"Are command radii artificial and unhelpful?" Topic

Someone above said that the command radius of a leader is the area covered by the command, and although it's a tautology, I think it's a very good point. I was thinking this while I was playing. Maybe we should give commanders the benefit of the doubt on deployments and a very generous command radius, but add stiff tactical penalties for isolated and unsupported units; a carrot and stick approach to the issue. I think this would result in the greatest ease of game play.

Being isolated and unsupported should carry their own penalties simply by being isolated and unsupported. That is enough stick. The carrot is not being isolated and unsupported. Why add more rules to those conditions that will be inherent in most movement and combat situations?

I don't know much about the command control and communication processes for WWII armies or after, but What is a "generous command radius?" How do you tell whether it is or not?

Your first paragraph restates my point- I want to reduce rules.

As regards point two, I would submit a reasonable command radius as being proper.

As regards point two, I would submit a reasonable command radius as being proper.

For what period at what scale with what game mechanics?

I don't see CRs as being universally 'reasonable'at all. [however that is defined, but obviously related to representing actual command control. It all depends on what you are talking about

My personal opinion is that command radii may not always be close to the ideal. For the more historic games the the Barker DBM additional points cost for Maneouver looks a better bet. The definitive shut off (mandatory command radii) is not a good model in my opinion. In the age of radio it makes even less sence. MANEOUVER GROUP looked at the issues in detail and chose a an intuitive and more flexible approach where radio is considered. The systems works like this. At the bottom level (I use tanks as it's probably a more simple illustration of the general issue).

At the bottom level (platoon) what one tank sees all other are a at least aware of and in many cases count as having been spotted by all in that unit) regardless of range within that platoon only. Now the disadvantage of being too far apart is that you are unable to gain the advantage of situational awareness provided by gnis, so daft speads of units are discouraged. However in open terrain the "sensible" spacing is set by the situation not an arbitrary radii.

Other functions of command like decision loops etc are delt with in other ways. Rapid advances can be commanded by high level command units but apply to ALL sub units. A bad idea if the units are disparate in there situation. Hence unit at all levels are best given where, possible logical common tasks. In the event of disparate units the command system is less responsive and hence some loss of function is suffered.

The advantage of the situation is it is intuitive. It plays well with players who have an understanding of a period.

It may not be intuitive to a Napoleonic player who is a first time player and little interest in the period. There again the target audience is critical. For a one off player the sins of a command radii may be an acceptable minima.

*Errata … Squad/Plt = 6-10mm should read 6-10cms …

My personal opinion is that command radii may not always be close to the ideal.

Add radio/commo failure or interruption, due to terrain, mechanical malfuction, jamming, etc., …

IF we are just playing a game, the CR or any other mechanic is just fine and the bottom line is whether you enjoy it or not in a game. If it is a question of how well a command radius represents the dynamics of command control, then it must be compared to the thing it represents. So lets take the pre-20th methods. Here is an 1804 and 1824 descriptions of brigade and division command from the British Regulations, it is almost identical to any nations' regulations, treatises or manuals from the 1700s through to the 1890s.

GENERAL ORDERS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE MOVEMENTS AND FIELD EXERCISE OF THE INFANTRY, 1804

37. In exercising or commanding a brigade or line, there must be quick perception and prompt determination, but no great exertion of voice is necessary, except in the executive words of halt and march, and in this assistance may be given by those that are around. All movements and changes of position are effected by the quietly but quickly placing of directing parts, and their corresponding aids, in certain situations to which successively, and in a great measure by the eye, the rest of the body quickly conform. The Commander himself is always at or near the point which determines the movement of the rest of the body. He is with the battalion of direction of the line: with the head of the column, with the leading echelon.

Casey's 1863 manual repeats this nearly word-for-word. Here is further explanations:

Field Exercise and Evolutions of the Army
By Great Britain,1824 Army, Henry Whitelock Torren
Page 264

S. 137. Commands.

1. It is of the first importance that all words of command to a division or brigade, should be circulated with the utmost precision and rapidity, for which essential purpose the eye and attention of each battalion leader must be constantly directed to the commanding general, or to the regulating battalion, when he cannot be heard. The general commanding must give his short orders of caution to the commander of the regulating battalion, or to whatever battalion is nearest to himself, in such terms as may not be mistaken by the soldiers for a battalion order. The battalion commander will proceed without delay to execute the order in the usual terms of command, and in so loud a tone of voice as to be heard by the contiguous battalions.

2. The execution of a command may be regulated by a signal, such as a trumpet, or any other method for effecting simultaneous movement, which the commanding general, at his discretion, may fix upon.

3. Where the wind, or the noise of fire-arms, may interrupt the progress of an order from battalion to battalion, the commanders will conform as quickly as possible to the movement which they see executed to their right or left; and staff officers will proceed promptly to convey the general's orders to the corps which, from these causes, may not have heard them pass from the regulating battalion: For this essential purpose staff-officers may be attached, to carry orders to particular bodies, so as to prevent the possibility of confusion; and where they are not in sufficient numbers, the different field-officers of regiments, who may be placed at intermediate stations, will assist in passing the order from one battalion commander to another: But great care must be taken by those who pass an order, that they have properly understood it themselves, for much mischief and confusion might arise from a multifarious communication of orders imperfectly delivered; and to prevent this the more effectually, it may be, in certain cases, expedient to send the command by a staff-officer, in writing.

4. When troops in extent of numbers are at all beyond the immediate control of the voice, it is particularly essential that the commands to HALT, or to MARCH, should be communicated by a signal, upon which the battalion commanders may act simultaneously; for the accuracy of combined movement would be totally lost, if the different bodies in line, or in column, be suffered to march, or to halt, as their respective commanders may catch the word in its approach from a distant quarter.

Note that there is nothing said about runners carrying messages from battalion to battalion [Though at the beginning of an engagement, detailed orders of what was to happen could be delivered to brigadiers who would then deliver the orders to their battalions that way.]

The above method, passing the command on by voice down the line, is much faster than any courier and one purpose is to get the entire brigade or division to move together "immediately." With this method, From any spot in the line, the regulating battalion or any battalion, the division or brigade commander could control the movements of the entire line regardless of how long it was or how far away the battalions might be.

Again, it doesn't matter how far away the battalions are from the brigadier/divisional commander. As long as they are part of the line and can hear the voice commands passed by other battalions, they are 'in command.' If they become disconnected, their primary job at that pointwas then to become reconnected and mirroring what the other battalions were doing. This effort to get back 'into command' didn't require any commander's action. This was all laid out and practiced.

A marching band leader can direct the movements of the whole band by pre-arranged signals. It would be a mess of a performance if he had to stop and tell each individual band member what was happening with each new move.

The brigade[s] given a supporting role had very specific responsibilities, one of which was to regulate on the regulating battalion in the first line. Without further orders, the supporting line commander could respond to requests by the commander of the first line.

The Corps commander would attempt to be in a position to visually see his command. If not, he would move around. What is clear from narratives and commentaries is that corps and army commanders had little to do once orders were given to start the battle. Napoleon spent most of the Battle of Jena kicking a Prussian drum around waiting for results. At Austerlitz, after releasing Soult, spent the next two hours wondering around the battlefield without issuing any orders.

"In modern battles the commander-in-chief has only two lines of action available―the direction in which to introduce fresh troops, and the moment at which he may do so. Once in action, the troops march straight forward, they may, indeed, leave the field again, but cannot be withdrawn at will. thus [at Austerlitz] Napoleon could here introduce Douet on Soult's left wing, but he could not have withdrawn him again and employed him on Bernadotte's right wing. Drouet had to move on in the direction once given, via Pratzen.

