"Artillery. Gun Crew." Topic

Hi,

The French gun crew consisted of 1 NCO, 6 skilled gunners (first class) and 5-7 unskilled gunners (second class).
CONCLUSION:
the number of skilled and unskilled gunners was about equal.

But in 1807 the foot artillery company [8 guns] consisted of 24 skilled and 45 unskilled gunners. In 1815 there were 20 skilled and 48 unskilled gunners in the company.
CONCLUSION:
the number of unskilled gunners was much greater than unskilled gunners.

QUESTION: why the discrepancy ? I am really confused.

There were actually more in a company. If you multiply your individual gun detachments by 8 you get more personnel in the unit (8 x NCOs, 48 skilled gunners and 40 – 56 unskilled gunners). As you can see, the unskilled gunners remain about constant but the skilled numbers drop. This reflects the wastage rates in the more experienced that all arms suffered as the Napoleonic Wars went on.

Generally speaking, French foot artillery companies had a strength of five officers, six NCOs, one drummer and 81 enlisted men.

Horse artillery companies had a strength of four officers, five NCOs, two trumpeters and 65 enlisted men.

Gun crews by regulation were as follows: 15 for a 12-pounder, 13 for an 8- or a 6-pounder, 8 for a 4-pounder, and thirteen for a howitzer.

I have seen the enlisted men divided into gunners 1st class and gunners 2d class, but never as 'unskilled.' Where is that listed or stated?

What happened, in a word, was Russia. And as Brechtel points out, the division between 1st and 2nd class gunners is not skilled v. unskilled, but a matter of seniority. I suspect a lot of the 1815 1st class gunners were less skilled than many of the 1807 2nd class.

I would definitely think that of the 1813 artillery arm which had to be entirely rebuilt after Russia, but not 1815 which had a high proportion of veterans.

And veteran artillerymen had returned from Spain in 1814…

Wasn't it common practice to draft infantrymen from the nearest battalion to provide "unskilled gunners" for the duration of the battle? So "unskilled gunners" may not have been carried on the roster of the artillery battery.

G'Day Gents

If I may…

when you say "skilled"…and "unskilled"…the English interpretation is looked at in the wrong manner.

For artillery you had Soldats de première classe et deuxième classe.

Those that were Soldats de première classe had their Certification Technique (CT)…

Soldats de deuxième classe were working on their CT and had to report to l'Adjudant-Major De Semaine twice a day under normal conditions….so that one day they could become certified.

During a campaign…I rather doubt anyone was certified…but that does not make an individual less knowledgeable…or…they may have been quite new at their profession…

As an example in 1815 48 Soldats de deuxième classe may have been quite knowledgeable…just not certified.

It is merely la Formation de l'éducation militaire…if the soldier was an idiot…he could stay deuxième classe for years…while an intelligent soldier might finish his education at a faster rate.

As for drafting infantrymen…you shall find that according to the Lois, Reglemens et Arretes…from 500 to 600 men are permitted to be used as d'auxiliares.

Best Regards
Art

All I ask, in any army, is that the spongeman is to the right of the barrel, if facing forwards…

reloading is from the left side, facing the enemy.

I will accept variation in which side the chap actually fired the gun or served the vent.

The day folk get that right, we will argue about the contribution of line infantry!

There is a 50% chance of getting this right, yet, strangely……….

G'Day Liam,

The detached infantry always got the bad end of the stick…they are the ones who ended up hating artillerymen…'do this'…go do that'…

If you have read Captain Webbers memoirs…and what the infantry were assigned to do for his battery in the mountains…tell me they didn't hate the artillery…

I can hear it now…

'pull you lazy b…'

'hold tighter you lazy b'

'put your back into it'

'hold the ropes…'

-and their reply must have been…'go f………….'

Best Regards
Art

Liam, allow me a walk gamer's reply (the apostrophe is important here)

In the bad old days, we were only provided 4 crew. So to avoid my batteries looking identical, I would mix them up on the base. They are only representational so are "markers". But like officers – I stick them all on one base. Not realistic, but it works for me

Of course, nowadays Franznap makes 16 different pose for French horse artillery, so I can now be more "accurate"

Cheers

Thanks Art – at least one man who knows who is speaking about – at least in the French Napoleonic army there was training for infantry as gunners as well, how they did it – and if that was realized – I don't know.

