"The rifle controversy" Topic

"Thanks to James's post I have just preordered a copy of Earl Hess's upcoming The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth at a substantial discount.

Hess's book is the latest salvo on a long-running controversy about the role of the rifle and about Civil War tactics in general. In 1987 Paddy Griffith, a British historian and instructor, published Battle Tactics of the Civil War, at least in part to refute earlier claims (i.e. those in Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage by Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson) that there had been a revolution in tactics in the Civil War because of the introduction of the rifle, and that one reason for the heavy casualties had been that the commanders of the day had not understood its greater killing potential, particularly its increased range.

Griffith made three interrelated claims in his book…"
Full review here
link

Amicalement
Armand

Hess' book is very good in the large scale (i.e., the big question about rifle-vs-musket). He does have a number of errors when it comes to the small details of tactics. I have been in touch with him and he admits the mistakes. So take some of the book with a grain of salt, but his basic premise is sound.

Concur with Scott.

What complicates discussion of this subject, IMO, is that the war was not fought exclusively with rifled muskets. At the start of the war, very large numbers of smoothbores and only slightly more accurate converted muskets were in the field – especially so on the Confederate side. I recall reading Griffith and wondering if he had bothered to confirm the armaments used in the firefights cited as confirmation of battle ranges; IIRC, many of his citation were from early in the war.

I don't disagree with Hess that the long range trajectory of the rifled musket was quite curved. Indeed, the typical MV of a rifled musket was only about 1100 fps. However, its spin stabilized conical bullet delivered a MUCH better narrower cone of dispersion than that of any smoothbore and this meant that massed zone fire at longer ranges was suddenly practicable. Was Hess correct about a zone of impunity between long and short ranges due to height of trajectory? I'm sure he is. But Balck ("Infantry Tactics") commented about the very same effect with French infantry Chassepot fire in the Franco-Prussian War – albeit at commensurately longer distances.

My opinion, FWIW.

B

Part of the problem of the rifle-musket is the dichotomy between the potential accuracy of the rifle-musket and its actual usage. Hardee's revision of Scott was prompted by the need to deal with the greater accuracy and range of the rifle-musket. Casey's 1862 manual explicitly states that his work was done to take advantage of "changes in weapons both artillery and infantry". There was clear recognition that the rifle-musket was an important technological change. Thus it should be no surprise that both the Federals and the Confederates strove to equip their armies with these weapons.

However, both Griffith Hess have pointed out that in spite if this technological improvement neither side took widespread advantage of it. To do so required training in both fire control and, most importantly, range estimation. Apart from some Federal sharpshooter units in the first half of the war, the ANV sharpshooter battalions in the later war, and to a degree in Cleburne's Division, this was not done. Instead the older and easier taught close range fire tactics were kept in place.

Griffith and Hess are not the only historians that have rejected the "Rifle Revolution" historiography. The following is from Mark Grimsley, "Surviving Military Revolution: The U. S. Civil War" in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press (2001), p. 76:

"These dynamics go far beyond the hoary, college-survey notion that the Civil War was a revolutionary conflict by virtue of its technology or tactics. Such a notion is misleading and sometimes flat wrong. The text-books tell us, for example, that the new rifle-muskets greatly extended the range and killing power of the infantry and that this innovation revolutionized the battlefield. In fact, a survey of the ranges of engagements in all major battles between First Bull Run (21 July 1861) and the Battle of the Wilderness (5-6 May 1864) reveals that the average infantry unit opened fire on its opponent at a distance of 116 yards – an improvement over the 80-100 yards characteristic of smoothbore warfare, but at best an incremental improvement."

This statement is footnoted as follows:

"This sample was created using the keyword "yards" in a computer word search of [the CD-ROM of the] War of the Rebellion. The search yielded numerous references to ranges of engagements. The battles examined were First Bull Run (2 unequivocal range references), Second Bull Run (8), Antietam (21), Fredericksburg (10), Chancellorsville (16), Gettysburg (25), Bristoe Station and Mine Run (7 combined). If anything the ranges were somewhat shorter, since five of the longest ranges are from attackers' estimates of the distance at which they first received musketry and artillery fire. (It is uncertain they could have detected the difference between the two types of fire.) In any case, the findings corroborate those of Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (1987), pp. 144-150. From his own survey of Civil War ranges of engagement, Griffith concluded that the average range for musketry was 127 yards. One explanation for the relatively short range is that most Civil War commanders preferred the shock effect of a single close-range volley as opposed to the firepower advantage of several volleys delivered at longer range."

