"SA - Are you treating the Symptoms or curing the Disease?" Topic

Recent TMP topics got me wondering how much do game designers really know about Situational Awareness and its effect and impact on battlefield (wargaming) decision making. The extent of the designer's SA knowledge would also help address the question of whether they are treating a few of the SA symptoms or are they really dealing with the total extent of the disease.

Before considering your response, let me state upfront that Situational Awareness is more than just seeing and identifying enemy units on the tabletop. It consists of:

1. Your perception of the elements and activities on the battlefield as influenced by the operational environment.

2. Comprehension of the current operational situation (i.e. enemy & friendly) in time & space.

3. Projection of future actions (friendly & enemy) against the current (known) status.

Yes, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty all through this domain. That is also why it is such an important aspect of game design.

By being aware and appreciating the complete nature of SA and recognizing the value of incorporating the significance aspect of it within a wargame design, I believe that this will help garner a more involved and active role of the Player, beyond his superficial function of locating and pushing lead figures around the tabletop.

What's your take on this?

Sounds a lot like my last staff meeting.

Does Battlegroup cover much of this with their observation rules? If I understand them correctly, you see them as bad or you don't see them or perceive them to be friendly or not a threat. It looks to me to be a simple, abstract way of representing the empty battlefield.

Obviously within the battle space (I.E THE TABLE) we model the visibility of troops in acordance with their situation. Much of the rest that you define is generally set within the boundary conditions of the scenario. Typicaly our senarios have a time limit on the basis to achieve this later may mean the enemy will be re-enforced to the extent that the current objectives cannot be achieved. objectives are not arbitary they may reflect a larger situationa requirement like clear a route for later use.

In some case the enemy may have additiona resources added with time. This may or maynot be known to the opposing player.

In our sort of game at company level then that is sufficent. In much larger multi eveing games, the gain for those larger games is more uncertainty in what will occour within the battle space, reconnisance, and observation now become critical as say, two possible enemy routes need to be observed as it is an unknown which route the enemy will take and when. Larger game will have some simplified element of logistics to again add to the scenario as now you may want to fight or divert resources just to improve SA.

Big Red, that was a really bad staff meeting--almost up to the level of some of the dreaded brown bag lunches, and we finally got rid of their perpetrator.

Analsim, I'm pretty sure I remember the lecture, but I threw away my notes long ago. Was it Benning or Huachuca? Bad day at Benning would be my guess.

I don't know how people cover these things who do simulations--well, actually I do know: they cheat--but among miniature wargamers we have scenarios and visibility rules which cover (1) and (2) and while I would love to have an opponent who didn't consider his future actions and mine, they generally choose less mentally taxing hobbies, like running or lifting weights.

Or politics, of course.

All,

Yes, you can correctly surmise that I might have been in the military for a couple of decades, so some this will be very familiar to some of you. But, don't let my opening statement color your opinion of this topic yet, at least not until we've had an opportunity to kick it around a bit more. ;^)

OK, let's have at it.

It seems to me that ‘we' (wargamers in general) do a poor job depicting the actual role that commander's play in conducting military operations. Game rules and mechanics are primarily focused on the operation and behavior of tactical units. Leaders (and Command Figures) are too often relegated to a symbolic (modifier/combat enhancement) role. That is simply ‘back-a**ward'.

Commanders (i.e. the Players themselves) should be the focal point, not the afterthought.

I think that the root cause for this reversal of emphasis is that we've failed to adequately describe the battlefield environment or define the actual role and constraints that the commanders (again, the Players) have to function within. This not simply noting that it's; "Turn #3, time to write your new orders".

Writing new orders is the end product. It is not automatic or cyclic. It comes (if at all) after the Commander (Player) has assessed his own SA, the scope of his present Mission and against his original orders, reports and new directives provided by his superiors.

This is assuming that our Commander is in a position where he can observe, is not threatened, is not moving and/or is aware of all the battlefield factors involved. Thus, like I said earlier, ordering the tactical units is simple in comparison to what I trying to convey to you as his true role of "BEING in the Right Place, at the Right Time" to influence the situation.

To me, this is the heart of what we should be trying to represent and far more entertaining, because the Player is now the ‘key element' and has a direct and active role in the wargame.

Granted this shift away from the tactical units will need some reasoned consideration, because the designer will have to ‘disconnect the direct guidance control mechanism' inherent in current/traditional wargame thinking and design. He'll instead have to look for autonomous substitute. BUT! Less control is actually more accurate then total control anyway.

Is any of this making sense to you?

Awareness is less as you get closer to the troop level. A general may have a decent awareness of what he faces and what is going on. The troops have almost zero awareness. Their awareness is limited to what they are engaged with. Anything going on even a tiny distance beyond their combat awareness is unknown territory.

Most wargames focus on battles. The generals' point of view and awareness.

Most skirmish games focus on individuals. It should be designed into the game. Or, the players can impose it to suit their group dynamic/prejudices/preferences.

Realistically, a bird's eye view advantage should be discounted somehow in a skirmish game; not so much in an army level game. The bird's eye view can represent intelligence brought to the general via scouts/spies. The timing isn't usually that crucial, i.e. how/when the information got to the general. At the start oft the game he sees the battlefield as-is, as does the opposite side's general. Any hidden troops or off-table movement are known to exist as possibilities, and therefore are being planned for contingently.

Skirmish games do not take into account anything beyond the immediate surroundings. A GM or consensus will allow for surprise elements intruding, etc…..

Analism,

I get what you are saying re the tactical play vs the role of the Commander. However, IMO, most players want to move and fight with the tactical units---this is fun. Many do not want to dig into the minutiae of staff work, etc. Maybe there should be a phase in each turn to model a Commander's actions/process, that would yield some benefit/disadvantage to his troops?

Ahh, my favorate topic.

I'm working on a set of wargame rules for the H&M period that are focused squarely on SA. They're based on John Boyd's Destruction and Creation, and are focused directly on the question of how fast a commander can make a decision. Basically, a commander may not make a decision until he has knowledge of his situation; the players knowledge is irrelevent to the commander and subcommanders knowledge. In the face of a lack of knowledge about his situation, and cut-off from the players knowledge, he must rely on orders to inform his decisions.

As soon as I made this question the focus of my rules almost every serious conceptual problem involving helicopter view began to collapse. I also found that by making the time needed to make decisions the basis for the rules, one is also able to model time well, which allows for realistic outcomes to troop actions once decisions are made. I'm 33 pages in on the outline, and about 80% of the way to having a playtestable set of rules, which includes instructions on army building, the rational behind the rules, etc.

Analsim,
Thanks for starting such a constructive and pertinent discussion that is near and dear to my heart.

forwardmarchstudios,
We're on the same page. Boyd is the man. The timing of the OODA Loop solves many problems for me.

We've covered this to an extent before: TMP link

Overall I see SA in light of the OODA Loop and timing. The better your SA the more quickly you'll observe the enemy, evaluate the current situation and future options, decide on an action and act on it. It's really all about timing and getting through your loop before the enemy does thereby give you the initiative. That's my view anyhow.

Ideally better SA allows you to start executing your actions before the enemy can counter your last action, he's always at least a step behind you in the loop. Initiative is determined without additional rules.

The initiative to engage and shoot first will normally go to the side with better SA and observation (unbuttoned, good optics, ideal tactical formation, better training, etc). Why? Because they start their loop before the enemy does.

Ideally, advance recon has identified enemy emplacements and avenues of advance so you start with high SA. However, for the example lets be fair and look at a meeting engagement where both sides have minimal intel and SA on each other.

At higher levels of command like Battalion and above observation will be very dependent on real-time (or as close as you can get to it) SigInt, C3, recon, sub-unit reports, HumInt, SOP's, deception operations, etc. Lower unit leadership initiative can play a deciding factor. Degrading these enemy assets will slow his reaction time and help you get and keep inside his loop.

