"elite troops form 75 % of his army" Topic

Hi Friends, I'm relatively new to napoleonics (and ACW). But after doing some research on the organization of armies in various countries, I have noticed there were so many elite troops.

For example, the French army.
The voltigeur companies in EACH infantry battalion were elites. The grenadier companies also were elites.
The foot carabiniers were elites.
The cuiassiers were elites.
The horse carabiniers were elites.
The Guard – of course – was an elite formation.
etc.

I don't know any other period in military history with so many elite troops. It's just shocking to me that approx. 33 % of Napoleon's army consisted of elite troops, (and 75 % of my friend's army ! YIKES !)

There are, of course, 'elites' and those that were actually better.

Don't let the title "elite" fool you into thinking that they were actually elite. Many times they were specialists but not truly elite in the sense that they were the cream of the crop. Take Voltigeurs for example, they men in those companies were selected because of their ability to think on their feet and were aigle but that didn't automatically make them elite. It did however make them well trained specialists.

As for your friend's army, I would suggest that he try to use more of a historical mix to his units for the period and/or geography you are fighting. The Napoleonic version of wall to wall King Tigers doesn't make for a good game. But of course that is only my opinion.

If 75% of the pies at the county fair get blue ribbons; it either means there are a lot of really good pies or the evaluation system is over inflated.

Maybe all those troops you mention are really good, but I would continue to research. I'm no expert but I thought cuirassiers were just heavy cavalry. I know none of the cuirassiers units were part of the Imperial Guard. And grenadier companies were composed of the bigger men of a battalion whereas young athletic men would be put in the light company. There are grenadiers and then there are grenadiers, like the Old Guard which are composed of proven battle veterans which are indeed elite. I'm sure there are some very knowledgable people on this forum who will come along shorty and educate us.

edit: I type too slow. Good points made by the above two posters.

Play with a set of rules that puts a heavy point tariff on "elite" troops, while at the same time not giving them a huge advantage.
He'll come around.

Of those you mentioned except for the guard only the carabiniers might be "elite" and they only get to be elite because they only had two regiments instead of 15 that the cuirassiers had. So elite because of rarity not necessarily quality.

Grenadiers and voltiguers are only "elite" if in combined battalions.

You could of course say units are elite based on their proved performance and not what they are called.

I'd say Davout's entire 3rd corps was elite even if it only consisted of line and light battalions.

The term 'elite' is often used in the limited sense of being better than the others in that unit rather than being of significantly greater effect in combat. The Grenadier company in a newly raised unit of conscripts were the elite of the battalion – but still probably pretty useless in combat.

You do need to avoid reading too much into terminology before you understand what the terms refer to. To do that you have to suspend belief a fair bit and not take everything at face value.

As you read more stuff (and I don't mean lots more) you will be much better able to judge what YOU feel are 'elites' and what are not – and why.

If you like playing historical formations, and love elite troops, you should try LaSalle. It's got a wonderful approach to that. Since you command a division, you can of course command a Guards Division – 100% composed of entirely elite troops (because that's exactly what Guards' divisions were).

Naturally your opponent probably outnumbers you, even though it's not a points based game per se. But the victory conditions are altered. It's assumed that if you command the Guard, and it's been committed to battle, then things must somewhat desperate for the army. So unless you win a decisive victory, you lose.

Not only does the Guard never "recule", but it also never settles for marginal victories!

(The rules author doesn't believe in the French Old Guard as supermen either. They're tough, but certainly not invincible).

Also elite back then isn't the same as elite now SAS etc goes through training that puts them heads and shoulders above others in the British army.

Back then they training was the same.
Only their actual combat experiences and moral made them any different.

The training of grenadiers a cheval was no different than carabiniers a cheval or cuirassiers.
Hell the training of hussars and cuirassiers where almost completely the same on the battlefield. Only difference was fencing techniques.
The actual combat effectiveness of heavy vs light cavalry is often exchagerated.

Hell the training of hussars and cuirassiers where almost completely the same on the battlefield.

No, it wasn't, even when cuirassiers carried carbines. Not unless French Hussars charged at a trot.

Elite companies were just the "best" of that unit. Grenadiers being the biggest men or the more experienced, lights being the most intelligent. However this wa not the same as being a real elite unit.

I would put it more in the 25%, but then I'm a Prussian and Russian aficionado

Different factors made a unit elite, but no general had an army that was 75% elite, though he'd have loved having one…like your friend.

