"Was Monty's finest hour just a pointless bloodbath?" Topic

I stayed out of this thread up to the point where I felt it appropriate to respond to your rather peculiar claim that Montgomery's behaviors during the post-Alamein pursuit were in some part due to his knowledge that the forces landed during Torch were going to seize Tripol,

Context is everything.
I was replying to (generally) ill-informed posters who complained Monty did not perform well because he allowed Rommel to escape. That is he failed to completely cut off, capture and disarm the whole of DAK. It is a common charge.
I do not know of a single example where an Allied Army cut-off and captured an entire retreating German Army.
Thus I wonder why Monty is singled out for not doing this when every single Allied General did not do it either.
Next I said there was no reason for Monty to race ahead and block Rommel's retreat (even if he wanted to) because he knew about the upcoming landings.
Monty knew Rommel was being tackled from his rear.
I never said TORCH were tasked with capturing Tripoli but that THE TORCH aims were to attack Rommel in his rear. The landing of the Germans in Tunisia simply made all the pre-landing targets redundant and it was start again from square one time.
I have been involved in many a Monty-bashing thread over the last decade. One problem I see is that whilst the bulk of the Hollywood-sourced historians are up-front about their hatred (and I put it that strongly) and are easy confound there is a sizeable community of better-informed posters who feel no need to counter the ignorant. They might disagree with the bashers but they keep their heads down because they know it won't make them popular. My contributions here contain no promotion of Monty but are simple corrections of the more outlandish slurs. However 90% of the people who read this will have me marked down as a slavish adoring fan who is claiming Monty was the best General in WW2.

You are suggesting that von Arnim assemble some reasonably powerful mobile striking force, pull it's components from the area of the primary threat to his position, and expose a 250km flank from Tunis to Gabes, to use them to strike at an American flank of about 40km from Gabes west onto the Maknassay road.

That is not far from what the Monty-bashers say he should have done to Rommel and I didn't see you criticise them.

"Where can I see an example of an Allied Army breaking a Germany Army and then surrounding and destroying it. The claim is Monty threw away the chance to do just that so I am looking to find where any German Army was cut-off and captured by this method."

The Ruhr pocket.

At the risk of splitting hairs, weren't the German forces in the Ruhr Pocket caught between two Allied army groups, rather than being broken and surrounded by an Allied army?

April 1945! Might as well claim the 4 million German POWs in Allied custody in May 1945 were all fit young SS men.
My point is proven. No Allied Army every encircled and captured a mobile German Army. Indeed the East was famous for its wandering 'pockets' of surrounded Germans that simply walked back through Soviet lines.

He understood that a divided Axis in North Africa, with 500 – 1,000km separating his force from von Arnim's force, in an environment where his adversaries had mastery of the logistics flow, would lead to nothing but disaster.

More likely Rommel just wanted to get as much distance away from Montgomery and Eighth Army as he could :)

A resolute stand at Tarkrouna-Khoms would have put Eighth Army logistics on an 1,100 mile round trip from the port of Benghazi. Whilst the stand may well have failed, not attempting at least to deny the port of Tripoli to Eighth Army for as long as possible was surely a mistake.

As to whether 1st Army could cut Rommel off by attacking towards Gabes/Sfax they tried and failed a few times.

While neither the most able or most likeable general one must give him his due. He won a battle that had to be won. Picking apart the record of historical generals is nothing but jackals picking on the remains of the dead lion.

"My point is proven. No Allied Army every encircled and captured a mobile German Army."

> See fate of German 4th Army in Bagration.

- – -

Here is the 5 Nov 1942 German status report, the details of which Montgomery was immediately made aware via ULTRA -

> 15 Panzer Division
8 battle-worthy tanks
200 infantry
4 anti-tank guns
12 field guns

> 21 Panzer Division
30 battle-worthy tanks
400 infantry
16 anti-tank guns
25 field guns

> 90 Light Division
three "weak" regiments
one "depleted" artillery regiment

> 164 Light Division
700 infantry
6 anti-tank guns

> HQ elements and rear echelon army service, supply and specialist units.

> The status of the Italian formations at Alamein appears to have been unknown to Rommel at the time, as they were at that moment still in the process of being ground up and destroyed by 8th Army.

(Note – Approximately 600 infantry of the Ramcke Parachute Brigade managed to rejoin two days later.)

In sum: 38 tanks, perhaps 3500-4000 infantry, 26 AT guns and perhaps 50-60 pcs of artillery: An overall strength = perhaps one motorized division with a very long administrative tail. I'm not sure such a force as described above could realistically be deemed to represent an "Army", except in the most strictly bureaucratic sense.

As far as the conduct of a pursuit is concerned, it can be argued that Montgomery never truly entertained the conduct of a pursuit as generally understood in the military lexicon. His actions could have perhaps been better described as an exceedingly cautious follow-up. The proof in the pudding IMO was his refusal, despite urgings of subordinates, to authorize a full-blooded thrust across the Benghazi bulge as O'Connor had successfully executed in 1940. The motives behind Montgomery's great caution ultimately remain open for debate.

B

More likely Rommel just wanted to get as much distance away from Montgomery and Eighth Army as he could :)

No. He was capable of reading a map. He knew his position was untenable, and that joining his force to von Arnim's was the only way to save the situation in North Africa.

