"Best book on Austerlitz" Topic

What is the best book on Austerlitz?

check the archives, heated discussions and character assasinations – in my view, that one by
Robert Goetz

+1 for Robert Goetz, but endorsing all von Winterfeldts' comments…

If you want something that goes into the political and diplomatic history leading up to the battle, as well as a detailed account of the military planning on both sides then I think Frederick Kagan's 'The End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801-1805' is worth looking at. However, it is a mighty tome and not for the faint-hearted.

Big fan of Gortz.

Goetz is good. Good update to Christopher Duffy's book. Scott Bowden has a large book"Napoleon and Austerlitz 1805" from Emperor's Press. I own the book but have only read bits and pieces. It is a "coffee-table" size book. It indicates to be one of a series, but I do not know if others where released. It is a great battle about which to read. Enjoy!

ANother +1 for the Goetz book.

Well I guess it all depends on what you mean by "best", and given that everybody has already said Goetz, how about…

Austerlitz: The Empire at its Zenith
by F. Hourtouille

It's especialy good if you are planning on painting the army.

I would highly recommend Napoleon's Finest-Davout and His 3d Corps: Combat Journal of Operations 1805-1807. It was translated from the French by Scott Bowden. It covers, Ulm, Austerlitz, Auerstadt, and Eylau.

It is the operational journal of Davout's III Corps for that period.

There is also an excellent section on the Ulm and Austerlitz camapigns in the Esposito/Elting A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars. The text is expert, and the maps are outstanding. Highly Recommended.

I think 'best' is difficult to define, a bit like looking for a title that tells the 'truth' or is a 'definitive' account. With that in mind I would suggest, along with those mentioned above, also worth considering is Ian Castle's accounts on the battle, both his Pen & Sword hardback and his Osprey Campaign version, plus Chandler's earlier Campaign Osprey account. In my opinion, it is always best to read as many accounts as possible, rather than rely on just one.

Agree.

The idea of 'best' is usually opinion and what a person prefers.

At least it wasn't another Waterloo question… ;-)

@Haitiansoldier

You see now – as predicted.

Anyone have any idea of what von Winterfeldt is rambling on about? All I've seen so far is people being helpful and offering useful titles and suggestions?

It's just another rant or two about people he perceives as enemies.

The best thing to do is just ignore him. He does the same thing on the Napoleon Series.

As the wise man once said: 'haters gotta hate.'

;-)

@Haitiansoldier

You see now – as predicted.

Again, from what I can see, everyone is talking about books on Austerlitz, while VW seems more interested in 'predictions'.

Perhaps he doesn't like the battle?

And I quite am sure Haitiansoldier welcomed the info on various titles and is not afraid of er, 'predictions'. LOL

I meant to add, I predict VW will make another er, 'prediction' post.

However, to be serious, I am sure Haitiansoldier (and the rest of us) would much prefer more posts on Austerlitz titles and accounts.

Gazzola: I did welcome the info and I appreciate the suggestions for Austerlitz titles.
After seeing these suggestions, I'll probably get The Empire at it's zenith because I recently ordered the Jena title in that series. With the exception of Waterloo, I know little about Napoleonic battles and I want to expand my interests.
And I ignored VW. Nothing he says is relevant to this discussion.
For all of you who gave me suggestions and were helpful, thank you very much.

Haitiansoldier

It is really good when people offer help and guide others to titles and sources they may not be aware of. It is one of the positive sides to the website.

I also have the title you have chosen (and all the others mentioned) and I don't think you will be disappointed.

Thanks Gazzola.
I got Jena: Triumph of the Eagle in the mail yesterday and it looks wonderful. I will definitely be ordering The Empire at it's zenith.

Hands down Robert Goetz. Very detailed book and you will not enjoy it unless you are a hardcore Napoleonic buff interested in learning everything about Austerlitz. If you want a general introduction I recommend the Osprey by Castle or Duffy's book.

>>check the archives, heated discussions and character assasinations – in my view, that one by
Robert Goetz

Interesting.
It's been many years since I invested in further books.
However, on reading just the visible preview there seem to be some really obvious, and provable errors- the Guard did not consist of only two battalions of chasseurs and grenadiers. How could such a basic fact be wrong?
Not important in itself, but equally how is one to assess other tangible statements?
I noted other generalisations in the preview as well.
I'm concerned for any of the Amzn reviews which point this out in contrast to the many sycophant ones.
Oh well….
regards d

The treatment of the Grande Armee in that volume on Austerlitz is poor, especially when compared to the treatment of the allies.

