"Were Tank Destroyers & Battlecruisers Disappointing?" Topic

I was idly reading through this link when I came across this quote:

Judgment-based military decision-making works best when it has a strong basis in experience. Almost by definition, there can be no strong basis in real-world experience if the question at hand regards major innovation. Today's standard military equipment was yesterday's innovation, and last week's hare-brained scheme. The tank, the airplane, the radio, and the machinegun were each, in their infancy, decried as useless, and yet today they are deemed essential. The rigid airship, the battlecruiser, and the tank destroyer were supposed to be great ideas, and yet they are now remembered for their disappointing results."

Are tank destroyers now remembered for their disappointing results? For that matter, are battlecruisers?

Battle cruisers worked very well in the Falklands

US TDs get a very poor response in wargaming circles, but I put it down to game design. Either we're given a set order of battle, or we're given points with which to pick our troops. We don't have to worry about getting them to the battlefield, so we love the thick armor and powerful gun of the lumbering, breakdown-prone Tiger and despise the fast, reliable M10. Add an "appearance roll" after you've paid for the units, and things might look very different.

As I understand it, the "kill ratio" of the TDs was quite respectable--and a little surprising given they were intended to counter the sort of German offensives seldom seen by the time they arrived in Europe. But it's also worth noting that they have no modern branch to burnish their record, while the us Armor Corps has very much adopted the policies and beliefs, not of the successful German armies of 1939-41, but of the unsuccessful late-war Germans with their emphasis on tank duels and tanks as the primary tank killers.

Me? I wouldn't revive the TDs. Warfare is too uncertain, and mostly you want general-purpose units rather than specialist ones. But I might tilt the scales in tank design a little more toward speed, range and reliability and less toward heavier armor.

And I'll leave battlecruisers for the naval historians.

I personally think the fact that TD's and Battlecruisers were dropped as a concept says much. The fact that they undeniably had good battles may say more about the way they were used and where, than any innate quality.

I would think that TOW and others similar missiles on Bradleys occupy the role of a TD. The concept remains: a lighter armored vehicle but with punch enough to take out a tank. Soon it will be a drone.

In most cases (with some exceptions) anything will work so long as it is used as intended…

The Battlecruiser is a good example. If you only used them for chasing down other cruisers and keep them out of the battle line, they do just fine.

On the other hand, the German Battlecruisers actually did fair much better than their British counterparts at Jutland.

I hear your Robert, but to me the Abrams combines the best aspects of the Tiger and the Sherman. It is fast, reliable, well protected, and well armed. Plus we made thousands of the things. It is the great modern compromise of armor, firepower, and mobility all combined into a very reliable platform. My experience with the Abrams was that we had 90-100% runners in all of our field problems. We had more issues with personnel than with the Abrams itself.

But yes, I'm with you on the Tiger and Panther tanks. If games like Flames of War required you to spend points on those tanks and then make a roll to see if they actually appeared then there would be some VERY different German armies out there!

The TD, IMO, was a great idea that looked awesome on paper. I wonder how it would have worked if the British or French had TD battalions in 1940? Who knows, they may have worked. However the day of the German blitzkrieg was pretty well over by the time US forces met the Germans in 1943. The TDs did do okay El Guettar.

link

I'm glad they're working well, Tgunner. I never had direct experience. My units were all light infantry or SP howitzers. There were serious reliability problems early on, not to mention fuel consumption.

Might also look at TDs in the Bulge, but you have to get pretty well into the weeds. The short answer is that the tracked TD units did quite well, but units re-equipped with towed guns, as many had been, just couldn't scoot fast enough in the presence of an advancing enemy.

1940? Might be fun to play out the campaign with a few groups of M10's taking the place of a couple of the DCRs, but my fantasy is to replay the German advance through the Ardennes in 1940 with a DLC and a DLM in the path of the advance. I think it would have been hard for any combination of doctrine and equipment to make up for horrendous real-life Allied strategy.

If TOW and other ATGM's occupy the role of tank destroyers, then the US M901, German Jaguar, and other similar vehicles would be tank destroyers.

The problem with specialized units like TDs and BCs is that they work well in special situations but in other instances may not. Falklands is an example of BCs working well. Jutland is an example of them not doing so well.

I like your appearance roll Robert. I used to have something similar for mercenaries in Middle Age and Renaissance games. The basic cost to acquire them was low, but if your opponent saved up some of his points he could pay your mercenaries to go home, or even defect. Nothing like thinking you have got a great army and then finding out that only part of it will be available for the battle.

I wonder how it would have worked if the British or French had TD battalions in 1940? Who knows, they may have worked.

As far as equipment goes in 1940, the British had cruiser tanks, which on paper bear some similarity to tank destroyer concepts (gun with good anti-tank performance, light armour and designed for mobility). As for the French, they had mounted 47 mm anti-tank gun on a truck chassis to be used in a mobile anti-tank role.

Combine those with armoured cars or light tanks for reconnaissance, and enough radios for communication, and you should be able to put together TD battalions that could give German armoured units troubles in 1940. Having doctrine and training for the role might be another issue…

WRT to the British BCs at Jutland, note that more recent historical accounts ascribe their loss to dangerous ammunition handling practices in use by the RN at the time. These practices were apparently put into place after the battle of Dogger Bank, and persisted through Jutland. This and the eminently durable German BCs calls into question the idea that the BC concept was inherently flawed.