We love painting up special units, not run-of-the-mill line infantry all in the same uniform and lowly chasseur cavalry. However, unless his army is only four units against your 12 un-elite troops, it isn't going to be either a fair fight or particularly historical.

G'Day Matt

"Elite companies were just the "best" of that unit."

"However this was not the same as being a real elite unit."

I think you are attempting to use a modern term…and imply it has the same connotation that was used during the Napoleonic era…

What is a "real elite unit"…in accordance to the military terminology used during the Napoleonic era?

Best Regards
Art

I believe that his comment about all cuirassiers being 'elete' goes to a question someone answered a long time ago here. The query was: If dragoons have elete companies (they wear fringed epaulettes), why don't cuirassiers? The answer was "all cuirassiers wear fringed epaulettes, therefore all cuirassiers are elete.
Every once in a while, it's great to take a really awesome French 'elete' force up against the bad guys, but most of the time we play with just 'regular' troops.
By the way, how come British armies always have incredible fire modifiers?
Cheers

The voltigeur companies in EACH infantry battalion were elites. The grenadier companies also were elites.
The foot carabiniers were elites.
The cuiassiers were elites.
The horse carabiniers were elites.
The Guard – of course – was an elite formation.

Once you start comparing like with like, most of that disappears. Almost all countries had "elite" light and grenadier companies. (that accounts for your first three).

The cuirasiers were no more nor less elite than other cuirassiers, ditto carabiniers.

The Imperial Guard, well, some of it was unquestionably elite. But the Old and Middle Guard elements were pretty small, not really much bigger than their Russian equivalents. The Young Guard is not an elite.

And all things are relative. Take the initial requirements:

"Art. XXXIII – … The soldier intended to belong to the Consular Guard must meet the following conditions, i.e.:
- to be on active service.
- to have made at least 4 campaigns,
- to have obtained rewards granted to brave men by feat of arms or brilliant deed, or to have been wounded
- to be at least 179 cm (5'6") tall for grenadiers, and at least 173 cm (5'4") for the chasseurs
- and to always have held an irreproachable conduct."

A large number of the British Army could have matched that, particularly later on in the war (but some units from relatively early)

Or take the first Imperial Guard requirements:

In 1804 after his crowning, Napoleon transformed the Consular Guard into the Imperial Guard (Garde Imperiale). A decree of July 29, 1804, stated: "The Consular Guard will take the title of Imperial Guard". The decree also described recruitment: "Each regiment of infantry, cavalry, foot and horse artillery, and each battalion of the train, prepared a list of 6 NCOs or privates likely to be called upon to belong to the Guard, having met the measurements of the needs of that Corps. The conditions to be included to fill these lists were:
- for the regiments of dragoons and horse chasseurs, at least 6 years of service, 2 campaigns: 1,73 cm tall (5'4")
- for the regiments of cuirassiers, and artillery, at least 6 years of service, 2 campaigns: 1,76 cm tall (5'5")
- for the regiments of line and light infantry, at least 5 years of service, 2 campaigns: 1,76 cm tall (5'5")
- for the battalions of the train, same time in service, and height of 1,678 cm (5'2")"

Again, these are not insuperable requirements. One imagines that for the Russian Armies of early 1813, the main problem would have been finding soldiers of the requisite height rather than experience!

From 1811 (n.b. before the Russian campaign):

In 1811 in the Old Guard were only 532 veterans from Egypt and Italy, the rest were younger. The number of veterans decreased and Napoleon was forced to accept 500 soldiers with only 5 years' service.

So, this would be equivalent of every soldier in the Peninsular who had served in South America or at Copenhagen or at Maida then being suitable for the Old Guard.

In 1813 the Old Guard was rebuilt, 250 battalions in Spain furnished 6 veterans each with at least 8 years' service. These men went into the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Chasseurs. The 1st Grenadiers and 1st Chasseurs accepted only those with at least 10 years' service.

So again, we could find a large number of British and Russian soldiers to fulfill these requirements. Any Prussian or Austrian who had fought in the "Glory Years" campaigns on the Allied side would qualify as equivalently experienced.

In 1814:

The first battalions of 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Chasseurs were made of veterans of the Russian campaign and Fusiliers with 3 years' service. The second battalions were made of veterans of the Spanish war.

So by this point the most we could say is that the 2nd Battalions of the Old Guard were roughly equivalent to a fairly average British (or Portuguese) Line Bn, but without the cohesion of being in the same unit for years.