The more the battles of modern times confirm this experience, the more it must be the endeavour of the commander-in-chief on a battlefield to secure to himself the mastery of these two points by which he alone can exert any influence upon the course of a battle, so as to be able to bring them up where and when his plan demands it. If he has no fresh troops to send forward at the decisive moment or to the decisive point, he can no longer turn a doubtful battle into a victory."
--Count Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a general.

Longstreet says the exact same thing about commanding a corps during the ACW. Corps and Army commanders had a fairly limited pallet from which to work once their forces were engaged. They weren't constantly engaged in activities. At the battle of Novi, Bagration found Suvorov napping in the middle of the battle… He only jumped up and ordered reserves to attack when he heard the right reports coming in.

Command radii don't represent anything related to these dynamics. Neither does the mechanic often linked to CRs, command pips, as though poor corps and army commanders had a limited time to do everything they had to do in a half-hour or hour and had to continually pump out orders to get anything to move during battle.

I remembered incorrectly about Casey's Tactics 1862 Vol III. He did not repeat what was written in Torren's 1824 manual. Here is what he wrote on general rules of command:

General rules for commands.

7. The general (by which term, in these evolutions, will be understood the brigadier-general in command) will always give orders to his brigade by word of command.

8. When the general shall wish to cause a movement to be executed, he will give the general commands relative thereto. Each colonel will always successively repeat, with the greatest rapidity, on their reaching him, those general commands, unless the general has given, or sent to him, an order to the contrary.

9. The colonels having repeated the general commands, as just prescribed, will immediately command, and cause to be executed, without waiting for each other, the preparatory movements which, in their battalions, ought to precede the execution of the general movement.

10. The general will look to the prompt execution of these preparatory movements in his brigade, and rectify any error that may be committed by the colonels.

11. The final command, or that which determines the execution of the general movement, will always be given by the general.

12. The lieutenant-colonels and majors will repeat the general commands, whether of caution or of execution, as often as the wind or the noise of arms may prevent those commands from being easily heard from one battalion to another.

13. When, from any cause, a colonel shall not have heard the general command, he will, on seeing the battalion next to his own executing a movement, immediately cause his battalion to execute the same movement.

14. When a line has to execute a central movement, the general will go to the point which he may select for it, and give or send to each of the neighboring battalions, the order relative to the movement which each portion of the line has to execute, as hereinafter explained.

15. In column, commands will be extended, by repetition, according to the same principles.

16. When a brigade is formed in two lines, the second line, in all the manœuvres, will preserve its relative position to the first, and conform to its movements. The chiefs of the battalions of the second line are charged with the preservation of the proper distances. If the movement is to be executed by only one of the lines, the cautionary command by the general will be preceded by the words first line, or, second line.

"What is clear from narratives and commentaries is that corps and army commanders had little to do once orders were given to start the battle. Napoleon spent most of the Battle of Jena kicking a Prussian drum around waiting for results. At Austerlitz, after releasing Soult, spent the next two hours wondering around the battlefield without issuing any orders."

The problem is when I do this my figures just sit there. :)

Another problem I have with this is that it is not true all the time. There are plenty of examples of army commanders intervening in the middle of a battle and changing plans. Napoleon setting up the grand battery at Wagram, or sending MacDonald's entire corps forward in a huge column come to mind, as does Archduke Charle's activity in the same battle… he even picked up a dropped infantry standard and rallied an infantry unit, IIRC. And lets not forget Jackson's flank attack at Chancelloresvillle; or as I like to call it, The Maneuver That Cannot Be Recreated on A Table Top. These are just a few examples.

I agree that there should be some sort of pre-battle planning involved, and if you have any advice on a game mechanic for applying this information I'd be interested in hearing about it. Weren't you working on some rules awhile back?

Anyway, I think that some planning takes place holistically when players set-up, and even when they write up an army list. In historic scenarios they don't have these options, of course; the planning, is effectively done for them.

The posts above concerning brigade orders and musicians are quite interesting and appreciated.

McLaddie: I agree with what you have copied from original sources for the brigade general. It seems very reasonable that these would operate as one unit with regulating battalions. I would not like to see regiment/battalion units out of sight, freelancing or acting independent OR still cooperating in a complex fashion with their brigade.

However, what about the next level up in organization, where a division is composed of multiple brigades? With a brigade, the typical size of terrain is such that the entire brigade can operate with the same set of instructions. However, within a division, one brigade may be opposite a small hill with a slope leading to it, whereas the second brigade has a small village to its front. Two others approach a pond? who goes first or do they both go left around the pond? What about the unit you leave behind as the reserve? At this level, it seems that details of orders to different units matter and are not implicitly obvious. Hence, there is a need for the issuing of specific orders, some delay in beginning the execution, and some chance for things to go amiss. (remember the charge of the light brigade?) A radius within which this can happen with high reliability makes sense. I do like the General de Brigade method of issuing orders.

As for even larger units (corp), they should be given generalized orders by the army commander, who mostly butts out at that point, since he can not micromanage everything. However, he can attach to one corp or division, where he things it is important, but should lose some overall insight to the rest of the battle.

Point 3 in McLaddie's quotation above:
"and staff officers will proceed promptly to convey the general's orders to the corps which, from these causes, may not have heard them pass from the regulating battalion: For this essential purpose staff-officers may be attached, to carry orders to particular bodies, so as to prevent the possibility of confusion; and where they are not in sufficient numbers, the different field-officers of regiments, who may be placed at intermediate stations, will assist in passing the order from one battalion commander to another: But great care must be taken by those who pass an order, that they have properly understood it themselves, for much mischief and confusion might arise from a multifarious communication of orders imperfectly delivered; and to prevent this the more effectually, it may be, in certain cases, expedient to send the command by a staff-officer, in writing."

Would seem to address units "out of command," that for whatever reason can't follow the regulating battalion. A variant on the command radius issue that I have seen that reflects this is a unit is "in command" if it is within the command radius OR within a certain distance (sometimes also in formation with) of a unit that is in command.
Phil

My personal opinion is that command radii may not always be close to the ideal. For the more historic games the the Barker DBM additional points cost for Maneouver looks a better bet. The definitive shut off (mandatory command radii) is not a good model in my opinion.

Definitely a matter of personal taste and preference, IMHO. As a wargaming mechanic, a command radius is certainly no more "artificial" – and no less "historic" – than a "model" that adjusts the size and maneuverability of an ancient army according to an arbitrary points system designed to make the game more "fair." My personal wargaming preference for Ancient warfare is to use command radii to depict ancient-period limits to command and control in a manner that is at once simple, artificial and useful. Naturally, YMMV. That's it.

The problem is when I do this my figures just sit there. :)

Forewardmarch:

Eeh. That's a problem with the rules.

Another problem I have with this is that it is not true all the time.

Never said it was.

There are plenty of examples of army commanders intervening in the middle of a battle and changing plans.

Absolutely. I think the key word is "intervening". They chose when and where to influence the battle as Count Yorck von Wartenburg notes. It wasn't all the time every minute. Their constant action wasn't necessary.

I agree that there should be some sort of pre-battle planning involved, and if you have any advice on a game mechanic for applying this information I'd be interested in hearing about it. Weren't you working on some rules awhile back?

I still am. Retired, I have more time to give to it. Obviously, some sort of order system is needed, to provide for the wind-up and release nature of orders. I think the key here is that each level of command from division down to brigade and battalion had a set number of decisions they could make. As Clausewitz points out, the lower you go down into the command system, the less and less control/decision-making options the officers have. What this means for a game is that applying those limits to the units will actually make the game simpler and limit to some extent the 200 foot general who moves every battalion in mind-meld fashion.

