"So, how much fire does it take to fully suppress a squad?" Topic

War Artisan – It sounds like you've got a cool concept.

Ushcha – "On action not mentioned is that trained troops are taught to get off the killing ground. Somtimes hitting the dirt is not a viable response and running is. Still a higher likely hood of a quick casualties but in the end less than hitting the dirt. Like assault from ambush, it may be a bad option but not as bad as hitting the dirt at very close range."
You're absolutely right (we call it "getting off the 'x'"), but we have addressed it, that's what all the talk about immediate action drills (battle drill in the UK) for near ambush and far ambush.

And regarding the UK concept of 'skirmishing forward,' that's exactly what we're talking about when we say 'fireteam rushes' and 'individual rushes.' What people need to understand is that when the assault devolves down to fireteam and individual rushes, this is a last resort, not the plan. A Company assault may well devolve to a series of individual rushes in 'the last 50 yards,' but trust me, the plan was for 1st Plt and Wpns Plt to support by fire (putting fire onto the objective and, in a perfect world, isolating it by cutting off retreat and preventing reinforcement), 2nd Plt is in reserve, and 3rd Plt waltzes onto the objective via a covered and concealed approach. You devolve to squad then fireteam then individual rushes because supporting fires were unable to suppress the enemy so that 3rd Plt could walk onto the objective, so now 3rd Plt has to fight its way onto the objective.

"Also as always the professionals don't always agree."
Certainly. While experience is experience, that doesn't mean every experience is universal.

"In the US analysis of the Bren carrier it notes that it's effectiveness does not increase closer than 400 yds."
Hmmm, that doesn't really make sense to me. I have made the case that wargames treatment of tripod-mounted MGs is kinda screwy to me, in that the bread and butter zone should be between 300-700 yards, with troops getting inside 300 yards (in 'normal' situations, not a bona fide chokepoint I can lay the gun on) becoming very difficult to engage, and not playing into the gun's strengths anyway.

But this is going the opposite way, it's saying a Bren is great at >400, but not less???? In my experience, a bipod gun is not much use beyond 400m (and even that is being generous) as that gun is kicking all over the place, plus smoke and dust obscuring your vision (you don't need to see the target when you're on a tripod, it's dialed in). For me, LMGs are the big killers at 100-200m, where they can watch a chokepoint (be it a doorway, an alley, or a gap in a hedgerow) and hose it down as targets appear. But that's just my opinion.

"This implies wargames are often over sensitive to range."
Again, I'm a simple man, and closer=more deadly with respect to small arms (in which I include LMGs and SAWs).

Foxweasel – You cracked me up with 'proper ninja stuff,' but you're absolutely right, there's not magic to fire and maneuver, it's pretty straight forward. For everyone else's benefit,the difference between qualities of troops is the the variation in the weight of fire put out and the ability to carry out fire and maneuver under fire.

And I recall having quite a spirited debate here on TMP with some folks saying that fire and maneuver wasn't done in WWII to prior. I recall one individual saying it couldn't be done due to proper weapons not existing; I pointed out you could do fire and maneuver with bows and arrows ;)

Regarding realistic, I agree, there's literally too many things to take into account, everyone just has to figure what level of distraction they can live with. For me, a wargame is realistic to me if it puts me in the perspective of the unit leader (whatever echelon I'm playing, be it squad leader, platoon-, or company commander), where I'm dealing with the decisions that are made at that level, with the information available at that level. It goes without saying that men and vehicles move and shoot in reasonable approximations of real life, but the next biggest aspects are that I can't do everything I want, I have to make priority decisions, and I'm not always in control of what's happening (I might want to get my troops moving, but this turn they're just not having it, due to enemy fire, or I might think I've got everything covered, but there's a lull and the enemy is able to move up nonetheless).

Andy ONeill – "Other rules have an under fire state. This is often pretty simplistic."
For games where 1 stand=1 team or squad, this is pretty much what I prefer. The team/squad is taking fire, is it:
1-ineffective, meaning my guys can keep doing whatever they want. I've even built in a 'free' return fire (free meaning it does not count as the unit's activation for that turn).
2-effective enough that the team/squad wants to take cover and return fire, halting maneuver (pinned)
3-effective enough that the team/squad has to take cover and is in no position to return fire effectively, or maneuver.
4-effective enough the team/squad has suffered enough casualties it is no longer combat effective within the timeframe of this gunfight.

As Foxweasel pointed out, you have to simplify, you simply can't account for every possible variable, and even if you could it would be unplayable.

Wolfhag – There's a thread somewhere here on TMP where I broke down a company assault from the Line of Departure to actions on the objective, from platoon's supporting each other down through squad, fireteam, and individual rushes. I'd like to comment on this:
"You'd start off with all three teams putting out max ROF to achieve firepower superiority (at least temporarily)."
For us, it was one thing to have the whole squad (all three fireteams) engaging a target in platoon fire and maneuver (squad rushes), but when we got to squad fire and maneuver, where you're taught to have all three firteams in the fight, trading out firing and moving (typically one moves while the other two lay down fire), in practice we did our best to build a firing line of two fireteams and keep the third out of the fight, it was the maneuver element.

The reason is that it's notoriously difficult to control fire and movement once the unit is engaged. As a PC, Plt Sgt, or even Squad Leader, it just kind of devolves, and you can really only exercise control of the couple of guys you're standing right next to once you're getting shot at and you're returning fire. So you try to keep that third fireteam unengaged; our mantra was that only units you control are the ones not engaged. So that third fireteam was the one to maneuver and close assault the enemy position, using a covered and concealed route to get there (thus keeping them out of the gunfight). And them being unengaged even provided a certain element of holding a reserve. But, as you mention here…

"If you are questioning this tactic – so did we. The response was you don't want to get involved in a long static firefight."
You don't always have a choice, and the issue with the long, static firefight is that you're surrendering the initiative (and I firmly believe 'momentum,' or whatever you'd like to call it, is a part of combat. You 'feel' like you're winning or losing the fight, which might not be an accurate assessment of what's going on, but it's going to affect how the troops carry out their tasks in the gunfight), and we speak constantly of getting inside the enemy's OODA Loop, dictating the pace and action to him, making him react to what we're doing rather than vice versa, and every minute you're sitting there is a minute YOU have to worry about being enveloped/reinforcements brought up/supporting fires being brought in (yeah, it's not nearly as capable or responsive as Western forces, but the bad guys have mortars and rockets they'd love to get some use out of).

McLaddie – "For example, Phil Sabin created a simple board game with ten counters a side representing a Battalion in WWII, Fire and Movement."
I need to try and find that! For what it's worth, I think (and this is purely an off the wall, wargamer opinion, nothing based on being a veteran) 'company level games where one stand= 1 squad, vehicle, or crew served weapon, is probably the sweet spot where you can abstract out a lot of the minutiae that wargames/wargamers get bogged down and argue about, where you can comfortably sit in the seat of the company commander, looking at things and making decisions relatively similar to what a company commander would make, with the granularity of information available to a company commander (simple example: I know 1st Platoon has two squads suppressed; I need to do something with 3rd Plt; do they reinforce, support, or do something else?).

To me, the lower you go (skirmish level, for example), the more issues you have to deal with (what is Private Snuffy's mental state this morning? Now multiply that by the ten for the rest of his squad), and the higher you go, the more you have to deal with 'other' stuff, primarily logistics.

I often hear Napoleonics referred to as being 'formulaic,' i.e., the 'rock-paper-scissors' of column-line-square and infantry-cavalry-artillery, and I think that's actually a good thing, as I think commanders try to break everything down to its bare essentials and deal with combat in those terms. So I think Company-level games in the 'modern'-era are the closest you can get to that, where the game/fight is about the ability to fire-suppress-close assault your enemies to oblivion, balanced with your attempts to keep units unengaged in order for them to have freedom of maneuver in order to deal with unforeseen circumstances. It also gets you a good mix of arms: rifle squads, MGs, mortars, infantry anti-tank weapons, and even the possibility of air/arty support.

Vtsao – An interesting question:
"Question for the veterans : if both sides crank up their rate of fire, presumably one side or the other ducks fairly soon. Or can the high rate firefight go on for a while?"
From my perspective, the high rate firefight isn't really a 'thing.' I mean, someone is ducking, or being eliminated. The closest thing is 'death ground,' i.e., the immediate action to a near ambush/unexpected contact. If I pop through a door and you're standing there, we're both going cyclic, but it's not going to last, one of us is going down. So, I can't really see two hostile elements standing toe-to toe to no effect.

Even if we're firing at each other from six hundred yards away (which is beyond average rifle range, even for Marines ;) ), squad vs squad, it doesn't work. Your squad is dug in, fires on my squad, which is advancing. We take fire with no casualties, but move laterally to cover. We begin firing, and now both sides have gone cyclic (firing as fast as they can, which, honestly, both squad leaders should get some noogies for, as there's no way I'd be happy with them for burning through so much ammo firing at someone so far away, in cover).

In my opinion, it's not going to last. With that much lead going back and forth, someone is going to get hit, and once that first casualty is taken, their fire is going to slacken. It's just human nature; the revelation that it could happen to you, the rubber-necking to see how bad Jones is hit, the need for someone to stop firing and provide first aid (and usually more than one man will), the need (in modern times) for the squad leader to call higher HQ to inform them of the casualty and start worrying about CASEVAC (which is a function of morale, training, and the tactical situation; our saying was always "first win the firefight," but that doesn't always work out in real life, for a multitude of reasons).

Additionally, guys start running low on ready ammo (ammo loaded into magazines) and have to start pulling bandoleers out to fill new ones (we actually planned for this, where one man per fireteam would do it, and he was also responsible for rear security. In earlier times this was the Scout; in later days this was the A-gunner, because the Scout was redesignated the Designated Marksman, and you wanted the ACOG in the fight, but that meant the SAW gunner was on his own while the A-gunner loaded filled mags). Weapons begin malfunctioning, gotta take cover and deal with that, guys need to halt for a breather, get a drink of water, all kinds of stuff has to happen once the firefight drags out, and you drop out of the cyclic rate as guys drop of out of the fight. Many will re-enter the fight, but the point is that, after that first 30-60 seconds you'll never again have everyone in the fight.

And so the side that can do it for that extra few seconds longer will get the upper hand, and the other squad will end up spending a lot more time with their heads down, behind cover, not firing. Again, suppressed doesn't mean no one is firing, it means that you're no longer delivering effective fire. There are too many different considerations to get into (we could try, but that should be a different thread!), but this where you always hear about keeping the LMG/SAW going. After that initial contact where everyone man is firing, it's not about that anymore, it's about keeping the LMG/SAW going, and that's why the USMC has three SAWs per squad. You've got 13 men, but in a sustained firefight, it's really about the team leaders directing their fire and keeping the SAWs in action.

Regarding formations, as a small unit leader they are key to what you're doing and the tactical situation, but in wargames, not so much, and I'm not sure there's a fix, or if there even needs to be. I suppose the only case I could make for wargames needing to worry about formations (though I'm not really focused on 1 stand=1 plt/company/battalion games) is in a platoon-sized game. At 1 stand=1 squad, you're the company commander and that's beyond your scope; you must assume the squad leader has his boys in the proper formation. At skirmish level (say a squad), they might start the game in a formation, but then they're just going to scatter to the winds in our wargames ;)

Hope that's helpful.

V/R,
Jack

Regarding realistic, I agree, there's literally too many things to take into account, everyone just has to figure what level of distraction they can live with. For me, a wargame is realistic to me if it puts me in the perspective of the unit leader (whatever echelon I'm playing, be it squad leader, platoon-, or company commander), where I'm dealing with the decisions that are made at that level, with the information available at that level.

Jack:
We all have different types of game experiences we personally enjoy and want from our games, including the level of 'realism' we want. That's the thing, however.

When analyzing or critiquing game play, gamers toss around words like 'realistic', 'historical flavor', 'reasonable results', 'historical accuracy' etc. etc. When taken seriously for game design purposes, such gamer views devolve into nothing specific, but subjective 'feelings' that puddle into 'I like' and nothing more.

IF realism/realistic has any functional design meaning[i.e. something you can specifically design for], it has to be the 1:1 relationship between the parts of reality chosen to simulate and the game dynamics.

I think (and this is purely an off the wall, wargamer opinion, nothing based on being a veteran) 'company level games where one stand= 1 squad, vehicle, or crew served weapon, is probably the sweet spot where you can abstract out a lot of the minutiae that wargames/wargamers get bogged down and argue about,…

You may be right, but I don't think a particular level of abstraction will keep wargamers from debating the 'minutiae', though it may reduce the incidents.In some ways, abstractions open the door for that because abstractions are often basically mystery meat. No one is sure what they represent.

