"Are command radii artificial and unhelpful?" Topic

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Hmmm. It looks like the thread has been taken off the Napoleonic list regulated to Game Design.

Any interest in continuing this?

You can also turn the question around.

Does it offer an advantage for unit control when the commanding officer (whatever level up the chain is relevant) is located nearby?

The quotes posted by McLaddie seem to suggest that – stating that the CO should be located with the unit "where the decisions are":
"The Commander himself is always at or near the point which determines the movement of the rest of the body. He is with the battalion of direction of the line: with the head of the column, with the leading echelon."

Phil:

Well, I think that is obvious from Marmont's description of the CinC. Yes, being 'nearby' did offer advantages. The question would be how 'nearby.' I would think it would need to be within voice command of whoever is being controlled.

Starting with the Napoleonic wars, the division commander would be with the battalion/brigade of direction. [commanders of 10,000] The Corps commander would locate himself in the center of his command, within 1,000 yards of the front line/artillery distance. [commanders of 30,000], but if writers from the 19th century are to be believed, like Marmont, Wurttemburg and Longstreet, it was more so they could be found by couriers than being within any radius or distance from the command. That's because their behaviors were very much more like that of the CinC. Determine when to release reserves, wait until success or intervene personally if there is an emergency.

As the century progressed and troops began spreading out, this command process began to break down, become less effective. Basically, the close Division and Brigade control didn't work as well. Colenso is a good example. Certainly, operations during the 1870 war demonstrated that too.

The command mechanic would need to take all this into account. Something that would reflect

*The impact of distance on command…time, SA and LOS
*Command methods based on the directing unit
*Staff operations [recon, familiarity with the units etc.
*Couriers or the lack of them [Like the Allies at *Austerlitz or Buller at Colenso]
*Personal intervention

I think a simple procedure could represent that.

Bill

I used them with my rules back in the 1980s. Today it is a matter of perspective. A lot depends on the scale and level.
At larger scale units the main concern is supply and routes as per commo. If they can get supplies then they can get orders.
In far future combat ECM is a battlefield option and still depends on the troop ratio. The larger the less need.

In ancient and pre-gunpowder eras a command radius is good but a lot should depend on the status of the command casting. In skirmish or small units a commander dies and his men melt away. You have to remember these are uneducated masses and are pushed to be there in the first place.

The pre-1900 gun powder era is the hardest to decide what mechanics to use. The men are still uneducated in general and motivation is a primary command factor.

In ancient and pre-gunpowder eras a command radius is good but a lot should depend on the status of the command casting. In skirmish or small units a commander dies and his men melt away. You have to remember these are uneducated masses and are pushed to be there in the first place.

Rudy: Controlling large masses in combat remained pretty much the same from ancient times to the advent of the radio and rapid transportation. Alexander the Great used the same regulating principle for his battle line that Wellington or Grant did. Alexander's Companions were always on the right and always moved to begin his army's advance. During battle, messengers found him and he issued orders when needed, from Battle of the Granicus River to the Battle of Hydaspes River. His 'command radius' extended the entire front of his army. The Greeks before him and the Romans after him used the same methods for controlling large bodies of troops.

The pre-1900 gun powder era is the hardest to decide what mechanics to use. The men are still uneducated in general and motivation is a primary command factor.

This issue of men being undeducated having something to do with the command control is new to me. They may have been 'undeducated', but they weren't stupid.

The methods for commanding troops was seen as 'scale-able'. As Wellington, the 1791 French regulations, Dundas, Casey in 1863 etc. etc. all said, the methods for controlling a company were the same for controlling a battalion, brigade and division, cavalry or infantry. What this means for the methods used for 19th black powder era isn't difficult, and certainly just as difficult as in ancient times for the very same reasons: they all had basically the same tools:voice, sounds and riders/messengers for control…and because of that, basically used the same methods.

I think I'm seeing an argument for a relatively small command radius: There has been significant talk of the commander on the spot to control his troops. On the spot would seem to me close enough to see what was going on, move to the troops in question and tell them what to do within the scope of whatever your turn might be. That includes being present with the regulating battalion to give it its direction. Units not within that small command radius will guide on the unit to their right (or whichever direction is toward the regulating unit) unless reacting to fairly narrowly defined triggers (like being charged or being approached closely in the flank).