I don't believe it is the best treatment of Austerlitz and singling out Scott Bowden at the end of the book for adverse treatment is very poor indeed.

check the archives, heated discussions and character assassinations – in my view, that one by
Robert Goetz

Do you have a link?

Thanks Brechtel that's useful info.
I'm not aware of the criticism of Bowden but my dealings with him and his work in the '80s were fantastic.

Given this book can be found for low $$ now, I'll take a chance anyway- my interest does spread to 'the enemy' as I've broadly rejected the 'British' version of writing off Napoleons adversaries as all incompetent.

-Keinmeyer had an amputation- anyone know when and which arm? Models do not show this defect!

regards davew

I can't find my copy right now so I got lazy and just ordered another one to reread it. It was under $3.00 USD on Amazon.

I consider Scott Bowden to be a good friend and he has unhesitatingly helped me in the study of the period for almost twenty years. He's a good man to have around.

After going through the Austerlitz volume for a couple of days, the following comments may or may not be appropriate to the thread and the conversation.

These are some of the errors in the book and because of the errors and omissions, not only do I not agree that it is the best reference for Austerlitz, but if it is used as a reference for further study it should be used with caution.

-While it reads in the Introduction that the book concentrates ‘less on the French' and ‘more on the Russians and Austrians' which is an excellent method to study the battle, there are too many errors on the French which detracts from the overall value of the book.

-No mention of the artillery arm of either side when describing the armies of both sides in Chapter 1 (pages 29-50).

-No references footnoted for the organization of the French army (pages 43-50) with the exception of three explanatory footnotes on page 48-no references listed for these three footnotes.

-There is no differentiation among the company strengths of the three cavalry arms. The strength of all three were different. The heavy cavalry (cuirassier and carabiniers) had 89 all ranks per company, the dragoons 119 per company and the hussars and chasseurs 144 per company. Neither the companies nor the squadrons were equal in strength. Two companies made up a squadron.

-On page 33 the text draws comparisons between the French permanent tactical and operational organizations and the Austrian practice of organizing ad hoc higher-level organizations and failing to note the great drawbacks of the Austrian system.

-On page 38 the text reads that ‘The Russian officer corps, however, suffered from considerable inconsistency.' At the very least, that is a gross understatement.

-On page 41 the traditional viewpoint of the results of Trafalgar is maintained, leaving out the fact that the fleet destroyed there was rebuilt and it was not the only fleet the French possessed. Further, the British were worried about the French navy through 1813, and that fact is also left out.

-The text gives the impression that the main training ground for the Grande Armee was the Camp of Boulogne, when there were six large camps along the Channel, Boulogne being one of the six. The units stationed and training there were known by their camp names, then as corps, and they received their numerical designations in 1805. The Armee des Cotes de l'Ocean was activated in June 1803 and camps were established at Brest, Montreuil, Boulogne, St Omer, Bruges and Utrecht. And the area covered by each camp was large. For example, Davout's III Corps was headquarterd at Bruges, but also had troops at Dunkirk, Ostend, and Walcheren.

-On page 47 the text reads that there was ‘the formation of a new army' in August 1805. That is incorrect. There was a name change from the Armee des Cotes de l'Ocean to the Grande Armee, but the troops and their formations were already in existence.

-There seems to be a confusion between the terms ‘doctrine' and ‘practice' on page 285. The French tactical system, based on infantry/artillery cooperation, as well as flexible infantry tactics which employed large numbers of skirmishers, sometimes entire regiments, was both superior to, and more flexible than, the Austrian and Russian tactical systems, and combined with superior French organization gave the Grande Armee the advantage over the allies.

-Page 44 states that there were 89 ligne regiments in the French army when there were 90. Consequently, on page 45, 70 line regiments should read 71.

-Also on page 45 it reads that there were 2 Irish regiments, when there was only one, originally known as the Irish Legion of one battalion.

-Further on page 45 it states that there were 99 officers and men in the grenadier companies when there were 83. The same strength would apply to the carabinier companies in the light infantry regiments.