Orientation would consider how quickly the front unit commanders (Platoon and Company) can size up the situation quickly with the game ideally having some type of limited intel or hidden units on the table. With poor SA (observation) the leaders will have a false impression of the tactical situation like seeing the enemy effort as the main thrust when it is really a probe. If they call in reinforcements it could end up pretty bad.

The decision phase would most likely be driven by SOP's defined before the mission and dependent on the current unit tactical formations and leader initiative. Unfortunately, this is rarely is taken into account in games I've seen, including mine. Most players are unfamiliar with small unit tactics and will try to shoot as soon as possible. Many of the games I've seen with small tables and high unit density leave the player no choice.

Poor observation and a wrong impression of the enemy intentions will most likely generate a poor decision. This will put you a few steps behind the enemies OODA loop with the likely result of giving him the initiative.

Now the original SA has brought the player to taking action. Based on the level of correct SA and OOD his action may be the correct one or not. This is where leadership really comes into play. Is the leader sure? Will he hesitate? Can his subunits effectively carry out the action ordered? Does the player even know what the hell he is doing? Delays allow your enemy loop to catch up to you.

Here is my attempt at the 1:1 level of a tank engagement (I know some of you saw this coming). As soon as enemy units come into LOS they perform a Situational Awareness Check (yes, that is exactly what I call it). This is not a traditional spotting check. It is assumed the unit has 360 degrees SA but the quality degrades towards the flank and rear and can generate a delay in detecting the threat.

The result of the SA Check is that the unit notices the enemy right away and can take action to engage and/or maneuver or there is a "delay" in noticing. The delay is an abstracted way to deal with the variables of exactly what the tank commander and crew were doing at the moment the enemy came into LOS (what direction was the TC looking, was he distracted, talking on the radio, etc). Effective SA that will not generate a delay is being unbuttoned, facing the direction the enemy emerges and crew training/experience. It is handled with a single D20 die roll.

If your SA is better than your opponent that delay allows you to move to the "Orient" step in the loop before him giving you the initiative to reach the "Action" part of the loop first.

Confused yet? I'll clarify: I do not use traditional unit activations or IGOUGO game mechanics. Game turns are used as a measurement for a "Time & Action" concept. It's a way to simulate the timing aspect of the OODA Loop. For me in a 1:1 engagement it all comes down to timing. Unfortunately, I have not found any other turn mechanisms or activation methods to realistically recreate the OODA Loop timing.

This is how I translate SA into the OODA Loop timing:
On a turn a player detects a threat, he evaluates the situation and makes a decision on an action. That action may not take place for 5-15 game turns depending on the tactical advantage/disadvantage, any delays, overwatch, weapons platform performance and crew training. Of course, he can be destroyed before he reaches the action turn.

Better crews perform the same actions more quickly giving them an advantage (initiative) to reach the "Action" part of the loop to shoot first. Each game "turn" is one second. On each turn there may be a number of actions like firing or there may be 1-10 turns of no action or firing so play proceeds immediately to the next turn. For details search some of the other discussions on this, I'll spare everyone the agony of the details right now.

Good SA that allows you to start your loop even a few turns/seconds can give you that initiative to shoot first. Any enemy with good SA can be defeated by maneuvering to flank or surprise him or with suppression forcing him to button up.

This system allows the split-second decisions that are vital in a 1:1 engagement somewhat like a Wild West shootout. Initiative is automatically determined. Opportunity Fire is intuitive as it is mainly based on timing between movement and firing. I'm able to use historical rates of fire and turret rotation without impacting play. There are a variety of risk-reward decisions the player can make to shoot sooner but with an accuracy penalty. This also generates a good FoW as your opponent does not know the exact turn you'll fire. It makes for some interesting engagements.

So this is how I've attempted to use SA as the basis of timing within the OODA Loop. I hope you found it fun and entertaining.

Thanks,
Wolfhag

dear Analism

A weighty topic in which I think (correct me if I am wrong) you are talking about deducing enemy intentions and knowledge of what the environment shows or is visible or gives us as hints. In other words, His units and dispositions are "as such" and from this we can assume that he is planning this, or is concerned about more that. Or "What is the enemy about given his dispositions and what he is planning to do, and what he thinks we are doing and what he is going to do about it, and in both cases when is he going to do it.

If I am correct then this is perhaps the thorniest problem in war games, and also in real war itself. Specifically complication it is if the enemy is showing me what I see or what he wants me to see.

I will follow this discussion. It sounds very interesting. My only comment so far is that when I have been an umpire in a game where both sides several times told me what they were doing, what they intended to do and what they thought the enemy was doing, and this was done for both sides , step by step for most of the time any side hadn't the faintest idea what the other side was about.

I think that the root cause for this reversal of emphasis is that we've failed to adequately describe the battlefield environment or define the actual role and constraints that the commanders (again, the Players) have to function within.

Analsim:

I think that what commanders do and how they spend their time is something that isn't given much attention by historians, let alone wargamers. It is an important question when that is what wargames do, give the player the role of a commander at some level.

Writing new orders is the end product. It is not automatic or cyclic.

True. I find it really annoying when rules have commanders giving orders/pips/APs etc. to every single unit every single turn… it is systematized mirco-managing.

It comes (if at all) after the Commander (Player) has assessed his own SA, the scope of his present Mission and against his original orders, reports and new directives provided by his superiors.

Yes, unless the player is the army commander, there will be orders/missions given he has to follow AND possible new directives during the engagement.

Awareness is less as you get closer to the troop level. A general may have a decent awareness of what he faces and what is going on. The troops have almost zero awareness. Their awareness is limited to what they are engaged with. Anything going on even a tiny distance beyond their combat awareness is unknown territory.

Great War Ace:
I think that may apply more to modern battles than pre-20th Century engagements. Often you read about commanders going forward to 'troop level' to see what is going on…and being criticized by historians for not doing it more--right up to WWI.

Most wargames focus on battles. The generals' point of view and awareness.

Most skirmish games focus on individuals. It should be designed into the game. Or, the players can impose it to suit their group dynamic/prejudices/preferences.

Agreed.

I will follow this discussion. It sounds very interesting. My only comment so far is that when I have been an umpire in a game where both sides several times told me what they were doing, what they intended to do and what they thought the enemy was doing, and this was done for both sides , step by step for most of the time any side hadn't the faintest idea what the other side was about.

Otto:
Do you think that has something to do with 'wargame mentality'[past game experiences] and a lack of experience with that kind of wargame? I only ask that because *guessing* what the opposition would do seems to be a real skill of competent
generals, whether a Napoleon or just a George Meade.

I have never liked written orders in a wargame nor seen the need for them. If we look at orders they can be defined as a way to get units in the fastest possible time to enact there commanders wishes.

For example (but not the only one) defining how a unit will get from A to B. If the move is some distance it will often need the unit to change to coloum of march, march to the new position and then re-deploy. Any system must represent this as the fastest means in accordance with their period, if its valid.

Reserves may indeed be held in coloum of march and so speed them to the target position and let them deploy for battle and be in the right position to intervene when and if neccessary.

Now if the sytem reflects this then the commander has to write his orders, but in his head, and then carry them out. changeing his mind will by definition then waste time (order, counter order=disorder).

I would love to say we invented this idea but Phill Barker in his DBM did this rather well.

This mechanism forces players to work out where they need to be and when, on the basis of their assumptions about enemy intentions. It does mean that players are forced to think harder and that the deployment is not from two lines ready for battle. Not possible with some armies of some sizes in a day. But then to be a challenge perhaps the game should span more than one day. However some smaller napolionic battles will fall into this categegory and certainly modern and WW2 actions in Normandy generally fall into this band.

It is interesting that in training begginers we tell tham to have a plan. With most we send them to the bar after a few bounds saying you have reached the end of your plan and you need a new one. Almost invariably they agree, have a drink and think, then come back and play in a way that clearly shows they have a new plan and immediate colapse is averted.