While the artillery regulations definitely stipulated that infantrymen were to be used to augment artillery crews, I have found no evidence of it as a usual practice in the Grande Armee.

Coignet does talk about it in the battles of Essling and Wagram, where Guard infantrymen were asked to augment depleted artillery crews, but that was because of heavy losses among the gun crews, not as a usual practice.

@ Brechtel

This is what confuses me. On the one hand, "French foot artillery companies had a strength of five officers, six NCOs, one drummer and 81 enlisted men." = 93 men.

On the other, if the crew requirement for an 8-pounder and howitzers was 13 men, then a field brigade / battery / company of 6 such guns and 2 howitzers should have had a complement of 104.

93 =/= 104.

Further, do these figures include all the headcount relating to the management of the horse teams, caissons, etc, or are these more guys still on top of the 93 or 104?

I confess that I find it very hard from looking at orbats what the correct level of crew was for artillery, whether French or anyone else's. I have an orbat for British troops in Britain in 1805 which shows Waggon Train and Drivers separately from the batteries, whose crews in some cases look very light and in others not.

French artillery practice was to 'brigade' an artillery train company with an artillery company. Usually, the two would always serve together. And the train company commander after 1800 would be a lieutenant who would be junior to the artillery company commander to avoid any command problems.

The only country that didn't have a separate train organization was the United States. Their drivers/conducteurs were artillerymen. It solved a lot of problems.

The number or designated gun crew for each piece included, by regulation, the 'assigned' infantrymen to assist the gunners. For the 12-pounder, for example, there were supposed to be 8 artillerymen and seven infantrymen. And that was written before the Revolution.

I cannot see why the eight artillery crewmen needed the infantrymen to serve the piece. It would tend to get just a little crowded in the gun position. Tousard, in Volume II of his American Artillerist's Companion mentions that the French didn't do that in practice.

So, leaving out the infantrymen, the numbers do fit. Two additional points should also be noted: first, howitzers were supposed to have a qualified bombardier, a specialist in handling common shell, assigned to each howitzer crew, and, second, the horse artillery would have a horse holder assigned for every three gunners when dismounted and serving the piece.

"The only country that didn't have a separate train organization was the United States."

Also Russia.

"In war only one fact is true, people die."

Also in war when enemy gunners or guns were overrun, troops were generally less "forgiving" towards gunners, hence higher loss rates.

Also Russia.

Were they artillerymen or train troops? The way that Wilson describes them, they are train troops…

There was no Russian "artillery train" as concieved of in the French service, but instead one "artillery" organization – hence my prior posting.

For example, in each "artillery battery company" (12 pieces heavy foot artillery – 12-lbers and 1/2-pud licornes), the crews at full strength were:

An officer commanded a vzvod (platoon) of 2 matching pieces – 6x vzvod make up the company.

For each piece of artillery:
NCO's
--- 1x feyerverker' (gunnery sergeant) : gun aimer/commander
--- 1x yunker' (aspirant) : control of materiel & logistics (officer candidate, literate) – this function was filled by the company's portupey-yunker' (flag-aspirant) in the 1st vzvod and the company's fel'dfebel' (sergeant major) for the 6th vzvod
rankers
--- 4x bombardir' (bombardier – or perhaps "artillery lance corporal" or "specialist" as used in the US Army) : rammer, match, 1st munitions bag, primer & pricker
--- 4x kanonir' (cannoneer – or perhaps "artilleryman 1st class") : spare match, spare primer & pricker, 2x handspikemen
--- 6x gandlanger' (handler – or perhaps "artilleryman") : munitions handlers, 3 riding limber horses, 3 riding caisson horses
--- 6x gandlanger' : 3 to work the limber, 1 attendant for each of 3 caissons

In addtion to 8 wagons of various types for an artillery company's non-combattants (artificers and craftsmen, medical, finance & admiinstration), each piece had 1 (for light and horse companies) or 2 (for battery companies) "provisions wagons" for foodstuffs, fodder, hand tools and baggage, each with a furleyt' (driver). These were called "furshtatsk -iy -aya -im and so on", and this has been translated as "train" – but they (i) were still part of the artillery company and crew organizations and (ii) were not directly part of moving the guns or their muntions.

