"So, how much fire does it take to fully suppress a squad?" Topic

Jack,
I was just trying to bust your chops – Semper Fi Mac.

uglyfatbloke: I'm no fan of BA but it does have some excellent points. I think it lacks interactive play but it a definate advance in miniature gaming (whether they invented it or not).

But honestly, great contributions from everyone. So good I've rethought my approach.

Fast paced is what I'm after too. That's why I'm using sections/teams as firepower and targets and a single roll to determine suppression and KIA. I'm dumping different levels of suppression too. There are two levels of firepower: sustained and intensive. There should be a marker by a team showing how they are firing.

I assign two attributes to a unit – Tactical Competence (based on experience and training) and Aggressiveness (based on motivation and scenario specific conditions). Both are borrowed from GI Commander. Then there is leaders with different levels that can modify the TC and Aggressiveness check die rolls to bring about the desired result.

I did buy into the different levels of suppression as I stated earlier and there is research to back it up. However, I found it's a little too cumbersome to carry out. I also had different levels of firepower. Evidence backs it up but again too cumbersome. I spent a lot of time on those two but I'm ready to kick them to the side.

Jack, in your Pinned and Suppressed examples above the common theme appears to be "motivation". We both know troops can do almost anything if motivated and/or desperate and led well enough. I'm calling this Aggressiveness and it's related to morale. Negative events will decrease a unit's Aggressiveness making it harder and harder for them to advance under fire and contest the enemy during a firefight.

Tactical Competence is the units training, experience, and morale rating. It determines how well they can shoot and protect themselves.

Leaders (an E5 or above) can use their ratings like a DRM to help a unit pass it's Aggressiveness or Tactical Competence Checks. They motivate for Aggressiveness and use their tactical sense for Tactical Competence. This enables poor troops to perform like average or better troops.

Firepower levels are sustained and intensive with intensive being 3x the sustained rating is. I originally had 5 level of firepower, again I complicated it too much.

In the initial stage of the firefight, both sides use their intensive fire. Suppression is determined by the firepower superiority modified by the difference in Tactical Competence ratings, cover/concealment and leadership (optional). I don't want to get into a lot of math and division (remember, I'm a Grunt) so modifiers would be used to increase or decrease the firepower superiority ratio.

It would work like this: Side A has a 2:1 FP Superiority and a TC Rating of 2. However, side B has a TC Rating of 4 giving side B a 2:1 FP Superiority (shifting the odds two levels in their favor).

We've pretty much established that 3-1 firepower superiority will suppress an average unit. So I'd think 4:1 to suppress and above average unit and 2:1 to suppress poor units based on their TC Ratings.

Now it can get interesting. At this point before rolling the dice each side has the "option" to commit one Leader's modifier. In a firefight, each Leadership modifier increases the firepower superiority level that it takes to suppress. I see this as "motivating" the troops to persist and fire. By using the Leadership modifier the Leader can increase the troops TC Rating for this firefight. That would make a poor unit average and average unit good. Now both sides check for Leader causalities. Each time a Leader uses his modifier to affect the outcome he exposes himself to enemy fire and snipers. Use them wisely.

When a unit loses the firefight it becomes suppressed. The winner automatically performs suppressive fire to keep his head down. To keep it simple I'm not tracking the level of suppression. He either is or is not. I didn't feel that way earlier. The suppressed unit can voluntarily stay suppressed and unable to be hit by direct small arms fire (of course there would be exceptions). However, while suppressed they can still observe and if "aggressive" enough or "motivated" enough they can pop up and return fire at moving units or attempt to suppress their enemy. To attempt to pop up and return fire they roll checking their Aggressiveness Rating. After seeing the result if they failed their Leader can now "motivate" them by adding his modifier and taking a causality check. If they pass their Aggressiveness Check they pop up and perform intensive fire and the other side automatically goes to intensive fire also to beat them down again.

To advance under fire units need to pass an Aggressiveness Check. Using the above example if they pass their Aggressiveness Check they can attempt to assault the enemy but will be met by intensive fire.

I like the idea of making it fairly easy for a unit to voluntarily fall back. Maybe if they fall back to their HQ or rally point they can recover to their original Aggressiveness Rating. Maybe having a Bn or Rgt CO show up will get their Aggressiveness back too like rallying.

Aggressiveness Ratings can be lowered from causalities and maybe each time they fail an Aggressiveness Check. As their rating lowers they will be less able to advance under fire and win firefights. It could be linked to morale.

Causality rates are determined by enemy firepower, defensive cover and TC Rating. I still need to fill in the details.

I like the idea of using a D6 for TC and Aggressiveness Ratings.
Like Legion said, well-trained troops don't need the leadership. Ideally, units with a high TC will pass their checks except in extreme situations. I envision Leaders contributing their modifiers only when needed and AFTER the initial die roll. That way when they do intervene it makes the difference.