He was given orders by Commando Supremo to build a defense at Mersa Brega (in Libya, about 200km south/west of Benghazi). He went directly to Hitler for a personal meeting on November 28, and proposed instead a retreat to Gabes in Tunisia, where his infantry could hold the line of the Wadi Akarit (which he viewed as a position that could not be out-flanked) while his panzers could join with von Arnim's force to push the 1st Army out of Tunisia and back into Algeria. His plan was rejected.

When his force arrived at the Mersa Brega – El Agheila line, he had about 35 tanks, 12 anti-tank guns, and 12 artillery pieces. Rommel required some 400t of daily supplies for his force. He was receiving about 50t.

The 8th Army attacked on December 10/11. Without combat mobility, Rommel could not protect his position from encirclement, so he withdrew to Beurat.

From there his supplies improved to about 150t daily, and he managed to muster about 95 operational tanks (still only about 35-40 German tanks, but now supplemented by more than 50 Italian tanks). But even with the improved supply situation, some sources indicate as little as 5% of the fuel supply was available for combat use. The great majority of available fuel was used just in the distribution of other supplies. And that wasn't enough -- there were hundreds of trucks abandoned along the supply lines for lack of fuel.

The risk to his lines of communication with Tunis was a constant concern. As a result he stripped the Grenadiers from 21st Panzer Division and sent them to protect Gabes on January 15.

Two days later Monty attacked him with over 450 tanks.

A resolute stand at Tarkrouna-Khoms would have put Eighth Army logistics on an 1,100 mile round trip from the port of Benghazi. Whilst the stand may well have failed, not attempting at least to deny the port of Tripoli to Eighth Army for as long as possible was surely a mistake.

MAY well have failed? Would almost certainly have failed is a more reasonable statement. He could not deny 8th Army anything with the force he had and the supplies he was receiving. Rommel knew ANY position he occupied in Libya was untenable, as demonstrated by his quick abandonment of Mersa Brega and Beurat.

How would you suppose to hold ANY position against the 8th Army with a such a numerical disadvantage and no fuel for mobile operations? Denying a port to the 8th Army for a few more days was a small impact on a big problem. Monty could afford a 600 mile line of communication and would still get his supplies. Rommel could not.

His only supply line was through Tunis. In November/December there was a daily risk to Tunis, and even after the British 1st Army advances had stalled in the winter rains, there would be great risk to Tunis after the end of winter unless the position in northern Tunisia was expanded. This kept von Arnim occupied and focused on other issues than supporting Rommel's operations against 8th Army.

Dividing the German force against a numerically and logistically superior enemy was a path to failure, and Rommel knew it. So combining two forces, his and von Arnim's, to face the most immediate threat, was his plan.

It's fairly simple military reasoning, actually. And it's all available in the historical record. No hyperbole, no moaning, no anybody-bashing involved.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I'm not sure such a force as described above could realistically be deemed to represent an "Army", except in the most strictly bureaucratic sense.

Indeed.

If we compare this to a typical US Army force structure, it appears to be something on the order of a half-strength infantry division.

An "Army" in name only.

As far as the conduct of a pursuit is concerned, it can be argued that Montgomery never truly entertained the conduct of a pursuit as generally understood in the military lexicon.

I am not certain that I would fully agree. If we accept the "military lexicon" definition as: "An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it", then Monty's actions are just perhaps along the periphery of "pursuit".

I think that his actions did have the aim of destroying Rommel's force. But I think he did not see catching Rommel as the key to destroying Rommel. Rather, I think he saw a repeated sequence of victorious battles as the key to destroying Rommel.

For whatever criticisms people may heap on Monty for lack of pursuit, the point should be made that the context of Monty's actions, at that time, was a two year history of REPEATED cases of British generals being defeated while in pursuit of Rommel.

Monty did not intend to repeat that history. He did not intend to win a battle and lose a campaign. He intended to win the campaign.

Putting myself in the context of that time, I can find little to criticize in that approach.

Although I will still maintain that the Torch landings and the 1st Army march into Tunisia made Rommel's position at El Alamein, or anywhere else in the western desert, untenable. The very presence of the 1st Army in Tunisia meant that Rommel would withdraw to Tunisia as fast as he could, whether Monty had broken through at El Alamein and engaged in a pursuit, or not.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Mark wrote -
"If we accept the "military lexicon" definition as: "An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it", then Monty's actions are just perhaps along the periphery of "pursuit"."

Delicately put.

But Montgomery passed up several opportunities to attempt to "destroy" Rommel's retreating force. He declined to make a forceful thrust across the Cyrenaican bulge to cut off Rommel's retreat a la Beda Fomm. On the two occasions when he later caught up with Rommel (El Agheila and Buerat) he generally maintained a static posture. It seems that the only occasion upon which he aggressively moved to bring Rommel to action was the NZ Division's southern hook around Buerat, which was fought off and not reinforced by Montgomery.

My question is why Montgomery acted with such circumspection. Did he not trust the tactical abilities of his troops? Did he mistrust his subordinate commanders when beyond his immediate control? Was he concerned about the effect of a successful Rommel riposte upon 8th Army morale? Was he an over-centralizer? Was he compulsively risk-averse? Was he, as you suggest, intent upon preserving success by refusing to take any risks whatsoever?

Inquiring minds want to know …..

B

See fate of German 4th Army in Bagration.

I asked for an Army that was surrounDed and captured. Whilst BAGRATION losses were high they were not anywhere near 'total.
Remember Monty is being criticised for letting '40 tanks' escape. More than 40 Panzers made it back from BAGRATION.