Note;- real terrain is oftem less friendly to cross country movement than wargames terrain which is often not representative of real countryside, with respect to say hedges and ditches at the ground scale modeled. Obviously this more often applies to smaller battles, bigger ones are conducted on multi day timescales. In all cases the terrain need to be at least crudely representative of the area being represented, or the system ammended to inherently reflect the impact of the terrain as an abstraction, personaly not a good approach for my ideal game.

I have never liked written orders in a wargame nor seen the need for them. If we look at orders they can be defined as a way to get units in the fastest possible time to enact there commanders wishes.

For example (but not the only one) defining how a unit will get from A to B. If the move is some distance it will often need the unit to change to coloum of march, march to the new position and then re-deploy. Any system must represent this as the fastest means in accordance with their period, if its valid.

UshCha:

I don't like writing out orders either. The real problem is that in writing out orders, there are too many variable in the orders: they can be anything and it gets down to parsing out the meaning many times.

However, in pre-20th century games, the need for orders is fundamental in running a division to army. Orders wound up the organization and then released it according to a predetermined plan. Changing plans for the entire army in mid-stream was difficult. That has to be a factor for command.

With your example--again pre-20th Century--battalions and brigade commanders had a limited suite of decisions they could make within any set of orders. Things like changing into column of march to travel from A to X was one of those things they could do. They couldn't simply decide to travel from A to X if it wasn't in the plan and if it placed them outside their place in the battle line to be formed.

Clausewitz described this: The lower down the chain of command one goes, the few decisions the commanding officer can make.[narrower parameters of control]

Which means that a player in the position of a corps commander can order a division to attack point A. The division commander will be restricted to his frontage in a battleline of divisions. Brigade commanders will be further restricted in what they can do.

That means that the player as corps commander, in moving those divisions and brigades, should also be restricted in how he can maneuver those units, with a limited number of decisions he can make for them. While it would be best to have real people playing every level, they too would be restricted…if recreating command is the issue.

I shake my head at brigade or battalion level Napoleonic games where player is allowed to maneuver them like they were free to do whatever the player wanted.

Dear McLaddie

You ask "Otto:Do you think that has something to do with 'wargame mentality'[past game experiences] and a lack of experience with that kind of wargame? I only ask that because *guessing* what the opposition would do seems to be a real skill of competent generals, whether a Napoleon or just a George Meade."

No, I don't.

Their remarks and side comments along with their gestures and semiotics always appear to be genuine attempts to apply the generalizations we call "the rules of war" and much of what we were arguing about in the "feel" topic to the situation at hand. Granted there is some part of "gaming the game rules" but I always find that to be a small part. They really WANT to understand and are giving it an honest effort to really put themselves INTO the game rather than manipulate around the game.

I've heard too many times people say "If I don't understand the rules I simply try and do what I think were the correct tactics in history" with the unstated caveat "let the chips then fall where they may" and then watched what they are doing, and they are truly TRYING to apply that and using correct tactics, and it is obvious to me that they know a lot more about what are correct tactics and what happens in the various periods. To put it more susccinctly. They may not be able to thread through the maze of verbiage of the rules, but they pretty much KNOW what ought to happen. Only after they become expert in the rules do they game the rules and that's only because the rules don't reward good tactics (whatever that is) or they find its simpler to game the rules.

As hard as I am on gamers sometimes I can't say it's not for lack of trying.

The glitch comes in what I said when players explained privately what they wanted to do and made note of what they thought the other side was doing or wanted to do did this disparity became overwhelmingly obvious. This was especially true in campaigns where such disquisitions were necessary and I could sit down and see the view of each player on all sides and compare them. That's when I saw that in most instances neither had the faintest idea of what the other player meant in his intentions and deduced utterly the wrong information from the signals.

In pondering this I realized it was not the players fault. They were only ONE person whereas real life leaders have legions of Functionaries, Flunkies and Munchkins to sift and refine the data and study the problems and advise them. This is simply beyond the ken of most gamers in a recreational Wargame where they just wanna have fun, and it got only worse in simulations where the individual had even more to do, and especially when these simulations got into multiple teams which almost always collapsed into personalities and bickering among them, but that's another r story.

This is one of the reasons I finally settled on a campaign system where it was almost a multiple choice test, refining everything to where the gamers were given clear choices, and not forced to guess. They still made the strategies but outguessing the enemy was largely not there. I admit this may be highly unrealistic, but it is highly unworkable to include it.

Dear UshCha

On two points were are in perfect agreement. I too dislike written orders in a wargame and don't see the need for them. Nor have I trusted them.

The second was on the difficulty of real terrain in which we are agreed.

Once, over 25 years ago about a dozen gamers from my group and I went on a long camping trip of two weeks in which we performed several experiments. Actual maneuvers if you will. We broke up into about 5 groups on each of these and each group had the latest up to date topographic maps. We were doing experiments on movement and maneuvers. It took place in a US National Forest so we had also AERIAL photos, and we had guide maps of all the trails, cabins shelters and tents. In one exercise we were all to rendezvous at a specific hill top, which had a paved, marked road running over it, and which we could all plainly see. (It was winter), and of the five groups only THREE ever found it, the other two got hopelessly lost and one of those two gave up because of the steepness of the slope and the loose scree made it dangerous to traverse. Others were similarly disappointing. We had no GPS then, but we all had compass' and the folderol that the Boy Scouts had given us. We tried a dozen or so of these problems and all of them in some way ended in a fiasco. By Day 7 of the 10 day trip we surrendered and just sat around and played Battle of the Bulge in the cabin.

One thing we did find out was the utterly astounding fact that everyone liked to move on the road because you actually got there and were not in perpetual danger of getting lost, but we also found that small dirt roads did not always go the way the map said they did and often did not exist at all. When I asked the ranger at the park where "Potter Road" was, he told us "Oh that road never existed, it was supposed to be cut 100 years ago but then the land went into the park service the park service just copied the map but it doesn't exist.

One begins to feel great sympathy for generals in pre modern days.

Otto,
What was the level of fieldcraft in your group? Having the right equipment helps but nothing replaces experience. I think there are a number of people reading this that have done an exercise like that at night and succeeded. Recon units in VN did it in triple canopy jungle without GPS behind enemy lines.

However, I do see your point.

In the military, they use what is called "Rout Reconnaissance" so that does not happen when amateurs are asked to move from point A to point B.

I chalk that experience up to "friction". You make a good point about the unexpected situations when moving into unknown territory. Patrolling, recon, HumInt and POW interrogation can prevent that from happening.

Wolfhag

Dear Wolfhag

Most of us were lifetime campers and outdoorsmen, we had 10 years in scouts, one made eagle, we were hikers and so forth about a quarter of us were veterans, others were in R.O.T.C.

I forgot to mention that we were NOT attempting to explore these issues in a modern setting, that is for WWI or Vietnam games, but as Napoleonic and Seven Years war gamers with the idea that 5,000 men were following behind us.

What our experienced produced the idea that once we were out of sight we might have well been on the far side of the moon. This coupled with the almost perfect uselessness of the topographical maps made us think that the commanders of 1700-1800 must have relied very much on local guides.

What our experienced produced the idea that once we were out of sight we might have well been on the far side of the moon. This coupled with the almost perfect uselessness of the topographical maps made us think that the commanders of 1700-1800 must have relied very much on local guides.

That certainly was one type of reconnaissance. There were scouts, cavalry patrols, surveying officers like Wellington's 'sketching' officers [He didn't make up the practice], skirmishers, views from higher elevations, etc. When it became difficult was in the close proximity to the enemy.

Intelligence about the terrain certainly was a problem for an invading army. We have hidden values for terrain[a face-down chit by the terrain like woods or rough terrain, towns etc. which denotes the actual kind of terrain effects.] Players don't know what the values are until they have troops cross it. Of course, defending troops often will know what kind of terrain is in front of them.

All,

WATCH OUT!

Because I am about to dump a can of gasoline on this SA thread by bringing the topic of 'Written Orders' into the discussion.