The real technological innovations of the ACW were at the strategic level, not the tactical: The telegraph, railroads, steamboats/steamships, ironclads, etc.

I should point out that Hardee's manual was not designed for regular infantry battalions, nor those armed with rifle-muskets.

Hardee's manual was specifically designed for the new Chasseur a pied regiment(s) that the army planned on raising. These troops were to be armed with the M1855 rifle and it'ssword bayonet. They were given a new design of accouterments that allowed the cartridge box to be both worn on the waistbelt via a large loop, and slid to the front, more or less, in order to act as a belly box. This, in turn, allowed the soldiers to go prone and easily load and fire their rifles. The rifles being shorter also aided in the prone position.

The model 1855 rifleman's accoutrement set was based on French designs. It had brass belt slides with a loop on top of each so that the soldier could use what are thought of as chest straps, to be hooked onto those loops and thus help take some of the weight off his shoulders.

Many of the situations that reenactors run into using Hardee's manual can be directly attributed to not understand WHO those drill instructions were designed for.

The better manual, if Scott's isn't to be used for federals is Casey's manual. Southern troops are best suited by Gilhams manual.

Quite interesting threads boys!.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

I would say that the actions of the troops and their officers answered the question as to if there was a revolution due to the rifled weapons or not. The war started in the Napoleonic style with stand up firefights and ended with troops entrenching and forcing their opponents to fight at a disadvantage, I don't think I've ever read of Napoleonic troops entrenching in a field battle.

There were no massed column of attacks as at Waterloo in a field battle. All of the divisions of the Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble attack at Gettysburg moved in line of battle, not massed columns. There were assaults against prepared positions by massed columns, but they were often shot to pieces and stopped cold; Vicksburg, Crater, etc.

During the Overland Campaign, at Yellow Tavern I believe, Federal cavalry armed with breech loading and repeating carbines ran into Confederate cavalry and thought to brush them aside as had become all to common. Both sides were dismounted as had become the norm. When the Feds moved forward they ran into Southern cavalry armed with Enfield rifles instead of the expected carbines and were stopped cold. Weapon ranges mattered.

+1 Dn Jackson. Further to his insightful remarks on formations, I would add Sherman's comment that, by 1864, his soldiers had pretty much abandoned conventional close order for more fluid and flexible skirmisher formations of varying densities. Ease of movement was, IMO, only part of the motivation for doing so.

Also, I think it is dangerous to simply extract range numbers from assorted reports and conclude that they are statistically meaningful without studying tactical context and the arms in use. Both the Union and the Confederacy (even moreso) fought with a very motley array of infantry arms through the early year or two of the war; a small but not insignificant number of Union regiments even as late as Gettysburg were still carrying smoothbores. On the tactical side, both limits on visibility and tactical methods exerted an influence upon fighting ranges. At the Sunken Road, the Confederates occupied a reverse slope position less than fifty yards behind the crestline; I physically climbed the slope from the Union start line and paced the distance from the crestline to the road; Sumner's assault into the West Woods was ambushed at very short range. Much of the fighting at Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Chancellorsville, the Roundtops at Gettysburg and the Wilderness was likewise fought in woods and/or thick undergrowth. Factors other than simple technical weapon characteristics played a large role in dictating engagement ranges.

B

I don't think I've ever read of Napoleonic troops entrenching in a field battle.

They did. Borodino for instance. A great deal of entrenching occurred at points that needed to be defended in a field battle… and they had the time.

There were very few encounter major battles in the Civil war. Then again, if every man was a skirmisher in the Civil War, even man was also an engineer/pioneer in the Napoleonic since.

Blutarski,

At least 40 federal regiments at Gettysburg still carried muskets. The confederates had fewer than 30.

By the time the Overland Campaign began in 1864, ALL of the federal infantry were armed with rifle-muskets or rifles, as were all of Lee's forces.

In the western theater in 1864, units armed with muskets were also rare, and were virtually non-existent in the federal forces.

It is fairly safe to say that by 1864 the only units armed with muskets were non-front line troops. Veteran reserve Corps, Home Guard, local militia, etc, would be armed with muskets, etc.

In games fought at the Brigade level, unless an entire brigade is armed with muskets, I see no reason to factor their use into combat equations.

I've always held the view that rifles and the better artillery in the Civil War both had the same issue. One which still holds good today.

It doesn't matter how far the weapon shoots, if you cannot acquire the target!

One of the factors governing battle ranges is the matter of terrain. It's all very well to have a rifle that's accurate to 500 yards,but if you can't see more than 150 the extra range does you no good. Most ACW battles were fought in less open terrain than most Napoleonic battles. Griffith admitted that he hadn't taken that into account.