For example, see Friedman "Fighting the Great War at Sea", pages 163-164. I quoted a passage from this book in this thread: TMP link

MH

War game rules designed by none veterans, are often filled with poor evaluations of equipment or tactics.
‘Wargaming circles' would be regarded as a weak and poor source for research.
Tank destroyers were very effective during defensive tactics. They were less effective on the attack. They were much better than AT guns since they were more mobile.

As regards battle cruisers, the heavy losses incurred were due to using them according to a flawed concept. But it has been pointed out that it was almost inevitable that such large ships (often bigger than battleships of the same vintage), with armament of battleship caliber, would wind up being employed as a fast wing of the main battle fleets. Even the name of this type of warship tends to imply that.

I don't think you can put down the British losses at Jutland just to undeniably hazardous ammunition supply arrangements, as these would have been the same in British battleships, none of which were lost. British battle cruiser design sacrificed armor for speed. The Germans achieved speed by a slight sacrifice of gun power instead of by inadequate armor. Even so, the Germans also lost a battle cruiser at Jutland--it just did not blow up. And, of course, there was the loss of H.M.S. Hood in World War II.

I think it is fair to say that the battle cruiser type was a disappointment as things played out in reality. However, if the British design philosophy had been like that of the Germans, and were it not for the unfortunate ammunition arrangements in British ships, then the losses would have been much less unequal, and the reputation of the type would have been less tarnished. Nonetheless, the concept of a limited number of fast battleships, as exemplified by the Queen Elizabeth-class, was a far sounder idea.

It seems to me every time either of these two, Tank Destroyers or Battlecruisers, comes up, we chase our tails in circles for lack of some very basic common terminology.

Are we speaking of tank destroyers as a type of vehicle? Or as a military organization? Are we speaking of the US Tank Destroyer command, or of the more generic issue of vehicles optimized for anti-tank combat?

Are we speaking of the RN model of Battlecruisers? Or of any approach used by any navy that used that label? Or any approach used by any navy for things between cruisers and battleships, that someone wants to call battlecruisers whether the navy that built them did or didn't?

Tank Destroyers were dropped like a hot potato at the close of combat in ETO. But only IF we mean the US Army's Tank Destroyer Command, it's organization, and it's doctrine.

Tank destroyers were very popular in the post war era, serving in the arsenals of almost every nation that built or acquired a force of armored fighting vehicles. But only IF we mean a class of vehicles optimized for anti-tank combat, that focused on high mobility and high anti-armor firepower at the expense of protection level.

Battlecruisers began disappearing from the major navies of the world starting in the 1930s, and were gone completely shortly after WW2. But only IF we mean the RN model of a separate class of warships with battleship main gun armament, but cruiser levels of speed, achieved by dropping the armored protection to a level that defends against cruiser fire but not battleship fire.

Battlecruisers dominated late-war and post war capital ship service. But only IF we mean fast ships with battleship levels of armament.

Battlecruisers were an interesting side-tree in major navies during WW2 and the post-WW2 era. But only IF we mean ships that were something less than contemporary battleships, but more than contemporary cruiseres.

Seems to me that any side can be correct, with indisputable historical fact on their side, depending on how we define (or fail to define) our terminology.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

It wasn't equipment in 1940 that failed the allies, it was doctrine and command/control.

It wasn't equipment in 1940 that failed the allies, it was doctrine and command/control.

Yes, but …

I think it is true that if you had given the French Pz IIs, with a scattering of Pz IIIs and IVs, I don't think they would have done much better than they did. They didn't know how to use them to achieve what the Germans achieved.

But on the other hand, if you had given the Germans R35s, Char-Bs and S-35s, I don't think they would have been able to achieve all that they achieved. The French equipment just was not suitable for the kind of operations the Germans practiced.

On the French side at least, the equipment was created to fulfill a doctrine. And it did, pretty well. The British tank development process … well that's a different question. But the French tank development process produced tanks that conformed pretty well to the French armored doctrine, and the French armored doctrine was pretty well integrated with the overall French land warfare doctrine.

In the end it was a grossly inadequate doctrine. So we can say doctrine was the more important failure. But if they had had a better doctrine, but still had R35s and Char-Bs, I think it is most likely that they still would have had a catastrophic failure during the 1940 campaign.

At least that's my read on the history of that period.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Equipment failed as well. Nearly all of the French tanks were far too slow (couldn't reposition to respond to a breath , etc., even if the French OODA loop had been much faster. The vast majority were so undergunned as to be useless against other armor--when th5se French became aware of the thickness of the armor on the Pz II and III, they were very worried and coinducted tests with the short 37mm that armed the majority of their tanks. The results showed that they were unable to penetrate the rear armor reliably, which set off a panic. The French were pushing out slightly improved ammunition as a stop-gap and were trying to rear with the longer 37mm, but they didn't have enough time.

The French air force was a half-generation behind in fighters, which was a serious problem. The RAF suffered from lots of really poorly-conceived and designed bombers.