That's my 2 cents worth Jack, what say you?

Wolfhag

There's my two cents, who's up next?

You've been doing a great job answering all their questions Jack & Wolf !

a squad able to maneuver and fire at will

I'd expect that from many Western Armies.

Like Legion said, well-trained troops don't need the leadership.

Yes e.g. US/UK Spec Ops vs. the Iraqis that abandoned their 42 M1s when confronted by Daesh in 2014 …

I've been mucking about writing a section = 1 stand rule set (I say writing, what I mean by that, is stealing ideas from any number of existing rules), for about 18 months on and off.
Subsequently I both love and hate in depth, informative threads such as this.
I love them because they both throw up excellent information and ideas, and they often reinforce the types of results I am trying to achieve, and gives me hope that I'm going in the right direction.
At the same time I hate them for those same new ideas and information, because there is always something brilliant I hadn't previously considered which I now wish to incorporate…..which means yet another re-write…
Thanks fellahs…..

No problem christot. Misery loves company. Welcome to my world.

Wolfhag

Jack, I reckon your definitions are spot on for people to understand in gaming terms. I'll have to give 5core a go.
I wrote a set of rules for platoon level WW2 and another for 70s Rhodesia, very amateurish stuff but I'll see if I can find them and see what I put for suppression.
As for Bolt Action, while generally ok for fun, any set of rules that don't give major penalties for firing at moving troops make me angry! As anyone who's tried hitting a running man will tell you.

I have been quiet as I don't know much on the subject at all, but I like Jack's definitions of pinned and suppressed and voluntary Vs involuntary withdrawal…'cause they are what I have in my rules :-)

Shaun, are you willing to share your rules?

All,

I finally took a break to see where we were at in this discussion. I have to say I am also impressed (as many of you have already stated) by the direction, content and value of this discussion.

Thus far, I think we've adequately reviewed the suppression factors pertaining to the ‘Sending' (i.e. the side issuing the suppressive fire and quantifying/qualifying its effect) of the suppression issue. So, it seems reasonable that we now take a look at the Soldiers on the ‘Receiving' side.

Granted the training, experience and morale of the Soldier and his unit, have a significant impact on how a Soldier reacts to suppressive fires. However, it goes without saying that understanding the Soldier's reaction to suppressive fire is an important consideration in our own wargame design, concepts and mechanics.

SUPPRESSION EFFECTS ON THE SOLDIER
The relationship between various weapons system signals and risk is not immediately obvious, but must be learned. The perceptual learning process can be conceptualized as evolving through a series of stages which form a cognitive hierarchy The learning process is one of increasing differentiation of weapons system stimuli through experience* A four (4) stage learning process is illustrated below, although the number of stages may actually be greater.

The first two stages of the process are representative of the soldier on his first exposure to combat.

In the first stage, ‘undifferentiated' general reaction to stimuli," each loud or unusual noise—artillery explosion, rifle fire, etc.—elicits a general suppressive reaction. The first stage soon evolves into the second stage, "gross selective reaction to stimulus differences."

In the second stage, the soldier has learned to selectively react to differences in weapon system stimuli, e.g., he may ‘pause or crouch' rather than 'pop down" when hearing artillery shells impact in the near, but not immediate vicinity.

In the third stage after more experience he learns to selectively react to simple patterns of weapons system signals; e.g., to react differentially to aimed vs. unaimed fire in his vicinity.

The fourth stage of the learning process contains two sub-processes. One sub-process, "abstraction of distinctive features," represents the process of learning to identify specific weapons systems. The other sub-process, "abstraction of invariant relations" represents the process of learning the summary characteristics of weapons system stimuli such as loudness. The relationship between weapons systems signals and risk learned in this stage do not appear to be acquired in current combat training, but rather are acquired through combat experience.

The reactions of the soldier can be classified along several dimensions:
- Activity-oriented1 vs. threat-oriented
- Reasoned" vs. unreasoned (voluntary vs. involuntary)
- Effective vs. Ineffective

As an initial framework consider reactions to be a change in the response of the soldier caused by signals from delivered fire or the threat of delivered fire. For example, a TOW gunner may flinch or duck after observing machine gun fire impacting near his position. Within this framework the reactions of interest are those which are threat-oriented rather than activity-oriented. That is, the reactions of the soldier to the perceived risk. Although the reaction is threat-oriented, the effect may either increase or decrease activity performance (i.e. the section on Performance Effects).

The "reasoned reaction of the soldier" is to decrease the perceived risk, by increasing his protection level, by:
- Popping Down-Prone
- Pop Down-Crouch
- Move to Cover
- Button-up (i.e. Tank Crews)

or by attempting to reduce the perceived risk through reactions oriented towards more effective aggressive action against the enemy. Thus, the TOW gunner after observing machine gun fire impacting near his position may move faster in reloading TOW. Another possible "reasoned" reaction is the "null reaction" or no change in task performance.