I can give you an example of an American General refusing to put his troops in the path of a retreating German Army.
Bradley in Normandy saved Patton from himself when he was refused permission to try and block the retreat. Bradley made no secret of the reason why. He believed the retreating Germans would simply trample Patton and destroy his command.

But Montgomery passed up several opportunities to attempt to "destroy" Rommel's retreating force. He declined to make a forceful thrust across the Cyrenaican bulge to cut off Rommel's retreat a la Beda Fomm. On the two occasions when he later caught up with Rommel (El Agheila and Buerat) he generally maintained a static posture. It seems that the only occasion upon which he aggressively moved to bring Rommel to action was the NZ Division's southern hook around Buerat, which was fought off and not reinforced by Montgomery.

My question is why Montgomery acted with such circumspection. Did he not trust the tactical abilities of his troops? Did he mistrust his subordinate commanders when beyond his immediate control? Was he concerned about the effect of a successful Rommel riposte upon 8th Army morale? Was he an over-centralizer? Was he compulsively risk-averse? Was he, as you suggest, intent upon preserving success by refusing to take any risks whatsoever?

Inquiring minds want to know …..

Monty had a very clear idea on what 'destroying' the enemy meant. In his book it was find the enemy. Attack and fix him them blast him to pieces until he is forced to run for it. Pursue and repeat until the enemy runs out of places to retreat and then accept his surrender.
Your error is to believe wars are only won by mad dashes into the night and maps with arrows all over the place.
Put simply you prefer style over substance.

Was he compulsively risk-averse? Was he, as you suggest, intent upon preserving success by refusing to take any risks whatsoever?

Inquiring minds want to know …..

Perhaps an enquiring mind might know about Arnhem and wonder why this same 'risk-averse' General is castigated for his 'reckless' gamble there.

There was an expectation that TORCH would allow an advance into Libya and attack on Tripoli from the west.

link

pg 16
The first stage would be to establish firm, mutually supported lodgments in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area on the north coast, and in the Casablanca area on the northwest coast, in order to have readily available good bases for continued and intensified air, ground, and sea operations. A second stage was to extend control over the entire area of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and in case of hostile action by the Spanish, over Spanish Morocco also. The Allies would thus create conditions favorable for further offensive operations through Libya against the rear of the Axis forces in the Western Desert.

Pg 29/30
Under the most favorable circumstances, advance forces would be established in northern Tunisia by mid-December, with a moderate number of aircraft operating against Axis supply lines into Tripoli and against Tripoli itself. These forces might consolidate the occupation of central and southern Tunisia as far as Gabès by the middle of January 1943. A corps of two British divisions could then be ready to move into Tripolitania at the beginning of March. The British Eighth Army, attacking westward, might by the most hopeful estimate arrive at Tripoli in mid-January. Military control of northern Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea would by such a schedule be achieved at the earliest by March, and might take considerably longer, with a corresponding drain on Allied military resources.

Confirmation of the expected attack on Tripoli can be found in Harry Butcher's book "Three Years with Eisenhower":

page 196: [26 Dec 42] "the British First Army was supposed to keep on to Tripoli after Tunis was taken."…………………

page 207. [17 Jan 43] "Ike told me before breakfast that the Eighth Army had progressed much more rapidly than we had been informed. Tripoli was scheduled for capture within ten days. This might alter his plans for the American thrust in southern Tunisia under General Fredendall. Rommel was being driven our way much faster than even the Combined Chiefs had expected. The only question mark was the condition in which the harbour at Tripoli would be found. If the Germans and Italians had time, before evacuating the city, effectively to block the port and damage the moles, derricks, etc, at least ten days and perhaps more would be needed by the engineers to make the port serviceable. Yet the port was absolutely indispensable to further westward movement of Alexander's forces."

From the above it is clear 8th Army advanced at a rate far faster than the Torch planners had assumed. What now for 'slow' Monty?

German 4th Army Order of Battle – 15 June 1944

XXVII Corps:
25th Panzergrenadier Division – destroyed
78th Division – destroyed
260th Division – no entry

XXXIX Corps:
12th Division – destroyed
31st Division – destroyed
110th Division – destroyed
337th Division – destroyed

XII Corps:
18th Division – destroyed
57th Division – destroyed
267th Division – destroyed

At Army's Disposal:
286th Security Division – destroyed

The 4th Army was pursued, encircled and destroyed by advancing Soviet forces in the course of its attempt to retreat back across the Berezina River during Operation Bagration. It was one of four German armies destroyed outright or otherwise wrecked during this offensive. The German 4th Army order of battle for 15 July 1944 is given below; it includes not one of the divisions under command of 4th Army on 15 June 1944.

German 4th Army Order of Battle – 15 July 1944

Attached:
7th Panzer Division

XXXIX Corps:
131st Division
170th Division

Sperrverband Weidling (VI) Corps:
5th Panzer Division
50th Division
Kampfgruppe Gottberg
Kampfgruppe Flörke

B

"From the above it is clear 8th Army advanced at a rate far faster than the Torch planners had assumed. What now for 'slow' Monty?"

This has absolutely zero to do with the topic under discussion ….. which unfortunately seems typical of your "responses".

Whatever the pace of 8th Army's advance from the point of view of the Torch planners, the question is why Montgomery studiously avoided aggressive contact with a clearly beaten and retreating opponent so dramatically inferior in strength; what decided him to forego the sort of aggressive pursuit that his close friend General O'Connor had earlier undertaken with such signal success over the same ground. As mentioned before, if you have some useful thoughts to contribute, I'd be pleased to hear them.