The British cruiser tanks having almost no anti-infantry capability was a a near-fatal flaw and became much more serious in North AfRica. The A9 had a plethora of machine guns, but the multi-turret layout reduced their effectiveness to a fraction of what it should have been.

And, of course, the French were handicapper by their vast supply of 75mm artillery, which was no longer suitable. It had many, many problems as an indirect-fire piece and threw too light a shell.

It's funny, I consider the attack helicopter as the penultimate expression of the US Tank Destroyer doctrine. It's an extremely fast vehicle armed to kill tanks from ambush. It can also be armed to kill infantry (and often is), but it's primarily a tank killer. It's just that US Tank Destroyer doctrine required a vehicle faster than anything could possibly be if it was on the ground.

And if we are calling battlecruisers "ships with enough guns to kill anything it can catch and enough speed to outrun anything that can kill it," I think the only time that concept ever worked out was the US 44-gun frigates like the Constitution.

That is a good point about attach choppers Lion. At least in US service anyway. They operate separately, but in conjunction with, land forces. Their scouts snoop out enemy forces and vector attack birds out to hit them. Then they disengage, go to another position, and do the process over again until they run dry on missiles. As a tanker, it was great to have their support but,they were rarely there when we needed them. (clears throat) NTC!!!!!!!!!

I agree with some here. It was more about doctrine and employment. And I not really crazy about open topped AFVs.

I consider the attack helicopter as the penultimate expression of the US Tank Destroyer doctrine.

I agree … with the threat of the WP's flood of AFVs crossing the IGB. Gunships were critical in killing as many of those AFVs as possible.

I would think that TOW and others similar missiles on Bradleys occupy the role of a TD

Yes, the TOW was mounted on Jeeps and APCs i.e. the M901 ITV. In the 101 we had an entire AT Co. with TOWs mounted on the M151 "Jeep".

In Mech units, '84-'90 there was also an AT Co. with 3 or 4 Plts of M901s. And each Mech Infantry Co. and an M901 Section with 2 ITVs.

And Mech/Armored Scout Plts had 3 M113s and 3 ITVs.

But to equate the M2 Bradley IFV as a TD is "not a good idea". The M2's(and M3 CFV's) TOW is not to be used as a Tank Hunter. It's there to get the M2/3's out of trouble. Not into by going Tank Hunting.

Just like why the Scout Plt has 3 M113s and 3 M901s. Not to go Tank Hunting. But to get the Scouts/Bn Recon element out of trouble.

The Scouts can also be used to Screen, a classis Scout mission. But Don't expect 3 M901s to go "toe2toe" with a large number on MBTs. Scouts in that case "Shoot & Scoot" … Trading space of time or vis versa, based terrain & situation.

The 101 had Jeep mounted TOW[ AFAIK now they are mounted on HUMMVs] to "Shoot & Scoot". Not to do a Bastonge like defense. That would be the last thing a light unit like the 101 would want to.

And the TOWs had to be mounted on a light enough vehicle so as to be air transportable by a helicopter. I.e the UH1H[then later the UH60] or CH47.

In the end it was a grossly inadequate doctrine. So we can say doctrine was the more important failure. But if they had had a better doctrine, but still had R35s and Char-Bs, I think it is most likely that they still would have had a catastrophic failure during the 1940 campaign

I agree "bad" doctrine no matter how "good" the equipment that is being used will probably not be that effective.

Again in this case the French[UK, Belgium, etc.] were generally fighting the last war. And completely out classed by the Germans' "new" tactical doctrine for the use of mobile combined arms doctrine. Which isn't to say both the French and UK Forces didn't win some battles vs. the Germans in 1940. But you have to "win" more than a few engagements to "win" a campaign, etc.

Yes, the TOW was mounted on Jeeps and APCs i.e. the M901 ITV. In the 101 we had an entire AT Co. with TOWs mounted on the M151 "Jeep".

I always thought of those as a replacement for AT guns in infantry units not TD's. Jeep mounted recoiless guns and later missiles replacing the towed 57mm and 3" guns.

Plus we made thousands of the things.

It is about 10,000 Abrams since 1979 which is not a huge number. Adding in tank production for the rest of the western allies you are looking at around another 5,000 tanks. In the same period the Soviets/Russians built nearly 50,000 T-64, 72 and 80 tanks. The Chinese built thousands more of their various models.

And, of course, there was the loss of H.M.S. Hood in World War II.

HMS Hood as built had deviated from the original British battlecruiser concept, and was really a fast battleship. Her protection (including deck protection) was better than any other British battleship during the interwar period, with the exception of Nelson and Rodney.

Based on the Jurens article navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood.php, IMHO her loss in 1941 was most likely due to a "lucky hit" in a 4" magazine, which had been added in the 1930s and extended out to the forward edge of the thicker magazine deck armor. It was probably penetrated via the thinner engine room deck armor during her final turn. A flaw, but not one to be attributed to British battlecruiser design concepts.

MH

EDIT: Also see this: hmshood.com/reference/written/santoriniReview.htm (I am impressed; I think I'll buy the book).