"Unreasoned" or involuntary reactions of the soldier are responses such as:
- Reduction/increase in the level of Motor Control
- Startled/Flinch (momentary loss of control)
- Momentary Pause in Task Activity
- Run

For example, the ‘tracking error' of a TOW gunner after observing machine gun fire impacting near his position may either increase or decrease.*

*NOTE: Shock effects produced by intense and/or long lasting artillery bombardment have not been considered because of time and resource constraints. These effects appear to differ from suppression both in duration and in the mechanisms through which the effects are produced. However, the potential importance of these effects is such that they should be considered in a more detailed analysis of suppression processes at a future time.

The soldier's reactions lead to a change in performance through the performance effects process, the weapon system employed by the soldier clearly influences the reactions which occurs. Thus, a rifleman observing machine gun fire impacting near his position may be more likely to duck than a TOW gunner observing machine gun fire impacting near his position. The effect of ducking may be greater on the TOW gunner's performance than on the rifleman's performance. The soldier's reactions are also influenced by his current state.

A TOW gunner who has recently ducked may be more likely to duck than one who has not, given the same delivered fire. A good predictor of the soldier's reaction may be his prior reaction or sequence of reactions. For example, in the following possible sequence of reactions by a rifleman to small arms fire, each reaction is of different duration and complexity: "startle-pop down prone-move to cover".

Each of the reactions has an identifiable beginning and end. However, it is not clear that each reaction is of equal importance or that the level of detail used is required. Each reaction in the sequence has an allocated time distribution.

Andy ONeill – Sounds good to me.

Wolfhag – Yeah man, I'm kidding too, no sweat ;)
Everything you wrote makes sense and sounds like it would work fine, but…

"Fast paced is what I'm after too."
You're a damn liar! ;) I know 'fast paced' is relative, but damn that sounds like a lot of stuff to take into account. Which is cool, just not my thing. By the time I get to sit down and play a game, my brain already hurts, and I'm looking for something that does not add to that. All joking aside, the reason super detailed rules don't work for me personally is, the minute I end up devoting more time and brain power to working through the rules mechanisms, I cease having fun, because having fun was having 99% brain power devoted to the tactical situation and decisions that need to be made. But that's just me.

I think the firefight being one by a stacking of factors with a little chance thrown hits the mark, the only issue might be (and you may have already worked this out) a method for the passage of time. I.e., these two units are locked in a firefight on the left, how long does it take to resolve, as there are units moving on the right and the two have to interact in a logical manner.

You and I had spoken years ago about (if I recall correctly) a relatively abstracted system where essentially units under fire 'locked down,' with the application of fire being strictly to facilitate maneuver, and leadership used in certain spots to 'flip the script,' but at risk (the leadership you described above is similar). I think you didn't even have enemy troops on the table, just bunkers? I always thought it was a cool idea, I just couldn't figure out how to make it work.

Foxweasel – "As anyone who's tried hitting a running man will tell you."
Clearly you weren't a Marine ;) I don't focus too much on that to be honest, in the context of a company level game, and my skirmish games are so close (>30m) it doesn't really matter, you're not running that fast.

I've tried writing rules many times, never works out. I go through all the machinations, end up with something too complicated, unplayable.

Shaun – You're alive!!! Good to see you man.

Analsim – Dammit man you can't add more stuff now! ;)

"The fourth stage of the learning process contains two sub-processes. One sub-process, "abstraction of distinctive features," represents the process of learning to identify specific weapons systems. The other sub-process, "abstraction of invariant relations" represents the process of learning the summary characteristics of weapons system stimuli such as loudness."
Yeah, I think I discussed this earlier. The first couple times for me was just total chaos, no idea what was happening, or really what to do, outside of what my leaders were yelling at me to do. It may sound incredible, but I'm telling you that in the end, you get contact and you can just see it in your head, like in third person.

In your head you know where everyone is, you know what's firing and what they're firing at, even in a city. You've got a clear picture in your head: 1st squad is on the left, a block over, and they've got three AKs firing at them about 100 yards away. We can take 2nd squad and hook in from the right, keep 3rd to cover our flank, but I don't want to be too deep as it's too far for us to get to without drawing more contact. All that happens in a split second, and you look around and most of the other guys already know what you're about to say.

You absolutely can still be surprised, it's not clairvoyance. But you can process, arrange, and situate everything you see and hear in your mind (to include the maps/imagery you viewed prior to the fight), to give you a mental picture of what's happening.