B

As far as the conduct of a pursuit is concerned, it can be argued that Montgomery never truly entertained the conduct of a pursuit as generally understood in the military lexicon. His actions could have perhaps been better described as an exceedingly cautious follow-up. The proof in the pudding IMO was his refusal, despite urgings of subordinates, to authorize a full-blooded thrust across the Benghazi bulge as O'Connor had successfully executed in 1940.

Huh? The pursuit by Eighth Army was about the furthest and fastest in military history – 800 odd miles, the equivalent of Moscow to Warsaw, in nineteen days – with the Axis forces being bled the entire way. I would like to know what you're comparing it too?
O'Connor began his pursuit ending at Beda Fomm – of a mainly unmotorised army – from about half as far away. And since both sides had traversed that part of the desert twice each, the chance of surprise was zero.

This has absolutely zero to do with the topic under discussion ….. which unfortunately seems typical of your "responses

It is claimed Monty's pursuit of Rommel was 'slow'.
The source I gave you clearly notes that Monty's advance to Tripoli was much quicker than had been allowed for.
It can not be clearer.
All the complaints are post-war invention.
Lies in fact.

The pursuit by Eighth Army was about the furthest and fastest in military history – 800 odd miles, the equivalent of Moscow to Warsaw, in nineteen days – with the Axis forces being bled the entire way. I would like to know what you're comparing it too?

He is comparing it to nothing. In the case of Monty 'special' rules apply. He is never judged on what he does but by what fools think he should have done.
It is clear from the US History I quoted that Monty's advance to Tripoli was much faster than they had allowed for at the planning stage.
Not that facts will have any impact on Hollywood referenced experts.

@ Fred Cartwright

As far as Monty is concerned he is largely right the set piece battle was his forte and mobile operations were not his comfort zone.

I've not read Montgomery himself on this – I've read six or seven books about the desert campaigns and similar about north-west Europe I suppose – but is it the case that the set piece battle was his forte, or was it more the case that any other type of battle, with the forces he had in the state of training and co-operation they were equal to, simply could not be controlled by a general? One thinks here of Ritchie at Gazala being under the impression that he was winning when he wasn't, but Montgomery's experience of France 1940 would have led him to the same view. It is perhaps a signature feature of the conscripted army of a democracy in wartime.

@ mkenny
Monty knew that to win for certain he just had to stay focused and advance on a broad front that could not be flanked.

I'm reminded of a remark of Rommel's (quoted by David Irving and I read it 40 years ago, so it may be dodgy), to the effect that the difference between a bold commander and a foolhardy one is that if the risks don't pay off, the bold commander is still in a tenable position, whereas the foolhardy commander's position is as screwed as he had hoped the enemy's would be. Montgomery post-Alamein seems to have viewed pursuit of Rommel a l'outrance as being firmly in the ‘foolhardy' box.

@ Mark1
Rommel's position was entirely untenable. He knew that.

An interesting counterfactual here is that if Rommel hadn't foolishly advanced so far into Egypt that he was beyond his supplies, and thus basically staked himself to the ground, he could instead have assumed a defensive posture a few hundred miles west. He could then have a fought a mobile defensive battle in much more propitious circumstances. Whether he won or lost that battle, Torch happening in his rear would have compromised his position so thoroughly that it would be game over. He could then have been ejected from Africa undefeated.

MAY well have failed? Would almost certainly have failed is a more reasonable statement. He could not deny 8th Army anything with the force he had and the supplies he was receiving. Rommel knew ANY position he occupied in Libya was untenable, as demonstrated by his quick abandonment of Mersa Brega and Beurat.

How would you suppose to hold ANY position against the 8th Army with a such a numerical disadvantage and no fuel for mobile operations? Denying a port to the 8th Army for a few more days was a small impact on a big problem. Monty could afford a 600 mile line of communication and would still get his supplies. Rommel could not.

Tarkrouna-Khoms was a naturally excellent defensive position. When Eighth Army set off from El Agheila in pursuit they had enough maintenance for ten days – any check before Tripoli would have required them to pull back. The delay would be measured in weeks not days.

His only supply line was through Tunis. In November/December there was a daily risk to Tunis, and even after the British 1st Army advances had stalled in the winter rains, there would be great risk to Tunis after the end of winter unless the position in northern Tunisia was expanded. This kept von Arnim occupied and focused on other issues than supporting Rommel's operations against 8th Army.

5th Panzer Army was doing fine by itself without Rommel, what they needed him to do was to delay the linking up of Eighth Army and First Army for as long as possible.

"Montgomery post-Alamein seems to have viewed pursuit of Rommel a l'outrance as being firmly in the ‘foolhardy' box."

> And that, given Montgomery's monumental force advantage, is the question that still begs an answer. Was O'Connor's thrust across the Cyrenaican bulge to intercept the retreating Italians at Beda Fomm a foolhardy act? Montgomery's subordinates certainly pressed him to seize the very same opportunity.

Why did Montgomery, after having caught up to Rommel at both El Agheila and Buerat, in each case remain static for several weeks? As I've said before on more than one occasion, I'm interested to understand the train of thought that led Montgomery to conduct the pursuit with such great caution.

- – -

"When Eighth Army set off from El Agheila in pursuit they had enough maintenance for ten days – any check before Tripoli would have required them to pull back. The delay would be measured in weeks not days."