Let me give you an example. One designer on TMP described an effort to design a Pacific War game and had this experience:

The game had multiple plane aerial combat as one of the subsystems. The original process had several procedures with die rolls to produce a single outcome. The play testers never 'argued' about the minutiae. With some math analysis he found that he could get the very same set of variable outcomes with just one die roll and put it in. Those very same play testers now felt the process was 'unrealistic' and got bogged down with questioning the realism.

Part of the bogging down and focusing on 'minutiae ' can be laid at the door of rules lawyers and folks that want the game to do it 'their way.' However, from my experience, a good deal of the problem is that gamers don't know what the abstractions represent and thus the results. It can 'feel' unrealistic when you don't know what reality it is supposed to represent. One wargame that I have never seen produce such minutiae questioning is 1870. The designer provided so much information about what the game system portrayed, there were no questions, not mystery meat. That didn't mean everyone liked it, but it did dramatically cut down on the arguments.

Novelists evoke reality by providing details that anchor the reader in the scene. Just like writing, too few details leave the reader doubting the 'realism' while too many bog down the flow of the story. And of course, readers and gamers will want different amounts. All good.

But if the game has too much detail, you don't find folks getting bogged down in the minutiae--they just don't play the game or eliminate some. When there is too much abstraction, that is when the questions arise.

On thing that bogs down a game is when an unexplained or unexpected result or process 'pops' the gamer out of the flow. Play comes to a screeching halt as they try to understand how that is 'realistic' or makes sense.

Those who have been through the Tactical Urban Warfare exercises with lasers or other military 'simulations' will remember this: The detailed instructions about what is and isn't being simulated/trained with the exercise, including such mundane statements as 'you won't have umpires adjudicating in combat' and 'there will be no RPGs in this exercise.'

Wargamers rarely ever have such specific explanations [What does the order die rolling in Bolt Action represent?] so they really don't know what they are simulating, what is meant to be 'realistic' and what is not, except when the wargame play makes them 'feel' something. Veterans have a real leg up on most gamers if the wargame is in their wheelhouse of experience.

With regards to range and small arms, it'd seem there's two range bands:

Area fire range where you'd shoot at suspected positions and "accurate" range where you can see a specific guy and try to kill him.

As long as we're doing area fire maybe it doesn't really matter if the Bren is 200 or 400 meters out?
Whereas once we can clearly see guys, it makes a huge difference?

I think it was a very good point -- whoever said it above -- that the first casualty is very important, and probably ends the firefight-as-such. But how units react to that first casualty might depend on their morale/training/experience/leadership -- which is an area where the game designer can do something clever.

if both sides crank up their rate of fire, presumably one side or the other ducks fairly soon. Or can the high rate firefight go on for a while?

It depends on ammo each has available. But the idea is to suppress the enemy and maneuver/flank his position. You can always call in mortars, etc. also. And as always the bottom line is, it always depends on terrain and situation. And the "situation" can encompass a number of variables, etc. … Again you just normally don't trade shots back and forth, at least not for too long. I.e. Suppress & Maneuver is the goal generally …

I'm a simple man, and closer=more deadly with respect to small arms (in which I include LMGs and SAWs).

Bingo !

not magic to fire and maneuver, it's pretty straight forward. For everyone else's benefit,the difference between qualities of troops is the the variation in the weight of fire put out and the ability to carry out fire and maneuver under fire.

Exactly !

And I recall having quite a spirited debate here on TMP with some folks saying that fire and maneuver wasn't done in WWII to prior. I recall one individual saying it couldn't be done due to proper weapons not existing; I pointed out you could do fire and maneuver with bows and arrows ;)

x2

Area fire range where you'd shoot at suspected positions and "accurate" range where you can see a specific guy and try to kill him.

Yes, that is pretty much the way it works …

Just Jack for a basic game we came to a similar conclusion that a Company battle group is the seat spot. We do in some cases go down to teams. Somtimes E. G Falklands the squad SAW ' S were poled to make a gun group and the rest the assult group. We do play higher level but them the higher ups are sorting out logistics. If everybody fights now who covers the following and who is going to re-group and re arm and rest. At company b at the group level you can have sensibly tanks and infantry and APC/IFV's credibly on table with grunts. All units have to have some formation, tanks may want to look in various directions and platoons may not always want to be facing for war; echelon left or right as in the manuals is possible without excessive effort.

echelon left or right as in the manuals,

That is generally true. But terrain plays a big part when using formations. E.g. in the jungle you can't very well move as you would in more open terrain.

And in any terrain once the firing occurs, formations may not look like in the FM. Going for cover and returning fire are the first things that generally happens.

But not always. E.g. we were taught if you get ambushed and the ambushers are 20m or less away. You charge into the ambush guns blazing, Yelling and screaming ! To use the more modern phrase, "Shock & Awe !", sort of …

You'd probably take more loses trying to break contact at that range, i.e., 20m or less. Than firing and moving etc. and attacking the enemy directly … You practice this sort of thing when doing Immediate Action/"battle drills", etc. Things have to happen very quickly with little orders given. In this sort of situation ..

Legion,
As I see it formations are adopted for situation and terrain. If for terrain or other reasons the threat is more likely forward and right you would echelon right, more firepower quicker on the right or front.

On the effectiveness of weapons at close range we class this all in as assult. Typicaly 60m or less. This is a big approximation as a narrow 2 lane road is 50m at ground scale so 50m on table can be as few as 16 in reality. For this reason we also add 30 to 50m to some short range weapons so they shoot sensibly across a road when they should.

Classing close in fire as Assult also helps as "leadership" in Maneouver Group is also ammo and fatigue. Both are used up more rapidly in "assult".

This thread has bought to light some other interesting issues but I may start another thread so not to de focus this one,it's too interesting.

As I see it formations are adopted for situation and terrain. If for terrain or other reasons the threat is more likely forward and right you would echelon right, more firepower quicker on the right or front.

Yes, I know how formations work and are supposed to work. And I frequently post "depending on the terrain & situation" with topics like this.

However, generally formations like Echelon Right, even the Wedge. Really only work that well in open terrain. E.g. the desert, open plains, etc. And you really don't want to being moving in the open for any long period of time. If you can find cover … For obvious reasons.

Formations really "morph" themselves into the terrain they are covering. We'd never stay in any formation if it left an element exposed to stay in that formation, etc, …

On Line/Line a' Breast and Column are generally the most used [and easiest to use] in many cases. And those can rapidly make themselves follow the terrain contours, etc.

Plus I will freely admit with being in 3 Mech Bns and frequently attached to Tank Bns. We generally moved in Column or On Line. Save for occasionally in the desert. And again using terrain/terrain masking is more important than staying in formation. That and keeping the proper dispersion.

Plus I will freely admit with being in 3 Mech Bns and frequently attached to Tank Bns. We generally moved in Column or On Line. Save for occasionally in the desert. And again using terrain/terrain masking is more important than staying in formation. That and keeping the proper dispersion.

What was the procedure for keeping linked to the units on the flanks or rear, or was that even a major consideration with what you've noted above?

Well at Plt and Squad level you want to see where the guy/ vehicle next to you for obvious reasons. But that was not always possible, based on terrain, light conditions, etc.

In dismounted movement especially in Closed terrain, i.e. jungles, heavily wooded areas, at night, etc., you certainly need to have LOS to the guy in front and behind you. Sometimes that means you have to be within arms reach[or closer]. You have little square pieces of "glow in the dark" tape on the back of your helmet or Patrol Cap. So the guy behind you can see those to at least have a good idea where you are. A break in contact with you other elements is the last thing you want to do.

For any type unit, you still want to maintain radio contact at least from Plt to Company. Many times you many not see where the other Plt(s), etc., in the Company are. Just a grid on the map. And in some cases the Co. Cdr can't see all his Plts. As they are maneuvering, using the terrain to cover/mask their movement etc. But commo is a priority. And as always that does not occur. Radios have the annoying habit of not always working at the worse times.

And at Plt to Sqd you usually can see where most elements are. But not always based on the things I have already mentioned. Hopefully the terrain will allow you to do the movement techniques : Travelling, Travelling Over Watch, Bounding Over Watch, using the formations mentioned, etc. But again in the jungle, the dark, or even thick fog. You can't always have those options. We had a break in contact in the daylight. I.e. the fog was so thick you couldn't see more than a few feet.

What was the procedure for keeping linked to the units on the flanks or rear, or was that even a major consideration with what you've noted above

You would like visual but again that is always not possible. But most importantly you want good commo to at least know on the map where other friendly elements are.

And along with this. You have to train to be able to operate in all types of terrain and light conditions. Use SOPs, etc. to limit breaks in contact, designate Rally Points, etc. As I have said many time before … You have to train and rehearse again and again plus develop situational awareness, etc. Know how the other guys [should] react, based on SOPs, etc., etc.

A simple thing like going into a 360 perimeter in daylight. Has to be practice in daylight to be able to do it in the dark.

McLaddie – I hear what you're saying. I'm on record as saying something along the lines of "good wargames rules are nothing more than a set of mechanisms that match your idea of what is/should be happening in that era at that echelon. There really isn't an objective truth, though there are ground truths (i.e., horses can't fly, etc…)." It sounds like your big issue is just that rules writers explain what they're abstracting and why.

Ivan – "Area fire range where you'd shoot at suspected positions and "accurate" range where you can see a specific guy and try to kill him."
The problem there is a guy can be ten yards away and I don't see him, but can hear his fire and thus direct fire at him, and there could be a guy 600 yards away that is in plain view. To me the ranges are (and this certainly is not developed):

-I can see him, and if eight million things went right for me I could actually hit him, but in real life I wouldn't waste the ammo, unless I was trying to have a little fun and scare him ;) Wargamers call this 'effective range' ;)

-Real effective range, where I can deliver accurate fire on the target.

-So close that you pretty much can't miss, close enough to use hand grenades. I refer to this in my batreps as 'close assault.'

I'm sure there are holes in that, and the first two would certainly vary by weapon.

"As long as we're doing area fire maybe it doesn't really matter if the Bren is 200 or 400 meters out?"
I think there's a difference between accuracy and effectiveness. We might be able to say the Bren is as accurate at 600m as it is at 200m, but if it was as effective the Brits wouldn't have used the Vickers. My issue with the statement on the Bren was not its ability to hit a point target at 'x' range (i.e., how accurate it is), it's the Bren's ability to deliver effective, sustained fire at that range. Pretty tough for any bipod weapon, which is why there are tripod weapons.

Don Lowry – "But how units react to that first casualty might depend on their morale/training/experience/
leadership -- which is an area where the game designer can do something clever."
Certainly. This gets back to how many variables there are. If you're in a near ambush where what you're supposed to do is go skirmish line and assault through, rally on the other side, a better trained/disciplined/motivated unit is going to do it while a lesser unit might/probably not. Leadership really has very little bearing in that situation as it all happens so fast (or, more precisely, has to happen so fast) there's not time for a leader to really exert any influence.

And in that case, if the squad is reacting the way it should, casualties aren't really going to have an effect on them doing their job, for the pure fact that if the squad is reacting the way it's supposed to, the collective has already realized the only way to survive this situation is to fight your way out of it, that to take cover or stop to check a buddy means death.

It's in the situations where there's some distance, where there's time to think and figure things out, that the term suppression works its way in. If we take contact from 500 yards away, there are lots of options, which is where small unit leaders make their money. In the near ambush scenario above, we're in the street and a guy is shooting at us from a house 15 yards away; not a lot of thinking too it, just a reaction, and hopefully the reaction is the right one, the one you rehearsed over and over and over…

Ushcha – "On the effectiveness of weapons at close range we class this all in as assult."
Ahh, that makes sense. You threw me earlier when you said something like 'we don't have close range in our rules.'

"All units have to have some formation, tanks may want to look in various directions and platoons may not always want to be facing for war…"
That's interesting. I don't think I've really seen formations done (or done well) in a modern wargame; gamers tend to throw everyone into the fight (the old 'we need rules to make the use of reserves necessary' issue), and we pretty much assume that all units have 360 situational awareness and can see everything any other friendly unit can see. Formations are used to lessen your vulnerability in certain situations, provide maximum firepower to a certain area (by making sure that firepower is not masked by friendly forces), provide as much tactical flexibility as possible (to react to threats in different quarters by keeping troops/units unengaged), and to provide 360 degree situational awareness/security. I don't know how you would pull that off in a set of rules, but sounds cool.