I can remember getting some replacements, and the whole company was taking mortar fire from three mortars, but the mortars were firing cross-wise. I don't recollect all the details, but if we were aligned 1st-2nd-3rd Platoons left to right, there were enemy mortars at left, center, and right, but they were firing so that the left-hand mortar was firing at 3rd Plt, the center at 1st Plt, and the right at 2nd Plt. Anyway, the new guys would dodge for cover every time one of the mortars fired, not understanding it was a mortar and was going to take 30 seconds to get to us, and they thought it was so cool that I could tell them where each round was going to hit based on which one had fired. A silly little example, but, just like any job, the more you do it, the better you get.

"Thus, a rifleman observing machine gun fire impacting near his position may be more likely to duck than a TOW gunner observing machine gun fire impacting near his position."
Hmmm, that's a tough one for me. Personally, I have to fall back on the 'effective' part. To me, it doesn't matter if the bad guy is firing a pistol: if the rounds are snapping past my ear or zipping into the sandbag right in front of me, I'm getting a bit nervous, even if I'm on a .50 cal.

In any case, cool stuff.

V/R,
Jack

Complications are a bad idea. I go for mechanisms which are simple. Even if It's at the price of a little reality,I'd rather have a mechanism you add multiple times than three subtly different mechanisms.
I did complicated in the 70s. It was never great.

I'm also reminded that I'm lucky to have never had to worry about real mortar bombs.

A principle of system design.
Try a simple easy solution.
When you see a problem, look for the simplest solution which fixes it.
Iterative development then repeats the process.
Don't aim for a complete solution straight off.
Even if it works, think how you can refactor for a better overall solution which gives the same result.
Don't get attached to your solution.
Another principle of development is that you can't effectively test your own solution. You need peer testing as well as end user testing. This is all valuable feedback.

I think we've well established a variety of mechanics that work for company level 1squad = 1 stand (and fireteams could work too one section down with little modification).

But we've also repeatedly bumped into any skirmish game that tries to do things realistically is a bit too weighty. Many quick games do handle suppression fairly well in aggregate (Chain Reaction 3 comes to mind) but in somewhat abstract and not totally realistic ways (ie no continuing fire at ducked back targets in that rulesset, so the threat of being hit by an In sight test when returning to a firing position is the only real effect of suppression-- works out overall but perhaps an MG should be able to keep a squad from even trying if it keeps firing).

This has the complimentary effect that gamers like Rod feel a bit incomplete with the abstraction of higher level games. We want to know why this fighter suppresses that fighter in this instance, and while we can de-abstract from die rolls to attributes and situational modifiers fairly realistically, it gets weighty and usually just means more die rolls… usually at around the point where we need to come up with the mental state of each trooper,

For example, the ‘tracking error' of a TOW gunner after observing machine gun fire impacting near his position may either increase or decrease.*

Generally unless the SA fire was near the gunner's position. He'd keep the sight/tracker on target. If FA, mortars, CAS, etc. is coming in anywhere in the area. Within LOS or where he could feel the "after shock"/blast/vibrations, etc. He might "flinch".

In either situation, even with just a little "flinching", possibly depending on the Range to Target. The missile might go out of control and he'd not have the time/skill to get it back on target.

To me, it doesn't matter if the bad guy is firing a pistol: if the rounds are snapping past my ear or zipping into the sandbag right in front of me, I'm getting a bit nervous, even if I'm on a .50 cal.

Yes, we used to say, "Heavy weapons draw heavy return fire." …

rounds are snapping past my ear or zipping into the sandbag right in front of me

Yeah … things could get a bit "dicey". No one wants to be a statistic …

Wolfgang, Just Jack,Legion 4, Weasal, I have just talked to Alex of Shipyards. If you would like to contact AOTRS Shipyards on Shapeways with an email address. I will contact you and send a copy of Maneouver Group as an informed review would be of interest to us. I would suggest you log onto wargames vault for the free bulletins as at least number 2 may be of interest if you choose to you have the rules. This route prevents any of up putting our mail address in the open on TMP.

No sort of contentious time. The thread has proved excellent in understanding and possible modeling parameters. However distilling which parameters is at least as hard. So first one.

The rate of fire is not directly relevant! Nobody is going to actually check actual ammunition usage. Now once a unit is suppressed am happy that the rate of fire can drop. However it seems that that has no impact on the actual game or tactics if this is not accounted for. UNLESS you now say that a unit can now keep more elements suppressed, but ammo usage would then be higher and hence an issue.

If you chose to do it the only issue would be the leadership controlling the maximum possible rate to achieve the initial suppression that would then not apply for subsequent shots. To my mind this parameter may be real but it has potential misuse because it could be used all the time and could result in excessive ammunition use if over used. The injury factors may not be high enough to dissuade excessive use. Discuss :-).

