"Dutch Harbor: The Unraveling of Japan’s Pacific Strategy " Topic

"Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto drew his hand across a map of the northern Pacific Ocean in a long, sweeping arc. From Attu Island on the far western edge of the Bearing Sea, the admiral traced his finger along the Aleutian archipelago to the island of Amaknak near the Alaskan mainland. There, in June of 1942, Yamamoto intended to strike the American forces at Dutch Harbor. As a strategist, Yamamoto had achieved near deity status among the Japanese Imperial High Command. His crushing attack on Pearl Harbor just six months prior was followed by quick and decisive victory in the Philippines, Malaya, and the East Indies. Now, with the southwest Pacific under firm Japanese control, Yamamoto looked to expand offensive operations to the north and central Pacific. By attacking key strategic points in the Aleutians, as well as Midway Island on the western tip of the Hawaiian chain, he intended to lure the already weakened U.S. Pacific fleet from Pearl Harbor to its final destruction.[1] Yet despite his meticulous planning, his intellect and his vaunted reputation, the attack on the remote Alaskan harbor upon which he now rested his finger would prove to be one of Yamamoto's greatest strategic blunders…."
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Amicalement
Armand

Thanks.

Thanks for the link, my friend.

As I expect may be the case for many students of WW2 history, I knew that the IJN split off a task force with 2 carrier to attack the Aleutians concurrently with their advance on Midway. But I have never before read an account of that task force's actions in the Aleutians.

It makes an interesting read.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

"would prove to be one of Yamamoto's greatest strategic blunders…."

I don't buy this. The attack on Alaska failed because the US had broken the Japanese codes. If we hadn't done so it may have worked as planned. Just because it didn't work doesn't mean its a bad plan. This is a case of hindsight being 20/20.

The attack on Alaska failed because the US had broken the Japanese codes. … Just because it didn't work doesn't mean its a bad plan.

I don't think the reference to the attack being one of Yamamoto's greatest strategic blunders had much at all to do with whether the attack on Dutch Harbor and Attu succeeded or failed.

Rather, it was a reference to splitting his forces at the critical moment. Regardless of whether the secondary attack succeeded or failed, it was a failure at the level of strategy from the moment it was set in motion.

What if Hosogaya had been more successful in his attacks? What if he had raided Dutch Harbor with a full air strike group, decimated the installations, and found and pommeled several ships of Theobald's force (whether finding them in harbor, or under weigh matters little to this suggestion). What if he had succeeded in landing a battalion or even regimental sized force on Attu?

What happens then?

If the Japanese fleet at Midway is destroyed, as it was, then everything he does at Dutch Harbor / Attu means nothing. Nothing. There is no way that a battalion or even regiment of troops is going to hold out within kayak range of a hostile continent without supplies, support, and reinforcements. With Kido Butai out of action (at the bottom of the Pacific), there was no path by which regular return trips could be effected.

So what would he have achieved? Perhaps he could, in the best case scenario, have sunk a few cruisers and destroyers, and distracted a division of Canadian or American troops for a few months.

Yawn.

Concentration of forces, in place and time, is one of the key principals of military tactics and strategy. When you want to run a diversion, you do it as an economy-of-force mission, with the goal of distracting substantial enemy resources away from the key place and time.

Instead Yamamoto sent substantial resources of his own away, and distracted a notably smaller US force, all at the exact time (of his own choosing) when he made his strategic blow.

If he wanted a short-term diversion he should have sent one or two cruisers and destroyers, with a company or two, about 3 weeks before his Midway move. Shell an installation, maybe shoot up a little local shipping, and put some token force on an island. Let the US organize a response before your main force is revealed at the strategic point.

But simultaneous strikes, with the diversionary force getting 1/3 of your most critical resource (carriers and air crew), is a strategic blunder of the first order.

What could possibly have been achieved that was more important than the Midway operation?

