"Updated Modern Articles Posted" Topic

Mostly concerning the Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the Russian Battalion Tactical Group.

I hope you find them useful!

link

Allgeyer's commentary on the Stryker seems to match up with what my friend the Stryker Platoon Leader and company XO had to say. An ICV needs to mount a gun big enough to blow up obstacles (so at least a 50x330mm HEP/HESH round), the infantry are the primary antitank gunners.

Quote from my friend, when I asked him about a Bradley/Stryker/M113 replacement:

Now the ICV type vehicle, whole different issue. Keep in mind my perspective is colored by being a Stryker guy.

The requirement should be for a vehicle, in a non armored formation, to provide protection, mobility, and battlefield dominance capabilities to the unit. Battlefield dominance comes in information, mission command /command and control, and firepower.

It should have enough protection to defeat man portable infantry weapons / crew served weapons. So [armored to stop] 12.7mm and RPGs

Its a non armored formation, so our firepower comes from our infantry.. so it needs to carry 9 dismounts along with Javelins / AT Missiles

Needs to have advanced optics, more computer integration, more signal support for information comms.

Weaponry should be what infantry need to win infantry on infantry fights.

So 50 cal is fine, but I'd look into replacing the MK 19 with a 'new' system, such as a 55mm low velocity gun.

The lack of organic ADA is an Army-wide issue, with the failure of the M247 program. From what I've read about the Sergeant York, there were two critical failures. The first, and more critical, was that the radar was utterly inadequate for the task (not a big surprise, since they use the F16's radar on a ground vehicle, and ground clutter overwhelmed it). The other problem was that the turret was very heavy and was mounted on old M48 chassis, which meant that it couldn't keep up with Abrams/Bradley formations.

I'd recommend borrowing a page from the Marines, at least for the Strykers: the LAV-AD, which mounts a GAU12 Equalizer 25mm gatling and two quad-packs of Stinger SAMs. I'd actually consider directly mounting that turret on a Bradley, since the Bradley formations already use 25mm cannons.

Strykers, though, use 30x173 cannons on the Dragoon model, so the Stryker AD turret would require a bit of a redesign to support a GAU-13, which is a 4-barreled version of the A10's GAU8 Avenger cannon.

Both choices are strictly to share ammo with the cannons used by the standard IFVs.

If the Stryker Dragoon (or it's hypothetical replacement) transitioned to the Bushmaster III 50mm, I'd say that the Stryker AD could keep the standard LAV-AD turret with 25mm gun, or could go to the EAPS 50mm CRAM gun turret (EAPS ammo is 50x365mm, much bigger than 50x330mm Supershot).

Another option would be to drop a Marksman AA turret onto an Abrams chassis. The Marksman turret is very similar to the Flakpanzer Gepard, with a 35mm gun on each side of the turret. Issue with this is a lack of missiles for anything outside the reach of the guns.

@lion thank you so much for sharing the insights of your friend, you cannot beat feedback from the guy on the ground that lives it every day! Much different perspective than me in my armchair.

We have completely given up organic short range AA except for dismounted Stinger teams, and I do not know how many of those we have available. I like the idea of dropping the proven turret system on the Bradley, it would be much more effective than the old Linebacker was.

Additionally, we do not have anything to fill the gap between short range and Theater level AD. Since, what, the late 80's it have been Stinger -> Patriot with nothing in between. This reflects a decade plus of counter insurgency and before that assumption we would have 100% air superiority so scant procurement resources went elsewhere or to sexier projects like RAH-66 that did not pan out.

Another item I found interesting…. if you read the
'Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group" article it is ALMOST like we are in bizzaro land when compared to the 1980's. The ABCT advantage is that is is larger and has more raw vehicle, while having deficiencies in certain weapons system. One of the suggestions is to use raw numbers of the ABCT to attack on multiple axis and overwhelm the BTG, basically a Battalion versus a company. There are some significant differences, but on the surface it sounds like the Fulda gap in reverse…

When I pointed that article out to my friend, he had some rather pointed things to say about the underlying assumptions Allgeyer was making.

He calls the US out on the weapons mounted on the Stryker being inadequate/behind, but doesn't call the Russians out on the BTR vehicle layout, which has an engine in the middle of the squad bay (something that everyone else figured out was a bad idea in the 1930s), being inadequate/behind.

My friend comments that historically, the US has focused on the infantry as the firepower source, while the Russians have focused on the vehicle as the firepower source.

This means that as the US adds more vehicle firepower (in recognition that the infantry can't do it alone), the Russians are adding more infantry firepower (in recognition that the vehicle can't do it alone). So our design and organization ideas are crossing.

Speaking of their role, his assertion that the Army does not know how to employ a medium force is blatantly incorrect. It has always been known, and is doctrinal that, the Stryker force fairs poorly against heavy mechanized forces. What he is lacking is the context of the fight the Stryker force was designed to face – dense or urban population environments within the context of a broader joint force which will have air dominance and other ground forces operating in supporting roles.

While he is correct that the Styrker force fairs poorly, when used within the correct context, joint and service fires have attrited heavy enemy formations and the Army leverages its other formations to provide support, either through integrating heavy units into task forces, as he noted that heavy battalions are added to Stryker forces during NTC rotations, or through maneuver of forces. Awkwardly, his argument equally applies to light forces being assaulted by heavy forces, but we do not care about the plight of the poor light forces, because we recognize their role in the joint fight, which he assumes away for medium forces.

I strongly suspect Allgeyer is an Armor officer, given how he looks at things.