Ushcha,
Will do. I'm humbled you'd ask my opinion. All of my info is from manuals, nothing is secret. Just Jack and Legion have many times more experience than I did.

I was fortunate to spend 6 months as an "Aggressor" at the Officers Basic School at Quantico (Camp Barrett) where 2nd LT's out of OCS learned how to be a Platoon Leader. Almost every day we'd be in the woods of Virginia patrolling, chasing and ambushing each other. It was the most fun I ever had in the Marines (except maybe liberty in Portsmouth, England). We were encouraged to role-play and trash talk the LT's and I'll tell you we got pretty creative and graphic. I won't subject you to the stories.

It was a great learning experience because we had VN experienced NCO's and we'd get to sit in on the Instructors critiques of the LT's after we kicked their ass. When I left I felt as a PFC I was confident enough to run a squad.

Wolfhag

You had fun in Portsmouth? I'm impressed.

It wasn't easy but Marines have fun wherever they go, including England! Nowhere near as much fun as R&R in Bangkok (or so I've heard).

First port we hit after 2 weeks crossing the North Atlantic on a helicopter carrier. We were berthed on the first deck below the flight deck and I had the top bunk. They were running flight ops most nights so I had Harriers with 30,000 pounds of thrust vertical landing a foot away from my face. I was ready to let rip when I hit dry land. I got back at my CO and Master Sergeant with some practical jokes on them out in town too. The bobbies were nice enough not to take us in. The locals drove us around town.

Wolfhag

You need to go to Edinburgh. England is a cool place to party, but Scotland is tops.

That's what I've heard. Unfortunately, our cruise director did not schedule that for a port of call.

Wolfhag

This route prevents any of up putting our mail address in the open on TMP.

UshCha … Wolf, Jack and Weasel should be abled to be PM'd here. As they & you are supporting members.

If need be Wolf can email me direct, IIRC. We have exchanged emails before. Regardless, they know what they are talking about. With or without me … But again anyone can feel free to ask me anything here on TMP about this sort of topic. Thanks !

…and I think you've PM'd us before now as well?
thathistorybloke@btinternet.com We've Always got a welcome for wargame ideas!

Legion 4 I am only a basic member.

OK so it appears I am a supporting member. But How do I PM?

I've never worked that out either; I've just put my email address here.

uglyfatbloke – old rules of mine had pinning and suppressed, then I took pin out, then in early 2015 I put pinning back in. On my blog I only have the rules without pinning and I have not got around to writing the rules up properly for the ones with pinning and suppressed (they are a bit different to the ones on the blog). So you may need to wait a while and I am distracted by other projects!

What's your blog called?

OK so it appears I am a supporting member. But How do I PM?

I thought so … I'm not a supporting member. And have not been for sometime. Bill maybe you can help out ?

What's your blog called?

SHAUN'S WARGAMING WITH MINIATURES.
The link is in his member profile: link

I sent UshCha a PM. The notification should show up in his personal email.

Wolfhag

Cheers Steve.

Gents I have Wolfhag and Just Jack contact and rules should be with you 7.8 MB so hopefully it will get through.

How about going back on track and covering my post on 13 May.

!

Great discussion.

But remember would be rule writers – human beings have to play the game without benefit of a multipage summary of this discussion.

Distill the concepts down to those which effect player decisions and abstract the rest out. Commanders don't have time to interview each soldier as to their current mental state. They give orders which they hope will be recieved, understood and if real luck acted on.

Generally: units are good to go or messed up – how much is hard to tell and likely could change quickly. Commanders can only give so many orders – one to get a whole company moving or one to get one platoon moving or one to just get a squad moving – but in the end one order.

Give Orders, check morale, if units managed to get to good order they obey, otherwise they stay down. Morale all or nothing. Simple yet focuses on what player/commanders can control – giving orders. Morale is the essence of human variation – unperdictable so can be abstract die roll.

Thomas J. Thomas
Fame and Glory GAmes

An me too Ushcha? You sent me some very interesting notes and I'm keen to see the rest of your work.

All,

I'm done with all these official data dumps for now.

Here's my own wargame design related take aways from this suppression discussion we just had:

1. Time. The duration of your turn, move or bound will effect how you apply fire suppression in your game design. Because shorter turns will actually increase the amount of factors/details you must consider, whereas longer turns aggregate them all together as one factor,…suppression.

2. Unit Quality Classifications. It definitely appears that better (more experienced, trained & disciplined) units will have a higher tolerance to the effects of fire suppression (i.e. inactivity, halting, going to ground and running away) on their unit.

3. Fire Suppression is a separate consideration from casualties and unit morale.

4. Suppression is as GEN Dupuy stated (in his comments), a Tactical consideration.

5. Fire Suppression effects on the targeted unit can be divided into one or up to four types, depending on the scope of your game design.