Anyway, I think that some planning takes place holistically when players set-up, and even when they write up an army list. In historic scenarios they don't have these options, of course; the planning, is effectively done for them.

To some extent, perhaps, but most games don't provide the kind of planning seen with most commanders. That is a problem with historic scenarios, you are stuck with the historic plan and subsequent positioning. I like to see the ability to effect this. Austerlitz is a good example. Both sides are 'stuck' with plans, errors and deployments that the other side knows from turn one.

The posts above concerning brigade orders and musicians are quite interesting and appreciated.

I'm glad. I am fascinated by how armies were moved and the subsequent dynamics they created on the battlefield.

Would seem to address units "out of command," that for whatever reason can't follow the regulating battalion. A variant on the command radius issue that I have seen that reflects this is a unit is "in command" if it is within the command radius OR within a certain distance (sometimes also in formation with) of a unit that is in command.

Valmy92:

Not quite. Note the reasons in #4 for the extra help from staff officers etc.:

"Where the wind, or the noise of fire-arms, may interrupt the progress of an order from battalion to battalion,…"

The need for possible support from staff officers is not related to distance at all, involving some kind of radius.

And when distance IS the issue, #4 gives the solution and it doesn't involve staff officers. The need for this is given:

4. When troops in extent of numbers are at all beyond the immediate control of the voice, it is particularly essential that the commands to HALT, or to MARCH, should be communicated by a signal, upon which the battalion commanders may act simultaneously; for the accuracy of combined movement would be totally lost, if the different bodies in line, or in column, be suffered to march, or to halt, as their respective commanders may catch the word in its approach from a distant quarter.

There is a reason that British Division commanders only had 2 staff officers assigned to them, and none for the brigade commander other than the brigade major. Generally, no more than that were needed for the units to operate efficiently.

For a corps, division and brigade commander, the essential thing was control, and part of that control was getting everyone moving together at the same time. The above methods were seen as the basic procedures for doing this. The distance from the commander was not a major consideration in moving troops at the divisional and brigade level, and often not even the corps level because they used the very same system for moving divisions together.

What I find telling is that the same basic procedures were used in ancient times right through to the beginning of WWI. [Read British accounts of the advance on the first day of the Somme or read the manuals from the previous ten years.]

The Greek used the regulating unit in the Iliad. Achilles troops, seen as the best in the Greek army are on the right and the entire line of battle moves when they do. [Fagles, Iliad, Bk 11, lines 1-10.] Where did Alexander and his Companions stand in the line of battle at all his battles?: on the far right, initiating the advance.

Before the advent of the radio and a dependable watch [pocket watches loose an average of 15 minutes a day, and not at a steady rate.] the methods for moving large number of troops together had been refined, but there had been no basic changes in the procedures.

I think the regulating batallions is great for command and control in rules. When a line of battallions move, they all adjust to the first, so you basically just need the commander to instruct one batallion then every body moves off.

The problem is when to allow different actions within a brigade, which invariably happened. One batallion breaks off to a flank in reaction to enenmy movement – it is no longer part of the regulation – how will it move, how do we represent the limits to the initiative of the batallion commander – retricting his view of the situaion while still not making individual actions impossible – because history is full of these examples!

The problem is when to allow different actions within a brigade, which invariably happened. One batallion breaks off to a flank in reaction to enenmy movement – it is no longer part of the regulation – how will it move, how do we represent the limits to the initiative of the batallion commander – retricting his view of the situaion while still not making individual actions impossible – because history is full of these examples!

Sparta:
That was a major issue for the real commanders, so you represent it just the way battalions were 'restricted' in real life.

Battalion commanders had a limited number of things they could do, depending on the circumstances:

The first principle was to maintain flank connections with other battalions in the brigade, second was to protect their own flanks. IF THEY WERE ON THE FLANK OF THE BRIGADE, they could do this by:

1. forming square if threatened without orders
2. refuse a flank
3. fold a flank forward to take a enemy line in flank.
4. IF separated from the brigade, they attempt to reattach OR if unable to, attach to any other brigade close to them. You see the 1/4th Ligne at Austerlitz do this.

Anything else, required orders and basically made them a separate command with a different MISSION than the brigade. At Austerlitz, a battalion from a second line moving up to support the flank of the first line--when ordered.

You certainly find rogue battalion commanders, but that is more chance event than typical.

Hiya

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Greek used the regulating unit in the Iliad. Achilles troops, seen as the best in the Greek army are on the right and the entire line of battle moves when they do. [Fagles, Iliad, Bk 11, lines 1-10.] Where did Alexander and his Companions stand in the line of battle at all his battles?: on the far right, initiating the advance.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

The rightmost place was the position of honour in Greek tradition, because there was nobody to your right to protect your shield-less side.

So being on the extreme right you were advertising that you were tough enough to not need somebody beside you. Troops who thought they deserved the right position might sulk if they were denied it.

Staying with ancient armies, it's interesting to read that even peoples sometimes considered a mob of hairy barbarians would be commanded by a trumpet signals.

Regards

David F Brown

The rightmost place was the position of honour in Greek tradition, because there was nobody to your right to protect your shield-less side.

So being on the extreme right you were advertising that you were tough enough to not need somebody beside you. Troops who thought they deserved the right position might sulk if they were denied it.

David B. All true. But having the best on the right then meant your 'worst' was facing the enemy's best…
Actually, what unit would you want as the 'steering wheel' for your entire battleline? That was also why it was deemed the position of honor. It is the reason that 2000 years later, the position of honor remained when shields had long disappeared. You wanted your most experienced troops in that important spot. That is why grenadier companies were on the right flank. That is why, in the ACW, the senior company commander led the far right company, or regimental commander, the brigade. It worked the same way for cavalry and artillery. Yes, the right hand section of a battery led a column, what the first to deploy led by the senior captain.

Interesting position McLaddie. I genereally agree with your view but am still not sure how to translate it into wargames terms.

Sparta:

The military has always held to the principle of KISS. Simple military rules for maneuver and formations can translate into simple game rules for maneuver and formations. Mike Collins for instance, uses rules based on the regulating battalion in his rules Grand Maneuver[British spelling…], but there are others.

But consider the rules for brigades of multiple battalions. The player can move the end battalions with a refused flank, or move forward to take a line in flank or go to square at any time [actually could be triggered to do that with enemy very close. But nothing else. If they want to do more with a battalion or group of battalions, they have to create a new [brigade] command with new orders.

So how do you create the new command? Might it involve…. a command radius?

So how do you create the new command? Might it involve…. a command radius?

Uh, no. It involves creating a new unit with a leader and separate orders. Using mechanics that most games have with any kind of order system.

I see your point, and our own rules have a number of operationspoints in commands – in effect how many regulating units a command can have (usually 1 or 2) – a method of showing different degrees of tactical flexibility.
But how to define exactly what the limits of the actions of the regulating batallion.

Sparta:

Not quite sure about your question. The 'limits' of the actions of the regulating battalion were defined by the regulations covering its actions.

Basically it did what the brigadier told it to. I moved like any other battalion. However the limits on movement are very real:

Most all movement by brigade or larger units once in battle line picked points in the distance to move towards, usually the goal of the advance or movement. [Remember the clump of trees for Pickett's charge?] It was a straight movement.

A line of battalions in line couldn't wheel more than about 22 degrees before it was necessary/SOP for all nations to form battalion columns to wheel further if order was going to be maintained while keeping the maneuver from taking forever. Ney spells this out in his 1803 instructions.

