"Why did the Russians do so well in 1806-1807" Topic

Can it all just be boiled down to the weather and stoic Russians getting killed in droves and not retreating?

While I think the Russians would probably have been beaten with better campaign weather. But On a tactical level the Russians seemed quite capable, lower officers seem to take initiative, generals place their forces quite well. Benningsen and those under him did well at Battle of Pułtusk and Golitsyn did well at Golymin.

I'd be interested in reading what experts think. I don't know much about the Russian army of this era. Apart from being dogged, and having a good artillery arm, I believe.

I'm not sure what you're asking…you sound surprised that the Russians fought well against the French?

Well, they got beaten soundly in 1805, so did Austria and Prussia got crushed in 1806. So what made the Russians unique in 1806/1807.

Most of the Russian officer corps had no real marshal interest and were officers mostly for the advantage in Russian high society, there was no universal training for cavarly and so regiments were trained on the whim of their commander(if he took any interest)
Few regiments had any training outside of parade grounds.

Yet Bennigsen moved his regiments with ease, plugged holes were needed, the Russian cavalry performed much better than the French at Pułtusk. Officers seemed to have no problems to judge the right time to do a bayonet charge.

There is no theoretical reason for the Russians to perform as well as they did.

When the weather was cold… they did well. When the weather was warm… they got smashed.

it was pretty cold at Austerlitz ?And they got proper smashed.

Austerlitz is not indicative of the Russian army's performance in the 1799-1814 period.

Unit vs unit The russians fought well at Austerlitz(so really did the prussians in 1806)
They were simply out generaled.

The Russians did poorly at Austerlitz. That's why they were beaten so soundly. They were both outgeneraled and outfought.

They fought hard in Poland, but at best Eylau was a draw, and the Russians left the field. And if it wasn't for the timely intervention by Lestocq's Prussians late in the day, the Russians would undoubtedly have been decisively defeated.

At Friedland the Russians were decisively, if not disastrously, defeated and that defeat led directly to Tilsit.

It were the generals and their mistakes, Laddies, not the troops. With Suvorov they did just fine, as they did with other Russian Generals. We don't blame the French troops for Eylau, Leipzig and Waterloo or the Peninsular campaign failures like Salamaca and Vitoria.

It wasn't just the generals, it was a myriad of factors, including their 'tactical system' which helped the Russians to do poorly.

And they didn't perform well in Holland in the 1790s either.

Blaming only the commanders, who did have the final responsibility, is to overlook the other inherent problems the Russians had-just as it is just to blame the Prussian general officers in 1806. It was also the systems the two armies employed, not just the commanders.

By the way, why would you blame the French troops for Eylau? As bloody as it was, they still won.

It wasn't just the generals, it was a myriad of factors, including their 'tactical system' which helped the Russians to do poorly.

So Suvorov beat French veterans with a poor tactical system? There were a lot of things wrong with the Russian Army, and the French Army had some problems too.

That being so, did the Russian system hamstring the generals, or vice versa? That isn't a black and white, either/or question, but considering what the Russians did at times, it certainly wasn't just their system and their system obviously wasn't so poor that the Russians and their generals couldn't beat the French.

Yes, there were a myriad of factors involved that 'helped' the Russians do poorly. No doubt about it…But if those myriad of factors together outweighed the Performance of their Generals, then there shouldn't have been any Russian successes before 1812.

By the way, why would you blame the French troops for Eylau? As bloody as it was, they still won.

Kevin, that was rhetorical. I wasn't blaming the French Troops, but pointing out that no one did blame them for the French failures. e.g. No one blames the French troops at Eylau for not decisively crushing the Russians as they were several months later at Friedland. Or Leipzig or Bautzen etc. etc.

never ever forget that greatest 'attribute' that Napoleon loved so much……. luck.

Napoleon believed that 'luck' was the ability to exploit accidents.

yes luck and propaganda (Eylau for example), but instead of dogma back to the op's question.

The Grande Armée was fagged and fought out – three years of hard campaigning, starving in 1807 took its tool.

A very long line of communication back to France.

Had to survive in a very poor country, a taste for 1812

In 1805 – Very poor Austrian army, the worst in the whole Napoleonic wars, no strategy how to operate against the French, they did not wait till the Russians arrived and opened offensive prematurley occupying Bavaria.

They took on the battle of Austerlitz lured into the trap by Napoléon cleverly outwitting them.

Would they have waited and maybe even retreated a bit – as Kutusov suggested – Napoléon would have been in a very critical situation.