According to the Decree of April 8th 1815, (Article 22.) the requirements for the infantry of Old Guard were 12 years' service, and for the Young Guard 4 years. The height requirements (Article 23.) were as follow:

We can see from this that the Young Guard in 1815 in theory would have been a much tougher proposition in 1815 than at any time previously, with the possible exception of 1812 (when many of its units had equivalent combat experience from the Peninsular). However, there is some evidence that this wasn't achieved in practice and it again became a collection of pretty raw troops.

A a levy of selected 2 officers and 20 men from each line and light infantry regiment joined the new Guard. Only the 1st Grenadiers and 1st Chasseurs were filled with men with 12 years' service and with the men of Elba Battalion. They were the old of the Old Guard, the sine pari (without equal). Almost 30 % of the I/1st Grenadiers were veterans of 20-25 campaigns, one third was awarded for bravery. They averaged 35-years of age and 5'11" in height.

The 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Chasseurs accepted men with 8 years' service. The 3rd and 4th Grenadiers, and 3rd and 4th Chasseurs were filled up with men with only 4 years' service in the Line.

This is in line with the general improvement in 1815, but again note that with the exception of the 1st Grenadiers and Chasseurs, these requirements are by no means that onerous.

By the way, how come British armies always have incredible fire modifiers?

I'm not sure that they always do; I know the rules I mainly use don't. Anyway, some historians reckoned that the secret of British tactical success was based on firepower, partly based on training and partly based on formation (strong preference of line over column, strong preference for 2-deep firepower maximizing lines over 3-deep "solidity" ones), with plenty of examples from the Napoleonic Wars to back this up. Others point to an emphasis on firepower in the British infantry going back over a century; here is as good a summary as any: link of this point of view

Hi Art.
By "real" elite unit I meant one in which special high standards were required to join or be accepted. This might be years of previous service as required by certain Imperial Guard units or the ability to hit a target at a certain distance like the 95th.

Grenadiers might be the biggest/impressive looking men of their unit but they were not elite troops. Where they even called "elite" companies then? I believe they were usually called "flank companies" but I may be wrong.

G'Day Matt,

Contemporary definition

ELITE de troupes, Fr. the chosen troop of an army ( 1816 British Military Dictionary )

In 1792 a battalion of Blues became elite because they were capable of marching in colonne with others…in lieu of merely en debandement with the army…

In the French Army…soldiers were chosen to become grenadiers…thus they are elite…

The term elite then started to become what is called…"expression impropre"…and there are two on this forum that have take such a military term to a new and higher level… ;-)

Best Regards
Art

Since I do play solo the Russian Guard or Cuirassiers divisions don't get played to much.

Just show up with all the artillery you can find and enough infantry and cavalry to protect it. Cannonballs are notoriously unimpressed by elite troops.

I don't think musketballs have any particular awe of elite troops either.
At least not the British ones at Waterloo.

If the French had so many elite units how come they lost?

I would tell your friend that he can have all the elite units that he wants, but not on the table facing your army.

If the French had so many elite units how come they lost?

They didn't in the beginning. Napoleon was good at winning battles at the price of getting a lot of his men killed. Unsustainable in the long run. In the end his army was full of conscripts.

some historians reckoned that the secret of British tactical success was based on firepower, partly based on training and partly based on formation (strong preference of line over column, strong preference for 2-deep firepower maximizing lines over 3-deep "solidity" ones), with plenty of examples from the Napoleonic Wars to back this up

Don't forget the materiel aspect: British manufacturing standards are the time were considerably higher than those of Continental European industries; British muskets were better, pure and simple.

Add to this the British monopoly on Indian saltpetre by the time of the Revolutionary Wars. This is supposed to have made British gunpowder as much as 20% more powerful than that used by the French.

These factors, combined with superior training, were what allowed the redcoats to fight effectively in two ranks. Other less-well-equipped-and-trained armies kept fighting in three ranks not because they thought it was better, but simply because they couldn't achieve sufficient stopping power without a third rank firing.

The Bavarian army fought in 2 ranks up to 1809 as did Prussian fusileers, Austrian/Prussian infantry with the 3rd rank used as skirmishers or seperate unit. Even the 1792 French volunteers fought in 2 ranks until they adopted the "normal" 3 ranks.
I doubt that British infantry had superior training or they had superior muskets.

They didn't in the beginning. Napoleon was good at winning battles at the price of getting a lot of his men killed. Unsustainable in the long run. In the end his army was full of conscripts.