The British battlecruisers were not using a different plan of action for ammo handling, they were ignoring the safety regs for handling ammo. Things like clipping open the blast resistant doors and leaving exposed powder charges in places they were not supposed to be.

The battleships were not doing these things. Jellicoe would not have permitted it and would have raised hell with the battlecruisers had he known what they were doing.

The reason the Bcs were doing that was because they could not shoot. They had a very poor level of gunnery and tried substituting rapid fire for accurate fire. In small arms it is called spray and pray. I dont understand why you would not spend the time to work on your gunnery instead of cutting safety regs, but I have seen it before in land artillery, so realize it does happen.

@Mark 1

I hear you re battlecruisers. By WW2 the concept was so nebulous as to meaningless. Eg Hood didn't make it to the fleet in WW1 because she'd been sent back to the yard to be re-armoured and by WW2 was essentially a fast battleship. Graf Spee was constructively a WW1 battlecruiser: cruiser armour, 25 knots (any more and the vibration made aiming impossible), 6 x 11" guns. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are routinely mislabelled battlecruisers but the Germans called them battleships. Alaska and Guam had the original battlecruiser mission but were called large cruisers. It's a mess.

@badger: the other advantage the RN's BBs had over the BCs was that they weren't engaged. I think it was Massie who called the BCF under Beatty the worst formation of heavy ships the RN ever sent to sea.

I don't think you can put down the British losses at Jutland just to undeniably hazardous ammunition supply arrangements, as these would have been the same in British battleships, none of which were lost.

As 4th cuirassier just mentioned, the only British battleships that actually got hit at Jutland were the Queen Elizabeth class, i.e. the most heavily armoured ships on the British side. Likewise, the German dreadnoughts were engaged only briefly, although in their case the leading ships were hit heavily, and suffered badly.

I suspect if the dreadnoughts at Jutland had engaged in a protracted slugging match the way that the battle cruisers did, the relative evaluation of the two types would have changed.

Strictly from a historical sense, isn't it a matter of technology outstripping the original concept?

The battlecruiser was replaced by the Fast Battleship, which gave you speed, protection and firepower, making the battlecruiser, which only gave you speed and firepower, obsolete.

The tank destroyer was a concept born of a time when the tank itself wasn't meant to go against enemy tanks as a primary role, but rather support infantry. Tank destroyers were meant to sacrifice some mobility or protection (depending on the doctrine) in favor of firepower. However, with better engines and armor design, the Main Battle Tank gave us mobility, firepower and protection in a single design, making the concept obsolete.

Yes there were oddballs like the Ontos and jeeps fitted with Recoilless Rifles or TOWs, but they weren't ever meant to be replacements for pure MBTs, but rather a way to give non-armored units more firepower, and thus protection if they were overrun by tanks. The Ontos ended up being used more as a bunker buster vehicle than an anti-tank system in any event, and despite some commanders using the jeeps with RRs in clever ways to destroy MBTs (see the Indo-Pakistan conflicts), no one seems to be pursuing a doctrine of using these vehicles (or AFVs fitted with missiles) as a primary offensive weapon.

I always thought of those as a replacement for AT guns in infantry units not TD's. Jeep mounted recoiless guns and later missiles replacing the towed 57mm and 3" guns.

Yes, that is generally true … Infantry units need the ability to kill AFVs on their own. As in some cases MBTs/AFVs are not always available. So to use them as Tank Hunters might not be their "best" employment.

Ontos and jeeps fitted with Recoilless Rifles or TOWs, but they weren't ever meant to be replacements for pure MBTs, but rather a way to give non-armored units more firepower, and thus protection if they were overrun by tanks.

Very much so, again Infantry units have to have it's own organic AT weapons.

The Ontos ended up being used more as a bunker buster vehicle than an anti-tank system

Originally a vehicle the US Army wanted. But ended up with USMC. And yes, they were used generally to good effect in places like Hue. Where they encountered no enemy AFVs, IIRC. But certainly did some damage to structures of all types.

IIRC the last USMC Ontos were withdraw from service from Gitmo in the early '80s. As the Cuban forces on the other side of the wire did and do have MBTs/AFVs.

and despite some commanders using the jeeps with RRs in clever ways to destroy MBTs (see the Indo-Pakistan conflicts), no one seems to be pursuing a doctrine of using these vehicles (or AFVs fitted with missiles as a primary offensive weapon.

Yes, you saw that in some of the early Arab-Israeli conflicts as well.
E.g. the IDF in some cases. The AT weapons mounted on Jeeps, etc., were better used in an Ambush etc., type engagement. A "Shoot & Scoot" type technique. As just like using the M901 or M2/M3 Bradley to go tank hunting might be pushing those crews' luck. A bit too much.

Admittedly good commanders will adapt, use their initiative, etc. to use their lighter assets to engage and destroy enemy AFVs. But as always not only do terrain and situation come into play.
But the relative "quality" of both sides' troops engaged. E.g. seeing footage of a number of Turkish new German made Leo A4(?) MBTs being destroyed by ISIS using a variety of AT weapons. In Syria last year was quite disconcerting. As the Turks are NATO and supposed to understand combined arms tactics, etc.