McLaddie, the entrenching at Borodino happened in the week before the battle, not during it. If Napoleon wanted to go to Moscow, he had to come through there and the Russians knew it.

Lots of things to talk about here! :)

I've seen the Ordnance Department test results on the 1855 Springfield rifle-musket and when sighted for 300 yards and fired from shoulder height, the bullet is 16 feet in the air at the mid-point of its flight, so the 'danger' zones are still pretty narrow.

One of the main reasons you see far more entrenching during the Civil War compared with the Napoleonic Wars is due to the railroads. Napoleonic armies had to forage to feed themselves and that meant unless they had some steady source of supply like a fortress/depot or river or the sea they had to keep moving or starve. So if you didn't want to attack an entrenched enemy, just wait a week or so and they'd have to come out. Civil War armies could stay entrenched indefinitely.

And all due respect to Sherman, but I've extensively examined the after action reports in the Official Records, and drill-ground formations and tactics were still being used extensively right up to the end of the war.

Thanks Blutarski. :)

Scott, no offense, but my default is to trust the people that were there and their observations rather than what can be gleaned from scattered reports by researchers 150 years later.

Uh, the folks writing those reports were there, too. Why is the word of a general commanding an army better than the word of the officers actually commanding the men in the field?

My thought is that he was looking at the overall picture, whereas you are reading what can only be described as a handful of reports, (not all reports made it to the ORs, some commanders didn't file reports, some didn't say anything about their formations, etc.). He made his observations based on the total campaign, skirmishes, full scale battles, sieges, etc. At Bentonville alone there were dozens or regiments involved. He looked at the entire battle and came to his conclusion. If you read every after action report, from every regiment involved, and they all, or at least the vast majority, said they were still in the tight early war formations, I would agree with you.

Again, not trying to be offensive, just my opinion based on the evidence we have.

Well, I can't comment on the actions of every regiment any more than Sherman could. Many regimental and brigade commanders did not comment on details such as their exact formations at any given point. But some did. And I can positively state that at least some units were still using close order formations at the end of the war.

Scott,
We seem to be left with a conundrum. If the reports you cite from the OR are to be taken at full face value, then why did Sherman make the comment?

Puzzling, to say the least.

B

Well, first off, I'm not familiar with Sherman's actual statement. Can you give the quotation and when and where it was said? If he was talking about the 'march to the sea' period, well, his troops weren't fighting formed enemy armies during most of that, so perhaps that is what he was talking about, I don't know. But I've read reports in the OR where as late as Saylor's Creek regiments were fighting in lines of battle and even advancing in columns of divisions. There was one action around Petersburg in November of 1864 where a USCT brigade used numerous textbook formations and one regiment even formed a square. I have no doubt that as the war progressed there was a greater reliance on skirmishers, but I have read nothing to make me believe that close order was abandoned.

I'm guessing this is Sherman's quote. From his Memoirs Vol. 2 pg. 394. Sorry for any weird formatting.

"Very few of the battles in which I have participated were
fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses,in perfect order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and of every cover. We were . generally the assailants, and in wooded and broken countries the " defensive " had a positive advantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the ground to their immediate front ; whereas we, their assailants, had to grope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a cleared field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a close and withering fire. Rarely did the opposing lines in compact order come into actual
contact, but when, as at Peach-Tree Creek and Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men fought individually in every possible style, more frequently with the musket clubbed than with the bayonet, and in some instances the men clinched like wrestlers, and went to the ground together. Europeans frequently criticised our war, because we did not always take full advantage of a victory ; the true reason was, that habitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did not realize the fact that our enemy had retreated till he was already miles away and was again intrenched, having left a mere shirmish-line to cover the movement, in turn to fall back to the new position."

Having quoted that, I must ask, did Sherman not see Baird's, Judah's and Butterfield's attacks at Resaca? What about Howard's at Pickett's Mill? Hooker's at New Hope Church? Hooker's at Gilgal Church? Hood's at Kolb Farm? His army at Kennesaw? Ezra Church? Hardee at Jonesboro? His own army at Jonesboro? Not to mention every major battle in the east.

Now, I get what he is saying, or trying to say. Skirmishing became constant during the campaign. But this was mostly because the two armies were in constant contact, unlike previous campaigns. The Battle of Latimer Farm was one big skirmish. The campaign from New Hope to Kennesaw was one big skirmish in Paulding and Cobb counties interrupted by several larger engagements. But those larger engagements were fought by regiments in line of battle.

But to say that army-wide the preferred and/or default formation for fighting devolved into the skirmish line is simply incorrect.