He still won most of his battles even at the end though; this argues that the "eliteness" of French troops was not a major factor in his victories. The reduced ability of French troops might account for the declining number of victories under other generals, of course.

IIRC the British noticed a difference in the French in the Peninsula after Vitoria (i.e. by Sorauren); i.e. from the losses in battle and the withdrawals of 1813 to rebuild the Army of Germany and the Guard.

For what it's worth, regarding a possible quality difference in British long arms ….

The Russians liked British muskets and rifles very much.

They bought over 100,000 Brown Bess muskets (some used and requiring remanufacture) and equipped at least 33 front-line regments and some some special units of militia with them. They were considered as good as (but not better than) the Russian's own 1808 pattern muskets.

The Russians also liked their captured Swedish muskets – equipping one front-line (31st Jäger) and 3 internal security regiments (Finnish Jäger) – all in Karelia and Finland – with them.

They considered captured French muskets generally inferior and useful only for second-line units. However, they considered Austrian muskets to be even worse, and one of the three front-line regiments that had them (Orel Infantry) kept collecting and rebuilding French captures until they had enough to request permission to convert.

The Russians bought some Baker rifles, and were also quite impressed. The Baker was considered more accurate than the Russian 1805 pattern rifle for jäger, but much more expensive. With the general turn toward equipping all front-line regiments only with muskets from 1809, the Bakers were never ordered in bulk – and those on hand equipped the jäger company of the Russo-German Legion.

One wonders how differently Wellington's army would have fought if he'd stripped out all his Old Guard quality veterans from the line, grouped them in elite battalions, and then not used them.

I doubt that British infantry had superior training or they had superior muskets.

You would be amazed at how much change a very small dimensional difference can make in firearms. Even simply a more consistent dimension will make an enormous difference.

On the other hand people always over play the effect of hardware.
I always read about how bad the russian muskets and powder was.
Yet when reading about actual firefights they don't seem to suffer any particular disadvantage.

Sing it Gunfreak!

Is that before or after you equalize number of muskets firing?

"how bad the russian muskets and powder was"
"actual firefights they don't seem to suffer any particular disadvantage"

There was a transition in logistical methods from 1801 to 1809 that likley explains much of this issue.

The Russians had used first a model 1763 musket, and begun replacing it with a better 1798 design. But since the rounds were mostly made up in the regiments using their extensive "non-combattant" staff of craftsmen and paid gangs of soldiers in their off-hours, there was no great push to standardize the equipment of each unit. The local manufacturing simplified and reduced the supply transport over the long distances of such a large country.

Studies were done from 1805 showing an almost random variety of long-arms : 1763 muskets, 1798 muskets, captures, local manufactures, and so on. This had been fine for the slower pace and smaller size of operations on Russia's borders, but insufficient to the needs of active campaigning against the French.

After rather extensive testing, the Russians (i) required all regiments to have the same musket, (ii) (mosrtly) stopped issuing rifles to their infantry, and (iii) standardized to the greatest extent possible on the two best muskets from their tests : the Brown Bess and their own 1808 design. This process was essentially complete by 1810/1811 – a rather massive industrial effort given the relative retardation of industrial development in Russia compared to France, and especially compared to Britain.

A parallel evolution applied to powder. The "old" system sent the ingredients for the powder to the regiments (which also owned the light artillery). Here they were mixed and the resulting powder ground. The emphasis was on local procurement to minimize transport. But the result was, naturally, a variation in quality control. The revised system, emplaced by 1810/1811 was to transition to pre-made rounds delivered from (much enlarged) factories through a rather elborate network of 1st, 2nd and 3rd "Line" and then mobile "Army" depots. An essentially new arm of service, the lines-of-communications engineers, were created to insure that the necessary road and river networks existed to move the munitions forward to the area of operations. A rather heroic number of standardized wagons were also built.

Concommittantly, the artillery was separated from the infantry and now relied on purpose-made pre-made rounds – again increasingly delivered from factories or made by "laboratory" and "garrison artillery" companies in major fortress depots.

All this science, engineering, long range planning, industrial production and staff work fits poorly with the western stereotype of the Russian military – a stereotype mostly created by English-speaking authors during the Cold War. But really, if the Russian officers were all rich teeange nobles who kept skipping their reading lessons to flog serfs and binge drink, they probably would have been unable to destroy Napoléon's largest army, and then – with the British – lead the liberation of German-speaking Europe and the end of the French Empire.