6. Fire suppression originating from Small Arms, Artillery and Close Air Support need to be handled and evaluated separately at the tactical level.

7. Ammunition expended on fire suppression of a target unit produces diminishing returns over time.

8. Fire suppression effect can be associated with the intensity of the casualties inflicted over a period of time. More casualties inflicted over a shorter period of time have a greater suppressive effect on the defender.

9. The reports indicate (with a curve on a graph) that Suppression effects go up exponentially with the casualty (percentage) inflicted. Thus, 2% casualties provides a 15% chance of suppressing a target unit, while 6-8% casualties is closer to a 70% probability of suppression. The chart caps out at 90%, meaning that additional casualties will NOT produce a greater effect.

That's about it for a down and dirty assessment.

Regards,

James (aka: Analsim)

Analsim,
Brilliant! I think you summed it up for many of us, at least me. Just a few questions/clarifications:

1. Time. Yes, the biggest factor that would drive the detail. I use small units of time and small units (sections/teams).

2. Unit quality also applies to a unit's ability to react and advance under initial fire. Trained drills may overcome the suppressive effects of gunfire. Like Legion said about assaulting into a short range ambush. A unit can be poorly trained but highly motivated to advance.

5. I'm going with two. Suppressed: avoiding direct fire but observing and recover quickly if fire lifts. Aggressiveness can overcome suppression to move or fire. Hunkered Down: Like suppression but less chance of responding to enemy activity. The typical choice for an artillery barrage. No automatic recovery from a barrage.

6. From what I've read in an arty/mortar barrage it's not always the size of the bang but the number. A four tube 81mm mortar barrage could put out 30-40 rounds in 30 seconds more quickly and accurately than a four gun battery of 105mm. The 81mm mortar has almost the same effect as a 105mm gun round too (IIRC but maybe wrong).

9. I'd like to see that report.

Wolfhag

This has got to be the most informative discourse "ever" on TMP.

@JJ specifically. Love your photos. May I ask why – as USMC – you were carrying while in civies? Or was that State Dept. stuff?

Also think your Soviet armour looks great. I'll be honest, I've never been particularly impressed by the photos Bashy2Bits (SP?) posts of his 3D-printed stuff – Major striation issies – but the stuff you've painted up looks fantastic (@Bashy! use JJ's kit for advertising!)

Sorry if this is regarded as necroposting…

I don't think it is, actually.

Oh … and @JJ? Yes, you do look dashing! Incredibly so!! :-)

JJ sadly is not on TMP anymore. I truly wish that would change …

As others have also observed, this thread has been a very interesting and well conducted discussion! My thanks to all who have contributed so much … it is an excellent read (and re-read).

I would like to suggest an interpretation, a conclusion I might draw based on what I have read in this thread. In this case I am angling off a bit, but not too much (I hope) from the original direction.

If I were to paraphrase the key take-aways from what I have read, it seems to me that:

1) Suppression at the unit level is driven both by the volume of the "effective" fire, and how many of the unit members have come under "effective" fire. In this case I am using the definition of "effective fire" as when rounds are snapping past the target unit member's ear or zipping into the sandbags or other cover in his immediate surroundings.

2) Once some level of suppression is achieved ("firepower superiority"), it takes only a few rounds per 10-15 second interval in the immediate surroundings of the unit members to keep them in a suppressed state.

3) Decisive results can be achieved if an opposing unit can be suppressed, and kept in a suppressed state by elements providing a "base of fire" long enough for a "maneuver element" to achieve a position to apply close-range flanking fire or close-assault tactics.

I don't think I've said anything controversial, nor particularly incisive, in these three points. Just summarizing what I've read. But to a purpose…

Based on this, I think US Army WW2 squad-level weapons might be due some re-assessment.

I don't debate that the German LMGs (MG34 and later MG42) were very effective at inflicting casualties. But I wonder if they were any more, or even less, effective than weapons like the Bren or even the lowly BAR, in the tactics described above.

I wonder if a full squad of ~10 riflemen with semi-autos might not have had a significant ability to suppress more members of an enemy unit, or to keep more members of an enemy unit suppressed, than would be suggested by the conventional wisdom about the squad's LMG being the real firepower of the squad. And in the battle to suppress an opponent, did the MG42's ability to fire a 10 round burst into one area in the same time that the BAR fired a 3 round burst make any effective difference?

I think there is little doubt that a lighter magazine-fed gun was more productive while the squad was in the process of maneuvering. BARs, BRENs and the like are often pictured being fired from the shoulder or the hip, while the MG34/42 seem to be more reliant on the odd two-man put-it-on-the-No.2's-shoulder approach.