The typical way to portray the line moving on a regulating unit is to have the regulating unit move where the player wants it within those limitations. If it runs into terrain or is hampered by terrain or enemy fire, the rest of the brigade moves no further. If battalions down the line run into terrain that slows them down, the player has the choice to leave them to catch up [The battalion's primary goal once separated] or the regulating unit slows/stop to keep order.

That process in no more involved than moving a brigade in most brigade-level games like AoE or F&F.

As others have said, I think the use of a Command Radius is – of course – artificial, but tend to think it is a decent enough way to try and portray an element of command and control in wargames. There are other (better?) ways to do it, sure: but I think it is a lot better than nothing.

I also think it is not wildly unrealistic: as warfare changed at the turn of the 20th century, a lot of thought was given to how to maintain 'grip' on formations which were becoming more and more widely spread. Though not perhaps a perfect analogy, Hart at Colenso favoured keeping his Brigade in close order to maintain this grip – it was undoubtedly the wrong decision, but it was one made by an experienced commander who considered the benefits on keeping his troops close at hand.

Perhaps 'Command Radius' can be thought of as an abstraction of the intangible quantity of 'grip', with better commanders / units being able to more easily operate in looser, more dispersed formations?

As with everything else in wargaming: each to their own.

Perhaps 'Command Radius' can be thought of as an abstraction of the intangible quantity of 'grip', with better commanders / units being able to more easily operate in looser, more dispersed formations?

Greenleader:
Certainly, in the later 19th century and into the 20th, formations dispersed and new ways of maintaining command control had to be developed. The problems are well-represented by Colenso. The transition from formed troops to unformed. Prussian officers of the 1870 war noted the same thing: Dispersing and skirmishing was preferred, but control was lost.

However, for commanders, any 'intangible' quality you want to imagine had no utility in actually controlling troops in battle.

To say that Command Radius is better than nothing is not saying much when [and if] the idea is to represent something that actually existed in how troops were controlled.

The question is how troops were 'controlled' when firepower led to the 'empty battlefield, then representing it. Saying 'command radius' is like tagging the unknown 'dark matter.' However, how troops were controlled in battle is NOT an unknown, but actually described in detail by just about all military organizations.

I`ll be using pretty much the same rules for regulation in my ancient set Bella Contra Barbaros – It`ll be published in about two weeks folks!
In the command and control rules, the loose informality of barbarian warband battle lines and commands will be contrasted with the Romans` drilled, diciplined, regulated approach.
I`ll have to knock out a scenario for the battle of Gergovia. In this battle regulation failed as Caesar`s legions advanced across the broken terrain in the Gaul`s camp; communication was broken between Caesar advancing with his right (leading) legion and the rest of his force. Vercingetorix then attacked his vulnerable left flank. Caesar blamed his officers for not being able to control their men as they attacked Vercingetorix`s hillfort. Unfortunately for Caesar he had led his men into another tricky situation, but it was such an error that even they were unable to fight their way out of this one and the day was saved by one of Ceasar`s "reserve" legions advancing to cover their retreat!

If Caesar had a command radius, how long should it be?
The history shows us that control could be lost in the space taken up by two legions.

I think the foregoing discussion illustrates the great wisdom of the DBX battle line "group" as being essential as a command control concept (prior to modern communications and CC).

Command distances have some use (in DBX distant stands cost more "PIPS" to move) but aren't as important as limiting the number of orders that can be issued and that a single "line" can be advanced using but one order.

The DBX CC system remains perhaps the best yet devised in terms of both simulation effect and ease of play – one of the few examples of true genius in the wargame design field.

Its why I shamelessly borrowed it for Game of Fire and Ice.

Thomas J. Thomas
Fame and Glory Games

Where does one buy DBN anymore?
I'm curious to try it out with my 3mm figs. I'd have to a adjust base-sized, but I'm used to it at this point…

I`d be interested to find out if the DBx C&C PIP system was actually tested using historical battles.

MichaelCollinsHimself-

IIRC they tried it out at Cold Harbor but it didn't work.

McLaddie

You seem to be rather passionate about this. I cannot see why it is big deal to rule that certain commanders can only effectively control their troops if they are within a certain distance, while others can effectively control theirs if they are within a slightly greater distance.

Of course it is an abstraction, but what in our games isn't? If it doesn't work for you, then fair enough and more power to your elbow: I think it is pretty effective.

IIRC they tried it out at Cold Harbor but it didn't work.

Do you have any further details?

Thx McLaddie – food for thought.

You seem to be rather passionate about this. I cannot see why it is big deal to rule that certain commanders can only effectively control their troops if they are within a certain distance, while others can effectively control theirs if they are within a slightly greater distance.

Greenleader:
Yes, I am passionate about history and how it is represented. I don't see why you'd think this is how it worked: better generals had a wider range of command control. General X only could control troops within 900 yards, while a better general Y could have control out to a mile. What makes that so?

Did poor commanders have weaker voices? Poorer horses that couldn't travel as fast? The control systems for poor and good commanders in all nations were basically the same, working at the same speed. If you have historical examples of what you are describing, I'm certainly open to the possibility. What you are describing is meant to describe and model a real result in command function, however abstract the mechanics.

Of course it is an abstraction, but what in our games isn't? If it doesn't work for you, then fair enough and more power to your elbow: I think it is pretty effective.

Of course everything in a wargame is an abstraction, from one lead figure representing 20 men to a series of phases representing a half hour. The questions is WHAT is being represented and how successful the abstraction is in duplicating the actual battlefield dynamics. Isn't that what this discussion is about?

So, when you say that the command radius is pretty 'effective', you are saying that it does a good job of modeling what in history? Where in the accounts, histories, as described by the participants themselves?

Or are you simply saying it is easy to use?

For instance, here is a section from the 1809 provisional set of French regulations providing instructions under the heading of "The Day of Battle." Something most armies created. It deals with command distances, but doesn't suggest that one general would have a greater area of influence than another, less able general.

The general will note to commanders of the different corps the place where he will hold himself most commonly during the action, so that they be able to make known to him what will happen each in their part, and ask of him new orders that circumstances could require.
However active might the general be, it is impossible that he see all the front of the army, nor that he be everywhere; thus the general orders, once given, it will be for the commander of the wings of the division and of the reserves to act according to circumstances, from the manner most proper to procuring the victory, pursuant, however to the plan that the general will have traced to them, which must be always the base of their conduct.

In other words, there is no expectation that the general will be at their elbow with orders, but that the expectation is that the CinC will hold himself at one spot so he will be easy to find and commanders are expected to use the general game plan and original orders as the basis for their actions.

Whether the plans were good ones or poor, such as the comparison between the French and Allies at Austerlitz, the command 'ranges' of everyone involved remained very much the same.

I think you are getting a little excited about this: it is hardly as though General Hart was shouting orders to his men, so I am not entirely sure what weaker voices have to do with this.

Though you possibly know better, Generals at the time of the Boer War worried about the loss of command and control as formations became more and more dispersed – are you saying they were wrong so to do? I am not sure what your military experience is, but even today no platoon commander is going to spread his men out over hundreds of acres, as he will lose control of them, and have no understand what is happening.

It stands to reason that the closer units were to their commander, the easier they were to control: orders could be passed more quickly, reports could be sent to him more easily and the commander could see where his units were more easily. A more confident or dashing commander, or one with more faith in his sub-commanders (or who is blessed with better sub-commanders), or one who has drawn up a simpler plan, or who commands more reliable troops, or who is in more open terrain, or operating in better weather / light conditions might not feel the need to keep his units closer at hand.