> Then why the additional 2.5 weeks delay upon reaching the Buerat position 250 miles away? If it was a logistical concern, note that Benghazi was well on its way to becoming functional as a useful forward port of supply for 8th Army by the time that Buerat had been reached.

- – -

"5th Panzer Army was doing fine by itself without Rommel, what they needed him to do was to delay the linking up of Eighth Army and First Army for as long as possible."

> Probably fair comment, at least for the short initial term of the campaign.

B

As I've said before on more than one occasion, I'm interested to understand the train of thought that led Montgomery to conduct the pursuit with such great caution.

The period documentation shows that you are inventing this 'caution'.

Quotes supplied earlier:

A corps of two British divisions could then be ready to move into Tripolitania at the beginning of March. The British Eighth Army, attacking westward, might by the most hopeful estimate arrive at Tripoli in mid-January

That means the most optimistic estimate of how long it would take Monty to reach (reach not capture) Tripoli was 'mid January.

Monty took Tripoli on Jan 23

Another source:

17 Jan 43 "Ike told me before breakfast that the Eighth Army had progressed much more rapidly than we had been informed.

Rommel was being driven our way much faster than even the Combined Chiefs had expected.

That means 8th Army were ahead of timetable and were 'much faster' than had been expected.

Therefore your claim that Montys advance was 'slow' is factually incorrect borne of your poor choice of sources. A post-war invention of those who had scores to settle with Monty.

Why did Montgomery, after having caught up to Rommel at both El Agheila and Buerat, in each case remain static for several weeks?

You need to understand the distances involved. Whilst the fighting troops may have been 'static', the logistics troops were most certainly not.
Buerat is some 800 miles round trip from Benghazi. Benghazi was itself badly damaged in gales and had to operate far below capacity. Much transport was still devoted to moving supplies from Tobruk – a further 350 miles away.

Words like 'cautious' and 'slow' are pretty unhelpful in this context, as they are almost entirely subjective.

> Logistics
Rommel had on two previous occasions undertaken rapid pursuit advances from El Agheila all the way to the Egyptian/Libyan border and he certainly did not possess the logistical lift capabilities of 8th Army. O'Connor had pursued at least an equal distance across the Cyrenaican Bulge and he was to be sure much less well endowed with logistical support than the 8th Army of Alamein. In view of these theater precedents, I suggest that the issue still merits examination.

> Subjectivity
Terms such as 'cautious' and 'slow' can indeed be viewed as subjective; they can also be seen as relative.

> Montgomery
I am so very, very tired of hearing al the bleating about "Monty-bashing". He was a human being with his own talents, virtues and flaws. He was not a divinity.

> El Agheila and Buerat
"On 15th November 10th Corps was ordered to send armoured cars across the Desert to the south of Benghazi, a mere ghost of O'Connor's daring march of 1941, while the main body of the corps followed Rommel along the coast road. Only on 18th November, when it was too late, did Montgomery order 10th Corps to advance "at utmost speed" to cut Rommel off.
From 14th November onwards, also, Enigma informed Montgomery that Axis reinforcements were flowing not to Rommel but to Tunisia; in other words, that he did not face the danger that had confronted his predecessors at El Agheila of a Rommel freshly strengthened and ready for a riposte. On 24th November Ultra decrypted an Enigma signal from Rommel to the German high command saying that it was unlikely that he could hold the El Agheila position for long, and other decrypts revealed that Italian formations were being sent back to Buerat. Thus Montgomery well knew that if he paused to make elaborate preparations for a set piece assault, Rommel might slip away in the meantime. Nonetheless, he still settled down to organize and stock for such an assault. On 5th December 1942, Enigma gave him the complete strength and supply return for Panzerarmee Afrika and the Luftwaffe for 1st December: fifty-four German tanks, a shortage of ammunition, no reserves of fuel. On 8th December a further decrypt revealed to the British commander that Rommel intended to retire in the face of a strong attack. Even so, not until four days later did Montgomery bring his planned offensive forward by forty-eight hours. As The Desert Generals pointed out, the dread British bombardment fell on empty desert; Rommel had already gone.
Montgomery's plan for attacking Rommel's fresh position at Buerat called for the dumping of supplies sufficient to nourish ten days' fighting by four divisions; a major cause of delay and of strain on British logistics. Yet as Professor Hinsley writes –

"When 8th Army attacked at Buerat on 15th January with between 7 and 8 divisions and 700 tanks it knew [from Enigma] that it was faced by one and a half German divisions with 34 tanks and 6 Italian battalions with 57 … and that the enemy still lacked sufficient fuel and ammunition for heavy fighting."

[Blutarski comment: The above British force superiority at Buerat was about 5:1 overall and approximately 8:1 in armor, a hugely greater superiority than at Alamein.]

- – -

The above is taken from Corelli Barnett's 2007 edition of The Desert Generals. I purposely confined the extract to cited historical facts and omitted his opinions and speculations about Montgomery's possible frame of mind and personality traits. Readers may draw their own conclusions.

B

The above is taken from Corelli Barnett's 2007 edition of The Desert Generals. I purposely confined the extract to cited historical facts and omitted his opinions and speculations about Montgomery's possible frame of mind and personality traits.

