"3WW: limited European attack = non-nuclear response?" Topic

From what we know now (or what we think we know now), how likely/unlikely would a 1980s Cold War nuclear exchange have been had any conventional NATO/Warsaw Pact attack been confined to German terrority alone?

Would European people power have had much influence on keeping it non-nuclear?

I'm interested more in a conventional mid-1980s type TY/3WW or 'what if' scenario whereby the WP advances to the French border (goodbye and sorry Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg) and does not look to fully engage with UK, France, and USA beyond Germany.

Public opinions would not have accepted killing millions to save them.
A bit the same as ww2 fears of gaz arracks in 1939, even for US media nowadays.
Even DDR andPoland would have objected.
First also consider what could cause this war. The 70sor even 80s.

A Warsaw Pact advance to the French border would have resulted in large American military casualties, I would think that tactical nuclear response would be absolutely certain.

I think that's more than half the reason that the American army was there, as hostages of a sort, a guarantee that escalation would be certain, making conventional assault impossible.

From what I have read/heard EVERY wargame on the situation, both civilian and military, ended up with one side or the other dropping just one bomb to warn the other side that they could go no further, than the other side drops one, than…

Granted these were games/tests and the implications of it were perhaps not taken as seriously as would have been if it were for real but it is worrisome.

Soviet doctrine did not foresee a non-nuclear, full-scale war* with NATO (approximately since the late 1950s). Yes, and just do not specifically war did not provide for a non-nuclear war. For example, GSVG was supposed to last about 20 minutes – i.е. The estimated time of the arrival of intercontinental ballistic missiles to the United States.

* A full-scale war means a war involving a unit of more than a regiment.

The US always stipulated that it reserved the right to first strike. It also made distinctions between tactical and strategic. The attitude was that tactical use did not mean events would go strategic. The Soviet reasoning was all or nothing.

As stated, the theory was a gradual set of escalations was a western conceit, the Soviets assumed that things would go to 11.

It was part of Soviet Planning to use tac nukes in there advance (Google 7 days to the Rhine). You would have to contrive of a reason for the Soviets to revise there plans. Perhaps post Chernobyl the Soviet leadership would have gotten cold feet about using nukes in Europe. If the Soviets did not start with Nukes then NATO may have been too nervous (international sympathy for WP or damage to France and Germany)to fire the first tac nuke.

Another item – the other side is not going to believe that you will "stop" at the French or Russian/polish border.

Another thing to consider – NATO had a "passive" nuclear option: using battlefield nukes within its own territory, rendering large areas impassable to WARPAC troops.
This was thought to carry significantly less risk of escalation than a strike on enemy territory.

We now know the Soviets delegated release authority for their "tactical" nukes. This would have allowed them to nuke Atlantic ports to prevent the movement of UK and US supplies to the continent. There were two big issues: would central Europe be turned into a nuclear battleground, and would the US use their strategic weapons and risk a strategic nuclear war, to defend Europe.

The war would have never been confined to Germany. The Soviets could not have afforded to allow other NATO nations to resupply and reinforce their forces.

Hello, Norman D Landings!
For such cases, BMP-1, T-64, ZSU-23-4 and 2c1 were developed. Radiation protection was also present on earlier samples of the Soviet military equipment, but these (especially the T-64) were specially adapted for passing through the radioactive terrain, and, if necessary, for conducting combat in the radioactive terrain.

The fighting units were Radiation protected but what about the supplies that would need to be brought up to them? Another bit of lunacy (both sides practiced it too). Your crew is fine inside the BMP – just don't eat the food that had to be brought through the area now full of fall-out dust.

Hello, Dynaman8789!

Lord, who will worry about the soldiers. As they say, during an nuclear explosion it is necessary to hold the assault rifle on elongated hands – so that the molten metal does not spoil the gowerment uniform. They will give them stew in washed banks, that's all.
Most importantly, what was meant at the same time was to pass through a strip of continuous fires, radiation damage, etc., to save at least a partial combat capability of the units and immediately start fighting. Do not bypass, but pass through the very hearth of a nuclear explosion.
Actually, the BMP concept itself is associated with this – the soldier is fighting, not dismounting. And T-64 is the quintessence of this approach – everything that can burn in it, is replaced by metal or hidden inside.