Lastly, in each company 2 rankers would operate an artel' (commissary) and would be provided with 2 small wagons or carts similar to those of cantinières in the French service. In the Russian service, the artel' was owned in common by the other ranks, and provided private-paid labor from the men, the funds been used to stock the commissary. The artel' wagons moved with the provisions and baggage wagon(s) for the company.

At the full regulated establishment, there woud actually be 8 more rankers per battery company than accounted for in the fore-going. Perhaps sensibly, Russian establishments always had this little "excess", to allow for some degree of absence, sickness or under-strength. In infantry and jäger establishments, there were enough men for 25 files per vzvod, but actually these were not expected to be fielded at more than 24 files per vzvod.

As a rather short-term foreign observer, not a Russian speaker, and not an artillery officer, it is quite possible that Wilson did not know what he was looking at – or that in composing his text he attempted to use the terminology that his readers might most easily understand.

If it would be of use to you, you may find the actual Russian estalishments (in Russian, in the old alphabet, but at least printed instead of in manuscript) here : link

so the so called experts are down to Wilson again???

Thanks le Breton for the excellent contribution, to be worth to be pasted and copied.

Simple question: Were the Russian artillery drivers trained artillerymen or just drivers?

The US artillery drivers were trained artillerymen and could man an artillery piece efficiently if needed.

There is a difference.

By the above posting, they were drivers with a different designation than the artillerymen of the battery.

To which "drivers" are you referring?

A furleyt' (which can be translated as "driver") were artillery rankers, trained to drive supply wagons (not munitions caissons, not limbers).

A gandlanger' (which could be translated at "handler") were artillery rankers, trained to (i) connect/disconnect and conduct the limber, (ii) handle and move munitions, (iii) stock and conduct the caissons.

As the pay went up from furleyt' to gandlanger' to kanonir' to bombardir' to feyerverker' (the last being an NCO rank), upon gaining one set of skills, the artilleryman would begin to be trained for the next set of skills. At each step the sufficiently senior and qualified (often fully qualified and just awaiting an open billet) would be designted "vitse-" (or vice- or deputy-) the next level, and would act in substitution in case of temporary absence of the next level billet holder.

Could a furleyt' aim/command a gun? I doubt it. Maybe some older men who really couldn't do anything more active than drive the supply wagon but who had not been invalided out of the active service. The men who ran the artel' were often like this. Could a furleyt' be part of the team (left axle, right axle, frontman) that operated a limber? Most usually, yes he could.

Could a gandlanger' operate a handspike? Usually yes, as that was the most junior task for a kanonir', and so was the first next-level skill taught to a gandlanger'. Could a gandlanger' vitse-kanonir' perform all the duties of a kanonir'? Yes, he could.

Does this make the Russian artillery "drivers" (still not clear who you are talking about) "trained artillerymen"? They were artillerymen, they were trained for their billets, then trained for the next level up.

The original topic was "The only country that didn't have a separate train organization was the United States." I think that "Russia also" applies, but perhaps I have not your understanding of what was intended by "separate train organization".

Brechtel198 appears to have forgotten an English language source he has frequently quoted in the past: Alex and Yurii Zhmodikov's Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars – Vol. 1. At pages 25 and 62+, they detail and document the improvements to the Russian artillery introduced by Paul I and under Alexander I, respectively, including the completion of the full militarization of the artillery--including all supply wagons & drivers--by 1803. Wilson's observations pale in comparison in this instance, as there was no separate 'train' organization.

Haven't forgotten it at all.

And the French artillery train was militarized in 1800, three years before the Russians did it.

Militarizing the train did not make the French artillery train personnel artillerymen. I submit that it was the same in the Russian service.