This is how Barnett responded to criticism of his hatchet-job on Monty:

But also in 1958 Montgomery published his own highly tendentious memoirs, along with accompanying braggardly performances on BBC television. These perpetrated the myth that in the Western desert all had been defeat, retreat and confusion until his own advent in command of 8th Army. This myth even alleged that Auchinleck was intending to retreat from Alamein if attacked again by Rommel. According to the myth, Montgomery instantly cancelled this defeatist strategy, drew up a brilliant defensive plan for the Battle of Alam Halfa, and then went on to win the Battle of Alamein thanks to his ‘Master Plan' exactly carried out in the event. Alamein was therefore the turning point of the war as well as proof of Monty's genius. So went the story. We all remember that Churchill himself summed up the myth in a phrase much quoted since: It may almost be said [the ‘almost' tends to get lose in quotation]: "Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat."'
It seemed to me clear that this myth was simply NOT justified by the available evidence, and that it was manifestly unfair to Monty's predecessors back to Dick O'Connor. That in particular it did a grave injustice to Sir Claude Auchinleck, who in the First Battle of Alamein in July 1942 had stopped a victorious Rommel in full cry for Alexandria.
So I wrote my book in order to demolish what I believed to be a false version of history, even though it was then the prevailing orthodoxy…………………….I was seeking to torpedo a national myth……………………………opened the way for the broader debate about Monty's talents as a general in terms of later campaigns like Italy and North-west Europe……………………….Second Alamein was strategically unnecessary because the Anglo-American ‘Torch' invasion of French North Africa 1400 miles in Rommel's rear would have forced him to retreat away --- and that Second Alamein was really a political battle, intended to restore Britain's. and Churchill's prestige by a final purely British victory before the United-Kingdom war effort became subsumed in the Anglo-American alliance……………………

Obviously Barnett is a man on a mission determined to takle 'the myth' of Monty being a god. Tilting at windmills would be a better description.

Google-bound experts only get half the picture.

"When 8th Army attacked at Buerat on 15th January with between 7 and 8 divisions and 700 tanks it knew [from Enigma] that it was faced by one and a half German divisions with 34 tanks and 6 Italian battalions with 57 … and that the enemy still lacked sufficient fuel and ammunition for heavy fighting.

There were actually just three divisions in Eighth Army's drive to Tripoli, 7th Armoured, 51st Highland Division and 2nd New Zealand Division plus 22nd Armoured Brigade. About 400 tanks in all.

There were actually just three divisions in Eighth Army's drive to Tripoli, 7th Armoured, 51st Highland Division and 2nd New Zealand Division plus 22nd Armoured Brigade. About 400 tanks in all.

I have lost count of the times he has got his facts wrong. Outlandish slurs are posted but when corrected he simply ignores it and invents another lie.

mkenny wrote – "I have lost count of the times he has got his facts wrong."

> I assume you are referring to Professor Harry Hinsley. He was the actually the author of statement to which you refer. Inasmuch as Professor Hinsley sadly passed away some years ago, you will be unable to correct him.

B

I assume you are referring to Professor Harry Hinsley. He was the actually the author of statement to which you refer. Inasmuch as Professor Hinsley sadly passed away some years ago, you will be unable to correct him.

The principle is quite clear. Any source you post you defend. It is considered bad form to respond to a valid challenge with 'take it up with the author'.
I can well understand why you wish to avoid having defend your several errors of fact but really………

"Obviously Barnett is a man on a mission determined to takle 'the myth' of Monty being a god. Tilting at windmills would be a better description."

Doesn't make him wrong.

He's right on the Churchill quote there were 8th Army victories prior to 2nd El Alamein. Auchinleck had no plans to retreat from El Alamein. Monty's biography is considered by the majority of historian to be little more than self promoting drivel. And finally As I wrote in my original post the Battle of El Alamein was militarily unnecessary. So it looks like Barnett's facts are correct despite his bias.

Doesn't make him wrong.

Does not make him right either. When an author shows a clear personal antipathy to a subject then his motives must be questioned. I know it will embolden the Hollywood referenced posters who have the same myopic outlook.

He's right on the Churchill quote there were 8th Army victories prior to 2nd El Alamein. Auchinleck had no plans to retreat from El Alamein. Monty's biography is considered by the majority of historian to be little more than self promoting drivel. And finally As I wrote in my original post the Battle of El Alamein was militarily unnecessary.

And Barnetts book is considered so biased as to be worthless as an objective study.

So it looks like Barnett's facts are correct despite his bias.

So say you, Ted Danson and George C Scott.

Indisputable Fact:

TORCH had intended to send a force into Libya to help Monty defeat Rommel.

Instead Monty came to the aid of TORCH and helped them take Tunis.

Monty's biography (sic)is considered by the majority of historian to be little more than self promoting drivel

Can you please list the number of historical works you have read on the subject. The number of historical authors you know have opined on the subject and a rough breakdown of the numbers who say Monty's 'biography'(sic) is drivel.

Feel free to ignore this request if you just made it all up.

If I were you I would, as a matter of some urgency, check the definition of 'biography' and 'autobiography' before replying.

"Terms such as 'cautious' and 'slow' can indeed be viewed as subjective; they can also be seen as relative"

In which case, it would seem reasonable to expect copious real life examples – including detailed statistics, of course, not just broadbrush statements, throwaway remarks or hunches, and certainly not hypothetical flights of fancy like 'well, X would have advanced at twice the speed' – of commanders who, when in a near-identical situation, behaved with greater dash and alacrity – and by so doing achieved greater success than Montgomery.

I am not saying there are not such examples out there, only that to say someone / something is 'slow' is essentially meaningless without providing context.