Of course, from the outside it seems schizophrenic (as well as standards, how much the tank should last on the battlefield before it burns), but in general, so everything was implied.

I agree with the doctrine statements made above. However, The Soviets wanted the industrial Rurh Valley for industrial purposes. And most of the rest of western Europe for agriculture. The use of either Nuclear Weapons or Persistent Chemical weapons would have eliminated a reason to conquer the west. We always assumed they wanted something other than being the Kings of the World. Both of these weapons leave a lasting affect and can make decontamination unrealistic in both manpower and cost.

Now clearly, Post Cold War indications show that their stance seems like it was more defensive in nature.

With some of the personalities in power, we are actually in more danger of a (non-accidental) nuclear exchange now than back during the Cold War.

Lincoln, I'd be curious where you got this from. Soviet forces were forward deployed, and their post cold war plans were not all about occupying western Europe for benign purposes. Examples:

link

This one outlines Soviet plans for a "counter attack" all the way to the Atlantic, using Nukes (and this is from the Guardian):

link

@Major Mike: pretty sure you have that backwards. The US has always regarded ANY use as a strategic use, which means a full strategic launch in response.

It was the Russians who had the funny idea of tactical nukes being just a bigger bomb.

Hmmmm, The Sun and The Guardian. Unimpeachable sources to be sure!

The two Viktor Suverov books Inside the Soviet Army and Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, indicate that their were multiple plans for conquering Western Europe. Both of these book are excellent reads. The give a great view of actual Soviet readiness during the Cold War, and social leadership climate within the army. Many of the WP films we saw as soldiers were staged. I'm not down playing the capability of the Warsaw Pact armies.

The overall strategy used, would have depended upon the political forces at work on both sides and the tactical/strategic objectives. All our briefings, right up until 1989 were any offensive action by the Soviet Union would have had the primary objective of securing the industrial heartland of West Germany.

BG Sir John Hackett's book The Third World War postulated the Soviets would not use Nuclear weapons prolifically, nor persistent chemical agents. However they would have used non-persistent chemical agents heavily. Multiple reasons for this, most having to do with retaliatory actions and the cost of clean up after the war.

The scenarios indicated in the two articles may have been one of the sets of war plans, probably were. Having said that, no power has one OPLAN to prosecute and unknown. That simply doesn't make sense.

I agree with your comment about the Sun and Guardian, but they were citing post Cold War Soviet documents. I'm also familiar with the books you cite.

I think we're in violent agreement here. Even if their goal was to secure the "industrial heartland" it could not have been done without stopping the flow of troops and supplies into the Atlantic ports or from other NATO countries outside Germany. The war would not have been confined to Germany and, as we've learned since the 1990s, the Soviets would have gone nuclear.

@Major Mike: pretty sure you have that backwards. The US has always regarded ANY use as a strategic use, which means a full strategic launch in response.

I'm obviously not 'in the know' regarding US nuclear thinking, but wouldn't it have been national suicide to do that?
It would seem a poor trade to destroy the United States (via a responding Soviet strategic launch) to avenge a Soviet tactical nuclear attack on US or Allied forces in Europe.

Unless the US believed it could defend successfully against a Soviet strategic launch?
I would think anything less than 100% successful intercepts/pre-emptive attacks would result in American casualties far in excess of any suffered in Europe.

Which would seem an unacceptable trade-off to me, but I don't do any strategic nuclear planning myself! :)

I'm obviously not 'in the know' regarding US nuclear thinking, but wouldn't it have been national suicide to do that?

Yes.. For BOTH the Soviets and the US (and a whole lot of the rest of Europe and North America). Hence, the nature of MAD (MUTUAL Assured Destruction).

Yeah, that's why it was called MAD. Because both sides would be guaranteed to be wiped out in a nuclear exchange. Mutual Assured Destruction.

And it mostly worked, seeing as we never saw WW3 kick off in Europe, or even the US and USSR openly fight directly.

This perfectly illustrates the motto of the Strategic Air Command "Peace is our Profession".

I understand the MAD concept, but not the allowing a tactical nuclear strike to trigger a full-scale nuclear war part, unless the Soviets were aware that it would. Otherwise it would seem a risky protocol to have in place.

I think its a safe bet that any use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead to escalation.