Bottomline upfront: Written Orders are important to this SA discussion because more than anything else written orders serve the purpose of documenting (for all to see):

"What the CiC/Army Player actually understands/perceives about: 1) The initial enemy situation, 2) His own Army's Mission, and 3) How he intends to use what he knows to deploy his forces, execute his scheme of maneuver in order to accomplish the Mission and win the game."

Once written and the game is underway, Orders now become the unquestionable foundation and source document for establishing and modifying his current SA in the future.

To portray SA faithfully, You need a written commitment from the main two (2) opposing Players. Especially, before the bullets start flying and any flaws in the original plan begin to appear

Granted many Wargamers view this as a needless step that only creates additional bureaucracy, hampering their flexibility, and hindering the flow of the game. But this is exactly why written orders are so important to SA.

Committing your forces on the battlefield is the ultimate gambling (i.e. risk) experience. You don't get to hedge your bet after seeing what cards everyone else has been dealt. And this problem is exacerbated by the fact that the forces going in harms way, are not likely to even know they are in peril.

Thus, written orders are not so much about the plans you created for the tactical units in your Army, but the commitment you made about the viability of the SA going into the battle.

It's this value as an irrefutable reference point that is needed in order to effectively portray SA in the first place.

See my point?

Bottomline upfront: Written Orders are important to this SA discussion because more than anything else written orders serve the purpose of documenting (for all to see)…

Once written and the game is underway, Orders now become the unquestionable foundation and source document for establishing and modifying his current SA in the future.

It's this value as an irrefutable reference point that is needed in order to effectively portray SA in the first place.

Analsim:
Establishing orders is important for several reasons, including the one you've emphasized. Orders are so basic that it is difficult to justify not having them represented, I agree. There are a number of ways to establish orders and that irrefutable reference point other than written out orders.

For a game procedure, writing out orders produces a document that is difficult to quantify. "Attack position 'A' and once secured, advance on enemy flank." There might even be instructions about how to attack and what time. Then of course, there has to be contingency orders in case this or that happens… etc. etc. etc.

What you will see in an attempt to corral that kind of thing is specific forms with 'objective', 'formation' etc., which can still be too open-ended to be truly functional in game terms.

Another approach is to have chits that have "Attack", "Maneuver" and "Defend" etc. on them. Unfortunately, these often have restrictions that say things like "Can't attack with more than X troops", "Must move towards the enemy" etc. which restricts far more than they should besides involving can/can't complicating rules.

As you say, "To portray SA faithfully, You need a written commitment from the main two (2) opposing Players. Especially, before the bullets start flying and any flaws in the original plan begin to appear."

There are a number of ways to establish that commitment without 1. open-ended orders with contingencies, 2. Generic order constrictions that must be followed, 3. or the ass-backward approach of command pips or order economies that some games offer. Some of that has to do with really sussing out the primary elements in any command/written order and when they are given. [Often they are relayed verbally in a pre-battle conference such as Frederick's at Luethen or Napoleon's and the Allies at Austerlitz.

I avoid written orders because they end up being far too open-ended and then contingency-laced, even with an umpire, and thus a less-that-effective game mechanism.

I see the point in writing orders but I've never really played a game like that so cannot really comment. I do agree with McLaddie on all of his points.

I think written orders can be simulated by assigning units an objective and in larger games a formation/posture that has advantages and disadvantages. Changing formations takes time. Units would assume their objective until a different order comes down from above or a new threat dictates them changing it. This is where lower level leadership/initiative comes into play.

I think much of the friction and fog of war that occurs in a battle comes from the delay in a unit getting a change in orders or not receiving them at all. This is why commanders like Alexander positioned themselves at the focal point of the battle.

This is why I include a delay element in the Situational Awareness Checks I use (replaces activation rolls) with troop differences being a big modifier. I think that simulates the Decision Loop fairly well.

I use movement arrows showing the direction and speed of a unit. Movement is confined to the direction of the arrow preventing the player from complete freedom of movement. It's somewhat of a movement order or pre-plotted movement. It adds an extra dimension to the game as players can get an idea of where units will be in a future turn – unless orders are changed.

So I'm somewhat on board with Analsim but not to the point of written orders. Then there is always the Frag Order:
link

Wolfhag

I'm working on a game that uses written orders issued by the CiC to corps commanders. As I said in another post on here recently, written orders have never had a modern re-do, and I think there is a lot to be gained from them. I've managed to solve a lot of issues with them that are intractable without them.

I disagree fundamentally with the position that written orders can lead to serious issues of interpretation. There are simple mechanisms that can be applied to keep players from abusing them. And, if someone you're playing with consistently tries to game written orders (or any other rule), just stop playing with them, and maybe reconsider your acquaintance . . . simple. No more hair-splitting required.

Here's how I resolved as this in Combat Command (intended to be the simplest possible WWII simulation – but no simpler).

Orders:

An essential concept in a military wargame (2nd best solution as UC has pointed out is Phil Barker's DBX PIP system).

But written orders are a pain (not to be endured). So you use the John Hill order chit system. You put a chit under a command stand and all the sub-units follow it. Just don't have too many and make sure they can be carried out in a reasonable way (but not totally free kriegspiel). So you must plan and guess ahead each turn.

Here's the real trick: then begin each turn with a Movement Phase (and no real time defensive fire interupt). So after you laid your orders – everything moves (well IF ordered to do so). So your situational awarness gets screwed up. Maybe because by the time your order arrived it was out of date, maybe because where the toy soliders were on the table was not quite where the real world simulations where etc.

Your get orders, limited intelligence and fog of war with no hidden pieces or written orders.

Thomas J. Thomas
Fame and Glory Games

I'll check in this round of the poker hand.

My heart is with McLaddie on this and I'm still not entirely sure of what the fine points of the discussion is about because I don't use written orders in any of the games I play and not in many other games so I am still trying to get my head around the experience of Analism and others.

Coincidentally I was carefully reading in Catton and Foote about the Western theatre and the campaigns of Braxton Bragg where his corps commanders readily disobeyed and disobeyed his orders (which in many cases if they had been carried out would have resulted in great victories rather than titanic fizzles, so I am not really enamored any more of them.

I will table my comments for a few passages. But one thing I will say is even if the orders of either method are used you are still left with the problem of interpretation of the movement of the troops. Is it the main attack or feint, etc.

All,

I want you to all know that I do read and appreciate everyone's feedback even if I do not address every comment directly. No indictment of anyone, just the fact that I don't always have the time to respond to every comment(s) as I would like to.

Moving on.

As many have pointed out, the commitment to your present SA level can be addressed in other ways outside the realm of written orders. No argument from me per se, other than the use of any abstraction has many unforeseen side effects and consequences.

Written Orders are only part of the SA equation. I believe that you'll also have to include several other physical and battlefield environmental factors into the game design to adequately replicate SA impact.

I'm talking about factors such as; 1) LOS, 2) Time, 3) Terrain, 4) The CDR's Location, 5) Information Quality, 6) Movement (where applicable) 7) Obscuration (i.e. smoke, dust and weather) and 8) Clausewitz Friction.

I'm sure that most everyone is familiar with the first seven on the list. However I wouldn't suggest the same about Battlefield Friction. So, for the sake of clarity let me offer this 200 year old anecdote about the last one, Clausewitz Friction.

Clausewitz's earliest known use of the term friction occurred in a September 29, 1806, letter to his future wife. Written while in the field with the Prussian Prince August's Grenadier Battalion, Clausewitz invoked ‘Friktion' to voice his growing anxiety and frustration over the resistance General Scharnhorst (1755–1813) was encountering to any all-out, bold, or well-conceived employment of Prussia's full military potential against the French under Napoleon. As Clausewitz observed to Marie von Brühl, the Prussian army at that time had "three (3) Commanders-in-chief and two (2) Chiefs of staff," a situation that provoked Scharnhorst to lament: "How much must the effectiveness of a gifted man [Scharnhorst] be reduced when he is constantly confronted by obstacles of convenience and tradition, when he is paralyzed by constant friction with the opinions of others."