I think you have nailed it Cleburne.

Again, for the sake of brevity, I agree with Scott and Cleburne. It's a matter of context.

I really do not think that anyone is arguing that traditional close order formations were at any time altogether abandoned. But in wooded or overgrown or otherwise difficult terrain, which was especially prevalent in the western theater, it was impossible for units to march shoulder to shoulder in close order and skirmish formations were a known and obvious alternative. As they say, different horses for different courses. I seem to recall some further commentary relating to increased use of dense skirmish line tactics late in the war, which I will be happy to post when I finish getting my books unpacked and back on shelves.

B

Howdy,

Trying to separate dedicated skirmishers (ala Napoleonic warfare) from line troops in the ACW seems to me a futile task. Sherman's quote seems to me to reflect low level adaptation of formations to the conditions on the ground (generally not recognized in the manuals). My assessment is ACW tactics were quite linear. I think Hess' book on tactics covers the subject quite well, and provides ample justification for the conclusion.

In my own (albeit limited) reading, I've come across only one account where one side recognized and attempted to take advantage an apparent range differential (smoothbore muskets vs rifled muskets) – that was McDowell (Sitlington's Hill) in 1862.

My conclusion, for most ACW gaming the difference between these weapons (smoothbore muskets vs rifled muskets) is not a significant battlefield factor, and can be neglected. Trying to recognize it on the table leads to "gamey" tactics generally not practiced during the war.

Ponder on,

JAS

Effective range is only as good as the shooters line of sight.

This may or may not help on a TV programme about foreshore archaeology, the presenter found a musket ball so for the show he got to fire a Brown Bess, now this guy had never fired a weapon before in his whole life, so the next bit is quite amazing, he fired two shots at 100 paces or about 75 yards, he hit the target clean centre both times.

And that is from an untrained person, so it makes me wonder what a trained person could do.?

I hope this helps.

Troops of this period rarely (if ever) got any target practice. Their training was primarily in loading and firing as rapidly as possible. So there probably wasn't a lot to choose from between a 'trained person' and an 'untrained person' when it comes to hitting a target. 75 yards is definitely within effective range for a smoothbore so a hit at that distance is nothing remarkable.

Hi Scott the British army have always fired on ranges and practiced platoon fire as well. I also think it is remarkable that a 'civie' can pick a weapon up and have 100% hits at 75 metres. Being rated as a marksman by the Bootnecks I hold to my statement.

How large was the target?

Standard NATO target of advancing Soldier.

Well, perhaps the fellow was just a naturally good shot. I'm an experienced shooter, but I was pretty darn good the first time I ever shot a gun. Or maybe it's just not as hard as people think. I've read in several sources that one of the reasons that firearms superseded bows was not that firearms were more accurate or longer-ranged (and certainly not faster to load and fire) but because they took relatively little training. An hour or so will turn a raw recruit into as good a musketeer as a veteran, while it took years of practice to make a good archer.

And, as many people will tell you, firing at a target with no one shooting back at you as an entirely different matter from a real battlefield.

The rifled musket trajectory was curved, but the roundball trajectory was even more curved at the same distances. People seem to forget that the roundball has the worst possible weight to cross-section ratio and terrible compare to a longer cylindrical bullet. Think of a bullet as a roundball that has been lenghtened to the rear to contain more weight. The trajectory is a result of initial muzzle velocity, gravity, and the loss of kinetic energy due to air resistance. Long bullets are heavier and can maintain their velocity longer because KE= 1/2 mass x velocity x velocity.

Up to around 200 yards, the trajectory of a smoothbore musket and a rifle musket (a Brown Bess and an Enfield) were pretty much the same using the service charges.

A round ball from a Brown Bess with the bore held level 54" above the ground, as presented by an infantryman, hit the ground at between 160 and 200 yards.

A bullet fired from an Enfield rifle musket held at the same height struck the ground at 195 yards and this would have been fairly consistent compared to the musket, so indeed, on average, a small advantage in distance to the rifle musket.

Regarding the statement above that a bullet from a US M1855 rifle musket would be 16 feet high in the air in order to hit a target at 300 yards, this is not true. From the very thorough US Ordnance 1856 "Reports of Experiments with Small Arms", the following claim is made:

the highest point of the 300 yard trajectory for the rifle-musket, is 40 inches

For a better idea of the actual trajectory of rifle muskets, how this affected the point of aim, and the margins for error, the following link to the Hythe Lectures from page 41 onwards is interesting. It can be seen that the real problems with trajectory were not as much of an issue as is often claimed until the range got out towards 300 yards:

link