On the other side, I think there are few things that are more effective at suppressing than putting 2 or 3 bullets into someone. That individual is certainly suppressed. Some of the guys right next to him are probably suppressed to, as they are busy dealing with their gravely wounded comrade. And casualties among their squad or platoon-mates might well motivate others to be more cautious in contributing to the firefight and thus subjecting themselves to return fire.

But once everyone has found at least some measure of cover, does the 1/2 second 2,000+ rpm burst have a greater suppressive effect than the 3/4 second 350 rpm burst?

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

"Crews would often fire off a belt of 100 rounds in one screaming burst. This produced tremendously effective suppressive fire, but its weapon-push effect could be felt way beyond fall of shot.

Sydney Jary, a platoon commander we will meet again later, recalled how fire from an MG42 would rip the air with the most terrible screech. Even those outside the beaten zone would go to ground whenever they heard it. We estimated one MG42 to be worth nine Brens or three Vickers.' "

Brains &Bullets: How Psychology Wins Wars by Leo Murray, page 173.

Wow ! They'd have to change that barrel after 100 rds fired. Vs. the standard 6-9 rd bursts to prevent overheating and possibly warping the barrel. But I could certainly see in the heat of action, when the hits the fan, pretty much anything can happen.

Of course a water cooled Vickers may not overheat like an air cooled MG. But I'd think you may have to put more water in the can.

I've read and/or saw on documentaries that the high RoF of the MG42 was like 1000rds/min.(?) And sounded like cloth ripping.

Of course Max RoF is not Sustained fire rate. But none the less even in a short few seconds burst would make a lot of noise, and throw a lot of rounds down range. Could be a bit disconcerting I'm sure …

Yet another interesting point.
I don't think the psychological effects can be underestimated.
Whether troops are reacting to first hand destructive experience of a high rate of fire weapon, like the German GPMGs, or to apocryphal or anecdotal evidence of their effectiveness from comrades, then a high rate of fire weapon probably does instil more fear – reality versus perception is not necessarily important. Getting hit by 1 or 2 rounds is going to do you a lot of harm, probably fatally, so the idea of getting hit by 3, 4 or 5 is simply even worse.
Jack has already highlighted the reverse situation- that good body armour gives the wearer a perceived degree of security- so being subject to higher volumes of fire would equally logically increase the PERCEPTION of danger.
Ellis' "The Sharp End" (the one WWII book everyone should read) shows that small arms wounds were almost entirely random, large-scale surveys showing wound allocation was directly proportionate to body surface area, but try telling that to the guy with rounds landing close to him- Every one MIGHT kill him.
3 rounds hitting a target are infinitely more effective than 30 missing, but what if 3 of those rounds MIGHT hit you?
Then surely it is down to morale, morale predominantly increased via experience, leadership and training

Wow ! They'd have to change that barrel after 100 rds fired. Vs. the standard 6-9 rd bursts to prevent overheating and possibly warping the barrel. But I could certainly see in the heat of action, when the bleep hits the fan, pretty much anything can happen.

"The barrel would typically require changing after every 250 rounds of rapid fire, but a single barrel could take up to 400 rounds of firing in an emergency before a serious danger of malfunction arose."

MG34 and MG42 Machine Guns by Chris McNab, page 42.

Yet another interesting point.
I don't think the psychological effects can be underestimated.
Whether troops are reacting to first hand destructive experience of a high rate of fire weapon, like the German GPMGs, or to apocryphal or anecdotal evidence of their effectiveness from comrades, then a high rate of fire weapon probably does instil more fear – reality versus perception is not necessarily important.

Speaking of volume of fire, the .50 cal is intimidating on its own, but when you have four of them on the same mount:

"In Korea, the quad fifty 'meat chopper', four .50-calibre machine guns bolted together, seems to have had more than four times the effect of a standard .50. The quad fifty 'kept them pinned way outside its beaten zone and had far more morale effect than any other weapon we had'. North Korean and Chinese soldiers were reported to be instantly torn between running and taking cover. The intense numbing crack of a near miss or the sight of the rounds hitting anything had an intense effect, but even when firing nowhere near a man, the heavy rattle and thump of the weapon could be enough to force him to the ground."

Brains & Bullets: How Psychology Wins Wars by Leo Murray, page 175.

Good intel Steve, thanks.

"In Korea, the quad fifty 'meat chopper', four .50-calibre machine guns

Yes, the Quad .50 came out in late WWII, IIRC. They were used by both the French and US Wars in SE Asia.
In WWII some were mounted on 1/2 tracks, IIRC ID'd as the M16(?). And also mounted on trailers pulled behind prime movers like the Deuce & 1/2, etc.

The French had some at DBP too.

I also think some were mounted on truck beds. They were used at Khe Sahn. The US Army had some attached to the USMC there. They could be fired indirect as well. IIRC they had a Max. Rg – 6800m.