"…also ammo and fatigue."
Not sure how hip I am to tracking ammo in a company-level game; it's certainly realistic, just not real fun. And fatigue is another interesting aspect that I'm not sure how you'd tackle in wargame rules. Maybe something simple, like 'after a close assault they can fire but not move,' maybe even fire at half effect or something? Fatigue is something that would be all over the map, as what's easy for one unit is hard for another, and capabilities once exhausted, or at various stages of exhaustion, varies greatly.

But it's absolutely an issue; you can read about a company attack where 1st Plt supported 2nd Plt's assault while 3rd Plt was in reserve, and when 2nd Plt took the objective they went firm and 3rd Plt passed through them, continuing the assault (or pursuit). The reason for passing through is the consolidation to take care of casualties, redistribute ammo and gear, check comms, reorganize units, and prepare defensive positions for counterattack. But another big part of it is that the assaulting unit is probably wore out, and they may not be out the rest of the day, but they need a breather.

Legion's got everything else nailed down; formations contract and expand with the terrain, and if you're leading you try to keep contact with rear elements, but really that's their job, whereas maintaining contact with flanking elements is every element's job. For me, that applies at team, squad, and platoon level. Companies tend to operate independently (unit boundaries), though there are movements and defensive positions where your company has to tie in with others. It's the job of small unit leaders at that end of the line to make sure contact is maintained, and his leaders to check up every now and again.

Other than that, it's rehearse, rehearse, rehearse, gear checks, rehearse some more, comm checks, rehearse some more, function check the weapons, rehearse some more, work comm and signals plan, rehearse some more. Gotta do it in the dark with no sleep and people shooting at you.

V/R,
Jack

Don Lowry – "But how units react to that first casualty might depend on their morale/training/experience/
leadership -- which is an area where the game designer can do something clever."
Certainly. This gets back to how many variables there are. If you're in a near ambush where what you're supposed to do is go skirmish line and assault through, rally on the other side, a better trained/disciplined/motivated unit is going to do it while a lesser unit might/probably not. Leadership really has very little bearing in that situation as it all happens so fast (or, more precisely, has to happen so fast) there's not time for a leader to really exert any influence.

Leadership, to me, doesn't just include what the leader does now; it includes how his "followers" view him, i.e. how much they trust his judgment, fear his wrath, etc.. He says "move," do you think, "Sarge knows best," or maybe, "is he crazy?" or "that's what you said last time and got 3 guys killed!"

In the near ambush scenario above, we're in the street and a guy is shooting at us from a house 15 yards away; not a lot of thinking too it, just a reaction, and hopefully the reaction is the right one, the one you rehearsed over and over and over…

i.e. training and discipline. But other than street fighting and jungle fighting, how often do the two sides get that close before the firing starts? I'm thinking more of actions at 100 to 300 yards.

V Jack, a lot of this is actually simple. For tanks we do a simplified version of the sort of thing Mako 11 does. Tanks see 180 degrees of the turret facing arc. Buttoned up is much less. Driver sees very little buttoned or unbuttoned. As we "hide" models on table there is many a time a tanker regrets he was not in a formation watching different arcs.

It would appear surprising to me but there are gamers out there to whom turning a turret of a tank in a game is utterly unacceptable.

If you can think of a way of getting a private communication to me I would gladly send you a free by copy of the rules under the profiso you do not circulate it and you send me some constructive criticism (good or bad). Note it's not a Convention game. The one criticism I cherish was from a now regular player. "Trouble is" you have to have some idea what a platoon leader has to do in real life".

We may be able to set something up with AOTRS Shipyards but on holiday at the moment. Will talk to Alex when I get back.

We do not "count" ammo as such way to much effort. Our units degrade "leadership" which effects their performance starting at around 5 and degrading to about 15. Dead simple each unit has a marker that does lots of things and a white board marker keeps Talley of the current value. Fast and less hassle than it would seem. Basically very few assults won't degrade the number so use of "fresh" troops is important. Again it's a simulation an average type effect. Sufficient to get it something like. After a close assult we make a unit ineffective for half a turn so may be vulnerable to an immediate counter attack. This is on top of the leadership/ammo fatigue effect. Now after 8 years we are having a lively debate on the conditions and limitations under which on a battlefield a unit may regain some/all of the degradation. Interestingly this is about what real men in real situations need to recover to full effectiveness having done some serious fighting. One account by a serving soldier reckoned assaulting 2 houses a day was a practical limit. Again knowing what is "right" is far harder than simulating it.

Don,

"He says "move," do you think, "Sarge knows best," or maybe, "is he crazy?" or "that's what you said last time and got 3 guys killed!""
Sure, I'm with you. I was just pointing out the variance in situations; in the near ambush, the guys really don't have time to think about Sarge, or even check to see what everyone else is doing, you just have to go and believe that everyone else is reading the situation the same way your are and is doing what they're supposed to do.

On a side note, if you want to see a case where Hollywood pretty much got it right, go get "Tears of the Sun." Towards the end the refugee column in moving an there is a near ambush. The SEAL team actually waits a little bit (if I recall, their point man got hit? That might be a different fight), but then they come on line and assault up to the enemy position, deliver a slew of hand grenades and point blank fire, then break contact back to the refugees.

"But other than street fighting and jungle fighting, how often do the two sides get that close before the firing starts?"
I dunno man. Terrain is certainly the biggest factor. There's always been this thing about running an ambush and letting the enemy get as close as possible, the "don't shoot 'til you see the whites of their eyes" kinda thing, and I don't really understand it. If I'm running the ambush, I'm not letting them get within 50m of me, as that's when they might get lucky and hit one of us. I want the kill zone out around 75-100m, which is plenty close for marksmanship purposes, but far enough they can't get on top of us, and hard to deliver effective fire if we're in cover (and we're going to be, it's an ambush).

Having said that, the psychological impact of a half-dozen/dozen automatic weapons cutting loose from 20 yards away in a chokepoint is nothing to be sneezed at…

"I'm thinking more of actions at 100 to 300 yards."
Again, I dunno. You figure WWII to present, there are plenty of ambushes, but there are also plenty of hasty and deliberate assaults (against hasty and prepared defenses), which means the action is more likely going to start further out as both sides are expecting a fight and probably wish to employ supporting fires, which is not a good idea if you're on top of each other.

V/R,
Jack

Ushcha,

I'm not familiar with what Mako does; it sounds like you've got spotting and firing arcs, which makes sense. Do you make spotting rolls?

"If you can think of a way of getting a private communication to me…"
I'll send you a PM here, we're both supporting members, so no sweat.

"…do not circulate it and you send me some constructive criticism…"
Of course.

"Our units degrade "leadership" which effects their performance…"
Fair enough, sounds interesting.

"One account by a serving soldier reckoned assaulting 2 houses a day was a practical limit. Again knowing what is "right" is far harder than simulating it."
Absolutely. As we've been saying on this thread, "it depends." Soooo many variables.

V/R,
Jack

Jack – "I think there's a difference between accuracy and effectiveness. We might be able to say the Bren is as accurate at 600m as it is at 200m, but if it was as effective the Brits wouldn't have used the Vickers. My issue with the statement on the Bren was not its ability to hit a point target at 'x' range (i.e., how accurate it is), it's the Bren's ability to deliver effective, sustained fire at that range. Pretty tough for any bipod weapon, which is why there are tripod weapons."

Sure, but isn't that a factor of the time it can do so for?

The vickers can shoot more or less as long as you have water and bullets, the bren can't.

But within, say, a 30 round burst from both, I doubt the targets would have any idea what they're under fire from. Maybe?

On the gaming table, we roll more dice for the vickers because it can keep rattling them out (thats ignoring the fact that machine guns are usually wrong in games, as we've talked about before).

Ivan,

"Sure, but isn't that a factor of the time it can do so for?"
Yeah, but that's one of the issues with effectiveness. How long can the Bren gunner keep that beaten zone/cone of fire on the target? I'm not talking about barrel changes, ammo, water, etc…, I'm talking about endurance and dealing with incoming fire. While it's nice to see your target, I don't need to.

If I'm on a tripod I've got the gun locked into a T&E, the rounds are going right where I want them to, at 600-700 yards (and you can say wow, aren't the rounds distributed quite a bit in the beaten zone at 700 yards? Why yes, they are, but nowhere nearly as bad as a bipod MG). I can be lying on my back smoking a cigarette, just squeezing the trigger at regular intervals. The gun team leader can be twenty yards from me, looking through binos and calling out adjustments.

I reach up, two clicks right, one click down, keep firing, whereas the bipod guy is trying to see the target through the flash, the dust, people shooting at him, and muscle the rounds onto the target. Sure, you can have someone else spotting the fall of shot for you, but add 50 at 1 o'clock ain't that easy on a bipod, particularly at that range. Maybe you tattoo mils on your forearm and wear a straightjacket to keep you aligned ;)

I do apologize; I feel like I may be misunderstanding, like I'm giving an answer to a different question than you're asking.

"But within, say, a 30 round burst from both, I doubt the targets would have any idea what they're under fire from. Maybe?"
It depends at which range I suppose. I'd say troops could hear the difference between a Bren and a Vickers; certainly not the difference between an MG-42 on bipod and one on tripod. The rounds from the tripod are going to be tighter at distance. The bipod will (should) be deadlier at short range: at short range I'm looking at individuals and hosing the area down, even walking the rounds onto people, where that's very difficult to do with a tripod (unlocking the T&E, AKA 'free-gunning,' is just a recipe for wasting ammo, and you can't keep up with humans moving at close range manipulating the T&E). That's what the bipod is made for.

But at 700 yards, that bipod is going to scatter rounds over a whole battalion. Sure, men can be hit, and maybe even suppressed due to hearing an MG and seeing someone nearby get hit, but most folks are probably going to realize the gun is far enough away that it's just shot-gunning rounds all over the place. No one wants to get hit by one of those stray rounds, sure, but that's my point, they're basically stray rounds. If you're sheltering behind a wall of sandbags, it's the difference between a round popping the sandbags every fifteen or twenty seconds, and a slew of rounds popping the sandbags every five or six seconds (each burst).

"On the gaming table, we roll more dice for the vickers because it can keep rattling them out…"
Certainly, you gotta do something. I'm all ears if you figure it out ;)

"…ignoring the fact that machine guns are usually wrong in games, as we've talked about before…"
It's getting hard to remember…

V/R,
Jack

Must admit machine guns are difficult to understand. Kevin first hand accounts seem to differ. I would do better if I knew what better was. Certainly serving guys with combat experience said warg as mess were too obsessed with rate of fire. Practicaly al they saw MG shooting as a couple or so of rounds for range then maybe 5 for effect then g in a neither target. Far from "graving fire" I. E fixed line not above 2 ft for approx 600m given the right flat ground. In other places it seems much more deadly but the key drivers are not apparent. Interestingly in the fall and the Paras moaned that the bypod "jmpy" was good to 1100m but hopeless beyond as the tracer burnt out at that point making fall of shot effectively impossible.
Of serving soldiers they said the Bren was accurate to 800m and that double tapping would keep folk suppressed no problem. Finding a basic common ground is a nightmare. The move by the US army away from the minimi to what is an effectively updated bar, which they admitted is less able to suppress is the way to go. Perhaps the optimum is ill conditioned so a range of weapons with slightly different abilities are pretty much the same effectiveness over all.

There really isn't an objective truth, though there are ground truths (i.e., horses can't fly, etc…)." It sounds like your big issue is just that rules writers explain what they're abstracting and why.

Jack:
That is my big issue, yes. IF you don't know what you are 'simulating', then a lot of the value is lost and gamers 'guess,' making it up as they go. Gamers get very good at it to, that guessing. It can be fun, trying to figure out what the 'mystery meat' is all about.

Having said that, there is a very objective aspect to this, though it doesn't necessarily match 'The Truth' as most folks see it.

It's just this: You are modeling *something*, in most cases 'reality' as described in historical accounts or in your case personal experience. If there is a claim that the game provides that simulated combat in any valid way, then the designer has gotten his ideas from someplace and used that as a template for the wargame. That is what is being simulated.

For instance, I can use Clausewitz as my model for Napoleonic warfare. That is what is being simulated and the simulation is accurate IF it models the dynamics he relates. Or I can model your description of reality in combat [or parts]. That is my template of reality and for the simulation to be accurate, it has to have a 1:1 relationship to that information. That is objective. You can decide that those sources are wrong or the sources can be wrong in anyone's book, but if the simulation models that data, it is an accurate simulation… of the wrong material.

We all get our ideas of what is reality from someplace, particularly historical events. So, in every case, any notion of 'reality' has to objectively be linked to those sources used to ground our notions of past reality.