WW1 battlecruisers had battleship guns, cruiser speed and armor between the two.
WW2 battlecruisers had cruiser speed, battleship armor and guns between the two. For classes I'd say the Scharnhorst, Dunkerque and Alaskas.
As far as tank destroyers:
WW2 tank destroyers were fully tracked, had tank guns and armored against small arms and only.
The modern equivalents are? I'd include tank-busting missiles so the M901 seems a perfect example.

I'd include tank-busting missiles so the M901 seems a perfect example.

As I said in the US Army J series TOE, etc. in the '80s. There was an entire Anti-Tank[sometimes referred to as Anti-Armor] Company in Inf Bns.In both the Light and Mech Bns I served in.

So yes, those TOW mounted vehicles, were Anti-Tank, i.e. Tank Destroyers. But their employment was a little different than the WWII "Tank Destroyers". Doctrine, tech, etc. had change a good deal since WWII thru the Cold War[and beyond]. And the conflicts that happened in that period, e.g. a number of Arab-Israeli Wars.

I won't cite the Iran-Iraq War, as I'm not sure what "doctrine" they were using. Generally reminded me of WWI tactics with modern weapons.

@Murvihill: Depends on your nation for the WW2 tank destroyer characteristics.

US and UK TDs were usually fully tracked with light armor and a big gun in an open turret, which gave them good mobility and situational awareness.

German and Russian TDs were fully tracked with heavy armor and a fixed gun, sacrificing mobility for protection.

All TDs operated from ambush. American and British TDs could shoot and scoot very quickly, while the German and Russian TDs could sit and take a few hits before leaving.

Modern light-armor+big-gun/missile vehicles are doctrinally equivalent to towed or motorized AT guns, they're an organic part of the unit they are supporting.

There aren't any modern heavy-armor+big-gun/missile vehicles and there haven't been any since about 1960 or so, the Main Battle Tank has replaced them. The S-Tank? Doctrinally a Tank, despite it's fixed gun. Even M60s needed to stop to shoot accurately, and the S-tank could stop, shoot and then accelerate very quickly. The S-tank was just as fast on a combat gunnery course as a Leopard or M60.

Attack helicopters are doctrinally equivalent to the US Tank Destroyer Corps, a separate unit assigned to support the combat battalion. Helicopters have the speed to react to an armored breakthrough and can be armed to kill up to 16 tanks each, though usually they carry ~8 missiles and a number of rockets for lighter vehicles and infantry.

WW2 tank destroyers were fully tracked, had tank guns and armored against small arms and only.

Except not all were. The later German tank destroyers has pretty decent levels of armour. The early ones were about get a big gun on an obsolete chassis. Soviet tank destroyers were also well armoured. It is the allied tank destroyers that had thin armour.

The TD debate rages on. TDs existed because back then you could fit a bigger gun in/on them than in a tank. With advanced tech the MBT took over. That doesn't mean the TD was a bad idea. It was just overtaken by modern technology. Don't see many horse cavalry units today but for hundreds of years they ruled battlefields.

Now let's try battlecruisers vs battleships. BC were lightly armored, heavily armed and high speed. Gee let's compare the Aegis Cruisers to the Iowa BB both of which served together some years ago. The cruisers look a lot like BC to me and the Iowa's are all museums. Yes. I'm stretching the comparison on purpose.

Both BC and TD doctrine made lots of sense if you assumed the enemy is going to perform exactly as predicted. They don't. So any weapon designed with a narrow focus of fighting ie we're only going to fight tanks, or cruisers or whatever … has a hard time in real war. BC looked like BB and commanders tried to use them as such. Ditto with TD that looked like tanks.

That's why we no longer have light medium and heavy tanks. We have MBT. Don't have light medium and heavy MG either we have SAW. Or pursuit planes vs fighters vs dive bombers vs medium, heavy etc. Specialization in weaponry is a fast track to obsolescence. Forgive typos on iPhone lol. Cheers!

Except not all were. The later German tank destroyers has pretty decent levels of armour. The early ones were about get a big gun on an obsolete chassis. Soviet tank destroyers were also well armoured. It is the allied tank destroyers that had thin armour.

Indeed … a number of German Pz.IV types, along with the JagdPanther and JagdTiger. And the USSR's SU 85 and SU 100. Plus SU 152 maybe not really a TD, but the 152mm cannon would probably KO most of any AFV/MBT it encounters.

That doesn't mean the TD was a bad idea. It was just overtaken by modern technology.

Yep … e.g. AH1s and AH64s packing TOWs or Hellfires respectively.

There were indeed big-gun TDs after 1960. Examples include:

- Jagdpanzer Kanone production began in 1966.
- SK-105 production began in 1971.
- IKV-91 production ran from 1975 until 1978.

It is an ex post facto rationalization that TDs existed because you could put a bigger gun on a chassis if you didn't armor it or put a turret on it. That's not how the decision-makers made the decisions that produced those vehicles (in most cases -- or at least in any of the cases I've studied).

New weapon system definition processes don't follow a line of "How could we make this other thing different?" Rather, they generally follow a line of "What are the priorities of the new weapons system? How can we achieve those priorities quickly and economically?"