Yes, it is easy to use and it works for me but I really have no interest in 'convincing' you that this is the best way to represent 'grip' as you have quite clearly made you mind up on the subject and that is, of course, perfectly fine – we should all just game it however we wish.

McLaddie

It may help this interesting discussion if you suggested an alternative that could be used in a wargame.

Can you give an example of the alternatives you mentioned? regulating battalion excepted.

I think you are getting a little excited about this: it is hardly as though General Hart was shouting orders to his men, so I am not entirely sure what weaker voices have to do with this.

GreenLeader:
Yep, terribly excited. What I am saying is, I am not sure at all how you envision Hart or others actually commanding that would involve a command radius.

Though you possibly know better, Generals at the time of the Boer War worried about the loss of command and control as formations became more and more dispersed – are you saying they were wrong so to do?

No, I've already noted that it was an issue in the 1870 war.

I am not sure what your military experience is, but even today no platoon commander is going to spread his men out over hundreds of acres, as he will lose control of them, and have no understand what is happening.

I have no military experience. I have to depend on what military men of the time and now tell me. If we are talking about a modern platoon leader, then voice and hand signals…and thus a command radius can work. But not at the battalion and brigade level or higher [like General Hart], which is what I thought we were talking about.

It stands to reason that the closer units were to their commander, the easier they were to control: orders could be passed more quickly, reports could be sent to him more easily and the commander could see where his units were more easily.

It stands to reason that if your description of command is true, then you would see that refected in battlefield decisions and actions, military commentary and instruction.

We certainly see commanders going to higher vantage points AND it is why he wouldn't move… so subordinates would know where he was to get orders to him. I quoted
the on contemporary explanation of that.

However, army commanders, corps commanders, division commanders and brigade commanders never talk about distances being important considerations other than what I quoted earlier--because the command system dealt with the distance issue differently. In linear warfare you couldn't keep commands close enough for such things to be a benefit.

It stands to reason that if distances to command elements was a major consideration [as it is with command radius rules], it would have been presented that way in military instructions. It simply isn't.

A more confident or dashing commander, or one with more faith in his sub-commanders (or who is blessed with better sub-commanders), or one who has drawn up a simpler plan, or who commands more reliable troops, or who is in more open terrain, or operating in better weather / light conditions might not feel the need to keep his units closer at hand.

Fine, all very reasonable. Do you see that dynamic in any 18th or 19th century battles you know about?

For example, did Napoleon at Austerlitz have his troops on a wider front than the Allies? Did Kutuzov and his subordinates keep their troops closer to them than the French? Did Grant keep his troops closer at hand than Lee in the Wilderness? Did Hart and the Boers?

IF that were true, would you say at Leuthen, Frederick the Great demonstrated much less confidence in his troops or had less LOS to his troops than the Austrians because the Austrians had a front three times the size of Frederick's army?

This isn't about us imagining what is reasonable, it is about what the contemporary said was reasonable and how that was reflected in their actions.

Yes, it is easy to use and it works for me but I really have no interest in 'convincing' you that this is the best way to represent 'grip' as you have quite clearly made you mind up on the subject and that is, of course, perfectly fine – we should all just game it however we wish.

And I am not trying to convince you of a 'best' way of doing anything. I am simply laying out how command was accomplished and how those dynamics are not represented by a command radius for the levels of command, army to brigade in the 18th and 19th Centuries.

You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts. --Daniel Patrick Moynihan

I can think whatever I want to about Napoleon. I can think he is a barbarian of an Emperor and general, but if I am going to paint a historically accurate, representational portrait of him based on the known contemporary portraits, I simply can't give him braided locks and a beard and say it is an accurate portrait…

or say because of the styles of the day, it is reasonable to give him long hair when he was 40. No evidence of that and lots of facts to the contrary.

The Wargaming Company

Yes, I think you are right that Command Radius might be a 'cheap and cheerful' way to represent command and control limitations / grip.

Given that this discussion was linked to Ancients, Napoleonics and WW2, perhaps some of us are talking at cross-purposes to an extent, as I cannot imagine 'regulating battalion' being terribly relevant to a WW2 battlegroup. If one finds that, when playing Napoleonic games, using regulating battalion works (and adds to the authenticity) of a Napoleonic game (of the appropriate scale, of course) then I am all for it.

McLaddie

You have already agreed that there was a serious concern over retaining control over units as formations became increasingly dispersed towards the end of the 19th century – so if you accept that (as you seem to have done), I am not sure what confusion remains. I have already given you the example of Hart keeping his men closer at hand than, for example, Hildyard. He said that he did so specifically because he wanted to retain grip over them.

I am not sure how one can dispute that there is a link between how far troops are spread about, and how much control a commander can exercise over them; anyone with any sort military background can confirm this – even in the age of radios – and you have yourself even agreed that this was identified as an issue at the time.

In a re-fight of Colenso, would you permit the advancing battalions of a British brigade to suffer no penalty whatsoever to command / control / morale if they were spread out over several miles? This would seem illogical. If one of Hart's battalions was four or five miles away over on the left, out of sight, would he have the same control over it as those he held more tightly? I would suggest not.

Sure, it can be annoying and / or 'artificial' for a given unit to be 'in command' if it is 11.9 inches from the brigadier and another to be 'out of command' if it is 12.1 inches away from him, but that happens in 1001 other things in wargaming.

Anyway, rather than going round in circles on this and talking about Napoleon's beard, perhaps you can simply suggest how you would tackle command and control / grip at Colenso, rather than using some sort of command radius method?

I am not sure how one can dispute that there is a link between how far troops are spread about, and how much control a commander can exercise over them;

GreenLeader:
I think part of the problem is that we are looking back over more than 100 years through the filter of 20th century combat. The formations and tactics used at Colenso were pretty much the same used by Troops fifty years before…even further to Napoleon's time. The Boers were doing anything differently than troops during the Civil War. Bueller took Colenso by deploying troops in classic open order when Hart had his troops march in closed columns. Bueller basically had his army divided up into four columns attacking points miles apart from one another.

Generals at the time of the Boer War worried about the loss of command and control as formations became more and more dispersed – are you saying they were wrong so to do?

Not at all. It was a major issue. Because of the growing reach and effectiveness of weapons, troops were spreading out as the 19th Century progressed. The problem was that as formed troops spread out commanders lost control… not because of distances, but because the command control methods used with formed troops didn't work well with skirmish-type combat… again, it wasn't distance, but the system not working that was the problem.

Here is what Captain Boguslawski of the 3rd Lower Silesian Infantry regiment concluded in his Tactical Deductions from the war of 1870-71 translated by Colonel Lumley Graham of the British 18th Regiment:
[page 88]

To sum up the characteristic points of the infantry battle tactics of 1879-71, it will be necessary in doing so to mention in the first place what we did not see.
That is to say, no, or at least very few, attacks by troops in close order;… But we did see--
Great deployments of skirmishers on both sides; long-continued, gradually advancing musketry fights, often rolling backwards and forwards; the other side pressing on in consequence, or a rush of dense clouds of skirmishers who endeavour at any price to dislodge their opponents; not forgetful that, in case of failure and retreat, they are dead men.
On both sides great dispersion; intermingling of troops, particularly in broken ground: hence the leader's control diminished. [Italics the author]

The solution to this loss of leader control as troops fought dispersed was not to keep them in some command radius… Hart learned the problems with that solution as Bueller learned the problems with dispersion of the army.

The translator of Boguslawski's work provided the answer:
page xiii

Captains.
As I have already remarked, captians play a much more important part in war than they did formerly. A necessary consequence of fighting so much in extended order is the employment of smaller tactical unit than the battalion; hence in close action the Germans work by companies, the captain being virtually commanding officer of a little independent body. Every army which adopts the Prussian system of infantry tactics (I don't mean that to be found in the regulations, but that carried out in practice), and I think all armies will be compelled to do so, every army, I say, will also find it necessary to increase the power, responsibility, and independence of action of the captain.