As a quick summary of what I am stating, let me suggest to you that SA is actually made up these three (3) primary ingredients:
1) The Operational Element (Military Doctrine, Orders and Leadership)
2) The Battlefield Environment (LOS, Time, Terrain, Obscuration, Weather, Stress and Noise)
3) Intangibles: Clausewitz's Friction (Human element, Acts of God and Fate/Chance)

Digest these items for a while and I'll come back and make the case that you would be able to occupy a Player's full attention in a game by just working through the issues and remedies associated with just these three (3) items.

Wolfhag: I rode a Tank for 10-years in the US Army. I'm retired now and work for office that manages their ground combat systems: Tanks, APCs and Artillery and many others. Two things that I think you would be surprised to know is that the average detection and combat engagement distances for the encounters you articulated above are a whole lot shorter than you'd guess and dramatically favor the defender. There's also a phenomenon I'd call 'Tanker Tunnel Vision' that plays in here too that skews things in favor of the stationary participant.

It's these kinds of intangibles that I am alluding to above. That discussion should interest you on its own merits.

Analsim,
Thanks for the advice.

Regarding engagement ranges, I agree. However, as soon as players get LOS to a target they can't resist opening fire. In the last game, a former military player did use a Company of T-34's to move fast and evade using blocking LOS to get within 500 meters of a platoon of four German Panthers and defeat them with only three losses. He negated their long range advantage.

Because of the "Tunnel Vision," any tank currently engaging a target can only respond to threats in their front 90 degrees and are blind in the rear 270 degrees. Noticing a threat on their flanks and rear normally results in a delay in responding. Delays are deadly and give the initiative to the enemy. That's why I don't need initiative determination rules.

I've tried to simulate the engagement times in the US M60 tank manual. The manual states using Precision Aim to get the first shot off takes 9 seconds, Battlesight is 6 seconds but is less accurate. That's a risk-reward decision for a player and gives an advantage to the gun with a higher muzzle velocity. Better crews have an advantage too.

Situational Awareness is represented in the status of the Tank Commander (buttoned or unbuttoned), overwatch (better chance to spot without delay and less turret rotation time) and crew performance. A Veteran crew can have a four-second advantage over a Green crew. This is what simulates the OODA Loop.

Fate/Chance is represented by a 5% chance of a SNAFU Check each time a unit fires. Fog of War is represented by the variables of a Situational Awareness Check (may have a delay in responding), crew response time (better crews act more quickly), weapons platform performance and aim time (Snap Shot, Precision Aim or Battlesight). You never know the exact turn your opponent will fire. Many times this forces a player to make a risk-reward decision like shooting sooner with an accuracy penalty and it backfires by missing.

Everything begins with a good tactical advantage and Situational Awareness. AT Guns do have a huge advantage when emplaced and concealed. I like to have the enemy bypass them and then open up on their rear.

Wolfhag

As a quick summary of what I am stating, let me suggest to you that SA is actually made up these three (3) primary ingredients:
1)The Operational Element (Military Doctrine, Orders and Leadership)
2)The Battlefield Environment (LOS, Time, Terrain, Obscuration, Weather, Stress and Noise)
3)Intangibles: Clausewitz's Friction (Human element, Acts of God and Fate/Chance)

Analsim:

You have to admit, those three ingredients are often just one big mix, where doctrine and leadership effect how terrain is confronted, where the Environment can be source of Friction and acts of God [and mother nature]

Point being, any representation of those three ingredients have a large measure of cross-influences in influencing and restricting SA.

Separating them can help in dealing with them, but how they are represented on the gaming table in any number of effective combinations and mechanics.

What I personally find very annoying is the idea that chance is represented by a die roll where it can occur anywhere at anytime to anybody, as though chance events are evenly divided across time and space, covering the whole table an inch deep.

In reality that isn't the way change events occur. There are 'choke points' where they are more likely to occur in an organization under stress. The military is often very aware of these points and work hard to mitigate them. Often what makes for an inferior army is the fact they over look such things.

A battle is an organizational study in stress management while trying to inflict it on the enemy. How such things happen and what commanders can do about it hasn't been well represented in most all miniatures games I have seen.

As we get deeper into this I see two divergences here. This is resolving down to a discussion of who gets his shot in first on the one hand, which has much to do with the scale of the combat when in the modern sense, and who is doing what when we are talking in pre-modern games.

The situational awareness of a commander of an individual tank is quite different from the situational awareness of the commander of a infantry battalion or regiment in the Musket period. A the very least a major difference is that the commander of a tank has his own survival intact. The commander of an infantry battalion less so and a commander of a battalion in the civil war less than even that.

But the problem is that no matter how you try and dress it up, unlike in real life where both things are happening at once and quite independent of each other for the two sides, in a war game you are constantly hag-ridden by the march of time and that someone must do something first, and no matter how you fiddle with it the side moving second has the option of "if you advance I will form square, but it you stay put I will fire." This is where written orders come in, imposing on one side or the other or both the necessity of STATING what he intends to do. The rest of it is FORCING him to do it, and in the manner he outlined.

Good luck!

It sounds good on paper, but when you get into the game I have seen the most wild interpretations of orders which is near cheating to overt cheating. The latter for example in a Johnny Reb game where a chit is placed near the command stand, but where you can see a bit of lichen near the sand which has a completely different set of chits. One to the allow the unit to form square the other to advance.
Also the use of initiative to allow by die roll or other, the "local" commander to change the orders depending on his "ability" or so forth.

This makes the whole written orders system suspect as a way to force the other side to make mistakes while giving ones own side a back door to get out of them, and ALL of it the result of "chance" by the die roll McLaddie is talking about. It is at this point, for example where one side executes a flank attack on the other by his orders, that the other will also begin bleating out "Yes, but the 443rd SS Mess-kit repair battalion would NEVER… or ALWAYS do this or that and the old drill manuals and SOP's are drawn out to prove ones assertion and all of it completely meaningless because it asserts facts not in evidence.

The second divergence is what the putative tank commander sees, and what he ACTUALLY sees. That is can he resolver the image of the enemy tank in the grass at all, or is he noticing for example, one of the shells in the shell rack is wobbling around because there's a bolt under its base. Or is his attention drawn away to elsewhere. Six seconds is not a long time. I can't even decide in that time if I want a vanilla cone or a chocolate thick shake float at the ice cream stand in that time, whereas the "time" for a battalion commander to make a decision is much longer and he can have a much longer and larger range of options. In the shorter time span to receive a "NEW" order to replace the old is going to take a LOT longer than six seconds and many more seconds to review or figure out WHAT is being ordered. In that time an enemy tank could have all the time in the world to zero in on it. Thus In a six second game one or more tanks might have to sit there for the entire rest of the game while they digested orders, (and were picked off one by one).

This is why I personally have completely tossed out orders of any kind as not being worth the candle and interfering with the fun of the game.

I also disagree with Analisms interpretation of Clausewitz's idea of friction, but that's unimportant for this discussion.

You know McLaddie there are parts of this "situation awareness" thing that start to resemble "feel."

You know McLaddie there are parts of this "situation awareness" thing that start to resemble "feel."

Otto:

Only if you want to get emotional about it…

Actually, commanders often would go with their intuition-gut hunches regarding the unknown…when something 'felt right' or not. The book 'Blink' is a great set of stories about this, particularly among very experienced individuals in whatever subject.

But lets not confuse the game system and what it projects to the player with the players response to a game situation.

Clauswitz has an entire chapter on 'friction' in his book ON WAR, and I agree, Analsim's reference to Clausewitz's first reference doesn't encompass what he wrote later after serious reflection.

