n'avait-elle qu'une armée ? C'est ce que l'auteur se garde bien de nous dire. Le voici, ce pourquoi : 400 mille hommes engloutie en Russie, 300 milles fondus en Espagne, 400 milles gaspillés dans la courte campagne de 1813 et 1814, voilà de ces pertes dont un Empire ne se relevé qu'avec le temps ; ce temps nous a manqué. Quelle nation pourrait reproduire et former des armées aussi rapidement que Napoléon les consommait ? » (Fußnote 18 – Kellermann (Lieutenant – général, duc de Valmy) Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo, en réponse à une ouvrage intitulé Campagne de 1815 et publié sous le nom du général Gourgaud, Manuscrit, MR 717, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes) Coppens S. 353

I remember that quote now from Dupuy. I did like that quote from Kellermann.

Not been on TMP for a bit, and I'm coming to this thread when it's getting rather old. But… anyway, I was lucky enough to be given review copies of both of John Hussey's Waterloo works, and I loved them.

My review of both volumes can be read at Amazon UK, or on my own blog:

Hussey's Waterloo, Vols I & II

Great discussion and much new information gleamed. This makes what TMP is great at, informed and polite discussion, Bravo!

Now, von Winterfeldt you mentioned better narratives on the battle(s) please could you tell me which ones you would recommend? Many thanks.

Gareth Glover : Waterloo: Myth and Reality

Gareth Glover : Waterloo: The Deafeat of Napoleon s Imperial Guard

In case of non English sources – Coppens, Bernard, Waterloo – les mesonges are a must read as well the a series of Belgian authors in the so called Carnets Vers series who discuss the topic very well.

Courtesy of Oliver's link, above, I offer this rough translation of part of the Prussian officer's report:

**********************
At 11 o'clock I arrived in St. Lambert. No enemy had noticed me. I caught a few French cavalry who had not guessed my closeness. On the left, on the large Genappe-Brussels road, you could hear individual cannon shots. A defile [was] ahead of us, which had to be passed to get to the wooded heights of Ohain and Lasnes across from St. Lambert.

I was ordered to proceed at once, to patrol the defile, and to pass at Lasnes, to find out, if possible, whether the wood [to the] left by [of?] Lasnes and an old abbey in the valley were to be seen by the enemy. I moved to the left in the village of Lasnes towards the abbey and learned that the right wing of the French reserve stood in Plancenoit and between this village and the forest beyond the defile of Lasnes. All the French troops stationed in this area showed me their backs. I concluded from this that we were not expected to be here. So I withdrew quite quietly, passed through the defile of Lasnes, and stole away to the forest on the heights. This was half unoccupied. The unoccupied part lay in the direction of Ohain, which was favorable to us; for from this place the I Korps made the connection between the left wing of the English and the IV Korps. Gently I went into the forest to a point from where you could [freely] see [the] field. On the left in front of me was the French army with the heights of Belle Alliance in the[ir] back, as they had [were?] in complete action with the English, who had already lost some terrain at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. A staff officer, who had followed me, shared the perceptions with me.

As my patrols came across an enemy in the woods, I returned some of the obscurity orders with the order not to show themselves, and hurried back to the heights of St. Lambert. Here I met the whole generalship. Upon my and the General Staff Officers' report, IV Korps marched on, passed the defile at Lasnes, and, unseen by the enemy, gathered together and in the forest. Before two brigades were united, the Feldmarschall was about to break out of the woods. General Bulow, on the other hand, deliberately and rightly hesitated until at least 12000 to 15000 men were together. An adjutant commanded our regiment to break out of the forest and attack the enemy cavalry. This happened. A fine tirailleur line, which confronted us was driven out, two regiments of dragoons and chasseurs thrown in a moment, several officers, men, and horses taken from them. Now our infantry advanced to the present village of Frischermont.