"If you were Napoleon, would you attack Russia in 1812 ?" Topic

I heard so many times that the Russian campaign broke the backbone of the mighty Grand Army.

If you were Him, would you attack Russia too ?

If your answer is "NO", then I'm very curious of your reasoning.

Yes, but I would go for Petersburg not Moscow.

Alternatively, take Smolensk and call it a day.

I'd set off a bit earlier.

1) Start earlier
2) Stop at and not attack Smolensk, when it was clear continued pursuit would return little.
3) Build Lithuania's military and force Russian to go on the offensive to stop it.
4) Then drag more of Prussian and Austria to support the conflict
5) Pull another Friedland- end Russian's ability to war

BTW-Not particularly a fair comparison/second guessing since we have 20/20 hind sight.

MG

As 138 said: yes, but on a more limited basis. Go for the Baltic States, St. Petersburg, and Smolensk, take over the major Russian trade routes to Europe, and then settle in for a defensive counter-punch or the inevitable negotiations. Garrison the Baltic States with Prussians and Smolensk with Austrians to keep those client states happy, and run the occupation from the more easily supplied St. Petersburg. Leave Davout in charge, release the bulk of the allied forces to popular acclaim, and go home to Paris and the charms of my young wife. ;)

Have doctors and Commissariat officers smart and brave enough to tell their Superiors and funnel everything to the top that:

1) Early report of Typhus have come in.

2) The Grass and Corn (cereal) for foraging/animals is STILL Green and will remain so for at least another month.

3) To at least recognize that a "Scorched Earth" policy might/could greet them at the earliest opportunity.

Do the basics and who knows what could have happened…

(Sorry, but the old Army marches on its stomach rule should always be applied first and referred to often in war, but it's been forgotten enough even in modern times that one has to be reminded).

Ok let us assume I am Napoleon (I am basing what follows on the works of Schroeder, Esdaile, Kissinger, Zamoyski, Jarrett). That means I still above all want peace with Britain, and I want to be hegemon in continental Europe. I.e I want to be the mediator of the relationship of the British Empire (and thus the world system) with Europe.

My logic is that as long as Russia is an independent state, Britain will i) always have a potential continental ally as an alternative to cutting a deal with me ii) as long as I am fighting Britain and an independent continental power exists that continental power will always be able to chart a independent foreign policy . Thus I must either (1)defeat Britain, or (2) defeat Russia, or (3)Turn Russia on Britain.

(3) has failed. Russia is willing to declare war on Britain but not prosecute it. It is also not implementing the Continental Blockade as I want.

(1) Requires two things (a) Defeating the British Army in the Peninsular (b) if not defeating the British Navy, at least straining it to operational limits, and thus making it prohibitively expensive for the British to land an army in Europe again. (a) is doable if I focus most of my forces on Spain. However if I do that Britain can get Russia to act on my flank. Russian action might trigger Prussia (who I know resent me) or Austrian (who are dangerous) defection. Thus (a) must be attained in a fast campaign. But that Wellington has shown he can stretch out the bloody things. (b) would be served by launching a large number of new frigates and fast ships of the line. However the costs money. Money can only come from four sources (w) eroding the continental blockade so that british capital flows into Europe (x) taking more money from the occupied territories (y) raising the monetary weight of the war on my winning coalition in France (z) conquering new territory to exploit.

Since I am Napoleon and thus fear loss of domestic elite support (y) is out. (w) is out because the Brits will gain as much as I will, and eroding will undermine my authority. (x) is dangerous as I am already over-extracting from my satellites and empire. (z) seems to be a choice, but where to go? Two options: Ottoman Empire or Russia. If I go to Ottoman Empire I will be helping Russia become stronger. I could of course ignore Russia in my Ottoman attack, but that would then make Russia ally with the British. So anyway you see it (2) is my only choice

So (2) becomes the optimal choice for you if you are operating in the bounded rationality of Napoleon.

Now if I am in Napoleons position and I am not Napoleon. No, I would not. I would buy Russian neutrality via giving them full support in the Balkans against the Ottomans (And thus tying Austria to me. I also return Illyria to Austria), then head a major campaign against Wellington in Spain. If am able to limit him into Portugal again, I then end the continental system and declare my willingness to negotiate a major settlement in Europe. I make sure I am the one calling the Vienna Congress and that I am there on that seat.