The solution to distance for the Napoleonic armies was the regulating unit [for both formed and skirmish lines]. As long as troops were in contact, the brigadier or division commander was in control. Corps and Army commanders had little to do to remain 'in command' and distance for them could be an issue, but it wasn't the basis for their troops being 'in command.'

As the century progressed and troops started spreading out, [Sherman concluded after the ACW that "all infantry combat would be skirmish combat."], control was lost, but how to maintain 'control' became more and more of an unanswered problem, even with Prussian tactics relying on skirmishing.

So, in 1916 at the Somme, the British left the trenches and advanced in two lines in extended order, soldiers 5 yards apart, all regulating on the right. By the end of the war, you had Stoßtruppen tactics, where small groups of independent squads were attacking, coordinated in a far different manner, controlled by NCO and low ranking officers.

By 1918, it does make sense that a command radius was an issue for those small units. And of course, those issues continue on to today. Napoleonic captains had no real tactical responsibilities and battalion commanders very few. Today that is all changed.

The tactical and grand tactical issues of distances and command control were never solved by military men thinking in terms of 'command radius' beyond small units. That is, limiting the size of a deployment by some imagined distance limit to their control.

In a re-fight of Colenso, would you permit the advancing battalions of a British brigade to suffer no penalty whatsoever to command / control / morale if they were spread out over several miles? This would seem illogical.

GreenLeader:

I thought I'd answer this in a separate post because the first was rather long. I have to ask two questions:

1.What penalties do you see British Brigades suffer being spread out as they were?

2.As Bueller was a seasoned commander, who would have a decent idea of how much control he could retain over such distances, why did he do it? And remember, the Boer commandos were spread out over the same distance too. Did they maintain command control??

If one of Hart's battalions was four or five miles away over on the left, out of sight, would he have the same control over it as those he held more tightly? I would suggest not.

Okay. So, if no control was possible, why would such a situation come up…as it did for Bueller on a larger scale? He did capture Colnso with a brigade spread out in extended order over a far greater distance than Hart's brigade.

Sure, it can be annoying and / or 'artificial' for a given unit to be 'in command' if it is 11.9 inches from the brigadier and another to be 'out of command' if it is 12.1 inches away from him, but that happens in 1001 other things in wargaming.

It isn't the stark line between 'in command' and 'out of command' that is the main issue. The question is again: IF troops are out of command over that arbitrary distance, why are troops sent out that far and what exactly is that distance in general terms?

Anyway, rather than going round in circles on this and talking about Napoleon's beard, perhaps you can simply suggest how you would tackle command and control / grip at Colenso, rather than using some sort of command radius method?

Sure. I'll give that to you tomorrow. [I have run out of time here.] I would help me if you could answer the two numbered questions above.

McLaddie

I assume that by 'Bueller' you mean 'Buller'? Unless we are now talking about 'Ferris Bueller's Day Off', in which he certainly lost all command and control!

Buller didn't really attack with four columns as such. Hart's Brigade and Hildyard's Brigades were the only two of his four infantry Brigades committed to the initial attack, with Dundonald's mounted brigade operating away on his right flank. His other two infantry brigades were only committed to help extract the assaulting forces when things went wrong. Hildyard's men advanced in open order, but they were not strung out over several miles: the Brigade advanced on a frontage of perhaps a mile and a half or so.

It is also interesting to note that Buller was not really a seasoned commander as you assert, certainly not in terms of handling large formations. Prior to Colenso, the largest formation he had commanded in action had been a brigade, and that was back in Egypt in 1885: a completely different sort of warfare.

Buller most certainly lost control of his widely spaced forces when things started to go wrong. He found he had no choice but to move his position and take personal control of trying to extract Colonel Long's guns – clearly being too far away from that point was an issue.

Also, Dundonald – operating far away over the right – requested to be reinforced, but this did not happen: was distance a factor? Had Buller realised that Dundonald had actually found the key to the Boer position (ie. the Hill of Hlangwane), he would surely have sent one of his reserve brigades to him.

In terms of the Boers: one can reasonably assume that defending forces do not require as much 'grip' as attacking forces: the Boer's job was essentially to sit in trenches and fire.
Nevertheless, Botha was unable to retain proper control over his men: his plan had been to let the British cross the river before opening fire, but his men ignored that and sprung the ambush too early, while the British were still on the southern side of the Tugela. Later in the battle, with Hart's Brigade pinned in the loop of the river, Botha was unable to ensure that Fourie's commando move to cut them off.
Now, one could say that these two deficiencies were as much to do with the ill-discipline of the Boers as the widely strung out defensive line, but either way Botha certainly did not have a good 'grip' of his men, and could not be every where at once.

Interestingly, as Modder River, Lord Methuen also had to move position to be closer to the action so as to keep the stalled 9th Brigade moving: he clearly realised that he was unable to influence events as he was too far away.

Equally, at Spion Kop, Warren didn't move to the seat of the action (ie. atop the hill) and thus lost complete and utter control of the battle, with no one knowing what on earth was taking place up there.

I accept that a 'good' commander having a 12" circle of 'influence' surrounding him, while a 'average' one has a 9" circle, can all seem a little silly and / or artificial, but I also think one needs to address the reality that commanders were unable to properly influence events from afar. Sure, when the initial plan of attack (not that most wargamers bother with such pesky things) is launched, the C-in-C can stand back and take a 'big picture' view of the battle… and as long as things go pretty much to plan, he can stay there and his subordinates will fight and win the action for him, with his only real involvement being to commit reserves or unleash the cavalry. But when things start going wrong, commanders moved to where they felt they were needed, indicating a link between distance and 'grip'.

Of course, by doing so, they lost their 'big picture' view, so this could have other negative impacts elsewhere on the field.

I would be tempted to represent all this by using a plan of attack type system, whereby the player has to draw up his plans prior to the battle, and the sub-commanders have to follow these as best they can. These sub-commanders would operate under some sort of 'command radius' system, meaning their brigade has to remain reasonably close together. If a battalion is 'dropped off' during the advance to hold a certain point, then the sub commander will no longer retain the same control over it – this seems perfectly reasonable.
I would then give the C-in-C stand the ability to move to certain points on the battlefield to take personal control of a given number of units (again, this could be a brigade or using command radius), but at the penalty of losing any real influence on events elsewhere.

All my comments here (and in earlier posts) relate to the Boer War, so obviously might not be in any way pertinent to earlier conflicts – of which I happily confess to know far less about.

Sorry, forgot to add:

Other examples which prove Buller was struggling to retain command / control at Colenso due to the size of the battlefield are that Hart's Brigade entered the loop in the river (which was not Buller's plan) and Long deployed his guns too far forward (which was not Buller's plan). Intersting to note that the Brigade which performed the best (Hildyard's) was in the centre of the battlefield.

At Elandslaagte, Hamilton (commanding the 7th Brigade) accompanied the Gordons, Manchesters and ILH on the flanking move, and his presence kept the attack moving when it faltered. By so doing, he had little or no control over his other battalion (the Devons), who were advancing frontally.
Interestingly, the Devons (like the Gordons) had only recently arrived in theatre from the NW Frontier, having been rushed to South Africa in response to the Boer invasion, and perhaps Hamilton placed greater trust in them and their commander (Colonel Park) than in, for example, the Manchesters (who had arrived from the rather more relaxed posting of Gibraltar) or the gifted-amateurs of the recently raised ILH – both of which he kept tighter 'grip' on during the attack.