Interesting to note that the
560 Axis tanks
79 SP guns
480 AT Guns
110 8.8cm Flak

only destroyed c 130 Commonwealth tanks during Alamein
Total tank casualties were c350. The numbers are given with a caution that not all battle casualties have been located but given the reporting dates are Nov 6 for casualties and Nov 19 for losses they wont be that far out.
Clearly Axis tank losses were far greater than 8th Army tank losses.

In which case, it would seem reasonable to expect copious real life examples – including detailed statistics, of course, not just broadbrush statements, throwaway remarks or hunches, and certainly not hypothetical flights of fancy like 'well, X would have advanced at twice the speed' – of commanders who, when in a near-identical situation, behaved with greater dash and alacrity – and by so doing achieved greater success than Montgomery

Good luck with that one. I have asked the same question several times and the Monty-bashers just ignore it.

Auchinleck had no plans to retreat from El Alamein. Monty's biography is considered by the majority of historian to be little more than self promoting drivel. And finally As I wrote in my original post the Battle of El Alamein was militarily unnecessary.

Auchinleck certainly did have plans prepared for retreat from the Alamein position. Auchinleck liked to have plans prepared, most of them rarely any good.

The battle of El Alamein was unnecessary because the Axis, instead of making the short sea trip across from Italy, would have reinforced Tunisia by marching and motoring a 150,000 strong army the length of north Africa? Seems doubtful to me.
Besides which the Axis only had to prevent an Allied convoy from reaching Malta by the end of December and the Island would have to seek terms of surrender.

There may be 'praising with faint damning' but this is really too much Raymond R.

'Montgomery, the pissing boy of WWII, yes he was a complete dick, an habitual liar with a poisonous personality who was promoted at least half a level above his actual competence'

I agree with mkenny wholeheartedly that no one bothers to read about Monty. He was a throughly professional soldier who was never beaten. He commanded at a level above most of those he is compared with. He is so often derided as self publicising or egotistical. Against such horrors as Patton and Rommel?
He was very human, compassionate, and very good at his job.

It is so often forgotten that he led the largest successful amphibious invasion in history and crushed about 40 German divisions in the Normandy campaign. He planned Market Garden – one of the most daring operations of the war but is still considered cautious or slow..what should the man have done to be given credit ?

Well, this has been an "interesting" if not altogether enjoyable thread to say the least. A few closing comments follow:

My sole interest in this thread was related to the peculiar nature of 8th Army's pursuit of Rommel after his defeat at Alamein. This pursuit I described as "slow and cautious" on the grounds that no attempt was ever really made by Montgomery to aggressively get at Rommel "on the fly" – he declined to exercise the O'Connor option of cutting across the Cyrenaican bulge; he refused on several occasions supplications from subordinate commanders to let them attack Rommel; he stood static at El Agheila for several weeks when Rommel stopped for breath and did so again at Buerat despite the knowledge provided by Ultra that Rommel was desperately short of both fuel and munitions; he ultimately gave Rommel breathing space of about three weeks to rest and re-organize his forces at the Mareth Line. If Medenine is to be considered, Montgomery in fact also technically surrendered the initiative to Rommel.

I then asked the following question ………. Why?

I never criticized Montgomery, beyond describing him as "over-cautious and risk-averse", and in fact deemed him "a successful general". I never raised a word about egotism or personal insecurities or tendencies toward self-aggrandizement and prevarication that critics have directed toward Montgomery. Nevertheless, I was immediately deemed a "Monty-basher" and subject to all varieties of ad hominem abuse. Such a reaction reminded me of the knee-jerk responses of the irrational Left when one is suspected of not toeing the party line.

Nevertheless, it pleases me to say that I have been able to piece together a quite rational explanation for Montgomery's conduct of the Alamein pursuit. By late 1942, the British Army was facing the first symptoms of a serious manpower shortage. Montgomery's response to this problem was to do everything possible to avoid any serious battlefield reverses by fighting only with overwhelming advantage on his side – i.e., by taking up a cautious and risk averse approach to the campaign. There were to be sure certain costs to this strategy: Rommel's army lived longer; the Tunisian campaign lasted longer; the Americans probably suffered more casualties than might otherwise have been the case. But Montgomery had a first responsibility to do what was best for the British Army. In fact, this same manpower preservation consideration arguably governed his conduct in later campaigns as well – even Market-Garden, the intent of which was to end the war as quickly as possible.

So ….. As mentioned before, I am really, really tired of all the bleating about "Monty-bashing" simply because someone has asked a honest question.

To Raimondo and Greenleader and others who participated in this discussion with collegiality and politesse, thanks.

B

Rommel's army lived longer; the Tunisian campaign lasted longer; the Americans probably suffered more casualties than might otherwise have been the case.

That is a very nasty accusation. Despite your excuses you clearly believe the USA suffered because of the timid brits. You really need better sources. TORCH was compromised before it started because one party played safe with the Atlantic landings. The landing forces were too slow, too timid and completely outplayed by a small German advance forces and an expected easy victory became a messy dog-fight where Montgomery(who had been expecting a thrust at Tripoli from the west) had to come to Tunisia to help overcome the new German Army that was allowed to enter Africa.
Your earlier faulty source:

"When 8th Army attacked at Buerat on 15th January with between 7 and 8 divisions and 700 tanks it knew [from Enigma] that it was faced by one and a half German divisions with 34 tanks and 6 Italian battalions with 57 … and that the enemy still lacked sufficient fuel and ammunition for heavy fighting."