Well, if I were Napoleon, of course I would, because I'd be completely nuts about control, convinced I was so brilliant that other's failures didn't serve as warnings, and always seeing brute force as the ideal solution.

But if I were just Emperor of the French starting about 1810, I'd tell Alexander that trade between Russia and Britain was not my problem, repeal the Berlin and Milan Decrees and return the Spanish Bourbons to Spain as I pulled my troops out--their country, their problem.

That leaves me with France to the "natural frontiers" Italy, Switzerland and a buffer state in western and central Germany, guarded by the most powerful army in the world. I could focus on making that territory peaceful, prosperous and well-governed. It's called quitting while you're ahead, and it's practiced in real life because in real life, unlike miniatures, the world doesn't end when you stop rolling dice for the evening.

Most wargamers played WAY too much Risk in their formative years. I never understood the attraction.

Heck yeah. I'm the greatest military mind of my generation.

Just don't take as many guys. Instead of backing away from my grand army and stringing my lines out, perhaps a smaller force could bait them into a fight.

I never understood why both Napoleon and Hitler tried for the whole enchilada so fast. Why not take a portion that could be digested, entrench, develop supply lines and structures and get the rest next year or the year after.

No, because I have 20/20 hindsight. Armed with that, I'd see what sort of compromise would convince the British to make peace and settle for staying on the throne in a France that had the frontiers won by 1800. Of course then I wouldn't be Napoleon, now would I?

But the King of Rome might become Napoleon II.

Pretty much what Robert said.

Hindsight is 20/20. Of course I would not attack Russia. I would consolidate my holdings in Europe and get to work on a world class navy.

No… build a Navy instead…

I'm not sure the wisest course was to attack Russia at all in 1812, but assuming it is felt by Napoleon to be necessary, then I'd agree with what many above have already said -- aim for St. Petersburg and seizure of the Baltic ports, since it was Russian trade with the UK that is ostensibly the cause of hostilities in the first place. So make that trade much harder by controlling the ports and compel the Russians to negotiate for their return. Encourage Finnish separatism. Hell, offer some of the Baltic territory to Sweden and Prussia to make them eager partners.

This seems more realistic and sensible than marching into the wastes of central Russia, anyway.

On the other hand, I also see the attraction of reaching a compromise with Britain over Spain to stop that futile waste of resources (find Joseph another throne and let the Bourbons return to Madrid and be a buffer to the Pyrenees); and then making a grand alliance with Russia and Austria against the Ottomans and conquer the Balkans, everyone gets a nice slice or some new protectorates (I bet the Russians would do whatever the French asked in exchange for Constantinople), the Turks are expelled from Europe, and Napoleon shores up his dynasty instead of traveling the road to Moscow and ruin.

Sure. How big can it be?

If I were Napoleon then I would still attack Russia because I would still be too arrogant for my own good.

Now, If *I* were Emperor of France instead of Napoleon and I made the same gains, I would not consider attacking Russia until Spain was properly subdued. Even then, I am not sure I would trust Prussia and Austria to remain on my side during an invasion so I am not sure I would consider an invasion of Russia. Finally, with such gains, I think finding a peaceful solution after my great victories of the past decade and consolidate my gains.

I would wait until I was fully motorized to start the campaign and my Polish allies had the new 75 mm guns on their tanks. Otherwise I would go beat up on the Austrians instead, because every 3 or 4 years they stab you in the back and declare war again, then when the Russians go to help them I beat up on them somewhere warmer like Bohemia.

I am not Napoleon… am I?

If I was I'd surrender to the British. Beg for forgiveness and offer to change my name to General Pendragon and help Britain.

Napoleon was not smart enough to understand the distances involved in Russia. That made it impossible for him to get to the centers of power in one campaign. The only way that he could win in one campaign is if the Russians fought a battle for all the marbles early. They were smart enough not to, and he was toast.