And THAT objective relationship is what gamers have to know to understand what they are or aren't recreating, learning, simulating. The "TRUTH" in the historical data used for the design is another issue altogether, and more in the historian and Historiography domain.

Legion:
Thanks for that explanation. It sounds like maps and radios [helmet coms?] have taking over in coordinating forces where close formations and LOS dominated in the last century…even into WWI.

Wow – lots of stuff to respond to. I'm fortunate to be a part of this discussion. Thanks to everyone, including Rod.

I can't disagree with Just Jack but hopefully some day we'll disagree and the old Sarge will he get to chew me out (ha, ha). Dude, you were on Guam? I was born there during the Korean War when there were still Japs holding out on the north end of the island. You were on Iwo too!! I'm not worthy!!!! I'm not worthy!!!! I'm not worthy!!!! Great blog.

I understand about people "not believing you" about what happened. My son has related some accounts to me that I ran by some friends in Spec Ops and they doubt the authenticity of his story and I find the details hard to believe too. That does not mean it didn't happen.

Legion: I read "On Killing" and then gave it to my son when he was 12. He still reads it once in awhile. He said it helps to know what's going on and it's not just him.

Regarding Legion's post about formations: Yes, formations are almost always used when moving across open areas expecting contact. In dense terrains like woods and jungle, it is almost impossible for a platoon to be in a skirmisher line or wedge. The terrain is not uniform and movement is slowed to about 10-20% of a column movement in the open. It's a real bitch, believe me, and it gets noisy when trying to coordinate with each other. Communication is degraded too. Unless you are moving to contact a known enemy position you'd be in a column. There is always a tradeoff for speed versus security.

Area and Aimed Fire: This is my understanding of this stuff. Before enlisting I was a competitive shooter with an NRA Expert rating, also the high shooter in Boot Camp (M-14). I could consistently put 9-10 rounds into a human torso silhouette at 500 yards (under ideal conditions) and about 10% of the platoon could too. Nothing special but yes, I did think I was hot stuff.

However, once I got into real infantry training and into FMF I realized it will not help me very much. Why? On a hot summer day in NC we were playing our war games. My squad had to quickly move and deploy to a flanking move by the "aggressors". With full packs we ran for about 75 yards and then seeing the aggressors we hit the deck to take them under fire.

At this point my lungs were bursting, I was out of breath and sweat was pouring into my eyes stinging them. When I hit the deck my pack rode up hitting the back of my steel pot and pushing it over my eyes blinding me. I had to get situated and then look through my M-16 peep sight at the targets 50-60 yards away. Good luck with that! I was totally FUBAR. There was no way I could have engaged a moving target with "aimed fire" like on the range. There is dust and smoke everywhere, I can't focus on my front sight, my vision is impaired and I'm breathing so hard I can't really take a breath to aim and they were not even using real bullets, just blanks.

What went through my mind was in a real battle try to pop off 2-3 rounds "aimed" at the target I could see the best I could. Maybe it would be called snap shooting. Even if you can't see them you shoot just to let them know you are there and maybe they should go away and find somewhere else to play. However, under ideal conditions, they'd be dead at 500 yards. I think Jack covered this too.

Personally, I don't use the aimed, suppressive or area fire designation in my rules. Too complicated and too hard to define. The way I see it the more a target exposes itself the more likely you'll be able to detect it and if you can detect it well enough or long enough you'll take aim and shoot. You don't need to be ordered to do it. Otherwise, you are performing the level of sustained fire into the designated area your Squad Leader tells you until you have a target to sight on. Call it suppressive fire, area fire or covering fire or whatever you like. I always thought that's how it was when an order was given for covering or suppressive fire. We weren't given an order to aim and only an idiot would continue to fire into an "area" when a juicy target suddenly appeared.

You could go from "area" to "aimed" fire a half dozen times in one minute depending on how the targets expose themselves to you and your ability to observe. So how do you determine which is which in a game?

In an urban environment area fire might be putting a round every 4-5 seconds through a window or murder hole to deny the enemy that firing position unless he wants to risk getting hit. If he decided not to pop his head into the window to shoot back he's suppressed either by the fire or self-suppressed (no need to shoot back, take a smoke break).

This is my interpretation of suppression based on some studies and reports I linked to: If your fire slows the enemy advance, forces them to hit the deck or duck rather than fire their observation and effectiveness will be degraded – I call that suppression and it's on a sliding scale. The volume of fire, good leadership, reaction drills, drugs/stimulants, aggressiveness, and training can enable you to overcome the effects of suppression.

So in my definition, you could say small arms fire almost always suppresses (degrades movement, fire, and observation) the enemy but occasionally or rarely (1% per minute or less) kills unless the target really cooperates (Banzai or Human Wave attack) or you have a real tactical advantage like an ambush or flanking fire where the rate could be up to 95%.

Right now I'm determining the suppression level based on the volume of firepower, loser suppresses. A 1:1 ratio has no effect, 2:1 suppresses one level, 3:1 two levels, etc. A Veteran unit will need 2:1 to reduce one level. A Poor/Green unit is reduced one level for 1:1 and two levels for 2:1, etc. Five levels means you are pretty much ineffective. Causalities can increase suppression 1-3 levels too. You can start recovering levels when the enemy fire ceases so even if they are not shooting back you still need to keep them under fire.

I determine causalities by comparing the enemy firepower to the defender's exposure/defensive status. This generates a causality "rate" percentage. A single die roll determines the # KIA/WIA. However, one important factor. The side on the losing end of the firefight can elect to "self-suppress" and therefore lower his causality rate BEFORE the die roll to determine causalities. However, his firepower for the turn is reduced too. This is reacting to take cover. More suppression = fewer causalities.

I have the causality rate tweaked based on the British WO Small Arms Accuracy (firepower versus exposure) report and the Human Factors in suppression report (what it takes to degrade performance). It's tweaked so that that shooting degrades a unit to the point it pulls back BEFORE suffering serious attrition that would cause a morale break but a defender can pull back at any time and recover from the effects of suppression. Close assaults are infrequent unless the defender occupies a man-made defensive position or is surprised. It's all still a WIP but I like the direction it's going. You guys have really helped me think about. Thanks again.

I normally play a reinforced company per side, 1" = 25mm with 6mm or 10mm models for tank battles. On a 6 foot table that gives 1800 meters of gaming space. I have played 28mm with 1" = 5 meters for 350 meters of gaming space for tank/infantry games.

Vehicles are 1:1. Infantry is stands of 4-6 man teams for 6mm and 10mm. 28mm infantry is doable but difficult to coordinate and track in an urban environment. I don't track ammo usage. The infantry rules are reaction based. When taken under fire units have options they can perform automatically (battle drills) or test their aggressiveness to advance in the face of enemy fire. There is no "activation" of units. Reaction times can be variable with delays giving initiative to the enemy (no initiative or orders phase) and SNAFU's can occur so it's not entirely predictable nor is it entirely random. Suppression levels generate delays making it harder to detect and engage enemy advances.

Movement phases and the results of small arms fire is done every 5 turns simultaneously which speeds up the game immensely. This is needed to measure the "volume" of fire. There is no magic "hit #" for each figure firing or firepower dice. Weapons over 37mm fire in a future turn after detecting their target depending on the "Time & Action" based on any engagement delay, weapon platform performance, crew training and some player "risk-reward" options. That means you may detect and engage a moving target but if your "Time & Action" to fire in a later turn he has moved out of your LOS you don't get to fire. We've had players close assault a tank with no infantry support with an AT magnetic mine and get there before the tank could respond. Being buttoned up generates a delay like suppression does. The "Time & Action" to fire in a future turn interacts very well with movement (somewhat like a frame by frame video game) so I don't need special rules for the initiative, opportunity fire, turn interrupts and fewer IF-THEN-ELSE exceptions.

Currently, I'm not using morale rules (heresy right). If you are on the losing end of a firefight very long your ability to fire, observe, move and advance will be so degraded that the only thing you can do is pull back. Pull back orders are automatically obeyed and once out of enemy LOS the unit can recover pretty quickly. Players will see pulling back as their only option and are "rewarded" by recovering from the effects of suppression. So far I like the results.

My opinion is that I do not see being suppressed (from enemy fire or "self-suppressed") as a morale issue. I think it does become a morale issue when you start taking causalities, have vulnerable flanks or the FOW / Fear of the Unknown forces you to withdraw. I'm not expecting everyone to agree and that's fine. I've been told the players can exercise too much control over their units. There needs to be a balance between control and random/forced actions. I balance it towards player control.

The firepower and suppression rules work fine for my system and scale but may not for yours and what you want to portray in your game. They don't really work for games with turns of 30+ seconds or platoon stands. There are different factor that come into play at that level.

There is really no right or wrong way to do this. I think many of the TMP discussions on these subjects break down because we use different definitions for things or cannot agree on a definition. I'm trying to clarify mine but there is no need to agree with me. We all have our biases and research and 1st person accounts can't be relied on 100% either.

Just one more point about fire and maneuver (I may have already mentioned). When the maneuver element was ready to assault they gave a signal or put up a star shell or toss a WP grenade on the enemy as a signal. The suppressive fire element went to max ROF for about 5 seconds or fire everything in your mag to put the guys heads down. The Squad Leader of the assault might have someone throw a few frags too. As soon as suppressive fire ceased the assault element made their move at a quick walk putting out grazing fire and aiming at targets that popped up. Timing is important!

In WWII Pacific the Engineer Team would then get into flamethrower range (15-20 meters early in the war and 40-50 later with napalm) for a final few squirts and then the demo man does his work. They might also have a few rifleman for protection. The fewer guys in the assault the better.

Sorry if off topic on going into detail on the game. I think it was needed to give a better understanding of the scale and what I want to portray in the game. One size does not fit all.

Wolfhag

Too many Yanks in this discussion, far too serious. If war wasn't fun we wouldn't do it for a job. All orders should be written on the back of a fag packet and the only phrase a commander needs is "Follow me!!!" Foxweasel firing the FPF, digging in and awaiting counter battery fire!😁😁

Foxweasel,
ROTFL. Very well. Reporting for duty sir. Where's my cuppa and a rugby ball?

Wolfhag

Legion's got everything else nailed down;

Thanks Jack ! As I said to Wolfhag you guys were USMC, and I started out in the 101 as a Rifle PL. Then finally commanded a Mech Co. But we were all Grunts … we know "the deal" …

Legion:
Thanks for that explanation. It sounds like maps and radios [helmet coms?] have taking over in coordinating forces where close formations and LOS dominated in the last century…even into WWI.

Yes, that is the way it is done. Units moving thru terrain providing them cover and concealment. And using your maps(today they have GPS, but you still have to be able to read a map) and radios.

For dismounted work usually the PRC-77. Carried on your back. When in vehicles, yes, CVCs(commo helmets) going thru the radio(s) mounted in the track. Or e.g. an M151, HMMWV, etc., the hand mic,(the guys used to call it a "Pork Chop")maybe a head set. But I really used those. Maybe be running an LZ/PZ …

You may go on an op, depending on terrain & situation, never seeing any other unit. Just talking to them on the Radio. And seeing where they are on the map. Dispersion is so very important from the Fire Tm on up. The NCOs would tell the troops. "You all stand that close together, one grenade will kill the bunch of you !"

The same goes for any weapon really. Small Arms' high rates of fire. Or GLs, mortars, FA etc. … "Keep your intervals !", the NCOs would say.

But as I said, terrain & situation. In the jungle you may have to be within arms reach. Or in the dark maybe even closer. And the jungles of Panama got very very dark. Around sunset/EENT, we'd usually set up an ambush(es) or go into a 360 NDP. Usually the only things moving in the jungle after dark are the locals[maybe] and the local fauna. And some of them bite !

But in most other terrain, we'd always like dismounted night ops, patrolling, etc. The darkness is your best concealment. And again that is where all that training, rehearsals, SOPs, etc., really come into play.

I read "On Killing" and then gave it to my son when he was 12.

That is good fatherly "guidance". If I had a kid I'd do the same. And again I highly recommend that for anyone here.

Regarding Legion's post about formations: Yes, formations are almost always used when moving across open areas expecting contact. In dense terrains like woods and jungle, it is almost impossible for a platoon to be in a skirmisher line or wedge. The terrain is not uniform and movement is slowed to about 10-20% of a column movement in the open. It's a real bitch, believe me, and it gets noisy when trying to coordinate with each other. Communication is degraded too. Unless you are moving to contact a known enemy position you'd be in a column.
There is always a tradeoff for speed versus security.