Otto,
If you disagree with the engagement times stated in the M60 tank manual my suggestion is to ask Analisim to direct you to someone in the Dept of the Army Training Department so you can straighten them out. Just don't tell them you can't decide on which type of dessert you'd like.
Page 105 and 106 detail battlesight and precision gunnery techniques and times:
link

I'm trying to use hard data when I can find it, not peoples feeling that have never crewed a tank. Any hard data is always appreciated

Here is another discussion where a Centurion crewman relates to shooting 3 rounds in 20 seconds.
TMP link

I'm aware training on the range and combat are different but you need a baseline to start somewhere. Combat and environmental factors that affect timing and performance can be implemented and the outcome compared to actual engagements. That how I'm working on it.

Yes, there are an infinite amount of variables that can occur at any time that would take a Tank Commanders attention away from his Situational Awareness. No one can realistically simulate that and I'm not trying to (that's ridiculous). I do use a die roll to determine the variable amount (best and worst case scenario) of time to get the first shot since I'm not trying to roleplay crew members and exactly what they are doing moment to moment. I acknowledge it not "realistic" in that respect, it doesn't need to be.

I do have a SNAFU Chart and you can customize your own with results like "TC notices a shell wobbling around or he has a pebble in his boot and misses sighting the enemy". You could have another SNAFU like, "The Gunner missed the shot because he has the crabs and was scratching his crotch when he sighted the gun". Don't laugh, it probably occurred fairly frequently on the Russian front. I use SNAFU's that I've run across in research and small unit histories and battle accounts. However, you can make it entertaining too.

In an engagement, an unbuttoned TC will almost always get the first shot off because of better SA. However, if he is flanked or surprised by a buttoned-up tank he'll probably lose. It's all about timing and Situational Awareness which involves a potential engagement delay (poor SA or positioning), crew effectiveness and weapons platform performance. With all things being equal the better crew will most likely win but nothing is guaranteed. The player can choose to have his poor crew hurry the shot (Battlesight or Snap Shot tactic) with an increased accuracy penalty and shoot first and get a lucky shot one second before the Veteran crew fires. It happens almost every game. There are no guarantees.

In my system, you can give an order but it will not execute for X number of turns of which almost anything can happen.

"Everything depends on prompt identification of a dangerous target, usually seconds decide. "
Quote from Otto Carius, the German tank commander. Identification is about Situational Awareness, seconds is the timing.

Timing is something missing in the Musket Era examples you gave. If the Battalion Commander notices a cavalry charge and orders a square, how long will it take to communicate the order, get the troops moving (how well are they drilled, are they fatigued, is the ground uneven or muddy, etc) and deploy before the charge hits home? To me, that's the real interaction and suspense of the game. If the game system allows "If you do X then I'll just do Y so nanny, nanny, nanny you can't touch me" then there may be something wrong. However, Musket Era is not my period of expertise but timing cuts across all eras and levels and is what can drive Situational Awareness.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag.

That is, if I could care. Your experience in training is meaningless when the bullets really fly. What you're attempting to cloak yourself with is your experience and or deference to the field manuals, which we all know in all times and places goes into the (commode) when the bullets fly. If you want to be insulting and condescending go ahead. I'm simply commenting on the problems with both arguments. I'm really not interested in what you think or feel when the enemy is shooting back. I am interested in what really happens on the battlefield THAT WE CAN MODEL

That's the point. If you can't model it then it's the disquisition of the dancing ability of angels on pinheads.

You seem to think that tanks go at each other like gunfighters in Gunsmoke. In combat it's not the one you're looking at that's the danger, it's the one in the brush you don't see that's going to blow you to kingdom come. or the infantryman in the same brush with a satchel charge or RPG… or the 8" howitzer firing at you from the next county, makes a near miss and flips you over on your head.

In modern war it all simplifies down to this. If you can be seen, you are dead. The rest of this is all quibbling about non essentials.

As for the musket period none of those factors are even remotely connected with the case. All the general in charge of the army cares is if it happened or not. He doesn't need to know all the intermediate steps, therefore those things can be loaded into a bucket and tossed out the window. One simple die roll will do.

But you've already strayed from the central argument. That was-- how do you achieve situational awareness from the signs and intelligence you see, that is what enemy and enemy moves you see and percolating from that what his intentions are. That's what the commander has to deal with. Now you're down to itsy-bitsy folderol of what the tank driver or gunner sees and his reaction time. Your last paragraph explains it all

You're looking for the thrill from inside the tank, not the situation from the headquarters.

Lets refresh what Analsim said.

"Before considering your response, let me state upfront that Situational Awareness is more than just seeing and identifying enemy units on the tabletop. It consists of:
1. Your perception of the elements and activities on the battlefield as influenced by the operational environment.
2. Comprehension of the current operational situation (i.e. enemy & friendly) in time & space.
3. Projection of future actions (friendly & enemy) against the current (known) status.
Yes, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty all through this domain. That is also why it is such an important aspect of game design. "

This is far removed from the world of 6 minute moves and training manuals.

By the way, the biggest gaffe in Wargames was in the old AH game of Tobruk where a rule on clearing barbed wire with artillery said that 30 yards of wire could be cleared by a hit from a 105mm shell. True, if the ordinance expert detonated the shell on the ground under the wire. Somehow this did not jibe with the British plastering the wire for five days and nights at the Somme and failed to cut it for most of its length.

In the musket period there is the testimony of the Pricne De Ligne who said that maybe the first volley was done by divisions but after that everyone just blazed away as best they could. Of that first volley from a fresh regiment he said "Anyone who says he has stood for the first volley is a hero. Anyone who stood to receive a second is a liar."

ll eras and levels and is what can drive Situational Awareness

I personaly am no lover of multi player games. Itl is very rare you get competent players. As to orders written or otherwise, it is my opinion that unless you have experts on a c o – operative mood they will ignore orders. Even when given orders March forward and die, we will cover you, the player advances very cautiously. What do you do, throw him out, call it "friction". Hence modelling sub generals whims to me is not within the scope of the possible. I did occasional play to the strengths and put caution generals where thy could be used to best effect.

Now you do have to ask is, some of the problem poor rules. If you take DBX you need to think hard as unless you act early you may not get in the formation you wanted in time, relying on lucky dice scores is not possible. Some of the need for orders or dice throws to me is about units transforming too fast. If it were slower the generals would not be able to remain inside the opponents decision loop. Despite its crude methodology DBM is superb at this. Also if forces lulls to redress lines. One gentleman noted how fast a Napoleonic formation could move. At that rate the defender would be hard presses to reconfigure on a whim.

Perhaps this has already been touched upon in the dense thicket of preceding posts, but, in case not, permit me the following thought. Situational awareness arguably alters somewhat in scale as command level escalates. It is lethally time sensitive and extremely localized in nature for the private in his foxhole, but (IMO) comparatively much less time-sensitive but much broader in extent for a general. The private is often counting time in seconds within an area visible to his own eyes. A general may well be counting time by the hour or day over an area visible to his army reconnaissance assets. It is a long-winded way of saying that successful modeling of situational awareness probably depends upon the command level anticipated for the player within the rules.

In practical tabletop terms, modeling situational awareness is not easy. Gamers prefer all their models to be on the table and many are very accustomed to the "gods-eye" approach to gaming. These factors can lead the game designer down the path of placing artificial limits upon the extent to which the gamer can exploit his unrealistically good S/A. This gets into tricky territory, but perhaps an solution can be found by the use of carefully defined tactical modes, which also require time and authority to alter.

For example

MARCH – Requires a named destination, a road route and assumes the force to be in column of march with minimal skirmisher or outriders.

ADVANCE – Requires a named destination or objective, a road route or cross-country direction; force may be in combat formation.

RECONNOITER – Requires a named place or defined locality ("the West Woods"); force may advance some or all of its force in combat formation until enemy contact or locality occupied.

ATTACK – Requires a direction of attack and a named objective (whether place, locality or identified enemy unit).

SUPPORT – Unit obliged to protect a named formation by fire and/or movement. It may fire upon any enemy firing upon the unit or the position to be attacked; it may attack any enemy attacking the unit it is assigned to support.

DEFEND – Requires a named position or locality; unit may not move from its position unless making a counter-attack to recover a lost position

RESERVE – Held stationary, awaiting activation by assignment of a new mode order.