Part of the geography, which hasn't been mentioned in the posts above, is that the invasion, for most of the time and distance was NOT of Russia but of the Baltic states and of Belorussia. These were swampy, poor regions with inferior agricultural output. Agricultural land in Belarus has historically been known to provide much less favorable conditions than the Chernozems (black soils) in neighboring Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan. So Napoleon was marching through a region without a lot of resources to supply his army and with a poor road network. Note that this region has always been a sort of buffer region for Russia. The real centers of power and population are separated from central and western Europe. It limited "western" expansion eastward and made it difficult and a lengthy amount of time for Russian forces to intervene in wars in central Europe. Remember the delays in aiding the Austrians and Prussians in earlier coalitions. Remember the same in WWI, where the Russians deliberately kept poor communications in the region as a buffer from the Kaiser. Remember that the Russian army retreated through Moscow to a rich region where it was supported after Borodino, while the French forces were left to eake out supplies from a poorer region with Cossacks in the way.

Okay, in terms of strategy, conquering Beolrussia or expecting a final battle there was not a viable idea if the Russians played their cards right. The objective should have been to attain the cities in central Beolrus, winter there and build up a supply base. There should have been a strike to St. Petersburg, which would have isolated almost all of Russia's trade with the west and given the French a secure supply base for the next year's campaign. Slices of Beorussia, Ukraine and Poland should have been given to Austria and Prussia to encourage their support and anti-russian attitude. The seizing of St. Petersburg and its trade would eliminate the cause of the war. Trade with Britain through Archangel, Iran or Siberia was not going to be more than a trickle. Pushing the rich, spoiled landowners out of the bright lights of St. Petersburg and into dank, medieval Moscow would be a disruption to their lifestyle and would put pressure on Alexander to come to an accommodation

Don't invade, but intice/trick the Russians into invading Poland and attacking first.

Napoleon did that on the tactical level at Austerlitz and the allies wandered into a trap.

Doing it on the strategic level would have been a masterpiece. And considering many of the senior Russian commanders wanted to attack first, then let them and give them incentive to do so.

And it should be noted that Napoleon didn't intend on keeping Russia as a conquered state. He might have wrung concessions from Alexander after a win, but occupation was not on the schedule.

Further, Napoleon's objective was not either territorial nor a major city-but the destruction of the Russian army-that was always his strategic or operational objective, never territory nor cities.

No… build a Navy instead…

He did, and quite a good one. What he didn't have was a set of senior admirals who would fight to the bitter end as the Royal Navy and the United States Navy did.

Napoleon's naval building program was good enough to keep the Royal Navy worried about the Imperial Navy into 1814.

Further, Napoleon's objective was not either territorial nor a major city-but the destruction of the Russian army-that was always his strategic or operational objective, never territory nor cities.

Actually, I don't think that is right. Napoleon's objective was the mind of Alexander and forcing him to reattach to Napoleon's opposition to Britain. What means to do it, was not the important thing.

He did, and quite a good one. What he didn't have was a set of senior admirals who would fight to the bitter end as the Royal Navy and the United States Navy did.

French admirals fought bravely to the end at Trafalgar and the Nile. The problem was that the RN was inflicting a kill ratio of 10:1 during those battles. The French couldn't win against the RN. End of story.

Fighting bravely isn't the issue. Fighting to win and hunting and fighting aggressively is. The Royal Navy and the United States Navy did, but the French admirals as a group, with notable exceptions, did not and that was the French navy's problem.

That being said, the French did have naval successes against the Royal Navy, the battle of Grand Port being one, where an entire Royal Navy frigate squadron was taken or sunk. And Latouche-Treville, Napoleon's best admiral (who unfortunately died in 1804) was successful in defeating Nelson twice in raids against the Boulogne Flotilla.

…Napoleon's objective was the mind of Alexander…

I don't agree. Napoleon's objective was always the enemy's army. With the Russian main army badly defeated and/or destroyed in 1812 Alexander would have come to terms as he had in 1807 after Friedland.

I would not attack Russia but hire Brechtel to do the PR work to convince everyone I had conquered it.

…Napoleon's objective was the mind of Alexander…

I don't agree. Napoleon's objective was always the enemy's army. With the Russian main army badly defeated and/or destroyed in 1812 Alexander would have come to terms as he had in 1807 after Friedland.