Again, Grunts know "the Deal!" … The Ranger Instructors would say, "Speed is Security !" And honestly, again, Column, On Line and Fire Tm/Squad Wedges. Never saw Echelon Left/Right in the field. Just in the FMs.

Foxweasel

Wolfgang – no worries mate, it's been a pretty meandering topic so talking about rules stuff is fine :)

Ushcha – "Certainly serving guys with combat experience said warg as mess were too obsessed with rate of fire."
I agree it's not merely a 'how many bullets can this thing shoot in 'x' amount of time. Fire that's not accurate is ineffective, i.e., a waste of ammo. So, it's not about ROF, it's about the ability to deliver effective fire, but once that occurs (or, for wargames, perhaps even factored into the effectiveness), you have to give some consideration to weight of fire (which is really a fancy way of saying ROF), so I dunno, it's all interweaved. I suppose wargames make ROF = accuracy = effective, whereas I guess I'd say accuracy + weight of fire = effective. Lot's of splitting hairs and semantics.

"…the bypod "jmpy" was good to 1100m…"
Are you sure they didn't say tripod? I know the 'Gimpy/Jimpy' has no problems reaching 1100m; the MAG-58 is the same weapon we used (M-240), but on a bipod? The only way I can see hitting something at 1100m is the gun locked in on a T&E on the tripod. You shoot an azimuth, convert to mils, lay the gun, elevate the gun, then start shooting. Then you have to have some with binos walk you onto target; it's hard to see a house at 1100m. To do that over open sights, muscling the gun on a bipod, would truly be a Herculean task.

"Finding a basic common ground is a nightmare."
Absolutely. But what Ivan and I were talking about was how to model the actual employment of MGs; all this stuff is just an example of even more problems when trying to write rules.

"The move by the US army away from the minimi to what is an effectively updated bar, which they admitted is less able to suppress is the way to go."
Now that is an interesting statement. Are you talking about going away from 5.56mm SAWs to 7.62mm accurized weapons, like the M-27? If so, here's the deal: again, it's about effectiveness. I could have a weapon with a high rate of fire, but if all my engagements are at 700m, it is very difficult for me to deliver effective fire with the SAW, because it's a bipod weapon and the rounds are so widely distributed within the beaten zone that it's not delivering the weight of fire on the target needed to suppress the enemy. Whereas the M-27 is firing single shots, but each shot is snapping within a yard of the bad guys (or even hitting them), and if I fire every time the sights settle, I'm keeping a sustained rate of fire on the bad guys that is very accurate, thereby effective.

In a nutshell: you can fire 400 rounds per minute, with 3 rounds hitting in the target area, or you can fire 20 rounds a minute, with 20 rounds hitting in the target area. Which one is more effective? I'd say the latter.

Then I'd say, well, why not use the M-240? On a bipod you're going to run into a lot of the same issues as the SAW; 400 RPM with 3 rounds in the target area. But if you put it on the tripod you can get 400 RPM with 200 rounds in the target area (that's firing at the cyclic rate, which you certainly can't keep up forever, but for that one minute). So the M-27 beats the SAW for delivery of fire into the target area, and the M-240 on a tripod beats the M-27 for weight of fire on the target area. But if you're out walking all day, would you rather carry an M-27 or an M-240 with tripod? Mobility is another issue that has to be dealt with.

McLaddie – Yeah, I gotcha.

Wolfhag – You bet; 53 countries in ten years!

"Personally, I don't use the aimed, suppressive or area fire designation in my rules."
Me either. Fire is fire, and all fire has the ability to knock you out of the fight and/or pin/suppress you (and other units around you), with different modifiers for the tactical situation (being in cover, etc…).

"Otherwise, you are performing the level of sustained fire into the designated area your Squad Leader tells you until you have a target to sight on."
Yeah, and this is what I was getting at previously. You're not just blindly firing into your sector of fire (when there are no target indicators*), you're either firing at places you think a human could be hiding, or you firing at a point designated by the team/squad leader (that house, or that clump of trees).

*If you saw that pic I posed of me in Fallujah, you see I have an orange Bic lighter tucked into my vest. The A/1/5 Company Commander took to calling me "Staff Sergeant Target Indicator." I replied that we were walking in the street, that I could cammie up my face, but it probably wouldn't help. He wasn't that fond of me, but that's okay, I was with B/1/5 and didn't have to deal with him that much ;)

I think your rules sound nifty, though you speak of ratios for suppression, which I think is cool if you're using them to inform odds for die rolls. Personally, I don't like wargame rules that are formulaic, i.e., if you have three squads shooting at one, the one is auto-suppressed. I enjoy the use of dice as, in my opinion, there is always the aspect of chance. I believe the die roll should be waited to the one squad being suppressed, but you need to roll for it, it shouldn't be automatic, there's always an off chance things don't go as planned. But that's just me.

"As soon as suppressive fire ceased the assault element made their move at a quick walk putting out grazing fire and aiming at targets that popped up."
I think you mean "assault fire," Marine ;)

"Too many Yanks in this discussion, far too serious."
Don't worry, only serious about the wargaming part. And you're OpOrders sound a lot shorter than ours, I needed at least an MRE box ;)

V/R,
Jack

nightmare. The move by the US army away from the minimi to what is an effectively updated bar,

Based on my experience in the late '80s

Squad/Fire Tms:

A 4-5 man Fire Tm could be carry:

1 M203 GL
1 M249 SAW
1 M60 MG
1 M16

The other could pack:

1 M203 GL
1 M249 SAW
1 M47 MAW
1-2 M16s

Plus the SL(M16) and .50 cal on the track if a Mech unit.

The Principles of Firepower were we taught, even as ROTC cadets …

Firepower has to be :

Accurate

Timely

In the proper volume

ALL,

I see that You all have been very busy. It is too hard for me to keep up and I do not want to disrupt the discussion. Thus, I'm doing a "Suppression Data Dump" from my Army sources that I hope will provide additional insight and/or food for thought support the general topic.

I. FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPRESSION

1. WEAPONS FIRE CHARACTERISTICS:
Volume of Fire per Unit Time
Cyclic Rate per Burst
Duration of Fire
Acoustic Signature
Acoustic Tone
Accuracy of Fire
Perceived Lethality of Projectiles
Distance of Passing or Impacting Projectiles from the Soldier
Manner of Distribution of Fire
Coordination of Fire with Suppressive Fire from Other Types of Weapons
Weapon's Basic Load
Visual Cues
Uniqueness of Sound (e.g., ability of enemy to consistently identify the sound with a particular weapon)
Actual Lethality of Projectiles
Signature Cues at the Weapon (e.g., muzzle blast)
In Flight Visibility of Projectiles (e.sg, tracer)
Impact Signature (e.g., debris or dust thrown up by impacting rounds)
Time to Reload
Reliability
Fusing

2. PRIMARY SUPPRESSION DETERMINANTS:
Proximity of Incoming Rounds to the Individual
Loudness of the Projectile Signature
Volume of Incoming Rounds to the Individual
Type of Weapons Systems Employed Against the Individual
Unique Projectile or Weapons System Signature
Visual and Auditory Signature Associated with Impact of the Projectile

3. OTHER FACTORS:
Experience under Fire
Leadership of the Unit
Fatigue/Stress
Environmental Factors (climate, weather, terrain, night OPS)
Hunger
Training
Doctrine
Posture
Task Loading
Unit Morale
Level of Unit Casualties
Availability of Cover and Concealment
Distance from Enemy
Group Dynamics (e.g., social stimuli of other soldiers, NCOs, officers)
Religious values
Mission type
Proximity to Other Unit Members, Commander, Automatic Weapons
Awareness of Enemy Fires

II. SUPPRESSION STUDY FINDINGS

1. Small Arms Suppression Findings:
(a) The .50 Cal machinegun was shown to be significantly more suppressive than the 7.62mm machinegun which in turn was significantly more suppressive than the 5.56mm M16 rifle.
(b) The number of rounds (e.g., 3 vs. 6 rounds) of ball ammunition per burst of automatic fire has little or no effect on the suppressiveness of the fire. However, the time interval (e.g., 4 sec vs. 12 sec) between each bursts has a significant effect.
(c) Suppressive fire delivered in small bursts within a short time intervals between bursts appears to be most efficient for delivering suppressive fires.
(d) The degree that a soldier is suppressed by incoming fire can be approximated by a mathematical model which includes the natural logarithm of his distance to the incoming fire.
(e) Classes (or techniques) of fire affect the suppressiveness of the fire. Classes of fire which result in a random distribution of fire throughout the target area are more suppressive than classes which result in fire being distributed in a systematic pattern.
(f) Soldiers who have received indoctrination stressing the lethality and dangerousness of weapon systems are more suppressed (40%) by the systems than soldiers who have not been indoctrinated.
(g) Soldiers operating independently were found to be more suppressed (43% to 115%) under similar conditions than collocated soldiers operating in groups.
(h) Soldiers defending from frontal parapet foxholes were significantly less suppressed (62%) than soldiers defending from standard foxholes.
(i) Suppression is affected both by the overall situation under which fires are delivered and by the individual bursts of fire.

2. Artillery Suppression Findings:
(a) For any given range and round size, the most suppressive detonations observed were directly in front of the Soldier (0 degrees). The observed least suppressive detonation varied for each round size, but always behind the Soldier. (The least suppressive aspect angle for 60mm, 81mm, 105mm and 155mm was 180, 150, 180 and 210 degrees, respectively),
(b) The most suppressive detonations during the volley fire were located to the Soldier's front (0 degrees) and the least suppressive detonations were generally at 90 or 180 degrees.
(c) For single round detonations, when obscuration of the target vehicle was reported, the angle between the target vehicle and the detonation measured from the Soldier's vantage point was generally between + 45 degrees.

III. EXAMPLES AND OPINIONS OF HOW SUPPRESSION WORKS

1. Huggins presents an explanation of how the suppression phenomenon works. Once a fire fight is initiated, all combatants tend to take cover. The next reaction is to assume a firing position and attempt to locate targets on which to deliver aimed fire. If no targets can be detected, a normal reaction is to deliver area fire at the assumed target location. Thusly, the fire fight tends to restrict the movement of the individual combatants. If one aide is able to increase its fire, the other side is forced to take greater cover, is less able to detect targets, and therefore, it less able to return fire. In this manner, one side tends to assume fire superiority and the other side is said to be suppressed. The more one side is suppressed, the less they can deliver fire, and therefore the degree of suppression increases as the opposing side is able to deliver even greater volumes of fire. In theory at least, one side could become totally suppressed, allowing the other side to maneuver freely against them. However, in practice, there is a limit to the amount of fire any one side can deliver. Weapon wear and ammunition supplies dictate some restraint. Also, unless some of the fires are lethal, the suppression will only result in a delay and not a victory. In other words, the purpose of suppression appears to be that of gaining the advantage in mobility and the ability to observe, but must be followed by lethal fire in order to achieve a victory.

2. Tepas also discusses the purpose of suppression. He feels that it is a harassment designed to fatigue the enemy by interference with the work-rest cycle and biorhythms. Ideally, the harassment weapons should
fatigue the enemy to the extent that he eventually falls into a deep sleep, and is therefore completely suppressed. That this may actually happen is attested to by an incident reported by Page, et al.

They state:
"An example of hyper-reaction is given in a report from a company pinned down while on the offensive
in Korea. While undergoing intense fire and infighting for several hours, officers reported at
mid-day that their most difficult problem was keeping the men awake and firing their weapons. This feeling of fatigue and extreme sleepiness, where it was not physically justified, was an avoidance hyper-reaction to an especially intense weapons effect."

3. Tiedemann and Young present an interesting notion on suppress which is essentially weapons-independent. They suggest that successive impacts of rounds coming closer and closer to an individual are likely to be more suppressive than rounds going in the other direction, or rounds randomly placed, or all hitting in the same spot. Whether this is true or not, it has a logical appeal. It might even be assumed, that impacts at successively greater distances from an individual would hardly have any suppression effects at all.

4. Burt, et al. report on an interesting finding which certainly seems to be related to suppression. In an analysis of several battles, it was found that as artillery strength increased, the relative proportion of casualties caused by artillery decreased. The same apparently contradictory relationship was also found for small arms. This may be explained in part by assuming that Increases in one kind of fire power caused personnel to take cover from that kind of fire power. However, it is difficult to imagine that personnel taking cover from artillery fire would not also be protected from small arms fire.

Just Jack:
Gotta agree.

You figure WWII to present, there are plenty of ambushes, but there are also plenty of hasty and deliberate assaults (against hasty and prepared defenses), which means the action is more likely going to start further out as both sides are expecting a fight and probably wish to employ supporting fires, which is not a good idea if you're on top of each other.