Really, I do not want to push a point into an agrument, but again Mr. Brechtel, you seem to be confusing the men responsible for the limbers, caissons and munitions (in French service, le train d'artillerie) with the men responsible for movement of provisons (in the French service, le train d'équipages militaires).

In the Russian service, the first group were always integrated into the artillery companies, even in Catherine's time (and for all I know in Peter's time). I did provide the link to the establishments – it is easy to check. The Russians did not ever use specialized private contractors, separate organizations or anything else specifically for the limbers, caissons and munitions handling.

Notable under the Tsar Paul were changes effecting the second group – in the artillery, per the establishment of 1798. There were modifications to this in 1803, 1811 and 1819 – all of which could be said to adapt the system of providing food and fodder and medical care to larger and larger field armies. Before Tsar Paul, the supply transport assets (wagons, horses) were requisitioned as needed. The men were always military.

Also notable in 1803 was the full prepartion of the artillery companies to establishment levels. Previous to this, the manning was intended to be at establishment (often a "peacetime reduced strength"), but the artillery equipment (except for training examples) was (supposedly) in parks, the horses were (supposedly) in remount centers and the supplies (supposedly) were in pre-made magazines. The "supposedly" part had proven problemmatic in 1799-1800, when the Army did not fight near its garrisons.

The French changed from private contractors to miitary servicemen in 1800 for the train d'artillerie. Among the reasons that Russia had always used military men for any military function were (i) there were no private companies in Russia, and (ii) there were essentially no such people as could be "employed" among ethnic Russians : it would break class for nobles, and serfs were tied to pieces of land and later to state-owned manufactories. Non-Russian "nations" were restricted to their homelands. Therefore, the class of people who you could have do this work were soldiers – and no one else (well, I suppose academics, non-Orthodox Christians, Jews and foreigners could be "employed", but unlikey as military supply wagon drivers).

Mr. Brechtel, it is clear that you do not read much or at all in Russian. But the tables in establishments should be understandable and give you the correct general idea. It is perhaps worth your time to look if you have an interest in the Russian service.

I'll rephrase the question already put:

Were the Russian artillery drivers trained and assigned as drivers, or were they trained artillerymen detailed as drivers, as they were in the US Army of the period?

Simple question; hopefully a simple answer.

Mr. Brechtel,

I have said what I know. I do not understand your simple question as more than a distinction without a difference.

If you tell me that every man sitting up on a supply wagon could jump off and aim/command a gun in the US artillery, i do salute them.

I think I made it clear that in the Russian service, all were artillerymen, in one organization, and that there was a career progression of increasing skills from furleyt' (driver of a supply wagon) to gandlanger' to kanonir' to bombardir' to feyerverker' (NCO, aimer/commander of a piece).

If each man that joined the American artillery already knew or was by some magic of instruction simultaneously taught all the various skills and could aim/command a gun, then more power to him. But I would feel bad, myself, if I were a "trained artilleryman" who could aim and command a piece and was instead "detailed" to drive the supply wagon. I suspect that the American artillery did not really train and assign men in this fashion.

"Gun detachments consisted of two types of soldiers: trained gunners and less-qualified men called …. matrosses in the U.S. Artillery. The gunners aimed, loaded and fired the piece while the others assisted by bringing up ammunition or helping to move the gun. Gun detachment commanders were usually N.C.O.'s who supervised the work of the detachment, personally laid the gun, observed the fall of shot and made the necessary corrections. Artillery officers commanded batteries of six to eight pieces or sub-units of two or three weapons. The gun detachment for a U.S. 6-pdr. field gun comprised the gun commander, two trained gunners and six matrosses. U.S. howitzers had a similar complement but four more matrosses.[23] …. When additional muscle power was required, it was the practice …. to obtain unskilled labour from the nearest infantry unit."
"[23] Amos Stoddard. Exercises for the Garrison and Field Ordnance together with Manoeuvres of Horse Artillery. New York, 1812, p. 35."