In '78 at Ft. Lewis, WA., we saw some while training. With the 9ID. Mounted on trailers like at Khe Sahn.

The .50 cal sounds like a jack-hammer, with a RoF 450/min, IIRC. We had 15 in my Mech Co mounted on our M113s and M35 Deuce & 1/2 Cgo Trk.
It just chews thru cinder block bricks, etc.

I don't think the psychological effects can be underestimated.

I'd think so too …

"I don't think the psychological effects can be underestimated"

The studies I linked to are all Human Factor Studies. My take on it is the psychological danger of being hit can be overcome IF the unit feels the risks outweigh the danger. It could also depend on the mission. Suppressed unit are normally still able to observe which means they should be able to attempt to respond to danger. The type and level of noise does play a big psychological role too.

Christot mentions morale being affected. I think morale is concerned more of the enemy being an overall threat like advancing or flanking you and you cannot stop them. If you are hunkered down and safe from direct small arms fire and the enemy is not threatening your position then you could feel safe in most circumstances. If they attack/maneuver and you cannot respond then morale definitely deteriorates and you start thinking of falling back.

I think two other factors about suppression are the reaction to the initial fire (response drills, pull back, assault, hit the deck, etc) and overcoming the psychological fear of the danger of enemy fire once suppressed (shoot at maneuver element, advance under fire, win back the firefight, etc). This is where leadership comes into play.

I play using "Tactical Competence" (training/experience)as a way to determine the reaction to the initial fire and "Aggressiveness Check" to overcome the fear of braving enemy fire to advance. You can have poorly trained units that are highly motivated/aggressive. Desperation can play a part too.

I think Mark 1 summed it up well enough for me. However, he did pose an interesting question regarding BAR's, Brens and MG42. Most WWII Marine Squads has two or three BAR men. This could allow them to keep two enemy firing positions suppressed or have "Talking BAR's" with the two alternating firing at the same enemy position. I'd think the semi-automatic rifles can provide the needed suppressive fire for the assault to make their final charge.

Wolfhag

are My take on it is the psychological danger of being hit can be overcome IF the unit feels the risks outweigh the danger. It could also depend on the mission

Very much so as I mentioned here or on another thread(?). If an ambush is 20m or less away. You charge into the ambush, guns blazing, yelling, etc. Demonstrating the newer term – "shock & awe", somewhat. I think IIRC, in the past that sort of technique was under the term – "violence of action".

The bottom line, you'd probably lose more troops trying to disengage at that range. Than attacking into the ambush.

"Aggressiveness and violence of action will carry you a long way"

From an old Infantry CSM I learned a bit from

Owen

How are some of you playing a situation where an infantry unit is in the middle of a road or very flat open area and gets a "suppression" result? Do they hit the deck in the open and stay in the kill zone? Is there some type of reaction?

If a US squad is on line and spaced 2-3 yards apart and is taken under frontal fire at 200 yards by an MG42 how many potential targets for KIA are there? Personally, I'd say only 1-2 as within 0.5 seconds everyone would have hit the deck. Flanking fire would be much more.

Wolfhag

I tend to think with small arms and MGs you only get to hit 1-2 guys before the rest take cover. After that you might pick off a few more if they have no cover and are just lying on the ground. That said, troops lying down in open ground are hard to see clearly even at quite short distances. Shorter still if you are lying down too. Real ground is not usually flat. It rolls and there are small dips and furrows.

I understand troops were trained, even in WW2, to hit the ground, roll and then to crawl or rush into better cover.

Greener troops would be more likely to just lie there and suffer than trained or veteran troops.

To return to the OPs question I would say that even a small amount of fire could suppress a target. Fire from a few rifles or an LMG like a Bren gun if there is no cover. Could is the key word.

It's a contest between the firepower incoming, the morale/determination of the target. It also depends on what you're doing. If you are part of the firing line, and the MG42 tears the air over your head, you might as well keep your head down and wait for it to move on to another target. If you're manning the Vickers MMG or some other vital weapon, or you're in the final stages of an assault or indeed caught in the open, then it might be a different dynamic.

To follow up on Mark 1s post above. I agree a Bren or a few rifles would have been just as good at keeping heads down as an MG42. It might be less effective at gaining the upper hand in the first place but assuming you do, then it's moot.

One thing that strikes me is the MG42 can be operated by only 1 man. [OK – he needs a no2 to load/change barrels but 1 guy with the nerve to fire it can loose off 100 rounds in just 5-10 seconds].

Having two MG42s in the same squad makes you harder to suppress or keep suppressed. If either MG42 gunner gets his head up and opens fire, you are back in the fight. They would be deployed a fair few metres apart – maybe 15-20 metres between them. It would be hard to win a firefight with such a unit. You'd probably need 2 of the weak 1944-45 era British sections.