For example, I can find no instance in the development record of the M10 tank destroyer where anyone in a position of responsibility or influence said anything like: "We can put a bigger gun on a Sherman chassis and make it faster if we take the roof off and make the armor thinner." It just didn't happen that way.

Rather, the flow was more along the lines of: "We are tasked to create AT guns with mobility and protection." Soon in the process they came to: "Let's use fully tracked chassis with good cross-country characteristics," and "We should provide all-round protection from small arms and shell fragments." This was followed by "This 3-inch gun has good AT performance," and "Let's give it a fully rotating turret." At some point they added "We can accelerate development if we use the same chassis that has already been developed for the new Sherman medium tank."

It is only after the fact that people look at it and say: "They took a Sherman and removed the armor to fit it with a bigger gun and make it faster".

So also with the StuG, or Sd.Kfz 131/2/8/9 Marder(s), or Jagdpanzer IV, or Jagdpanther, or the SU-85. No evidence of a thought process of "We can put a bigger gun in this tank if we just do-away with the rotating turret". Rather, it was more like "we can meet all of the priorities specified for this type of vehicle more quickly and economically by using this available chassis and mounting the gun in a casemate."

I don't think it is a matter of technology out-stripping concepts. The state of technology does not invalidate the concept of tank destroyers (if by that term we mean light, highly mobile vehicles with heavy anti-armor firepower). There has always been a balance between mobility, firepower and protection. The MBT is a balanced design that takes full advantage of the automotive, armor and weapons technology of the day. So also were the Pz III, and the T-34, relative to the technology of their day. At the level of technology available at any point in time you can have a balanced design, or you can emphasize one (some) factor(s) over the other(s).

The difference today is that most modern armies have come to the tactical / doctrinal conclusion that their force will be more effective if they focus on the balanced design, rather than multiple designs with various deliberate imbalances.

There's no doubt that the US, or British, French, German or Russian armies could put bigger guns on an MBT chassis. Or they could make the vehicle more mobile if it didn't have as much armor. They have concluded, after 60-70 years of experience, that they get more tactical and operational capabilities from designs that provide a balance of armor, firepower and mobility.

At least that's how I read it.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I'm not sure I'm willing to call a Kanonenjagdpanzer a 'big gun', since it only had a 90mm from decommissioned M47s. It was about 20 tons lighter than an M48, but that was primarily due to the minimal armor (even by WW2 standards, 10-50mm is minimal!).

The SK105 is more a light tank for airborne and mountain warfare (much like the M8 Armored Gun System). 105mm gun in a turret with little armor. Not that the low armor is necessarily bad, as it's not much less protection than a Leo1, which was designed under the assumption that you couldn't effectively protect against shaped charge warheads.

The IKV-91 only has a 90mm low-pressure gun, so it's even more lightly armed than the other two.

The SK105 and IKV91 are best described as 'motorized AT guns', roles that are typically filled with ATGMs today. But in the 1960s, guided missiles weren't anywhere near as reliable or as portable as they are today (or even in the late 1970s with the TOW). I will grant the Kanonen-jagdpanzer as a Tank Destroyer by designed role.

There's no doubt that the US, or British, French, German or Russian armies could put bigger guns on an MBT chassis. Or they could make the vehicle more mobile if it didn't have as much armor. They have concluded, after 60-70 years of experience, that they get more tactical and operational capabilities from designs that provide a balance of armor, firepower and mobility.

At least that's how I read it.

And I'm seeing a continuous desire for greater mobility in US tank designs. While the Future Combat Systems vehicles were a bit light (they had to be under 20 tons to be transportable in C130s), their protection level was supposed to be equivalent to an Abrams due to the active protection systems. And right now it's looking like the next US tank will be closer to 30-35 tons than to 70 tons.

- IKV-91 production ran from 1975 until 1978.

The Ikv-91 usually gets labled as a TD in English language books but it was not design as a TD nor designated as such by the Swedish army. IKV stands for "Infanterikanonvagn", (in English "Infantry Gun vehicle", a TD would have been designated "Pvkv", "Pansarvärnskanonvagn" wjich translates as "Anti-tank gun vehicle".

In modern terms the Ikv-91 was a FSV/Fire Support Vehicle and while it was designed to be able to engage enemy tanks if needed it was not used on the tactical level as a TD/'motorized AT gun'.

while it was designed to be able to engage enemy tanks if needed it was not used on the tactical level as a TD/'motorized AT gun'.

Just like the M2/M3 Bradley IFV/CFV.

The difference today is that most modern armies have come to the tactical / doctrinal conclusion that their force will be more effective if they focus on the balanced design, rather than multiple designs with various deliberate imbalances.

Very true … if for no other reasons than supply and maintenance considerations. The Germans in WWII violated this concept x10 ! I would have hated to be a Log or Maint. Officer then. There were just way too many types of vehicles, chassis, weapons, etc., etc. to effectively supply, maintain, repair, etc.

Having been both a Bn Log then a Bde Asst Log officer and both a Bn and Bde Maint Officer. Studying the way the WWII Germans did such operations boggles the mind. It is almost amazing they got much of anything supplied or running or even Fully Mission Capable(FMC).