Gee, I guess I missed some history. I thought that Napoleon sat in Moscow for a number of weeks trying to communicate with Alexander. Instead, he must have reorganized for a few days and then taken off against the main Russian army again. As well as that, I guess all those and earlier communications to Alexander about his desire for peace and an end to the invasion are all an old version of "fake news".

The political objective has to be addressed by the strategy which has to be addressed / implemented by the operational plan, i.e. a successful campaign.

Napoleon used the battles as the operational way to achieve his strategic goals. Usually the strategy was to remove the means whereby the enemy resisted; he then got to implement his political goal by force as he had the only force left in the game.

This approach worked quite well on the whole but faltered badly in Prussia, Spain and Russia, in different ways. In Prussia in 1806, defeating the Prussian army didn't produce a Prussian surrender because the Prussian army wasn't the main one. It took defeat in 1807 of the real main army, the Russian, to accomplish that.

In Spain, beating Spanish armies didn't end Spanish resistance. In Russia, tactically defeating the Russian army at Borodino but leaving it intact enough to fight on didn't bring Russia to the table, certainly not while the French were 500 miles inside Russia.

As Correlli Barnett put it, Napoleon the statesman set Napoleon the general impossible tasks. There was probably no political goal vis a vis Russia that a French army could effectuate in 1812 (a French fleet maybe).

Napoleon had IMHO a better chance in 1815 than in 1812. It is often assumed that had Napoleon won at Waterloo he'd have been crushed anyway. I'm not so sure. Britain would have evacuated her army and been accusing of running away, while Prussia's army would have suffered an apocalypse worse than Jena. The only two players left would be Austria and Russia, who would have wondered what political goal, exactly, another war with Napoleon served and what risks were worth taking for that goal. They weren't at liberty to wonder this at the time, but with two of four coalition powers eliminated, it wouldn't have been long in occurring to them.

The British weren't always as clear-sighted as they might have been about their political goals, but in 1812 they didn't lose sight of the key one, which was toppling Bonaparte. Let's not forget that contracts to clothe the Grande Armee in Russia were let to British companies with the minuted connivance of the Cabinet, who were clear that nothing should be done (or omitted) that might discourage Napoleon from invading Russia.

No way I would invade – first deal with Spain, give it back to the Spanish King – and then re cuperate, any attack on a strong empire would be suicidal.
Next step up on the escalation, make Poland a Kingdom, then let's see what the Russians would do.
In case they attack, make an even greater Polish Kingdom.
In the end make Poland so strong that it would not even check the Russians but keep Prussia subdued as well.

The Continental System was one of Napoleon's three 'great' mistakes. The other two were Spain and Russia.

Napoleon's initial plan was to trap the Russian armies close to the Russian border and not to pursue into the interior.

And though he defeated Kutusov at Borodino and inflicted heavier casualties than he incurred, it was not a decisive defeat.

Napoleon fully understood the size of Russia, but it was just too big and the distances were too great for the means at hand.

It is also overlooked that the Russian losses were about on a par with what Napoleon incurred.

Napoleon's motivation for marching deeper into Russian was probably that he had not lost a campaign before and was reluctant to withdraw, though in hindsight he should have withdrawn, or at least not stayed in Moscow for a month.

His best tactical performance of the campaign was probably the Berezina.

If I was smart enough not to invade Russia, hopefully I'd be smart enough not to invade Spain, either.

@ von W

The trouble with making Poland a kingdom is surely that there's no way you annoy only Russia. Austria and Prussia would have been a bit unhappy too, at which point the Continental System has just sprung two more leaks.

The thing is, Britain's Foreign Policy has always been not allowing a single "empire" in Europe (Britain being inside the EU and therefore part of that "empire" allowed the EU to happen).

The declaration of the Continental System created your war with Britain.

I think the best bet would have been to take the Baltics and St Petersburg, then dare the Czar to come take them back.

The declaration of the Continental System created your war with Britain.

France was already at war with Britain when the Continental System was created, and its purpose was economic warfare against Britain.

