"Comparison of Allied Armies 1805-1807" Topic

In a recent thread TMP link Gunfreak asked why the Russians did so well in 1806-7. As an expansion on that, do people think that there were in fact big differences between the tactical skills of the various Allied armies in this period, or do you think the perceived differences can be explained more by some calamitous Allied generalship (Mack during the Ulm campaign, the battle plan at Austerlitz and the Prussians in 1806)?

Tactically I am not sure there was that much to choose versus say Austria, although the latter lacked proper light infantry and had actually worsened the capabilities of the Grenzers in this area so they were tactically outfought by better troop types if not in unit tactics.

Both tactically and strategically, however, the Austrians were notably clumsy. Even as late as 1809 their initial advances managed marches of 6 miles a day and after two days they had to call a halt for a day while they sorted themselves out from the utter confusion into which they had fallen. The army commander usually had to deal with being second-guessed by the Aulic Council, which was essentially an attempt at war direction by remote committee.

The calamitous generalship is well-documented, but there was also chaos at the organisational level. The Austrians were in the throes of reorganising from six-company to four-company battalions. It appears possible that parts of the army were each on a different organisation in 1805. This in itself bespeaks abject doctrinal confusion. They also failed to mass guns or cavalry. In fact, their organisation pretty much ensured they could not, with much of the artillery dispersed among line battalions. Hence they had nothing in the playbook to address instances where the French did so.

The individual Austrian musketeer was no less brave and effective than any other. But when he's badly led, badly organised, insufficiently specialised, and inadequately supported by cavalry and artillery, he's going to lose, especially against Napoleon.

The Russians are for the other thread. The Bavarians fought two-deep, interestingly, but otherwise seem to have been a conventional force that was a lot more effective than the allies. I'm not sure why and would welcome others' views.

The 1805 British army was specialised to operate on a small scale at long range. The latter militated against large cavalry and artillery contingents to begin with. It won its relatively small battles – never until 1815 against the main enemy's main strength in the main theatre – by relying on light infantry to counter the enemy's while line infantry reserved its fire so as to deliver a psychologically shattering volley at very close range, whether on the attack or defense. This generally worked so well against the smallish remote detachments it fought that neither the organisation nor the doctrine changed over the era, although its limitations emerged at Waterloo against an enemy with abundant cavalry and artillery.

The Prussians were actually outnumbered in 1806, which makes their performance hard to judge. Generally Prussia needed superior numbers and / or a more effective ally on the field to win its battles even in the later period. So the 1806 army was always sure to lose, making it hard to judge whether it was unusually bad, or just not big enough in 1806. Its later successes, always with the advantage of numbers, likewise make it hard to judge by its results how much it had actually improved. An army that can pit 63,000 against 27,000 French (admittedly under Davout) and lose is, I suspect, up there (or rather down there) with the 1808 Spanish. Effectively it seems to have been Frederick the Great's army, as though 40 years had not passed.

Those same Prussians managed to save the day at Eylau, and those same Spanish were the very first to defeat an imperial French army. Every dog has it's day. In this period the ability and personal character of commanders even at lower level accounts for a great deal.

Effectively it seems to have been Frederick the Great's army, as though 40 years had not passed.

Duffy points out in "The Army of Frederick the Great" that the reality was that it was Frederick William I who created the Prussian army and that Freddy the Adequate merely used it effectively against inferior foes. His contention for this is that FtG/FtA left the army in much worse shape at his death than in had been when he inherited it. In addition, it's tradition of victory made the army resistant to changes. For example the French were moving in the much more efficient Divisional maneuver blocks (the origin of Corps system) in 1760.

The problem wasn't the army per say. But lack of good officers. Freddy had great officers. That took the initiative.
At Rossbach Freddy was eating while all his officers from generals to liutenants had put the army in motion. He just had to show up for the ball.

That is what prussia was lacking in 1806. The iron drill of blind obedience that musketeers had in the prussian army of 1757 seemed to have infected lower and higher command too.

The prussian musketeer could fight just as well as any one. But with out quick thinking officers they could only stand and shoot.

4th Cuirassier,

Regarding your comment about the Bavarians, it is likely that their quality reflects the influence of Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford. As Army Minister of Bavaria, he reorganized that service between 1785 and 1796. Rumsford was an American who had been Lt. Colonel of the (Loyalist) King's American Dragoons during the Revolutionary War. He was also a prominent scientist of his day who was responsible both for theoretical discoveries in thermodynamics and various practical inventions.

@4th Cuirassier,

Just regarding the British, fair enough in general but:

Many of the troops that Britain fought in Spain were the veterans of the Grande Armee of 1807
The battles of Vitoria and Bidassao and so on were big battles by any standards (as in similar in scale to Austerlitz, Jena, Eyalu, Friedland)
The French Army of Spain was more efficient than that of the French Army in central Europe in 1813-14 (since that was used as the veteran troops to rebuild the latter)

@ 4th Cuirassier

Did the Bavarians revert to a three deep line after allying with the French? I only have the Osprey book to go by which does state they had 6 companies per battalion, of which one was a Grenadier until 1811 when a light company was added, so along the same lines as the French. Oh, and the light infantry battalions carry flags?

@ Whirlwind

Fair enough. I was thinking of Alexandria, Maida, etc as well as the Peninsula, where until fairly late, most battles were relatively small.

@davbenbak

I've no idea actually, it was just something I recall reading. You're right to pick it up though, they went to three deep at some point after 1805 IIRC.

@ Attila

That sounds a plausible origin.

the Bavarians were allied with the French already in 1805 and for that received lare chunks of territory, a lot of Austrian muskets and as well as 2 complete cavalry Geschütz batteries (and became a kingdom).
They returned to 3 ranks in the 1809 campaing.
Light battalions did not carry colours

One of the good things that the French troops in Spain could say … Bernadotte never lead a corps there! ROFL