RETREAT – you get the general idea.

Certain mode changes occur automatically, initiated at the local command level. For example, a marching unit attacked or fired upon would alter its mode to DEFEND or RETREAT or perhaps ATTACK (depending upon a die roll against the local commander's personality assessment – a rash commander would likely order an attack; a coward a retreat – all beyond the control of Oz behind the curtain). Otherwise, a mode change initiated by the player would involve some time delay mechanism before taking effect.

What I am suggesting here is that, however perfect one's situational awareness may be on turn one when he launches his grand assault, he cannot know with any certainty what the situation will be like on turn four when his opponent has responded to the threat. If a voluntary change from one tactical mode to another takes time, the unrealistically perfect situational awareness becomes less of a benefit.

FWIW.

B

UshCha – I have played many, many games with multiple players and I consider it a useful and important part of modeling command. As you point out, not all players are equal. Some are aggressive, some cautious some passive, some unpredictable, some totally bloodthirsty and rash. Some know the rules better than others. Part of the wargame experience (for me at least) is to marshal my subordinate players and assign them commands and jobs that best suit their personalities or minimize their shortcomings.

FWIW.

B

Blutaski, what you say is true and proably quite representative of some unrully mob of ill trained troops. However to me that is of little or no interest. I like battles that are with able troops and competent commanders, where credible concentrationin tame and space had a reasonable probability of sucess.

The concentration on orders to me seems a bit off track. In our games there are clear objectives and timescales. You may need to secure route X or clear enemy position Y. Or at a more grand scale, clear a route from A toB. There may be more than one way to clear the route and that may be fior the local commander to decide, or it can be proscribed. What is being faced may not be known to the attacker. Excursions from the master plan by acommander, may well cause failure as timescale may not be met.

Again muti player game can rarely provide a plausible command structure for a competent regular army.

Hi UshCha,

We will have to agree to disagree on these points.

B

I have gone back to the original post to review where I think we are.

For low level games the SA is defined by the players brief. You tell him what he has and what he has to do and what he may expect to meet. The extent to which this models the actuality is entirely within the command of the writer of the brief. Thus it can be covered as far as I can see very well.

That is you tell him what forces he has.
You tell him what you want him to do and maybe show the rough position of forces opposing him (real or imaginary).
You tell him what you think the enemy will do (which may not be what the scenario writer is actually setting them to do).

Thus all bases are covered in a satisfactory manner.

Larger scale games where the action can be over a range of routes means that both sides need to Fight for intelligence as to where the main effort may come and must decide if a given attack is truly an attack or a feint. Now if you want to include more diverse things such as intelligence from spy networks then it's either scenario driven or else its for me no longer within my sphere of interest.

I am aware that my son has played in campaigns where the GM has given him specific "Treacherous" briefings such that he is not always playing on the side he appears to be. Seems an excellent way of screwing SA up if that is your inclination but again is out of my interest zone.

Otto,
Professionals will tell you that when the going gets tough and the lead is flying you fall back on your training. I've talked to guys that have just gotten back from deployment. They said that's what kept them alive. Teamwork and leadership in the face of flying lead. Yes, sometimes the book and manual do go out the door but that's not the normal situation and it rarely breaks down to chaos. However, it can if your SA is bad and get ambushed so I do somewhat agree with you. But during the VN era, we went over drills for hours upon hours on how to react to ambushes. We didn't need an order or to be "activated" to execute it. If you wanted to live, you assaulted into the ambush, there are no other logical choices.

You train and drill so much the response is automatic. Yes, automatic is what they tell me and that's how we did it too. If you want to model a game not based on manuals the troops trained to execute SOP's once the lead starts flying fine. Not me. Note: I'm not advocating 100% player control over all units at all times either. That's why I built in SNAFU's.

Yes, I have tried to model it down to the itsy bitsy viewpoint of the tank crewman. Is that a problem? I'm glad I got my idea across. Yes, the thrill from inside the tank, not the HQ. That's the goal of the game. SA and timing crosses all levels. I think that's obvious and something we can agree on. If you don't like that viewpoint it's OK, no problem.

One of the first proponents of documenting Situational Awareness were fighter pilots. Should their view have been from the air wing HQ or from the cockpit? SA can be applied to almost every endeavor from construction trades to warfare to driving down a freeway. If our viewpoints differ we're both right as it applies to any level.

I absolutely agree with all 3 of your points on the operational level. I'm looking at the low-level tactical level. Different factors drive decisions and SA. It can also be applied to the man to man level of combat too or a Wild West gunfight.

Did I really stray from the question of intelligence? If Analsim was limiting the discussion to high-level intel and SA then I did. If so he can tell me I'm out of line and I'll quit contributing and just lurk.

You said:
In modern war, it all simplifies down to this. If you can be seen, you are dead. The rest of this is all quibbling about non-essentials.

I really agree with that and I've tried to reflect the unit with best SA and local intel normally shoots first. However, I don't think you would you suggest we decide an entire game on a single die roll to determine who wins with a healthy modifier for the side that sights first? Why bother with models and terrain?

Personally, I think these "non-essentials" are what a war game is all about isn't it? The non-essentials are the details we strive for to paint that picture and tell that story. It's the tactics and strategies built into the rules we use to outfox your opponent.

Yes, Otto, I'm looking for the feel through the Situational Awareness of the tank crew, it's a 1:1 scale game. In a short engagement of a few minutes, I doubt what the General is thinking crosses the mind of the tank crewman or the individual rifleman. If you think I've got it wrong – OK with me. Give me something definite and constructive to go by. I've been wrong before. If you want a game with the viewpoint of the Armored Division General fine, but that's not what I'm doing. Nothing wrong with that. I try not to tell people how to model a game they want to play.

If your example of Tobruk is to prove the manual is not always right, I totally agree again. I never said manuals were the end all to be followed religiously. I think I called manuals baseline to start with. Research is tough because many sources disagree but you need to take a stand somewhere and it will not please everyone. I'm used to that and always looking for new data that I have not run across.

I've had about a half-dozen former tank crewman play the game and others evaluate it (none with WWII experience). So far they've given the game a thumbs up. I think I'm on the right track. I meet with the president of a large game publisher next week. Wish me luck?

Otto, I like your posts and opinions, mostly because they are a different approach than mine. However, I rarely agree with you on the implementation for a game but that's OK. Your insight is somewhat unique compared to others and I'm always looking for something new. Sorry if I came across as a little snarky.

Wolfhag

Your experience in training is meaningless when the bullets really fly. What you're attempting to cloak yourself with is your experience and or deference to the field manuals, which we all know in all times and places goes into the (commode) when the bullets fly.

Otto:
Meaningless? If it was, what would be the point of the training? Combat is a team effort and teams half to practice together to be effective. An army is an organization that goes into battle attempting to maintain its order, its ability to function [as trained] while 'friction' and the enemy attempt to destroy it. The army that maintains order longer, wins. I would think that is obvious from Alexander, Napoleon to von Moltke and Schwarzkopf.

I'm simply commenting on the problems with both arguments. I'm really not interested in what you think or feel when the enemy is shooting back. I am interested in what really happens on the battlefield THAT WE CAN MODEL.

I agree with that. Training has something to do what really happens on the battlefield. However, we need to choose what we want to model. That is done by identifying those events that we want to mimic, the template for the model.

That's the point. If you can't model it then it's the disquisition of the dancing ability of angels on pinheads.

Yep, so, as we are talking about past events, whether WWII, Afghanistan or the Napoleonic Wars, what real things are we talking about. We can only model what we know. We can't create a model of a T-34 if we don't know what one looks like.

In modern war it all simplifies down to this. If you can be seen, you are dead. The rest of this is all quibbling about non essentials.

So, the question would be, what events/evidence leads you to create that 'model' of modern warfare? I see a whole lot of exceptions in just tank battles in Desert Storm, let lone current fighting in the Middle East.