Is originally from F H Hinsley 'British Intelligence In The Second World War' and is page 252 of the Abridged volume. I managed to track down the source rather than relying on a mention in another book and found something interesting.
You also said:
El Agheila and Buerat

"On 15th November 10th Corps was ordered to send armoured cars across the Desert to the south of Benghazi, a mere ghost of O'Connor's daring march of 1941, while the main body of the corps followed Rommel along the coast road. Only on 18th November, when it was too late, did Montgomery order 10th Corps to advance "at utmost speed" to cut Rommel off.

"

This is how Hinsley saw it:

"'on the morning of 18 Nov it was learned that Rommel had decided to evacuate Benghazi that evening, abandoning his ammo stocks because british armoured cars had been sighted south of Benghazi'"

Though your intent was to slight Montgomery instead it turns out his action made Rommel flee in such haste that he left all his ammo behind. Hard to trap a man who is literally prepared to throw everything away in a desperate attempt to seek safety. A victory gained without firing a single bullet!

Get a life, mkenny.

There were to be sure certain costs to this strategy: Rommel's army lived longer; the Tunisian campaign lasted longer; the Americans probably suffered more casualties than might otherwise have been the case.

The real question should be way the TORCH armies completely failed to take Tunis (to timetable) or cut off Rommel from Tunisia. We should be asking why Monty had to fend for himself whilst the TORCH armies struggled in Tunisia. In the end Monty had to come and help them rather than the planned isolation and then two-front attack on DAK.

One thing I've been waiting to see discussed is that you do not defeat an enemy by taking land, but by destroying their armies. Rommel was in Egypt, the Allies were invading at the other end of Africa. Sans political pressure, Montgomery had a choice: He could engage DAK in front of El Alemain or he could let them retire and engage them at the Mareth Line. Assuming his performance in the pursuit would match his historic performance DAK would be intact at the Mareth Line and with a supply line what, 800 miles shorter? Seems to me the attack at El Alemain was the right choice and the battle entirely necessary.

One other comment about the TORCH armies: The Americans committed to this landing and battle were completely green. No soldier from Eisenhower to the lowest private had ever seen the elephant. I believe any strategy adopted would have failed initially until the Americans learned some hard tactical lessons about warfare. Holding the green American army and untested UK army coming from the Home Islands to the same standard of the 8th Army seems unreasonable to me.

One other comment about the TORCH armies: The Americans committed to this landing and battle were completely green. No soldier from Eisenhower to the lowest private had ever seen the elephant. I believe any strategy adopted would have failed initially until the Americans learned some hard tactical lessons about warfare. Holding the green American army and untested UK army coming from the Home Islands to the same standard of the 8th Army seems unreasonable to me.

What is really unreasonable of using two sets of standards as a measuring stick. If Monty was 'slow' reaching Tunisia then the TORCH armies were even slower reaching Tunis. In any like-for-like comparison Monty was much faster than TORCH. If we measure against initial objectives then for Monty that was Tripoli and for TORCH it was Tunis. Not only did Monty take his objective without the planned thrust into Rommel's rear but he then came to Tunisia and helped take Tunis.
If you say Monty was 'slow' then it follows that the TORCH Landings were even slower.

I think many faults could be laid at Monty's hands including the slow progress in Italy, Caen and Falaise and the disaster of Market Garden.

But El Alamein was the high light of his career IMO and it did effectively destroy Rommel's forces (which had already been stopped anyhow and proven to be a glass hammer).

Thus it was extremely effective. It's a shame the pursuit wasn't successful as it would've completely destroyed the Germans but the Brits just lacked that kind of mobile warfare capability.

I think many faults could be laid at Monty's hands including the slow progress in Italy, Caen and Falaise and the disaster of Market Garden.

I would be interested to hear what you think Monty could have done differently to ensure Caen was captured by D+1. Similarly with Italy, which is ideal defensive country and the Germans had some of their best troops there. Of the 2 approaches in Normandy I have always thought Monty's one of shifting the focus of his attacks up,and down his front to keep the Germans guessing and to threaten a breakthrough which obliged them to commit any reserves on the Commonwealth end of the line was the right one. Contrasted with Bradley's plodding approach of trying to force his line forward at all points which made for slow progress despite the bulk of German forces opposing Monty. When he did finally concentrate force at one end of his line he finally broke through and thanks to the Commonwealth effort there were no Germans in the area to close the gap once it had been torn open.
As for Market Garden much of the blame there lies with the Airborne commanders whose plan it was for the for the drops, including choice of landing grounds. My main criticism of a Monty is he should have replaced Horrocks as commander of 30th corps, who was burnt out by that stage of the war, having been badly wounded and still recuperating from his injuries.

But then we would not have been able to enjoy Edward Fox's brilliant performance in 'A Bridge Too Far'.

"What is really unreasonable of using two sets of standards as a measuring stick. If Monty was 'slow' reaching Tunisia then the TORCH armies were even slower reaching Tunis. In any like-for-like comparison Monty was much faster than TORCH. If we measure against initial objectives then for Monty that was Tripoli and for TORCH it was Tunis. Not only did Monty take his objective without the planned thrust into Rommel's rear but he then came to Tunisia and helped take Tunis.
If you say Monty was 'slow' then it follows that the TORCH Landings were even slower."

So you are telling me that a green soldier will perform the same as a veteran? Gosh, I'll have to throw out every set of rules I've ever owned.