1806 – the Prussians seemingly suffering from megalomania, thinking to take on offensively again – alone and not waiting for the Russians – to operated against the French.

Despite an excellent army – it was crushed to the lack of any sound strategy, they should have waited and even retreat and make the lines of communications longer to the French and unite with the Russian Army and then fight Napoléon.

In 1807 the Russians were strong enough to take on the Grande Armée almost alone (with the exception of L'Estoques small Prussian force) – their army was well equipped and had excellent soldiers.

Despite an excellent army – it was crushed to the lack of any sound strategy, they should have waited and even retreat and make the lines of communications longer to the French and unite with the Russian Army and then fight Napoléon.

Excellent armies are not defeated and destroyed destroyed in three weeks.

No matter how anyone attempts to paint it, the Prussian tactical system was obsolete and the army overall lacked any meaningful or effective training. The artillery and engineers had been neglected for so long that they were ineffective. The Prussians did not have an artillery school until 1791 and that was even abolished in 1808.

Excellent armies are not defeated and destroyed destroyed in three weeks.

The French Army of the North was defeated and destroyed in four days in June 1815. It doesn't make it a poor army in my book.

James Arnold points out in his Eylau book (and even a bit in Friedland), that the Russian Irregular Cavalry (Cossacks et al), played HAVOC amongst the Dragoon divisions that were positioned to conduct screening duties during the winter, because they had not yet melded as units, along with the fact that they were not quite fish nor fowl in regards to their intended duties.

I don't think the French lights did much better than their dragoon brethren.
Arnold points out all outposts during the 1806-1807 winter got widdled down by Russian Cossack, hussar and dragoon raids.

Excellent armies are not defeated and destroyed destroyed in three weeks.

Sure they are, if the mistakes are bad enough. History is littered with examples. Having said that, I am not sure that the Prussian Army could be considered 'excellent' compared to the other nations' military.

The French Army of the North was defeated and destroyed in four days in June 1815.

Nord was defeated and badly hurt, but it was not destroyed. And Grouchy's command, part of Nord, was not defeated and skillfully retreated southward, joining those units who were at Waterloo.

It was destroyed, it's moral was gone, they could not withstand another attack.
Do you think there is a snowball's chance in hell Napoleon would have surrendered to the British if he thought his army wasn't destroyed?

ok – to prevent hair splitting and more dogma – excellent army – was the wrong expression, lets say a well trained army, as for the quality of the soldier not worse than in 1813.

Nord was defeated and badly hurt, but it was not destroyed. And Grouchy's command, part of Nord, was not defeated and skillfully retreated southward, joining those units who were at Waterloo.

Well by the same token, there were still Prussians fighting against the French well after Jena and Auerstadt. On any comparison, the French of 1815 threw in the towel rather quicker than the Prussians did in 1806-7.

The only Prussian units left in the field were in East Prussia. The Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt lost at least 41,000 killed, wounded, and captured as well as at least 315 guns and at least 30 colors. French losses were about 13,000.

The rest of the Prussian army that got away was pursued to destruction.

That did not happen to Nord after Waterloo.

French losses in the Belgian campaign were 64,602; allied losses were 62,818.

As of 25 June, Nord had 62,737 present and under arms. About half of Nord's artillery got away. The Prussian pursuit was at best amateurish and Wellington's Anglo-Allied army was crippled and generally incapable of an effective pursuit.

The French response politically to Waterloo was to force Napoleon's abdication, which did not happen to the Prussians after Jena-Auserstadt. Davout had about 117,000 troops in and around Paris and was still effective.

With Napoleon gone, Louis returned and the French army retired behind the Loire. It was Louis who destroyed the French army, not the allies, thus allowing the allied occupation. The two situations are entirely different.

Having said that, I am not sure that the Prussian Army could be considered 'excellent' compared to the other nations' military.

They weren't-that was my point.

Could you give examples of excellent armies being destroyed in three weeks?

It was destroyed, it's moral was gone, they could not withstand another attack.
Do you think there is a snowball's chance in hell Napoleon would have surrendered to the British if he thought his army wasn't destroyed?

No, it wasn't and the information that contradicts your posting is above.

Napoleon didn't abdicate because he was defeated. Napoleon abdicated because of the political situation after Waterloo with the unconstitutional actions of the Chambers.

Napoleon could have used force to contradict what the Chambers had done, but refused to do so. JC Herold remarks on this fact. Napoleon's comment was 'I have not come batck from Elba to have Paris run with blood.'