-The reference on page 45 to the provisional Grenadiers d'Oudinot (also known as Grenadiers de la Reserve and Grenadiers Reunis) was originally formed as an elite unit for the invasion of England. During 1803-1806 it was formed from the grenadier/carabinier and voltigeur companies of the regiments that were still organizing and training or were on garrison duty. So, therefore, only two companies were taken from each battalion and it was disbanded after Austerlitz.
-The dismounted dragoons (the army dubbed them ‘wooden swords') referred to on page 46 originally formed for the invasion of England in two divisions, and when the Grande Armee turned eastward, it was found that three out of four dragoon squadrons per regiment could be mounted, and the dismounted squadrons were reorganized into a division of four provisional regiments. They were assigned to guard the Grande Armee's artillery parc and the army's baggage trains.
-On page 46 it reads that there was ‘one battalion of marines of the guard.' This Guard battalion was of sailors as the French had no marines. This is a poor translation of ‘marin' which is a sailor.

-Comment is also made on page 224 that the Velites of the Grenadiers a Cheval of the Imperial Guard were organized as a squadron, numbered 5th in the regiment. This is inaccurate as on campaign the Velites were assigned to the regular squadrons and intermixed with the veterans. The Velites were organized as their own squadron of the regiment during peacetime and in garrison, but not on campaign and definitely not in combat.

-On page 306 the text reads ‘No other battle save Waterloo would match the broad impact of Austerlitz on the course of European history.' This is an accepted view, but I believe that the Jena campaign, with the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, had more long-term impact in that the Prussian army was destroyed and the Prussian state ceased to exist. That didn't happen after Austerlitz and the Russians did not, as the Austrians did, sign a peace treaty with France. The contest with Russia was left unresolved and wouldn't be resolved until after Friedland and the Prussian catastrophe in the summer of 1807.

-The table of Allied Artillery Losses on page 281 misrepresents the artillery arms of the various states. There were two types of artillery for the period-light and heavy. Light artillery consisted of field (or foot) artillery, horse artillery, and mountain artillery. Heavy artillery consisted of siege, garrison, and fortress artillery none of which as far as I can find out were employed by any of the belligerents at Austerlitz. The table referred to divides the allied artillery into heavy, light, and horse artillery which is incorrect.

Apart from Brechtel198's listing, the Bowden book is to put it mildly more than a little disappointing map wise.

Much better to go with Duffy, Goetz, Hourtelle and Ian Castle's " Austerlitz – Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe" or contemporary maps.

The maps in the subject book on Austerlitz are excellent. The best ones I have found, though are in the Esposito/Elting Atlas.

There are 3 on the battle, 2 on the campaign, and 5 on the Ulm campaign.

Sorry Brechtel – but I do take great issue with the Bowden maps – they are to put it mildly extremely disappointing – a five year old could do the same!!

I do like and appreciate good maps that help to illustrate battles. Esposito and Elting's Atlas which I have the original version is excellent but not as good as others. It gives a good general over view where as Castle/Duffy etc give a good impression of where the individual regiments were, which is what I think most of us wargamers want.

Sorry Brechtel – but I do take great issue with the Bowden maps – they are to put it mildly extremely disappointing – a five year old could do the same!!

I didn't mention any maps in a book by Scott Bowden. I did mention that his treatment in the Goetz book was poor and uncalled for.

When you begin to get into regimental locations in a large action on maps, it begins to get just a little cluttered. I do think that the Esposito/Elting maps are the best I've seen for skill in construction as well as overall information.

The maps I did mention above are in the Goetz book, not the Bowden study.

Thanks Brechtel198, I missed the updated reply for some reason a month ago!

I'd agree with 98% of your observations.

I'd take the book then as sometimes informative if technically inaccurate, provoding you can discern the difference- (Like the break out of horse artillery- at least a way to identify proportions).

The Situations given by the French outline all the captured artillery in all fortresses, from memory 1000 in Vienna alone, so again it's what isn't told by citing simple stats that is at fault.

One minor point on a subject very close to my research heart- the Grenadiers Reunis started life 1802 under Junot (who felt he had been 'banished' from Paris by Citizen Buonaparte to St.Omer).

While they were slowly grouped and encamped corps by corps over the next two years, much of the legere had already formed voltigeur (or eclaireurs) companies within regiments; the ligne less so and though not formally designated till 1805- yet I bet they were in existence in many units.