GreenLeader:

Actually, I love the movie, but I have seen it spelled Bueller too. Perhaps a German translation?

Thank you for your battle description. Buller was certainly new to army command, but a veteran of other conflicts and would have had an idea of how command control was or wasn't maintained. And no, Hildyard wasn't spread over several miles, but his brigade was certainly spread out on a far wider front than Hart and still kept control. [Actually a typical Napoleonic skirmish formation--extended line.]

Sure, when the initial plan of attack (not that most wargamers bother with such pesky things) is launched, the C-in-C can stand back and take a 'big picture' view of the battle… and as long as things go pretty much to plan, he can stay there and his subordinates will fight and win the action for him, with his only real involvement being to commit reserves or unleash the cavalry. But when things start going wrong, commanders moved to where they felt they were needed, indicating a link between distance and 'grip'.

Agreed. That is how it is described by most 19th Century commanders. I see it, the real issues are Line-of-sight [knowing what is happening--the big picture] and the commander's physical presence, like Hamilton. Distance is only related to those two issues. And no, wargamers may or may not be interested in mechanics involving 'initial plans of attack' But that is another issue.

I also think one needs to address the reality that commanders were unable to properly influence events from afar.

Okay, I'm with you on that. The question is then: What constitute 'proper influence', particularly if the commander isn't physically present? If we use Colenso as an example, there seems to be some very stark demarcation lines for command control for the CinC and subordinates:

1. Physically present: complete control complete 'grip'

2. Able to see the action--some sort of 'grip'/ability to respond/influence the action by sending orders, reserves or simply moving to that location and be present or

3. Outside those two conditions: no control

Does that sound about right?

The methods available to army and corps commanders remained very much the same throughout the 19th century. The problem became one of control when formed troops started spreading out and the old tried-and-true methods for moving men at the division and brigade level began to break down.

McLaddie

You have inspired me to dig through my DVD collection and enjoy the film again – it is certainly a classic.

I think your three 'levels' make sense, though I would pedantically adjust the third one to 'almost no control' – he might still get (increasingly panic-stricken) messages requesting support, to which he might be able to react in some way.

But does that mean that we now have to define 'physically present'… and does that bring us back to the dreaded 'command radius' again? Taking Hamilton at Elandslaagte, or Methuen at Modder River as examples: by moving up to 'take grip' of a certain portion of their brigade (in Hamilton's case) or Division (in Methuen's case), how many battalions / how wide an area could they influence?

I guess one option is to say they can only influence a given assault / advance to contact or a given withdrawal attempt (or whatever): on balance, this would seem to make more sense to me than saying that, by cunningly (and very game-ily!) being placed in position 'x' to take advantage of his 12" command radius, Hamilton can influence the troops 10" in front of him who are attacking, change the orders of a battalion 9" to his left and also steady the nerves of the troops 11" behind and to his right who are in danger of routing. Instead, he should have to pick one of these 'situations' to 'take grip of', and move into direct / very close contact with it (thereby losing any view of the 'bigger picture').
The only problem this leaves us with is: how close together should the units he is trying to influence be to one another to count as a single 'situation'? Hamilton was able to keep the Gordons and Manchesters (and, later, the ILH) moving forwards by assigning himself to the flanking attack, rather than moving to a certain point or attaching himself to a specific unit.

I totally agree with your closing paragraph: the Boer War (and much of the First World War) saw commanders grappling with larger / 'emptier' battlefields, but without the improvement in battlefield comms (especially on the attack) to compensate.

Greenleader:
I think the option you describe is a reasonable one given the evidence.

The only problem this leaves us with is: how close together should the units he is trying to influence be to one another to count as a single 'situation'? Hamilton was able to keep the Gordons and Manchesters (and, later, the ILH) moving forwards by assigning himself to the flanking attack, rather than moving to a certain point or attaching himself to a specific unit.

Yes, Hamilton was using the regulating unit method on the flank to keep the line of troops moving forward.

We have gone from Napoleonic methods at the beginning of the century to their dissolution at the end of the century, so I think focusing on army and corps level command as we are addresses the question of CRs and how to represent command overall rather than division and brigade.

So to the problem you note: What we are talking about is the commander's 'situational awareness' and then what he can do in response. The US military has that process broken down into six elements which really aren't necessary for us--just those two will suffice.

Let's look at the command radius mechanic for a moment. Let's assume a 50 or 100 yard per inch with say, half hour or hour turns. So what does the radius represent?

IF it represents situational awareness from what he can see, then if he is on ground level with the troops, he isn't going to see very far: Most 19th century military place that at about 1700 yards or a mile. In this case, barring obstructions, that would be 34 or 17 inches, far more than most CRs provide for and certainly further than Buller and his subordinates could see at Colenso. And the radius would the expand and shrink depending on the commander's elevation…which is why CinCs such as Napoleon stationed themselves on high ground when they could.

During the Napoleonic period, commanders could actually count flags in a general direction, and because of the use of battle array, tell which units were engaged. Not so at Colenso.

If we say it represents how far messengers could travel, then in a half hour, a rider could travel 3-4 miles at a trot, or for 50 yards to the inch: 102 or 51 inches in a turn, half that for a walk. Even with round trips, information coming in and then going out, you have a 25 or 51 inch radius in any direction. As Buller could send anyone with a message, there would really be no limit to how many messengers could be sent, and of course there was a limited number of commands to actually communicate with. This too appears to be far more potential control than demonstrated by anyone at the battle, British or Boer.

A commander could only 'control' in reference to what he knew. He had to get information and then respond in person or through a message.

The problem with any CR mechanism is if based on army capabilities, the range is so far that it obviously doesn't represent what was happening on the ground or the actual influence the commander had in distance areas, actual distances usually far shorter than any imagined 'command radius.' We are back to personal intervention.

Your wrote earlier:

Buller most certainly lost control of his widely spaced forces when things started to go wrong. He found he had no choice but to move his position and take personal control of trying to extract Colonel Long's guns – clearly being too far away from that point was an issue.

Why no choice? Sending orders didn't work? He HAD to take personal control? Again, my points above.

Also, Dundonald – operating far away over the right – requested to be reinforced, but this did not happen: was distance a factor? Had Buller realised that Dundonald had actually found the key to the Boer position (ie. the Hill of Hlangwane), he would surely have sent one of his reserve brigades to him.

Did Buller even receive that request in a timely fashion?
Since he was on the move, the messenger may not have been able to find him…

It would seem that the courier system didn't work at all, even though potentially, he could/should have had communications across the entire eight mile front in fairly small time frames of 1/2 hour or less.

Some other process is needed to represent Buller's command control… simple distances don't capture that at all other than up-close and personal intervention.

McLaddie

Yes: fair points and well made. I agree that in a 30 minute turn (or even a 15 minute one) a great deal theoretically COULD happen, but – for whatever reason – didn't really seem to in reality. You are certainly correct that a galloper could have ridden to and from the position of Long's beleaguered batteries several times in a turn… unless he was shot en route, of course.

I guess the factor of personal intervention needs to be considered more deeply: Methuen, Buller, Hamilton, Penn Symons et al all found themselves in the thick of the action, rather than standing back and directing affairs. Similarly, on the other side, de la Rey himself personally tried to lead a counter-attack at Modder River… as you state: we need to look at WHY commanders of the period (and, indeed, other periods – 'H' Jones at Goose Green springs to mind) felt they had to intervene personally to 'get things moving'. I agree that a 'Command Radius' doesn't address this issue terribly well (unless it is a very small CR).