Not only that, but they really over designed some of their systems. E.g. the interwoven road wheels of the Panthers' and Tigers' suspension systems, must have been quite challenging to keep them running. In most cases, I'd think. But … I was not there so …

Add Czech, some French, etc. vehicles, some converted and repurposed, etc. It's amazing they kept anything FMC …

Save for right off the assembly line. And even then there were problems. E.g. the first version of the Pz V Panther had a number of "teething problems". And that was not a rare occurrence it appears with other weapons systems either … But again, I was not there … so …

@Legion4,

… if for no other reasons than supply and maintenance considerations. The Germans in WWII violated this concept x10 ! I would have hated to be a Log or Maint. Officer then. There were just way too many types of vehicles, chassis, weapons, etc., etc. to effectively supply, maintain, repair, etc.

An army probably thinks differently about these things if it is expecting very high attrition rates, war production limits are reaching absolute maximums and the war is total; the proverbial kitchen sink will get chucked in.

The Germans went into WW2 supremly ill prepared for the war they found themselves in. Even the short Polish campaign badly depleted munitions stocks to the point where only 1/3 of the divisions had ammunition in store and those stores would only last for 14 days of combat. Central depots had another 14 days worth of munitions but after that the troops would be limited to small arms and bayonets. The situation was just as bad in the Luftwaffe which had expended most of it's bombs in Poland.

So the Germans had to press captured equipment into service to make of for their shortages and to expand the army. But the belief that the could use their operational and tactical superiority to defeat the Soviet Union meant that the Germans never took the chance they had to make a strategic pause in order to streamline their equipment and war industry.

Wow, a day later and all the responses. Regarding TD's, the Soviets had SU-45, SU-57 and SU-76 all which fit the light armor, heavy gun, tracked definition. The Germans had Marders, Nashorns, that PAK 43 on an RSO chassis, all were the same. The German heavy TD's at least were a compromise to simplify production (STG was an assault gun upgraded to a TD, the others were to avoid the complex machining of turret rings) or to take advantage of available equipment like the Ferdinands. The SU122 and SU152 were assault guns like the early STG's, the only ones that don't fit into clean categories are the SU-85 and SU-100.

The SK105 and IKV91 are best described as 'motorized AT guns'…

OK I like that term: "motorized AT gun". It is similar to the term used by the US Army in WW2: "gun, motor carriage". This was the designation of the "75mm Gun, Motor Carriage, M3", the "3-inch Gun, Motor Carriage, M10", the "76mm Gun, Motor Carriage, M18" and the "90mm Gun, Motor Carriage, M36".

We get all wrapped up in how we individually interpret or use the terminology. What do we mean when we say Tank Destroyer? The US never produced a vehicle designated as a "tank destroyer". The US produced self propelled guns, which were used by the tank destroyer command to equip tank destroyer units. The organization and doctrine of the tank destroyers was dropped almost immediately after the war. The class of vehicles used by the organization to fulfill the doctrine remained, both in the US and in other nations.

I agree that the SK-105 and IKV91 were not deployed and trained in tactical / operational formations and doctrine similar to that of the US Tank Destroyer branch. But they were vehicles born of the same technology trade-offs. They were motorized, self-propelled guns. They emphasized high mobility, and armor sufficient to offer some protection from small arms and artillery fragments, (and MAYBE HMGs and small auto-cannons), but not from direct-fire anti-tank weapons.

Not only that, but they really over designed some of their systems. E.g. the interwoven road wheels of the Panthers' and Tigers' suspension systems, must have been quite challenging to keep them running.

Having a little (VERY little) experience with a team working on a Panther's suspension, I will echo and amplify the perspective offered by Legion 4.

To remove a single interior road wheel required 7 other wheels to be removed. SEVEN! Really? Yep. To get at an interior wheel you must remove the outer wheel of the set you want to access (1), and the outer wheels of the sets two wheels to right (2) and left (3), so that you can then remove the pairs of wheel to the immediate right (4, 5) and left (6, 7). That's just if the wheel is bent or the rubber tire is torn or some such. If you have to get at the torsion bars, well, let's just say you'll exercise a lot of vocabulary in the process!

There is little doubt that the interleaved suspension provided the best mean peak pressure over the area of the track run, and also provided an exceptionally smooth ride over obstacles within the reasonable travel range of the torsion bars. But the cost in terms of complexity of maintenance was VERY high. Even the Germans gave up on interleaving for tanks after the Panther, although I don't think they ever gave it up for their half-tracks.

…There were just way too many types of vehicles, chassis, weapons, etc., etc. to effectively supply, maintain, repair, etc.

An army probably thinks differently about these things if it is expecting very high attrition rates, war production limits are reaching absolute maximums and the war is total; the proverbial kitchen sink will get chucked in.

Yet the Soviets, when confronted with the same very high attrition rates, war production limits and absolutely total impact of the war (in triplicate!) in 1941, went the exact opposite way. They simplified, simplified, simplified. Yes, they took in whatever they could lay hands on through captures, or through allied supplies. But even there, over the course of time they simplified, simplified, simplified. Fewer truck models, fewer tank models, fewer airplane models, fewer choices in fuel types, fewer variations on small arms, artillery, weapons calibers, etc.