These companies were 'taken' from garrison regiments, on a 'loan' basis of units/ battalions NOT part of the great Armee des Cotes de l'Ocean. In a typical sales-pitch type political move, although designated Grenadiers, 80% of the troops were legere units, not line.

Those corps who had not formed 'voltigeur' companies despatched '3 companies of fusiliers'; given the orders to use the small/ agile/ nimble men for voltigeurs, I can't believe that these 'companies' weren't sorted [that way] before they were sent off beside their respective Grenadiers.

Each battalion formed with all companies from the same regiment. Two battalions so formed created a regiment. One of these battalions also had a senior officer in command who was designated to lead the regiments.

The planned '6' regiments derived to only 5, thus two Brigades of 4, and one of 2, battalions, under 3 Gens de Brigade. Indeed, a handpicked crew!

And you are correct- prior to the campaign start the Situation already used "[Division de la] Grenadiers de la Reserve" as their official title.

On the camps locations: "Ces six camps seront : un en Hollande, un à Gand, un à Saint-Omer, un à Compiègne, un à Saint-Malo, un à Bayonne …"

The last I had thought was a mistake or typo, but logically so near to Spain, culturally 'mixed' Basques etc. and somewhat remote from the main population of France, a strong 'garrison force' would appear necessary to forestall and 'naval landed raids' by the Brits.

On Davout, I believe the camp he commanded was complete and whole. His administrative skills gave him a broad purview of occupied/ absorbed Netherlands, which meant supervision of garrisons towns etc. A precursor to his heydays as Commandant-Govenor at Danzig and Germany between campaigns.
regards
d

This is an excellent article by George Nafziger on the Grenadiers Reunis, both from his book on the French Army and then placed on the Napoleon Series:

link

The voltigeur companies in the ligne and legere infantry regiments were authorized to be formed in March 1804 for the light infantry regiments and September 1805 for the line infantry regiments.

Some regiments, however, had already formed 'light companies' between 1796 and 1801 and they were usually called eclaireurs (scouts) and are mentioned by Teste, Coignet and Thiebault.

This is an excellent article by George Nafziger on the Grenadiers Reunis,

Excellent overall but I convey, wrong in detail. Yes I've had that list in my hands for 30 odd years (from when he was selling dot-matrix print-outs)!

Even the opening paragraph doesn't correlate with his list. 17? battalions in 7 regiments? Yet he lists only 10 in 5 regts. And yes, that is what existed and fought in 1805.

Also be aware, in the battalion totals cited he has totalled 'all troops' 3 days after the battle- whether present, in hospital, wounded/missing or detached.

The elite battalions had fought in the advance guard from the beginning of the campaign and is possibly why N. placed them in reserve with the Guard. At the battle they were at approximately half strength of that given there.

He has also reorded the regiments (these are not per the Situations) and nor is his 'continuum' (implied or otherwise) that the same force carried on year to year correct.

The first and second brigade units are reversed; and there were 3 Brigadiers- why he failed to mention General de brigade Laplanche-Mortières as 1st Brigade commander I don't understand.

I do have the actual Situation as dated (I think) by George, copied from, well Service Historique 'AT' Vincennes in 1984.. I can read it well and it is not as he listed.

And their 'regimental' designation did not include the word grenadier. That was solely used in the Divisional title.

The first Grenadier Division was formally disbanded in July 1806. Ended. They actually marched off (toward France and regimental depots) and some at least to Neuchatel/Neufchateau to 'occupy' on behalf of Prince Berthier, the duchy taken from Prussia.

The new war of 1806 a new force (Division) was raised; again in 1809. None compare to the first, nor do they accurately convey the status, except in title. Oudinot held command as the fire-eater he was.

Like many overlooked in history because he seemed like a Marshal of last resort for Napoleon, yet he was an efficient and thoroughly conscientious officer and General de Division under the Republic, Directory and Empire. Neither his honesty nor early actions were ever questioned, and he seems to have equally balanced mens lives against the merits of victory at all costs.
d

Oudinot was also promoted past his level of expertise. He was an excellent infantry commander, but didn't understand the employment of combined arms.

He was one of 'Lannes small change' the three generals of division promoted to marshal after Wagram. The other two were Macdonald and Marmont-all of them unfortunate choices and there were others who were much more deserving and better commanders, such as Grenier.