It also appears to me that this regulating system in the Napoleonic period went up to the division, but above that things were different. Thinking impulse vs. linear a la Noseworthy's description. Higher level commanders would of course have small radii for direct action like the division commander, but would mostly exercise through couriers carrying mission orders to their subordinates – whether represented by a courier figure on the table or time to activate based on the distance between sender and receiver (though this has some resemblance to command radius as well) with some chance of delay or going missing.

Higher level commanders would of course have small radii for direct action like the division commander, but would mostly exercise through couriers carrying mission orders to their subordinates –

Valmy92:
I think we are trying to see history/command methods through the notional lens of command 'radius' rather than the other way around.

Any 'mission' orders had already been given before the troops moved. As Marmont says:

A General directs 80,000 or 100,000 men, he fixes the plan, and gives his orders before the battle; sets the troops in movement, and awaits the issue of events in a central position. During the action he becomes a kind of providence: he is ready with instructions for unforeseen cases, and he provides remedies for great accidents.

In other words, any orders would be 1. in response to subordinate reports and/or what the CinC could see himself and 2. reacting as a 'remedy' to unforeseen 'accidents' rather than carrying on a constant stream of orders… In other words, any kind of permanent radius/control. A courier figure mechanic is certainly one way of handling the message system. What would the CinC be responding to?

As for personal intervention, Marmont describes what he sees as that kind of control:

He ought to expose himself before the battle, in order to see for himself, and to judge with precision of the state of things; having fulfilled these duties, he gives his orders, and lets each play the part assigned to him. If things go well, he has nothing else to do;…

This is where many 18th and 19th century rules sets fall down-- The CinC gives the mission orders and lets it all play out… if things go well, he has nothing else to do.
This windup and release is the fundamental nature of battle in many respects. What the Command Radius notion does is make the CinC often someone with not plan but to push forward, but also a constant opportunist, continually changing any and all coordination and mission to react to new circumstances when CinCs never had that kind of long-distance control.

If the CinC had to intervene, he had reserves to commit or personal intervention… that is pretty much it. As Marmont observes:

if accidents occur, he should meet them by combinations within his power; if things go very badly, and a catastrophe is imminent, he should place himself at the head of the last troops that he launches against the enemy, and his presence at that momentous period, will give them an impulse and produce a moral effect that will double their value.

It was after this fashion that Napoleon commanded. As his operations were almost always crowned with success, and the armies he commanded very large, he rarely exposed himself to immediate danger. But at Leutzen, there having arisen a great crisis, which was very perilous from the nature of the army, composed as it was of young soldiers, he rallied his troops in person before Kaya, and led them to the charge under a murderous fire.

It is pretty easy to see this in action during Napoleon's battles. The number of orders he gives at battles like Austerlitz, Jena or Leutzen for the day can be counted on two hands. Say, one order to some element per turn in a 10 turn game… not because he was limited to that, but because any more were not necessary.In reality, Napoleon would go HOURS between issued orders during those battles.

McLaddie,
I understand what Marmont thought the CinC ought to do but, not everything goes as ought. Earlier in the thread Wellington's moving about the field to be able to intervene personally at the critical spot was mentioned. How close did he have to be to intervene personally in a crisis? (line of sight matters too)

The idea of how far away to impose a delay on a change of orders is based on being able to see or not what he is reacting to. I assume (recognizing the danger) the arrival of a courier to tell the CinC what is happening. We the players can see the whole table and are often playing both involved commanders. How long did the intel on which the new order is based take to arrive at the command post and how long did it take for orders issued in response to arrive?

Plans and mission orders did change on the day of battle in the face of unforeseen circumstances. An example off the top of my head is recalling Desaix to intervene at Marengo. Another is the back and forth of d'Erlon between Quatre Bras and Ligny, never intervening on either field (or if you're playing on a big enough table, either front)

How close did he have to be to intervene personally in a crisis? (line of sight matters too)

The idea of how far away to impose a delay on a change of orders is based on being able to see or not what he is reacting to.

Valmy92:
True. I think we have to see how things work and then create the simplest method for mimicking it.