Well, with 20mm figures and a 5x8' table I don't have room for long-range stuff at any reasonable ground scale. So any prep fire is presumed to have already happened before the game starts, or at least before the attacking side is placed on the table.

If I'm running the ambush, I'm not letting them get within 50m of me, as that's when they might get lucky and hit one of us. I want the kill zone out around 75-100m, which is plenty close for marksmanship purposes, but far enough they can't get on top of us, and hard to deliver effective fire if we're in cover (and we're going to be, it's an ambush).

Sounds right to me. But, as you say, terrain will play a big role. And not all fights are ambushes. Anyway, as I said, I'm thinking in terms of fights that start, or get serious, in the 100-300 yards/meters range. Normally involving only small arms and LMGs, or maybe a MMG and/or light mortar. (I don't game anything more recent than Korea.)

Wolfhag,
Do you share your rules? I'm interested in seeing how what you describe actually plays on my tabletop.

Some pretty good points there Analsim. Were you in the Army or just a student of war ? Not that as this point in matters. Your posts are pretty well researched, and accurate, etc., it seems. Always glad to have someone who adds those sort of studies to the conversion.

Hi James:

Thanks for the valuable addition. I notice that the opinions noted don't actually say that the purpose of suppression is to fix the enemy so other elements can maneuver around them. The view given by "Tepas also discusses the purpose of suppression. He feels that it is a harassment designed to fatigue the enemy by interference with the work-rest cycle"</1> sounds more like WWI and long-term action than assault tactics…

I notice that the opinions noted don't say that the purpose of suppression is to fix the enemy so other elements can maneuver around them.

And yet that is what was taught at the US ARMY Infantry School. Who knew !?!?

RTJEBADIA,
My tank-tank version is about 90% complete including hand-held anti-tank weapons.

The small arms and suppression infantry rules still need work. That's why I'm so interested in this discussion.

I'll be at KublaCon in SF over Memorial Day doing some final playtesting. The next step is to release a free intro version. I had a meeting a few weeks ago with a major game publisher who gave me some ideas and ways to better prepare the game.

I'm also working on some short videos for the main aspects of the game. Videos are the best way by far to come up to speed. I'll try not to be too boring.

Here is a 5-page description of the game system: link

If you are still interested e-mail me at treadheadgames AT gmail

Thanks,
Wolfhag

Way back, Just Jack made the point that once engaged, unit leaders lose a degree of control over small units, whether they are suppressed or not. Eventually everyone's basically taking individual action, with that being some mix of taking cover and firing to make the enemy take cover. The leaders exercise control primarily over units in reserve (unenengaged), or direct personal leadership over the men directly around them (who are engaged). Though I would suppose that with effort and enough time having fire superiority that might effectively "rally" the unit back to effectively being unengaged (so long as the enemy still does not fire-- perhaps they retreated, perhaps another unit has engaged them and achieved fire superiority), but this must take more time and effort than simply moving the unengaged unit.

I forget if the connection was explicitly drawn, but this seems closely related to the idea that a company assault's assaulting platoon might devolve from an unrestricted maneuver by a platoon to a squad assault to individual rushes assaults-- As the assaulting platoon becomes engaged by insufficiently suppressed enemy forces (or entirely new small contacts).

I've tried representing this in rules by having leaders use leadership points (actually dice, but that just introduces some randomness based on the leader's abilities) to order troops around, with unengaged forces allowing group/unit activation and engaged forces (suppressed or not) requiring individual orders. For squad level games I also let individual troops use initiative dice for the same effect on themselves only (and for SF I had this vary considerably-- high initiative but unruly space pirates were likely to activate themselves but had relatively poor leaders, imperial guard-types had an effective leadership structure but no individual initiative). All of these activation dice would determine not just whether a unit activated but the order in which they act (so units activated together also act in coordination while individually activated troops kinda just did what they did when they got the chance to). Though reactions allowed this to be circumvented so that an enemy walking into view would trigger a "loaded" activation in a sense.

In short, reserve units were easier to maneuver and use *as units* in addition to as individuals, though a unit moving in reserve suddenly engaged would be at a disadvantage in other regards to a unit that is already engaged or sitting in "overwatch" when they 'find' a new contact (won't go into the mechanism for that here, but that part was simple).

I also experimented with order dice being hierarchical-- So lieutenants would order the reserved squads while the engaged squad leader would be trying to get men around him moving *or* try to pass down to fire team leaders to get a greater number of men going in a coordinated fashion-- but with this being harder than just directing the fire of the MG next to you.

One important note: suppression wasnt exactly tied to being engaged. So if you were taking fire and ducked back into cover that allowed freedom of movement, you could still have an organized withdrawal through a covered route. If that got cut off, that's when the big casualties happened.

Here's a short batrep I did at squad level:
link

Overall I think I was going for too much detail (individual activations in random order mixed with ordered activations by unit leaders mixed reactions and all of those might be sprinting vs. moving and firing vs. taking an effective fire position) but with streamlining I think the basic dynamics were right while keeping some wargame familiarity (having activation rolls, in sight tests a la THW).

Particularly, I think if I took a leader-centric view and removed individuaul detail (assuming anyone not specifically ordered is either engaging the enemy or suppressed) the whole thing might work better with little loss of accuracy.

Though having truly hidden units would be the next big step…

EDIT: oh, and I haven't played No End In Sight or NSIS by Weasel yet, but one thing that made me stop tinkering was the realization that streamlining this would probably just result in NSIS with some minor house rules added.

I'll try to expand on Analsim's excellent post:

This looks to be mostly from the "General Theory of Behavior to predict the effects of suppressive fires" report.

1. Small Arms Suppression Findings:
(a) The .50 Cal machinegun was shown to be significantly more suppressive than the 7.62mm

The .50cal burst can expect to be about 4x as effective as and M-16. The effectiveness miss distance for an M16 is 1-3 yards. The .50cal is 23-25 yards.

(b) The number of rounds (e.g., 3 vs. 6 rounds) of ball ammunition per burst of automatic fire has little or no effect on the suppressiveness of the fire. However, the time interval (e.g., 4 sec vs. 12 sec) between each bursts has a significant effect.

This is why automatic fire is a waste of ammo and accurate and sustained fire in intervals works best. At every 4 seconds, it would be almost suicidal to pop up, aim, fire and duck back down. So think about it – if you have a 3 weapons firing at each defender (3-1 odds) you could "theoretically" have a sustained fire rate of 1 round every 12-15 seconds for each rifleman and the defender would be almost completely suppressed. That's actually what the manuals state for sustained rifle fire. Excess shooting would be wasteful. That's why Squad Leaders needed to make sure their guys were not wasting ammo. If the enemy did decide to increase his firepower you had enough firepower reserve to pour it on and get him to duck back. That's how I see it anyhow.

(c) Suppressive fire delivered in small bursts within a short time intervals between bursts appears to be most efficient for delivering suppressive fires.

Here is an example of being suppressed: link

However, I would not say it is definitive for all cases. From the accuracy of the fire if it is an AK I'd say 200 yards away max, more likely 100 yards. The video does show that once you lose the firefight and are suppressed the enemy gains the initiative. There are different ways you can simulate that in a game. The interval was so short he did not dare stick his head up.

(d) The degree that a soldier is suppressed by incoming fire can be approximated by a mathematical model which includes the natural logarithm of his distance to the incoming fire.

I've seen the formula, it's from a math professor. I'm a Grunt so I'll pass.

Radial Miss distance: Another US Army experiment was taken to determine the chances of suppressing an ATGM operator with a machine gun burst:
Miss distance 30m 25m 20m 15m 10m 5m 2m 1m 0.1m
Suppression chance % 10 25 30 35 40 55 70 85 100

From "A Further Look at the Prediction of Weapons Effectiveness in Suppression": If 2 projectiles passed within 2 meters of the target within 0.4 minute (2.4 seconds?) the duration of the suppression was 0.6 minute (3.6 seconds?) but could be extended for 0.01 minute (0.6 seconds?) for each projectile for each projectile that passed within 2 meters of the target WHILE it was suppressed. Translating this into seconds suppression time appears to be 3.6 seconds incremented by 0.6 seconds for each additional round. So Weasel, is this the answer you were looking for????

Once suppressed it takes 1/3 of the firepower to keep him suppressed. Personally, I see that as the side that lost the initial firefight is going to be ducking more and shooting less than the side that won who may also be "suppressed" to an extent but spending more time shooting and less time ducking.

(e) Classes (or techniques) of fire affect the suppressiveness of the fire. Classes of fire which result in a random distribution of fire throughout the target area are more suppressive than classes which result in fire being distributed in a systematic pattern.

This would give a good case for "area fire" as it would give the impression there is no safe spot near you, fear of the unknown. This would also be why Squad Leaders needed to make sure they had good coverage.

(f) Soldiers who have received indoctrination stressing the lethality and dangerousness of weapon systems are more suppressed (40%) by the systems than soldiers who have not been indoctrinated.

I'd attribute this to combat experience. Knowing the sounds and the distance, type of weapon, etc. However, I would not consider that suppression a "bad" thing, just that experience gives you the survival skills needed to fight another day by knowing how much time to shoot and how much time ro relocate/duck. FNG's would be oblivious to dangers that vets would detect. I also think vets would know when NOT to shoot back because it's not going to accomplish anything except give away your position.

(g) Soldiers operating independently were found to be more suppressed (43% to 115%) under similar conditions than collocated soldiers operating in groups.

The book "On Killing" has a fairly detailed write-up on this. In WWII US Army procedure was to put the "shy" rifleman in with a weapons team of 3-6 other soldiers. They performed up to par. Evidently there is a lot of peer pressure to perform.

(h) Soldiers defending from frontal parapet foxholes were significantly less suppressed (62%) than soldiers defending from standard foxholes.

I'm sure that's because you've got more protection in front of you but it probably is worthless against a .50cal.. I've also read about putting the parapet behind the trench as you get better concealment and do not sky line yourself when popping over the parapet.

(i) Suppression is affected both by the overall situation under which fires are delivered and by the individual bursts of fire.

If the overall situation is long range ineffective fire and the enemy is not attempting to maneuver then you'd "self-suppress" to conserve ammo and not give away your position.

Wolfhag

Holy crap, that is quite a data dump by Analsim, and pretty cool. A couple thoughts:

-I agree with everything up to 3.II.1.e ("Classes of fire which result in a random distribution of fire throughout the target area are more suppressive than classes which result in fire being distributed in a systematic pattern."). Maybe I'm misunderstanding what they're actually getting at, or lacking context.

But if you're telling me I'm more likely to be suppressed if I'm in a beaten zone 30m x 30m, and every 4-5 seconds ten rounds rain down randomly within that beaten zone, than if I was hunkered behind a wall and every 4-5 seconds a flurry of 5-7 rounds slammed into the other side of the wall, that doesn't seem right to me (just my opinion, though).

The very next bullet ("Soldiers who have received indoctrination stressing the lethality and dangerousness of weapon systems are more suppressed (40%) by the systems than soldiers who have not been indoctrinated.") seems a little strange to me too. I'm picturing a one squad of green troops that was told the MG-42 was a GI killer, and one that was not. I don't think the difference in reaction between the two squads (as a collective) would be appreciably different when coming under fire the first time.

If 'indoctrination' is referring to veterans vs green, that makes more sense, but then needs a lot more qualifiers. For example, green troops will dive for cover when if they hear gunfire within 50m of them. Veterans are able to tell that gunfire is outgoing from a nearby friendly squad, and are going to keep moving, and the same applies to enemy fire. Once you've been shot at a few times, you become pretty finely attuned to it, and you know whether it's you being shot at or not. Your first few times, it's total pandemonium, and I recall having no real idea what was going on, even struggling to piece together what exactly happened as guys were explaining to me after the fact! What I thought had happened and what really happened were two totally different things.

Getting down to III.2., the discussion of work-rest cycle/biorhythms seems a bit strange. To me that sounded more like the talk of the old concept of "harassment and interdiction" artillery fire, vice suppression. And while I've heard of the hyper reaction where guys fall asleep in combat situations, I never actually saw it, though I can tell you that there were times (not every time) where, immediately after a gunfight, you were just drained, your buddy just shut down, you could feel every ounce of energy and mental coherence flow out of you. As I understand it, this is an adrenaline issue, with exhaustion due to physical exertion, the elements, and dehydration being a separate matter.

III.3. seems to be stating our case, that it's not just fire that suppresses, it has to be effective fire, directed at and impacting near the individual/unit.