"I think the best bet would have been to take the Baltics and St Petersburg, then dare the Czar to come take them back."

In case he did – who should hold the ocupied territories? Boney couldn't stay in Moscow – due to having this huge line of communication and his weak political situation in France – when he was away for a longer time.

His only and hole strategy was to hope for a bonne bataille – very early in the campaign before his army melted away – this did not come – and then he was as hopeless as driftwood – because he had no alternative plans

For the "Attack Petersberg" alternative, I am dubious.

Essentially, there are two ways into Petersburg from the west : through Narva and through Pskov.

If you advance through the Baltic ports and then Narva, then the whole time your left flank rests on the sea controlled by the British and the Russians. And you will have to protect your right flank from offensives Brest-Bialystock-Grodno, Minsk-Vilnius-Kunas, Vitebsk-Polotsk-Dunaberg and Pskov-Dorpat

If you advance through Pskov, your left flank is open to only a few second-class Russian units and maybe raiding paties. There are equivalent 4 divisions in Petersberg and Finland, but the Russians will likley hold these in reserve and not try to insinuate them on your flank. You wil still have to be concernd on yuor right flank/rear about advances Brest-Bialystock-Grodno and Minsk-Vilnius-Kunas. Forces moving Vitebsk-Polotsk-Dunaberg and from Pskov will be more or less to your front. There are no really good, direct roads leading from your assembly areas to Pskov, by there are some roads and you can probably control enough of them to move some your supplies.

The problems really start *after* you take Pskov. You are now about 350 km from Peterburg (almost the distance Smolensk to Moscow). There is exactly 1 road, and not a great one. It goes north-east through almost 200 km of uninhabited (even now) dense forest to Luga (a village) and then turns north for the final 150 km through Gatchina to Petersburg. The Russians could wait for you at Old Novgorod near Luga, but they wont have to. The Russians will have filled that forest with obstacles, ambushes, traps, partisans, etc. Your cavalry will be useless. There will no place to deploy infantry. There will be no foraging for food. You will never get out of that forest.

You can't go around that forest to the left (there is a huge lake). If you strike out east from Pskov, hoping to get around the dense forest on the right, you find there are no roads at all (pretty much true even today), and very few inhabitants. There is also a nice selection of smaller forests and swamps (which is why hardly anyone lives there).

Please tell me how I am wrong, but I just don't see how you get a "French" army to Petersburg.

And if you do, the locals might not co-operate. They might do something like they did for 872 days from September 1941 to January 1944. Petersburg then was the only Russian (not Baltic-German) city with any kind of substantial middle class. It was also the only area with a substantial number of factory workers (these being state-owned serfs, and not nearly as repressed as agricultural serfs). Middle class people and factory workers can be surprisingy hostile when someone tries to take their property or their jobs.

Lastly, even if you take Petersburg, why would th eRussian make a deal. They could burn the place down, blockade you there and watch you starve in the ashes through the winter. There are only two ways out : through Narva and through Pskov.

My thought was that the Czar would have some national pride attached to St Pete, as the Venice/Vienna of Russia, so he'd HAVE to take it back if it was taken.

But I will surrender to your area knowledge. I sure as hell wouldn't want to deal with a hundred km of forest filled with Cossacks!

I agree with about all of you on grand strategy based on 20/20 hindsight. But Napoleon did not have that, and had 100% expectations that Russia would fall like a house of cards. I can't imagine anything other than complete failure on another front (Spain) to alter the juggernaut.

but.. if I was Napoleon I might consider an alternate cooperative campaign involving Russia vs the Ottoman Empire and the Bospherous (sp) in return for a return to Egypt.

Lion -
I hope this works ….
You can visit : this is the only road through the forest northeast of Pskov, today (a 2-lane paved road, with some grading, drainage, etc.):

link

Bogs, swamps and light forest east of Pskov – this is where you go (for several hundred km) if you don't want to go into the forest on that 1 road leading northeast from Pskov.

link

By contrast, it is a rather pleasant trip from Revel (old name for Tallinn) through Narva to Petersburg. Lovely view of the Gulf of Finland in many places …. which would *not* be so lovely to the French as they would be mostly seeing British and Russian ships.