And so they became more efficient under wartime stress, while the Germans became less efficient.

The school of "we are falling behind -- we need to reduce our efficiency" is not a proven model for success. But it is a demonstrated result of leadership that is not able to understand the challenges faced, nor reach effective decisions to address those challenges.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

At least that's how I read it.

I am not sure what you are reading Mark, but I see no sign of the big gun, light armour weapon system disappearing. The Striker MGS and Centauro tank destroyer are 2 recent examples. Rapid deployment and cost being the drivers for producing such vehicles.

Fred:

If it reads that I feel the big gun, light armor, high mobility vehicle has disappeared, then I have not expressed myself clearly.

That is not my perspective at all.

The vehicle type remains, and has remained, in armies across the world.

What has disappeared is the WW2 era US Tank Destroyer command and doctrine. Not the vehicle type. We may or may not call them tank destroyers, depending on how we wish to read our history and use our terminology.

They tend not to be designed on the chassis of current tanks these days. Some would assert that means they are not tank destroyers, but rather something else -- well fine, call them something different. But designing on a current tank chassis with less armor and a bigger gun was just an occasional by-product of the design process, rather than a defining characteristic of the vehicle type.

Highly mobile vehicles with high firepower, that are armored but to a lesser extent than current dominant tank designs, remain.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Maybe you can throw into the discussion that whole class of "destroyer" aircraft typified by the Me 110. The future of aircraft in WWII was either speed or a hellish armament flying in close formation, and yet a whole class of aircraft completely missed the mark.

An army probably thinks differently about these things if it is expecting very high attrition rates, war production limits are reaching absolute maximums and the war is total; the proverbial kitchen sink will get chucked in.

That may be true, but I'd rather be in an Army that does not have or expect high attrition rates.

Regardless, having too many types of weapons systems, e.g. as the WWII German Forces did, it makes resupply, repair, servicing and recovery much more difficult. For every weapons system, i.e. Infantry weapons, FA, AAA, MBTs, AFVs, etc., etc. that does not have ammo or the parts, etc., to keep it FMC. Is one less weapons system available to field in combat.

And Mass is the first Principle of War.

As a Bn and later Bde Motor Officer, we tracked every part on order, for each weapons system. We did a daily report of what is not FMC. Down to the parts it needs on order to get it FMC, etc.. That way all Cdrs from Plt Ldr to Div Cdrs knew what they had to go to war with if war broke out right now, today.

Yet the Soviets, when confronted with the same very high attrition rates, war production limits and absolutely total impact of the war (in triplicate!) in 1941, went the exact opposite way. They simplified, simplified, simplified. Yes, they took in whatever they could lay hands on through captures, or through allied supplies. But even there, over the course of time they simplified, simplified, simplified. Fewer truck models, fewer tank models, fewer airplane models, fewer choices in fuel types, fewer variations on small arms, artillery, weapons calibers, etc.

A very good example. Simplicity is another Principle of War. And we see today most militaries do the same. Because it is a much more efficient and effective way to be ready for war. And if need be go to war and be successful.

Having a little (VERY little) experience with a team working on a Panther's suspension, I will echo and amplify the perspective offered by Legion 4.

Yes, save for building many models of Panthers in my youth. I could only imagine the maintenance challenge/nightmare the Tigers, Hanomags, etc. could be. Of course my experience is with M60s, M113s, M901s, 2&1/2 and 5 Ton Cgo Trucks, M151 1/4 ton "Jeeps", HMMWVs, etc. But based on that it amazes me some WWII German vehicles ever got out of the Motor Pool ! Your discussion of the Panther's suspension system is pretty accurate, I'd think … Would not want to be the OIC in charge of maintenance of a Bn of Tiger Is or IIs. Yikes !

What has disappeared is the WW2 era US Tank Destroyer command and doctrine.

I beg to differ. It just grew rotors and started beating the air into submission (helos don't fly).

But I guess it did take the development of good AT missiles and turbine engines for the idea to re-emerge.

And so they became more efficient under wartime stress, while the Germans became less efficient.

Guderian in his memoirs has a whole chapter dedicated to German armoured vehicle development in 1942, when he was on inactive service – this chapter was put together from reports that he was able to access later on. That whole chapter consists of page after page listing design changes to tanks in production, more design changes to tanks under development (such as Panther, Tiger and Maus), new designs for self-propelled guns based on existing tank chassis, and changing production goals for the next year. And somewhere there is also a mention of complaints regarding the difficulty of maintaining vehicles on the field due to the large number of different variants.

While German industry has (IMO) a well earned reputation for delivering very high quality, but complicated and over-engineered products (visit your local BMW/Mercedes dealership if you don't believe me … ;) …), they were also capable of delivering masterfully simple and effective weapons of war (StuG series, Panzerfaust, MG42, MK108) when suitably incentivized. This suggests a shortcoming in German industrial strategy

Another factor which appears to have affected AFV availability under service conditions was the short-changing of service and maintenance spare part inventories for the sake of maximizing new vehicle output … robbing Peter to pay Paul … which suggests to me a fundamental lack of industrial capacity required to prosecute war on the level that Hitler's regime invited.

B