We should not allow incidents of personal intervention to blind us to other issues though: the reality is that -
other than those 'dropped off' to hold certain positions for example – commanders tried to keep (and still do try to keep) their units reasonably close to them (what 'reasonably close' means can be argued back and fore all day) – much closer than a galloper would theoretically be able to travel several times in a turn. Of course, this was also for reasons of mutual support / concentration of force rather than simply command and control.

When this 'reasonably close' distance was exceeded, there seems to be have been potential for a loss of control. As C-in-C's got further and further from the action – and were no longer able to see what was happening in the way that the likes of Napoleon and Wellington usually could – even radio / field telephone sometimes seems to have struggled to convey the urgency it theoretically should have been able to: an example is the commander of the British 29th Brigade who famously said the situation was 'a bit sticky'… which didn't quite convey the reality to his superiors.

Sorry – starting to stray a little away from command radius now.

We should not allow incidents of personal intervention to blind us to other issues though: the reality is that -
other than those 'dropped off' to hold certain positions for example – commanders tried to keep (and still do try to keep) their units reasonably close to them (what 'reasonably close' means can be argued back and fore all day) – much closer than a galloper would theoretically be able to travel several times in a turn. Of course, this was also for reasons of mutual support / concentration of force rather than simply command and control.

Greenleader:
Yes, and that personal intervention could be expected or just the result of poor planning and execution.

Perhaps we can get grounded a bit, starting with the Napoleonic period and then looking at the same issues a century later. Here is what French Marshal Marmont wrote in his On Modern Armies: pp.95-97 The book is available on google for free:

link

The organization of armies demands divisions, and reserves of each arm. I allude to armies of moderate strength, for large armies require, in addition, another element of order and of action. This is obtained by forming the troops into corps d'armée ; that is to say, that it is requisite to establish fixed commands, intermediate between the commander-in-chief and the generals of divisions.

An army of 100,000, composed of ten or twelve divisions, would be difficult to manage were it not organized into corps d'armée ; for confusion would soon result from the excessive number of independent units, able to manoeuvre freely in obedience to a general direction given by the commander-in-chief. Hence the need of forming aggregations of divisions, in order to simplify the dispositions of the command-in-chief was soon felt; and, two, three, or four divisions were joined. together. Thus, an army composed

96 _ MODERN ARMIES. on. 1.
as I have indicated is parted into four fractions, the commander-in-chief can move them easily, he has at his disposition four corps, three of which form his line of battle, and the fourth his reserve. In all degrees of the military hierarchy, the exercise of the command is facilitated in proportion to the smallness of the number of immediate subordinates the chief has to deal with.

So, how many elements did Buller command at Colenso? I count more than five with the reserves. What's your count? How many subordinates can a CinC juggle effectively? He has staff, but even then, if like Hart, you ignore them or underutilized them, even four elements can be too many. But he doesn't have many:

"Buller was handicapped by a shortage of competent staff officers, as most of them had been dispersed from his Corps, like the Corps itself, to the various distant fronts throughout South Africa. [Page 213. Pakenham, Thomas (1979).The Boer War.]

The corps d'armée being small armies should have an organization conformably to the principles I have established, and be composed—

l. Of three divisions, in which the various arms are
combined;

2. Of a cavalry reserve, supported by horse artillery;

3. Of an artillery reserve. '

The reserves, which are meant to be sent in all directions, ought to be very mobile; and the artillery reserve, which has often to take post at great distances, should be mounted artillery. Thus the ordinary artillery, which is organized so as to be extremely mobile, will serve along with the infantry divisions, and the horse artillery will be attached exclusively to the service of the cavalry and of the reserves.

Obviously, Buller didn't use his horse artillery and cavalry units this way. It's hard to tell if Buller's reserves were ever called upon. So, where are commanders of the various sized commands expected to be?

The organization which I have described is suited for the existing armies; it is the necessary consequence of the nature of the arms and of the mode in which war is now a-days made; and the fractional parts into which the army is divided are designed to facilitate the exercise of the command. But there are various kinds of command, and they change their character according to the number of soldiers.

If a General fights with 10,000 men, he ought to be in the midst of his troops, and often exposed to the fire of small arms.

97_MODERN ARMIES
If a General is in command of 30,000 men, he directs the movements of his troops and reserves, and though he is usually, except in extraordinary cases, beyond the range of musketry, he must be constantly within that of cannon, and he must remain within the space where the balls fall.

If a General directs 80,000 or 100,000 men, he fixes the plan, and gives his orders before the battle; sets the troops in movement, and awaits the issue of events in a central position. During the action he becomes a kind of providence: he is ready with instructions for unforeseen cases, and he provides remedies for great accidents.

He ought to expose himself before the battle, in order to see for himself, and to judge with precision of the state of things; having fulfilled these duties, he gives his orders, and lets each play the part assigned to him. If things go well, he has nothing else to do; if accidents occur, he should meet them by combinations within his power; if things go very badly, and a catastrophe is imminent, he should place himself at the head of the last troops that he launches against the enemy, and his presence at that momentous period, will give them an impulse and produce a moral effect that will double their value.

It was after this fashion that Napoleon commanded. As his operations were almost always crowned with success, and the armies he commanded very large, he rarely exposed himself to immediate danger. But at Leutzen, there having arisen a great crisis, which was very perilous from the nature of the army, composed as it was of young soldiers, he rallied his troops in person before Kaya, and led them to the charge under a murderous fire.

Bueller commanded maybe 20,000 men, counting artillerymen. So, according to Marmont he should have been within about 1000 yards of his entire command, but the forces were too spread out for that.

So, looking at the brigade commanders and Buller, acting as both division and corps commander according to Marmont, ALL of the brigade commanders save Hart acted like a CinC: "he should place himself at the head of the last troops that he launches against the enemy,…" when things go badly.

The bottom line is that:

1. Buller had too many elements in his plan/command to effectively control them all.

2. Buller, according to Marmont, was acting as both division commanders AND Corps commander based on the size of his force and his organization.

3. He didn't have enough staff to support his operation, which is a failing for the British from 1800 to 1900…one reason Wellington often was found running back and forth across the battlefield.

4. Because of that, Buller was left with only the personal intervention to solve any problems which further reduced his overall control. He never really had the option to send off his troops and wait to see what happens as Marmont says.

5. The last issue is one of rifle ranges. Now not only were division commanders [of 10,000 men] but Corps commanders [of 30,000 men] within rifle fire range IF they followed Marmont's dictum. This meant that Buller could expect to exercise command under rifle fire the entire battle, very different from Napoleon and his contemporaries…even the Civil War.

Obviously, Buller's plan didn't take into account any of these conditions. From what I can tell, Hart and Hildyard both used Napoleonic methods, one successfully and one disastrously.

So, exactly how did men at each of those levels keep a grip on their troops…at least during Napoleonic times?: Marmont only describes where they would be except for the CinC, whose control was fairly limited after issuing orders, which explains how Napoleon can sit in one place or wander around during the battle hardly issuing any orders at all.

What is clear is that whatever methods had been in place most of the century, between the British lack of organization and the changing battlefield conditions, they didn't work at Colenso.

Keeping that all in mind, I think we can then start talking about command control for the 19th Century, CRs and how command was accomplished at different levels of command.

I have been thinking hard about this for my own game design, so…

we need to look at WHY commanders of the period (and, indeed, other periods – 'H' Jones at Goose Green springs to mind) felt they had to intervene personally to 'get things moving'.

Well one of the reasons could be that like Lt Col Jones their original plan was vastly over complicated and at the time, personal intervention seemed like a way of getting out of the they had perpetrated!