I assume (recognizing the danger) the arrival of a courier to tell the CinC what is happening. We the players can see the whole table and are often playing both involved commanders. How long did the intel on which the new order is based take to arrive at the command post and how long did it take for orders issued in response to arrive?

That is the issue.

Plans and mission orders did change on the day of battle in the face of unforeseen circumstances. An example off the top of my head is recalling Desaix to intervene at Marengo.

The French 'plans' for the battle of Marengo never changed: The plan was to survive. Desaix attack was to stop the Austrians, the same efforts as the rest of the French during the battle. That the Austrians were caught off guard and defeated is a real credit to the French, but there was no real change in the mission because of the unforeseen circumstances.

Another is the back and forth of d'Erlon between Quatre Bras and Ligny, never intervening on either field (or if you're playing on a big enough table, either front)

That is another command issue. d'Erlon did receive orders in fairly short order, it was the conflict in which he should respond to… and the time it required to turn his corps around that were the issues.

McLaddie,
You miss my point on Desaix. He had been sent on a mission (on the table writ large) when Napoleon did not expect to be attacked. The change of plan that I am referring to is the one that brings Desaix to the field (writ small) at all, not what he did once he got there.

Again with d'Erlon, my point wasn't how long it took him to get orders, but that he had them as part of a plan, the plan changed and he was told to do something different.

My real point with both of these examples is that both were doing something that was part of the plan, rather than sitting in reserve. The plan changed and they got new orders to follow. Worked out great with (but not for) Desaix, not so much with d'Erlon.

I'm going to address the Wellington issue separately from the orders issue: how close does he have to be with line of sight to intervene personally? THIS is something that I believe a command radius is useful for. How big would be dependent on the time scale of your turn, but I think would be relatively small since he thought he needed to move to be near the critical point when necessary.

Actually, Valmy92, I didn't make myself clear. Both Desaix and d'Erlon were not on the field of battle, but miles away--and off the table in most games. The missions/plans given to both the French at Ligny and Ney at Quartre Bras or Napoleon's plan [save the day having been caught with his boots off…] at Marengo did not change with the absence or appearance of troops on the battlefield. Also, in both cases, we are talking about one order from Napoleon…and one from Ney. The orders are examples of intervening to correct accidents, apply reserves or to address an emergency.

So, yes, d'Erlon and Dexaix were ordered to do something different, their orders changed, but the 'plan' for the day didn't.

Bottom line: Changing or redirecting one element of an army doesn't change the entire plan. In fact, it is difficult to do, sending out orders to every command to do something different in the middle of a battle. Also, changing a plan mid-stream cannot involve something that most military men thought was possible: disengage from combat and go do something else other than withdraw.

Couldn't you just use the commander's move radius as the basis for these issues? If he needs to "take charge" of a local unit, he moves to that unit (if he can get there). If he's not in contact, he can't exert his influence. If he is in contact, he can. Calculate in a time to fix the problem, then subtract from the movement allowance.
Example: Rules state turns are 30 minutes, general's move allowance is 9 inches. He uses 3 inches to get to a unit that requires guidance -- thus has 6 inches left. If you calculate it takes 10 minutes to straighten out the situation, then he has 3 more inches of movement left in the turn.
If you combine this with units that are issued orders, those orders cannot be changed until either the general comes in contact (and verbally changes them) or returns to his pre-designated HQ spot (established pre-game) where couriers from his other units can find him again. So the general can go micro-manage a unit someplace, but all other units are on auto-pilot until he returns to HQ.
If this is combined with some sort of sub-leader rating, where units may not move, move slower or have other issues, then the C-i-C has to decide whether to go kick a slow moving unit in the rear while abandoning the rest of his army to previous orders, or staying in control of everyone and hoping the laggards eventually kick it into gear.
Just trying to get some game ideas rolling here…

Tshryock:

That is certainly one way to do it and the 'auto-pilot' is certainly more in keeping with how battle orders worked for the CinC.

One issue would be the distance a commander could move in say 30 minute turns. At a trot, which a horse can maintain longer than 30 minutes, that is four miles, or across most tables from a central point regardless of the scale, 7000 yards in real scale. Obviously terrain would have an impact. You would have to have a time element in there: how much time was spent at a particular location before moving on.