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

The carriers sent to Attu and Kiska carried about 1/4 of the carrier fleet's aircraft, not 1/3 and one of them was unable to maintain fleet speed. That said, those two carriers could have made it down to Midway by the time the Japanese expected the US carriers, which was after Midway had been taken. The Japanese didn't suspect the US was reading their mail.

Happy you enjoyed it my good friend!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

The carriers sent to Attu and Kiska carried about 1/4 of the carrier fleet's aircraft, not 1/3 and one of them was unable to maintain fleet speed. That said, those two carriers could have made it down to Midway by the time the Japanese expected the US carriers, which was after Midway had been taken. The Japanese didn't suspect the US was reading their mail.

Murvihill:

I agree with most of the statements you offer. Yet I still maintain my criticism of the strategic decision-making.

I confess going in that naval issues are not my forte. So I am open to correction on the following, but my understanding of the carriers is:

Junyo: Fleet carrier sized, but built as an ocean-liner conversion project. The Aleutians was the Junyo's first combat campaign. Not fast enough to keep up with Kido Butai. But with a good sized airgroup and 25-26kts speed, this carrier could still have been an important asset.

Ryujo: Light carrier, but with a pretty impressive airgroup (40+ planes) for its size. The double-deck hanger space made it somewhat unstable in rough seas (so let's send it into the Arctic Ocean?). But still it was a pretty fast ship. Operated with Zuiho as part of the light carrier group in the Pearl Harbor construction of Kido Butai.

For Midway the Zuiho was assigned to the invasion force. Addition Ryujo would have more than doubled the airgroup to cover the BBs and Cruisers.

Junyo might have been used to cover the occupation force (the transports) or perhaps to add to the invasion force. It was about 2kts slower than Zuiho. So maybe that's too slow for the invasion force -- IDK. But it had a sizable airgroup, both strike and fighters, to offer.

Perhaps a second carrier task group could have been formed, with the two light carriers and Junyo, to maintain attacks against Midway independent of Nagumo's first fleet.

One of the issues that sunk the Japanese fleet was Nagumo's worries about Midway's airfield. He was torn between chasing the suspected USN carriers and striking the field to stop the constant flow of land-based aircraft attacking his force.

I am trying to approach this without relying on 20-20 hindsight. I accept and agree with the perspective that USN carriers were not expected to oppose the landings on Midway. Still, the whole operation was staged as an effort to ambush the USN fleet response. If I want to set-up an ambush, I am NOT inclined to reveal the presence of my ambush force as I set it up! That's just good basic tactics. So even if I wasn't aware that the USN would be ready and in position to counter my strike, I would hope I was smart enough to use a different force to subdue Midway.

I think this was in his plan with the second fleet (the battleships of the invasion force). But regardless of whether Yamamoto expected his own BBs to carry the battle, it was an active disregard for the behavior of the USN over the prior 6 1/2 months if he expected the USN to sail it's own battleships into action against the combined airgroups of 4 fleet carriers without carrier air cover.

So even if we take his seat, if we don't expect USN CVs waiting in position to counter, if we expect the surprise presence of our battleships to be the force that tips the balance when the USN does respond … even with all of that as my assumption set, I can see my position as stronger if I have a second air strike group lead the attack on Midway (rather than the First Fleet airgroup), or having more air cover resources with my battleships or my transports.

It's a matter of focus. If Midway is where I need to win, if winning at Midway means I need to have enough strength to grab the island before the Americans respond, and also I need to have sufficient strength to maximize my probability of crushing their response … if that's my strategic intent, when what am I doing sending a sizeable force off half an ocean away on a diversionary attack that isn't going to be done soon enough to allow a counter-move to start before my main attack is revealed?

It's bad enough to split your force. Even worse to split it with timing that denies the potential of a diversion.

I stick with my assertion it was a strategic blunder. Not just because if failed as it did, but because it was poor strategy even IF the Americans had not had the magic wand of radio intelligence on their side.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)