To be honest, I am not totally convinced that the relative failure of the French at Eylau was due to Russian strengths. I strongly suspect that it was Napoleon's hubris what gave the Russians the shot at giving a heavy corrective to the Grande Armee. Napoleon planned a battle against an imaginary enemy, that would, in his mind, stay put while he developed one of his brilliant maneuvers. The Emperor didn't take into his plans the awful weather, and therefore he didn't calculate correctly how much time would take his forces to reach their attack positions. He also thought that the Russians would be mistified and wouldn't move, not to say attack -as they did-. In other words: he was caught with his metaphorical pants down.

Eylau was as much Napoleon's failure as general as Russian ability. Actually, Friedland shows that Napoleon had learnt from his failures at Eylau, and took advantage of Russian weaknesses to give them a hard lesson in the operational and tactical art of war.

Napoleon didn't abdicate because he was defeated. Napoleon abdicated because of the political situation after Waterloo with the unconstitutional actions of the Chambers.

So, according to your argument, Napoleon would have abdicated even after defeating the Allies at Waterloo. It is the logical corolary: if defeat had nothing to do with his abdication, victory would have been equally immaterial.

That is not a logical assumption, nor is it my 'argument.' The political situation in Paris should be taken into consideration regarding Napoleon's abdication in late June.

If Napoleon had won in Belgium, the political situation in Paris would have been much different.

Ergo, the defeat at Waterloo was decisive in Napoleon's abdication.

You can't have it both ways.

Your argument is both a circular one as well as an exercise in semantics. Either way, it isn't historical inquiry.

No, mate. It's your argument which is circular: you can't say that the defeat had nothing to do with Napoleon's abdication and at the same time defend that it was the defeat at Waterloo what caused the political unrest in Paris and therefore Napoleon's abdication.

And the "isn't historical inquiry" is a lame excuse to try to dodge the rethorical trap you have walked into all by yourself.

Again if Napoleon thought his army was useful he would use it.
It was morally destroyed and ceased to exist as a useful tool of war.
In other words destroyed. As the allies chased the French the same would happen as with the prussians in 1806. Large swaths of french would be picked up here and there until it was all gobled up.

Napoleon just gave up before it happened as he knew well it would.

If Napoleon thought he had a tiny tiny chance to catch victory from defeat he would. But he didn't.

From Clauswitz:

All that Bonaparte and his supporters have said about the great forces that were still available, about the possibility—yes, even the ease—of continued resistance, is mere blather. In placing the loss of 40,000 men into a simple mathematical relationship to the initial forces, they want to give the impression that this was an insignificant portion of the whole, but even they do not have the courage to state this laughable argument openly. It is not 40,000 men that France lost on the fields of Ligny and Belle Alliance; it was an army of 80,000 that was destroyed. This army was the cornerstone of the entire defense structure, on which everything depended, in which all security lay and where every hope was rooted. The army was destroyed, and the commander who led it, in whose miraculous abilities half of France believed with an enthusiasm bordering on superstition, the great magician was—as he himself said of Blücher at Ligny—caught en flagrant délit. Thus all trust in the mind that was directing everything collapsed along with the military structure that was supposed to protect France's borders.

For these reasons no victory has ever had greater psychological power than this one, and what was accomplished by this power—the sudden overthrow of the huge faction that had formed against the Bourbons, plus the exile of Bonaparte, who was still worshipped by half of France—is therefore not remarkable and cannot be attributed to the actions of individuals. Indeed, it would have been almost a miracle if things had turned out otherwise.

The full extent of this victory was already clear to the two Allied commanders on the day after the battle, because trophies of victory comprising 240 guns (their entire artillery park), plus all the field equipment of the enemy commander-in-chief, leave nothing to be desired. They are the unmistakable sign of an army that has been totally destroyed and driven from the field.

and:

Fugitives had already reached Philippeville on the 19th, and they were equally incapable of resistance, so Bonaparte hurried that same day toward Laon. What is truly revealing is that in Laon, most likely on the morning of the 21st, thus around 60 hours after the end of the battle and ninety miles from the battlefield, Bonaparte received a report that a considerable body of troops was approaching. He sent his adjutant to see who it was, and it was his brother Jerome with the generals Soult, Morand, Colbert, Petit, and Poret de Morvan, who were arriving with around 3,000 infantrymen and cavalrymen they had gathered together. Regardless of how much respect one may have for the French army, this can only be called complete dissolution, a flight without equal.