This gets into tricky territory, but perhaps an solution can be found by the use of carefully defined tactical modes, which also require time and authority to alter.

For example

MARCH – Requires a named destination, a road route and assumes the force to be in column of march with minimal skirmisher or outriders.

ADVANCE – Requires a named destination or objective, a road route or cross-country direction; force may be in combat formation.

Blutarsky:
While these are generally the kind of thing you see in order mechanics, let me point out somethings that are the basic issues with this approach…mechanically and historically:

1. What is the difference between 'march' and 'advance'? other than one is forced to have minimal skirmish protection and the other 'may' be in combat formation? You have to create a number of exceptions or details to make these two distinct, with distinct purposes.

2. Rarely, if ever did commanders in the 18th or 19th century dictate orders making a distinction between march and advance.

RECONNOITER – Requires a named place or defined locality ("the West Woods"); force may advance some or all of its force in combat formation until enemy contact or locality occupied.

How is that different from advance? That 'may' with some or all goes from a reconnoiter to a reconnaissance in force.

ATTACK – Requires a direction of attack and a named objective (whether place, locality or identified enemy unit).

Again, the distinctions between the orders of ADVANCE,
RECONNOITER, and ATTACK require more exceptions and restrictions to make them distinct with distinct advantages and liabilities.

SUPPORT – Unit obliged to protect a named formation by fire and/or movement. It may fire upon any enemy firing upon the unit or the position to be attacked; it may attack any enemy attacking the unit it is assigned to support.

What does 'protect' entail? That could mean attacking an entirely separate command from the one the supported formation is attacking because it could threatened it. Again, more detailed restrictions and instructions are necessary to game that 'protect' order.

DEFEND – Requires a named position or locality; unit may not move from its position unless making a counter-attack to recover a lost position

This one requires fewer limitations, but 'counter-attack' would need to be specified…a player can only attack to recover a lost position? So once the position is recovered any attack has to be stopped? Recovered how, stopped when?

RESERVE – Held stationary, awaiting activation by assignment of a new mode order.

RETREAT – you get the general idea.

This isn't to say the order types you list are bad, just that order distinctions of that sort are difficult to quantify and tend to be areas creating the most questions and issues for that reason. ESR is one game I see doing a better than average job with this type of order formation, but even then about 2/3rd of the rules questions are about order meanings and qualifications.

Certain mode changes occur automatically, initiated at the local command level. For example, a marching unit attacked or fired upon would alter its mode to DEFEND or RETREAT or perhaps ATTACK (depending upon a die roll against the local commander's personality assessment – a rash commander would likely order an attack; a coward a retreat – all beyond the control of Oz behind the curtain). Otherwise, a mode change initiated by the player would involve some time delay mechanism before taking effect.

That makes sense, but then you have to cover all the 'what ifs' for each of the 8 different orders.

I think to have orders that are 1. easy to game and 2. follow something like the historical orders, we have to not only study actual orders, but what leeway subordinates had in following them. As Clauswitz notes, the lower you go in the command hierarchy, the less leeway and fewer decisions the officer has, which was purposeful. One of the changes in command during the 19th and on into the 20th century was the increasing decision-making ability and responsibility given to battalion, company and even platoon commanders as the battlefield size increases and troops were more and more dispersed.

The content of orders given in 1800 for a division were going to be quite different than those in 1900 from those in 2000. A great deal of the distinctions revolve around what officers at different levels could do regarding their Situational Awareness.

I think some of this may be due to the size of a battlefield. March is typically a column of march. Its the only way to get somewhere fast as you will need to cross rivers by bridges and fords. While in an open field a linear formation may go quickly it will not do so if difficult terrain like hedges ditches marsh are encountered. It will have minimal protection as perhaps a few light troops on the flanks and forward but they will struggle to keep up if the going is bad.

Advance implies advance to contact this will be slow if real world hedges and ditches intervene.

Which you use will depend on whether you have realistic terrain and the size of the battlefield. Even in the English Civil war terrain could be very significant in many places. You could argue that some of the bigger set piece battles could only occur in large open spaces.

If you are miles from a command element and going away then it could take a significant time to catch up and pass on new orders. However this is a unique large battlefield that may not be typical of most games. Certainly in these circumstances orders are relevant IF the situation is very dispersed.

I think some of this may be due to the size of a battlefield. March is typically a column of march.

Advance implies advance to contact this will be slow if real world hedges and ditches intervene.

UshCha:
I agree that is what is 'implied'. The issues are whether
1. A commander would give that kind of order to a suppordinate… An army commander to a Corps commander or Corps CinC to a divisional commander.
2. Whether such changes in formation weren't left to the commander in charge changing formation as deemed needed by the terrain and enemy presence.

Think of Ney at Friedland. He purposely exited the forest in march columns in an attempt to move quickly and was driven back by Russian artillery. That wasn't done by order of Napoleon.

What are we asking players to focus on in regards to orders and how does that jive with the demands of the historical counterparts.

McLaddie wrote -
"That makes sense, but then you have to cover all the 'what ifs' for each of the 8 different orders."

Agreed. We have done some preliminary concept validation exercises, but it is far from a mature product. It basically works with "adult" gamers, but its resiliency when confronted by "rules lawyers" remains unknown/suspect. The concept stemmed from a grand tactical ACW/H&M rules study project to limit excessive command flexibility to a more realistic level.

For example –

> Most H&M rules (with which I am familiar) permit a player to launch a division-level multi-wave assault across a 2,000 yard attack frontage on turn one, yet allow him to instantly bring the entire force to a screeching halt in a single game turn, often from halfway across the table-top. Once set in motion in the real world, cancelling such an attack would IMO have been an impossible feat.

> In the gamer world, artillery positioned and ordered to support a particular position or body of troops are often freely permitted to engage any attractive target, no matter how fleeting or innocuous, anywhere else on table-top without restriction. Such needless expenditure of valuable ammunition would have been vigorously discouraged in the real world.

> In the gamer world, a player, having explicitly tasked a force to occupy and defend a particular position, often has no compunction about ignoring those orders in order to attack or advance in order to exploit a tasty momentary tactical opportunity ….. even though said gamer's command figure might be three miles away on the other side of the table.

I concede that this speaks more to the issue of command and control than to situational awareness, but the two seem to me so closely related that the line of separation is very blurry.

B

It was interesting in the Bounds and Movement thread that one Napolionic player noted that generally the units moved too slowly in wargames. They would in fact cover 300 yds in short order. Once moving, getting the order and then stopping in in seconds seems a bit implausible. It may be that the rules are in error and the bound length is too short. Setting the bound length to the nominal time, at the level you are aiming, at that minimum time an order could be acted on, would get rid of theis artificial effects. In effect like a car you have to account in some way for Momementum both physical and within the command structure. As an example comming out of a wood in coloumn. It may be possible to stop it within a few seconds but the length of the coloumn would mean a significant time would be needed to relay a complex order such as re-deploy in the woods leaving room for the lot at the front. Hence you would proably lose a fair bit of the coloumn if attacked out of the wood before it was expecting to transform.

In our own modern game time must be spent setting up a high speed moves and once enacted it cannot be curtailed without cost in one form or another. Similarly the enemy if not set up cannot respond to the high speed with his own high speed move as he now has to use time to set up that move r as he is behind on the decision loop.

I admit it does not answer all mof it, really who is in control. Your example indicates that in reality some orders at low level are in fact direct from the much higher command element. It would be possible to issue such orders in a game by removing the sub commanders from the command loop. You could make the high level command move the troops. This would cost him decision time in other areas so is a suitable penalty for commanders who whish to micro manage.

B:

I agree that command and control is tied to SA. What you know and can see dictates what you will react to. The orders limit what can be done and more importantly, how fast.

The examples you give are good ones. So the questions are how to limit that control in time and space as well as limit what is 'directable' like artillery.

It goes back to how the hierarchy worked in limiting the options with in orders at each level as well as what they could see and know.

Otto won't be joining us for a while. He's in the DH serving a full term.

Wolfhag