Overall I think there is some really good stuff in there, though I suppose I'm just saying that because it (largely) reinforces my own opinions ;)

Don – Cool, now show us some batreps! ;) I think 150-300 yards is a good 'average' starting distance for company-sized fights on the tabletop. It does miss some stuff that can have a major impact on the battle, but from that angle, not too many folks want to go through the time and trouble of setting all their toys up, Turn 1 moving their guys up to their jump-off points, then defense supporting fires slam-them, breaking up the attack and forcing the assault elements to fall back in disarray.

I play much the same way, maybe even picking up the action a bit closer, to help units out by getting nearer close assault range so I don't spend the whole day moving troops around with nothing decisive occurring. Hell, for awhile I was using Ivan's "Five Men In Normandy" for a series of skirmish fights called "The Last Fifty Yards," where a company attack had gone in, devolved through squad and team, down to individual rushes, so that I picked up the tabletop fight at the final push onto the objective. I was playing with a Captain or Lieutenant and five rifleman against the last few holdovers huddled around a machine gun, on the objective.

McLaddie – Look at the last sentence of III.1.

RTJebadia – "Way back, Just Jack made the point that once engaged, unit leaders lose a degree of control over small units, whether they are suppressed or not. Eventually everyone's basically taking individual action, with that being some mix of taking cover and firing to make the enemy take cover."
Certainly, but I'd like to put a little bit of a finer point on that. What I'm talking about is the fact that a Company assault running into serious resistance (and continuing the attack, vice pulling back and letting supporting fires have at them) is that it quickly shifts from the Captain's war to a Lieutenant's war (platoon), then down to Sergeants (squad) and ultimately becomes a Corporal's war (fireteams). The idea is that a leader can really only control two or three other guys, right next to him, once under fire, and that is the reason four-man fireteams led by a Corporal (NCO) became the basic element.

The Captain very quickly is left with not a lot to do other than ask for SITREPS from lower, provide SITREPS to higher, and handle supporting fires and other requests of higher HQ. Certainly once he commits his reserve, there's not much to do other than head up into the fight and provide face to face leadership to small groups of men.

Your rules sound cool, certainly seem to look at things the same way I do, but man, it seems to me you need a lot of mechanisms and to account for a lot of variables. It seemingly infuriates some folks that read my batreps (like Rod ;) ), but I prefer very simple mechanics with few variables so I can keep the game moving and focus on tactical decision making.

Sci-Fi is not really my thing, but the batrep was cool nonetheless!

Wolfhag – Your video illustrates what I was saying above. There's no way that guy is less suppressed by the rounds hitting the sandbags right next to his head, then if the rounds were falling all over the place, at random.

"I've seen the formula, it's from a math professor. I'm a Grunt so I'll pass."
Yeah, it's tough. I mean, it would be great if there was a no- formula that said if 'x'-size round impacts within 'y'-distance, a man will be suppressed, and, as with anything, if you have enough data you can draw those types of generic parallels, but if you're trying to model the real-life behavior of an individual for a wargame, there's just too many factors to deal with.

Even in exactly identical scenarios (which could never happen), what suppressed me today might not suppress me tomorrow, and what suppresses me might not suppress you, etc… Dealing with the human element makes for some nasty variances…

To make the situation more general to be more applicable for wargames, I roll dice, and a unit moving in the open, not expecting contact, has a small chance at continuing its movement, a small chance of being rendered combat ineffective, and a pretty good chance of being pinned, and a little bit better chance of being suppressed (suppressed is the most likely outcome, with pinned, knocked out, and okay all equally possible after that, though you can see it's clearly weighted towards some negative result).

What drives some folks crazy with that is, if the target unit came through unscathed, was it because the fire was ineffective (and even, why was the fire ineffective?), or was the fire effective but the target pushed anyway (and why was the target able to push through anyway?)? Me, I don't care, because if I'm a Company commander, none of that matters to me, it only matters that contact occurred and the targeted team/squad is still in the fight, still on the move, and returning fire.

"Once suppressed it takes 1/3 of the firepower to keep him suppressed."
I was thinking on how to use that in a game, and looking at the negative aspects. In real life, what this means is you return (or open) fire at the cyclic rate, then backing off to the sustained rate. But in game terms, if you don't have mechanisms for rate of fire and tracking ammunition, it's moot. And I could see something gamey happen that I never saw in real life: use a machine gun to suppress an enemy squad, then have one of your squads take over keeping the enemy suppressed while the MG switches to a new target, suppresses it, have another friendly squad take over keeping the second enemy squad suppressed, and so on.

"This would give a good case for "area fire" as it would give the impression there is no safe spot near you, fear of the unknown. This would also be why Squad Leaders needed to make sure they had good coverage."
Like I said man (and only for what it's worth as my opinion), that doesn't make any sense to me. If rounds are hitting right above your head, you are thinking "holy , I'd better keep my head down, or get the hell out of here," not "thanks goodness they're all hitting in one place, that means everywhere else is safe." No, that means the bad guys see you, and can hit what they're aiming at.

Conversely, you're sitting there (like the dude in the video), and rounds are impacting 5m in front of you, 5m behind you, 5m to your left, and 5m to you right, with no discernible pattern, what are you thinking? You're thinking, "this kinda sucks, but these guys don't seem to be able to hit , so let me pop my head up and start returning fire." Then, if the fire closes in on you, you probably back down, but likely they're not skilled (which is why their rounds are impacting all over the place, and not on top of you), and when you return effective fire, they decide to huddle up to give the situation some thought. So you were pinned, not suppressed, delivered accurate fire to suppress them, and now your side is free to maneuver.

V/R,
Jack

I just want to add that even if no consensus emerges, this has been one of the coolest discussions on TMP

Just Jack is da man!

wolfhag

All,

I found a contemporary discussion between the current 'Army experts' researching suppression, which I think could have easily been part of the discussion we are having right now, here on the "TMP" message board. I thought you all might like to see what they had to say.

These are the Minutes from a Working Group Discussion of Suppression & Modeling (wargame) between some of the leading authorities during the mid-70s. The group consisted of these persons:

1. GEN (Ret) William Depuy
2. Dr. Robert Blum
3. Dr. Henry Dubin
4. Dr. Wilbur Payne
5. COL Robert Reed
6. Mr. Keith Thorp

Terms used during the discussion and throughout the suppression analysis and related to possible Actions and/or Effects resulting from Soldiers receiving suppressing fire:

1) Flinching. A term used to describe a largely involuntary, instantaneous reaction to the noise or flash of a round. Generally believed to be of short duration this can nevertheless interfere with immediate on going tasks such as aiming or controlling weapons. This is not usually represented as a separate phenomenon in combat models.

2) Inhibiting. A term used to describe 4 more or less conscious and controlled action to reduce exposure to a risk from fire. This term was used for actions such as taking cover or changing the state of movement. To varying degrees present models represent this.

3) Neutralizing. This term was used to represent what appears as a very long term psychological effect of fire. The principal historical source for this is the final report of Operational Resiarch Section 2. But there are other historical examples that indicate it is a real phenomenon. It is not represented in current, small unit combat models. The volume-duration dimensions of fire that occurs in such models seldom, if ever, reaches the range in which this phenomenon seems to occur.

4) Interfering. This term was used to represent effects where, independent of psychological state, the effects of the fire would make it impossible to continue or perform some task. This subset would then include effects of smoke or dust. Current models do not usually incorporate these effects in that part of the model called the "suppression" sub-model.

The discussions of the foregoing topics ranged widely and many diverse opinions were voiced. However, the group generally agreed on the following:
a. Suppression is certainly important enough to be modeled.
b. Suppressive effects may be as important as lethal effects.
c. Suppression is caused by a wide diversity of variables and is difficult to model explicitly.
d. Generally that which has a greater potential to kill has greater potential to suppress, with two notable historical exceptions, white phosphorus and the "Headlight" round for WWII bombers.
e. Artillery bombardment almost completely eliminates return fire by infantry from the beaten zone.
f. Artillery will probably cause tanks to button up and move out.

DISCUSSION:
Depuy: Historical perspective on suppression. US failure to grapple with the real problem – that is getting fire on the target when the ground attack begins. When the suppression is needed most – all fire ceases. This is one thing modeling does not address sufficiently. At Monte Casino the Germans had 3 – 5 min after British prep ended to get into position.

Payne: Models have the capability. The problem exists with the tactical approach taken by the players/programs. Perhaps we need to deal with activities and consequences of activities dealing with exploitation of suppression.

Depuy: The Germans prepped with small amounts of artillery, then heavy weapon direct fire, and finally with small arms – suppression, US approach was heavy artillery – lull – then attack (large groups of targets). Israelis will not attack with their tanks until they have destroyed all visual enemy tanks or suppressed or driven them off, Can models reflect that?

Payne: Yes – it depends on the scenario presented by armor types. One of the problems is modeling the time after suppression. The Russians' model initially identify ‘go to ground time' then all the rest is reorganization time.

Depuy: Difference exists between prepared position and hasty position reaction to suppression.

Payne: Models do handle this although perhaps incorrectly. Going beyond ii this may cause users to look too closely at details. The correlation exists between lethality and suppressiveness. It may lead to problems to compensate for the variations to that rule.

Dubin: What General Depuy way be telling us is that we do not address the tactics of suppression.

Payne: Again this is a function of the tacticians using the models.

Depuy: Models should also handle performance of crews.

Payne: People are not comfortable with projections of less than outstanding performance. Any model Is capable of doing this.

Dubin; The biggest criticism in our last games is that there is too much attrition for rounds expended.

Reed: Models need to better address how much degradation results.

Thorpi Models need to address continued suppression. Times/Amount Ammo.

Payne: Some models do that (ASSARlS, & etc.)

Thorp: Is allowing that capability worthwhile?

Payne: Transition states are infrequent.

Reed: General Dupuy may be looking for a process control model to explore tactics.

Payne: Every means of enhancing suppressive effects, degrades lethal effects. Suggest two level board to review proposals – one to review effects, one to decide if it is cost effective. Models can't answer that question.

Payne: Almost any round will produce flinch. Bigger rounds produce longer effects. Models don't represent neutralization from long duration, saturation explosives).

Reed: What about Nukes: Delays casualties, unit dissolution, and suppression on grand scale.

Dubin: Chemical weapons also?

Reed; Psycho/Physio effects – heat injury?

Payne: We have difficulty Isolating suppression. Different results from proving ground and combat involve many factors. May be double-dipping in trying to solve this problem.

Dubin; Great deal of bureaucratic pressure to reduce rate of attrition, and speed. Suppression is a straw we are grasping for.

Payne: Will use suppression to label effects which we cannot effectively factor. Our models are throughput models – if you put it in at one end, they come out at the other.

Blum.: Models do not include conditioning variables.

Payne: I feel it is better with the current system. Player must input behavior.

Blum: Agree.

Just Jack wrote – "….. it quickly shifts from the Captain's war to a Lieutenant's war (platoon), then down to Sergeants (squad) and ultimately becomes a Corporal's war (fireteams). The idea is that a leader can really only control two or three other guys, right next to him, once under fire, and that is the reason four-man fireteams led by a Corporal (NCO) became the basic element."

I was not there, but have accumulated about 150-odd accounts of small unit (</= company level) actions in Vietnam. One common thread that crops up repeatedly, particularly in defensive firefights, is the constant circulation of non-coms and platoon leaders around the unit perimeter to keep everyone motivated, organized, directed, supplied, bandaged, and probably to maintain their own situational awareness. My impression is that the tremendous noise, distraction, effects of incoming fire and drastically limited visual radius when everyone is down prone a/o dug-in in heavy cover made effective command and control impossible to provide from any distance greater than "nose-to-nose". Is this a reasonable interpretation?

I would also be interested to read comments/responses as to what consequences might likely arise if those non-coms and platoon leaders failed or were unable to do so.

B

Some great comments guy !

what consequences might likely arise if those non-coms and platoon leaders failed or were unable to do so.

Even if there is only 2 men in foxhole, one of them is in charge. And based on how well those troops are trained and experienced, plus motivation, etc. So even if an NCO or PL is not standing next to them, "good" well trained, experienced troops will normally do their duty.

And regardless of what is going on, troops are briefed on the mission and SOPs are developed, etc. So they should know what to do.

In many cases, when I was a Company Cdr. The Platoons just reacted as we had trained. And as I and others here have said before. You have to train & rehearse again and again … then repeat again Immediate Action/Battle drills, etc.