It was Jerome, however, who had been designated by Bonaparte to collect the army at Avesnes, and of whom Bonaparte said in his Memoirs that he had already assembled 25,000 men there on the 21st. Bonaparte also has Jerome bringing 50 cannon back with him, but it is well known that all of the 240 guns comprising the French artillery had been captured either on the battlefield or during the retreat.

As the pursuing Prussian corps advanced beyond the Oise down the road from Soissons to Paris, they encountered Grouchy on the 28th. For several days a few weak remnants of the defeated army had flitted past them like shadows, so it is certain that there was no organized body of 25,000 men assembled in either Laon or Soissons, and that those troops who were there did not unite with Grouchy but fled to Paris before he arrived. Grouchy himself speaks in his reports to the government commission about the low morale and disaffection of the army.[81]

The strength of the army at Paris also proves this. Not counting the National Guard, this army had 60,000 men, of whom 19,000 had come from the depots, so only 40,000 could have been from the main army and of these, around 25,000 had come with Grouchy, so the remaining 15,000 must have been the residue of the army that had been defeated at Belle Alliance. It is thus clear that between the battlefield and Paris this army had disappeared as a factor in the course of events.

Strategically, a victory of this scale has to be regarded as in a class by itself, deriving from exceptional circumstances and leading to results of a most exceptional kind.

and:

And the "isn't historical inquiry" is a lame excuse to try to dodge the rethorical trap you have walked into all by yourself.

This.

Could you give examples of excellent armies being destroyed in three weeks?

German 3rd Panzer Army, 4th Army, 9th Army in 5 days by the Russians.

link

It was abundantly obvious that Napoleon could not politically survive a military defeat in 1815. This was Wellington's judgment at the time, and was the reason he thought a pursuit a l'outrance unnecessary. In addition, it should be remembered that the Congress of Vienna had not declared war on France. It had declared Napoleon an outlaw, and the allies were at war with him personally, not with France. Once defeated, Napoleon was sure to fall.

This was Napoleon's analysis of his position also, and it explains why he undertook the 1815 campaign at all. If he waited for the Russians to arrive he'd definitely lose, whereas if he attacked Wellington and Blucher right away, he might not. He thus followed the course that offered a chance to postpone strategic personal defeat (probably there was no chance to avoid it altogether, but postponement might amount to the same, depending on Allied resolve).

To the extent that French troops continued to fight, this took place largely in the areas the Prussians were advancing. There is a causal connection behind these facts. Wellington's troops were advancing in an orderly fashion and paying for local supplies, because they weren't at war with the French and acted accordingly. The Prussian advance was essentially organised punitive pillaging as revenge for having had two further humiliating defeats meted out to it at Ligny and Wavre. As well as being profoundly stupid, it was probably illegal. It naturally triggered a defensive reaction from intact French forces.

The French army after 18 June, aside from the parts mauled at Waterloo, was capable of fighting, but the cause was a dead letter.

German 3rd Panzer Army, 4th Army, 9th Army in 5 days by the Russians.

The key word in the discussion is 'excellent' and I would submit that the above listed German formations were far from it in mid-to-late 1944.

Additionally, the use of Wikipedia as a reference is suspect at best.

Additionally, the use of Wikipedia as a reference is suspect at best.

It is a quick way of pointing to the event which one is referring too. OTOH compared to some secondary sources that some people rely on, it is at least up to date.

The key word in the discussion is 'excellent' and I would submit that the above listed German formations were far from it in mid-to-late 1944.

The German Army of WW2 has a good a claim as any. And there is a strong evidential basis for it, unlike in many other cases.

Could you give examples of excellent armies being destroyed in three weeks?

There are lots of good examples from Greek and Roman history too: Leuctra; Pharsalus; Teutonberger Wald; Adrianapole…

Also a really good example (although two months rather than 3 weeks) is the 1914 BEF.

the most important thing, Napoléon regarded himself as being beaten, he had no fighting will any longer, his card house had collapsed and he was finished, don't get disstracted about what excellent armies were,

But back to topic, the French Army of 1807 wasn't those of 1805 and 1806 any longer, they encountered a unified lead Russian army who prooved to be a tenacious opponent, they days of the walk overs were finished forever.

The Russians did appear to be tough opponents. However, if I recall, some of the Russian commanders appeared to be be over confident and tended to blame the Austrians for any failures.

Korsakov was defeated by Massena in the Second Battle of Zurich 1799.

And concerning Korsakov-'he listened to nobody and consulted nobody; he paid mot the slightest attention to the depth of knowledge of Archduke Charles, and was unable even to assemble a staff. His army was the embodiment of chaos.' (page 213. Eagles over the Alps by Christopher Duffy)

Suvorov, I believe was forced to retreat and the Russians left the coalition. This might suggest, apart perhaps for Suvorov, it is both commanders and troops at fault?

In 1812, Napoleon's army suffered equally or more from the bad weather, than actual combat losses by the Russians. They were aided by bad weather in 1812 and at Elyau.

I'm not attempting to take anything away from them, I still consider them Napoleon's second toughest opponents, the Brits being the first.

If Napoleon was the warmonger and did not care how many men lost their lives, as some people like to portray him as, then I am sure he would have continued fighting.

But in my opinion, after the defeat at Waterloo, along with the failures of Ney and Grouchy, he may have lost the confidence in his commanders to carry out the simplest of tasks. eg: Ney did prevent Wellington from aiding the Prussians at Ligny, but he was slow to act and failed to capture the cross roads and called back troops that may have made a difference had he allowed them to continue to Ligny. Grouchy, of course, although he was not defeated and got his troops back, failed miserably to prevent any Prussians marching to Waterloo.

With all that happening, and seeing his army retreating in the way they did, one can understand why Napoleon may have lost total confidence in carrying on the fight. However, had he decided to do so, and with the other allied forces not yet a threat, who knows what might have happened. And of course, Napoleon may well have had enough of fighting himself. Unless he could inflict serious defeats against the allies, the allies (thanks to their paymaster Britain) were happy enough to carry on and it was not bothering them how many more men might need to die to achieve their aim of defeating Napoleon. After all, we must remember that it was the allies who declared war in 1815, not Napoleon.

Massena had 75 thousand men or more at Zurich. The coalition had about 60,000 – of which 33,000 Russians under Rimsky-Korsakov.
The defeat at Zurich essentially compelled Suvarov to cease a previously successful campaign.
The Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland was a failure. The Russian invasions into the Adriatic were successful, but the intended second step to Naples was not undertaken.

"the Russians left the coalition "
As far as the Russians were concerned, this was due to a diplomatic dispute with British restrictions on trade in the Baltic. Western writers think it was because of battlefield reverses. I do not know of anything along those lines in Russian primary or contemporary sources.

In 1799-1800, where the Russians fought alone or commanded, the results were good – otherwise not. This was again the same in 1805.
They blamed their alliance partners. A more neutral statement might be that the Russians were challenged by the need to integrate their forces with those of alliance partners.

"In 1812, Napoleon's army suffered equally or more from the bad weather, than actual combat losses by the Russians. They were aided by bad weather in 1812 and at Elyau."
I have never understood this "it was the weather" excuse. Maybe it was something to tell yourself after losing your arny and your régime to your enemies.
The weather was the same for the Russians.
If Napoléon suffered so much from the weather, and the Russians much less so, why does that not count in favor of the proficieny of the Russians?

As we all know, sometimes its just the dice.

indeed if you suffer from bad wwather – your equipment is wrong – a lame excuse to avoid blaming those who are responsible for such a thing, the head of the army.

Souvorov remains one of those few military commanders who was never defeated. The retreat from Switzerland comes following the defeat of Korsakov which changed the strategic situation.

In addition, Souvorov worked closely with Melas and, realising the deficiencies of Russian staff work, used the Austrians to take up the slack.

Regarding the 1812 Russian Campaign, I must point out that it was emphatically not just the weather that led to French disaster. Logistical arrangements were totally inadequate to support an army of several hundred thousand men. French and allied soldiers and their animals were falling out and dying of exhaustion, hunger, and disease in droves even before they crossed the Russian border in the summer. The further they advanced, the worse it became because supply trains could not keep up with the advance, and the French system of relying heavily on foraging (more accurately, stealing the peasants blind) simply did not work well in Russia--for several reasons including thin population density, relatively scarce resources, Russian scorched-earth tactics, and the threat to foraging parties from Cossacks and partisan bands. Consequently the effective strength of the Grande Armee had shrunk by roughly half well before cold weather set in. This has to go down to poor intelligence and strategic planning; ultimately, however, it probably just really wasn't possible to adequately supply a force of the size needed to subdue Russia unless the Czar caved in quickly, which he didn't. So, Napoleon misjudged his adversary, and the rest, as they say, is history.

indeed – the whole planning was for one nice battle and then the Russian emperor will sue on his knees for piece, that was at least what Napoléon thought – but then the Russians did not play into N's hands.
Napoléon had no concept other than this when he attacked the Russian Empire