As Jack posted …

The Captain very quickly is left with not a lot to do other than ask for SITREPS from lower, provide SITREPS to higher, and handle supporting fires and other requests of higher HQ. Certainly once he commits his reserve, there's not much to do other than head up into the fight and provide face to face leadership to small groups of men.

I'll only add, even thought you should always designate a Reserve. In many cases you may not have the troops to do so.
Using the "traditional" 2 Up, 1 Back. The 1 Back maybe/function as your Reserve. But again everything generally depends on … Terrain & Situation …

As I had mentioned here on TMP before. When I was a Rifle PL in the 101,'80-'81. The Rifle Co. was an entire Rifle Plt short.
I.e. :

2 Rifle Plts [instead of 3]
1 81mm Mortar Plt

But when I was a Mech Co Cdr, '87-'89. We were up to "full" strength at least by organic units in the TO&E.

3 M113 Mech Plts
1 M901 ITV Section[2 Vehicles]

So in the "traditional" method :

2 up [Mech Plts]
1 back [Mech Plt]
ITVs in Overwatch

Wolfhag – "Just Jack is da man!"
Knock it off! There's been plenty of folks posting cool stuff here. For me, it's been cool getting Foxweasel's perspective, and you and Analsim in particular have posted some really cool data/studies.

Analsim – It's interesting they put flinching in. I think this is what I was trying to get at somewhere in one of my posts above, about having the instant, auto-response, with the key being, what happens next? If it's a near ambush, does the soldier/unit make the right read and carry out the correct immediate action drill, and if it's far ambush (using the terms loosely, it's more about unexpected contact at close range or long range, not so much about whether it's the textbook definition of an 'ambush' or not), do they make the right read and carry out the immediate action drill, then respond to leadership to get them to do something else. For wargaming purposes, even at very low, skirmish level, I think that 'flinching' is probably not something you can account for unless each turn is 2 seconds of time.

"This is not usually represented as a separate phenomenon in combat models."
Right. It's involuntary, and the flinch is over with in a second. Then you're back to thinking and reacting, and you make a choice whether to present yourself to the enemy or whether to take cover.

Neutralizing makes sense to me as they describe it, but, as they say, it doesn't seem relevant to the time frames we're discussing in a wargame, unless you wanted to take it into account as something that occurred prior to action picking up on the tabletop, a state the troop(s) is already in when the game starts. I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around 'interfering' though.

"People are not comfortable with projections of less than outstanding performance."
That is hilarious. "General, you're folks don't want to hear they suck." Makes sense; DuPuy was Army ;)

It sounds like the panel discussion is more worried about the physiological reaction to fire than the conscious, decision-aspect of being under fire. In my opinion, the 'flinch' is real, but men recover rather quickly from that, and then it becomes a conscious decision. Suppression results from the fact that, given a choice, most men don't want to present themselves to the enemy if enemy rounds are impacting all around them.

So I joked about 'self-suppressing,' but the point there was not that I could make a conscious decision to hide rather than return fire, you always have that choice. The 'self-suppression' aspect was that I could afford to hide because I was no longer needed (heavier weapons were brought to bear, and all I had to do was wait for them to handle their business). So the conscious aspect of 'regular' suppression is, I could stick my head up, but what am I going to accomplish other than getting whacked?

And you've got to have full context: again, in the near ambush, the right thing to do is present myself to the enemy while I return fire and assault through their position. I don't have a great chance of survival here, but it's a better chance of survival than me taking cover, not being able to return effective fire, and being close assaulted myself. But if the enemy is 200 yards away, I'm probably not talking myself into standing up, returning fire, and moving forward; it doesn't make sense, I'm going to get killed. Maybe if Big Sarge tells me 2nd Squad is looping around to the left, I'll stick my head up and return fire (I'm assuming we're receiving heavy fire here), but I'm not leaving the shelter of this wall/sandbags/vehicle to move forward. Now, if you want me to move back, out of the line of fire, and it's reasonably safe to do so, I'll go for that.

Point is, they are decisions, the Flinch only lasts a second. Rounds impacting around you can sure as hell throw off your aim, adversely impacting your ability to deliver effective fire, which means the enemy is probably winning the firefight, and you're probably going to make the decision, sooner rather than later, to get your head down (going from pinned to suppressed, in my wargame terms). A static firefight with two sides just blazing away at each other didn't really happen in my experience, though I've heard about it in the very long range engagements we discussed earlier in the thread (both sides are keeping up a relatively high rate of fire, but the fact is they're having a hard time delivering effective fire due to the range, and/or they're delivering effective fire but can't close assault due to the distances involved, and ultimately your fire will slack, then it's the enemy's turn for awhile).

"Will use suppression to label effects which we cannot effectively factor."
That's what I'm talking about, abstraction!

Blutarski – "…tremendous noise, distraction, effects of incoming fire and drastically limited visual radius when everyone is down prone a/o dug-in in heavy cover made effective command and control impossible to provide from any distance greater than "nose-to-nose"."
Absolutely. I remember as a young Marine looking at a rifle platoon organization and thinking, why do they need so many NCOs/officers? There's a Lt, a SSgt, four Sgts (three squad leaders and a Guide), and nine Corporals.

In the movies, the Lieutenant, or the grizzled Old Sarge, just hop up, yell 'follow me,' and there it is. In real life, you can't have enough leaders, as each one can only control the couple guys right at his hip. So the Lt comes up with the plan (under fire, with fire having destroyed the old plan), then he, the SSgt, and the Guide start moving out to make physical contact with the squad leaders, pass the info, then they and the squad leaders move out to make physical contact with the fireteam leaders, and then the officer and NCOs starting kicking guys in the ass and pointing out targets.

What I'm describing is the worst-case scenario, very heavy fire. Obviously if you've got elements unengaged, those are the guys you're going to be able to communicate with via radio and they're going to be able to keep their folks moving in an orderly fashion.

"…what consequences might likely arise if those non-coms and platoon leaders failed or were unable to do so."
Well, in some cases a lower-ranking individual steps up and leads the platoon to victory. More often, a lower-ranking individual steps up and wins himself a (posthumous) Medal of Honor or Navy/Distinguished Service Cross for firing some sort of LMG until the barrel melted, covering the withdrawal of the rest of the platoon. Worst case, the platoon breaks and runs.

Legion – "So even if an NCO or PL is not standing next to them, "good" well trained, experienced troops will normally do their duty."
Absolutely, but context is huge. As in my war story earlier about taking fire straight down the street, no one told the two Lance Corporals to dart left and cut off the bad guy's retreat (or envelop if he didn't retreat). But the context here is, those guys were at the tail of the formation and either 1) performed a slightly modified reaction to a near ambush, taking advantage of a nearby alleyway, or 2) they simply judged the fire to be ineffective (not enough to force them to stop maneuvering and hunker down) and began the envelopment.

I don't know how they viewed that particular situation; we didn't discuss it as I wasn't interested, wasn't thinking in those terms. I was doing what I thought was right (returning fire and moving forward) and so were they.

"I'll only add, even thought you should always designate a Reserve."
To be clear, in my scenario, the Company Commander had designated a reserve, but contact had forced him to commit the reserve.

And you actually have an extra element over us (Marine Rifle Company). We have the three rifle platoons, and sure we have a Weapons Platoon, but Wpns almost always get broken up, so that the MGs, SMAWs, and assault men (infantry trained in demolitions) are attached out directly to the platoons, with only the mortar section remaining, and they hang around the CP. They could be used as a reserve in a last-ditch, holy we're about to be overrun kind of way, but I wouldn't try using them as a rifle platoon-style maneuver element in an offensive capacity.

V/R,
Jack

So are any closer to a definition of suppression and if so are we any closer to developing a construct that can viably depict (as opposed to simulate)battle at a company level? Oddly enough, the thing that has worked best for us for both WW2 and Vietnam has been a field-stripped version of Bolt Action.

Legion – "So even if an NCO or PL is not standing next to them, "good" well trained, experienced troops will normally do their duty."
Absolutely, but context is huge.

Completely agree … But along with the ever present "Situation & Terrain" paradigm. We know not all of our troops are, Rommels, Pattons, Rambos, etc.
Just like any leader/trooper, some may make different decisions, choices, etc. Than you or I, etc., would.

I got to know most of my troops skills, predilections, etc. pretty well. As most leaders do. After a while working/operating with them. And vis versa, of course.

E.g. One of my Plt Ldrs was a former SEAL and Ranger qualified as well. And many of my other LTs were also highly qualified, many OCS, etc. One was even a former Navy Salvage Diver too. So I got to know their strengths and weakness, etc. And fortunately, many had few "weaknesses".

Just like how a Bn Cdr does with his Co. Cdrs. I was usually cross-attached to a Tank Bn. I'd imagine the Bn Cdr did that based on my experiences and training, etc. Or he wanted to get rid on me. And make me the Tank Bn Cdr's problem !

In some cases I was made the acting Bn Cdr. Again, I'd imagine based on his/their evaluation of my "skill set", training, etc. And generally like the way I knew my Plt Ldrs, XO, 1SG, PSGs, etc. The Bn Cdrs and even the Bde Cdrs "know" their Co. Cdrs etc.

Believe me I'm not bragging, like many we just did our duty to the best of our abilities.
I believe, e.g. the former SEAL was assigned to my Co. Because as it worked out, we were always given, some "unique" missions. Based on my base training and experiences, I'd think in my past. E.g. day/night river crossings, beach landings, etc., with RB-15s. Did that many times in Panama, etc.

I was deployed to the Panama Canal Zone 3 times with the 101. 2 tours on the DMZ in the ROK. Cross trained with the USMC at Little Creek. And the USAF at Eglin AF Base, etc.

So my "skill set" was a little different than the other 5 Line Cdrs[4 Mech 1 AT] in the Bn. And vis versa … So given the same situation(s) we may all make a different decision(s). I'm sure many understand what I'm getting at.

So are any closer to a definition of suppression and if so are we any closer to developing a construct that can viably depict (as opposed to simulate)battle

I'd think based on all the input given here from various sources and denizens here. I'd think like the examples, etc., I tried to make in my previous posts.

I think regardless of the definitions of real world military actions put forth on the gaming table. Many will be based more on the knowledge and predilections of the gamers. Regardless of what real world input has been given here and elsewhere. By some who have a pretty a good CV, veracity, etc. As has been pointed out, sometimes its a challenge to try to simulate the real world on the game board.

Totally, hence 'depict' rather than 'simulate'. My goal is to end up with a fast-paced company game where the squads function as entities rather than evaluating individual SMGs /LMGs/assault rifles.

Uglyfatbloke,

I propose, in a company-level game where one base=one squad:

1: Good/Fresh/Happy: a squad able to maneuver and fire at will.

2. Pinned: a squad willing and able to deliver effective fire, but unwilling to move from its present position unless motivated ("rallied") by a senior leader (Company Commander, Company XO, 1st Sgt, Plt Cmdr, Plt Sgt), or the enemy decides to stop delivering fire on the pinned squad (regardless of whether they choose to or are forced to by other friendly elements). The senior leader must be in base contact with the squad, and will be exposed to enemy fire when attempting to rally the squad. The pinned unit is more vulnerable in close combat (usually expressed in terms of modifiers), but less vulnerable to direct fire.

3. Suppressed: a squad unwilling and unable to deliver effective fire, and unwilling to move from its present position unless motivated ("rallied") by a senior leader (Company Commander, Company XO, 1st Sgt, Plt Cmdr, Plt Sgt), or the enemy decides to stop delivering fire on the suppressed squad (regardless of whether they choose to or are forced to by other friendly elements). The senior leader must be in base contact with the squad, and will be exposed to enemy fire when attempting to rally the squad. The suppressed unit is extremely vulnerable in close combat (usually expressed in terms of modifiers), but much less vulnerable to direct fire.

What still needs to be figured out is:

1. A voluntary withdrawal by the pinned or suppressed unit. Probably allow if it's a covered route, allow pinned units but not suppressed units if it's not?

2. An involuntary withdrawal, whereby the player does not want the pinned/suppressed squad to leave its current position (likely due to not having a covered route to withdraw), but it does anyway. I submit this should only happen to suppressed units, not pinned units; pinned units should become suppressed. Additional fire could then drive them back.

There's my two cents, who's up next? And I feel a bit goofy saying it, but 5Core pretty much does all this already (which is why I use it).

V/R,
Jack

If you're suppressed with no cover, perhaps you must withdraw to cover.

If you can choose to take cover which makes it harder to hit you but also harder to persuade to move forward then separate that out and you can do it by choice or as the result of pin / suppress. (Oh, and bad at close combat.)

Suppressed will not spot new threats.
Pinned is less likely to spot new threats.