"Field Artillery of the War of 1812: Equipment, Organization, Tactics and Effectiveness"
Donald E. Graves
The War of 1812 Magazine
Issue 12 – November 2009
link

Organization of a Regiment of Light Artillery*, Act of April 12th 1808 as amended by Acts of February 24th 1812, May 16th 1812 and January 20th 1813
Artillery company organization
1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1 third lieutenant ("conductor lieutenant" responsible for ordnance, equipment and logistics), 2 cadets, 5 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, 8 artificers, 1 farrier, 1 saddler, 58 matrosses, 12 drivers
* i.e. horse or flying or mounted artillery – supposed to be true horse artillery with horses for all ranks, but in practise sometimes "wurst" or "wagon" mounted

Regulations United States Army of May 6th, 1813
Artillery equipment organization
A division of light artillery (manned by a company of artillerymen from the light regiment) was :
--- six pieces of ordnance, viz., four cannon of the same calibre and two howitzers
--- for each six-pounder one caisson, for each howitzer two caissons (8 total)
--- three wagons, provided with assorted and spare articles of equipment, ammunition, harness, entrenching and artificers' tools, etc.
--- one traveling forge

Historical sketch of the organization, administration, matérial and tactics of the artillery
United States Army – by Lieutenant William Edward Birkhimer
Washington D.C. : J.J. Chapman, 1884
link
page 356 et. seq. & 380 et. seq.

Comment :
The American artillery organization seems to me just the same as the Russian, except that the Russians integrated their supply of food and fodder down to the company/crew level.

I must be missing something – but just don't see any "trained artillerymen" "detailed as drivers" in the American organization. I see "drivers" detailed as drivers (of the equipment wagons and of the caissons, which latter would be a position for a gandlanger' in the Russian service).

Please correct me if I am wrong.

The gun crew consisted of :
7-8 First Class gunners (skilled)
5 Second Class gunners (unskilled)
If necessary several infantrymen were attached
to the gun. They were drawn from the grenadier companies.

So it can be that 15-20 men served one 6pdr cannon in the French artillery. SO IT WAS VERY CROWDED.

What is your source?

From Louis de Tousard, American Artillerist's Companion, Volume II, note on pages 134-135:

'The American and the English are the only nations which present such a number of men to the enemy's artillery and musketry. The Prussian, Austrian, and French, who have made the greatest improvement in their field artillery, have reduced the number of men necessary to the service of a field piece, and as few of them as possible are exposed to the enemy's fire. Two American 6-pounders present a front of twenty-two gunners and matrosses, besides those who point and direct the piece during the time of the firing. Two 8-pounders, and in general any field piece in action of the powers herein mentioned, present in front but four gunners and matrosses, besides those who point and direct the piece. The difference in the loss of that precious class of men must be incalculable; for it is known as a principle that a firing battery always attracts the fire of the adverse batteries.'

So, it appears that the gun crews in the French service (1) were smaller than stated in the regulations, and, (2) infantrymen were not employed, from the grenadier companies or anywhere else, as part of a gun crew, with the exception as the emergencies already cited.

As was pointed about above – it would be wrong to say that gunners second class are unskilled – Art pointed that well out.

Infantry was only taken in – as emergency.

Also not all gunners would be employed at once, you needed some in reserve to re place casualties and rotate.

gunners had to walk back to the ammunition waggons to get ammunition.

@Le Breton

Thanks for sharing all your expertise – don't let yourself dragged into the usual – in view – war of attrition in words with a certain person.

A French 6-pounder would have about 10 men near the gun (including the NCO aimer/commander) – plus – 2 men for the caisson nearby (say 20-25 meters) – plus – the train NCO and 3 men with the limber (and usually the horses for the deployed caisson) and 2 men with each of the addtional caisson(s) all located behind the nearest convenient covering terrain (or at least backed away from the gun line).
Not so crowded at all.

A French compagnie d'artillerie à pied (1811) ….
heaquarters
--- capitaine en premier commandant la compagnie
--- sergeant-major
--- caporal fourrier : company clerk
--- lieutenant en premier & lieutenant en second : to command sub-elements or detachments of the compagnie
--- 2x tambour : drummer
park
--- capitaine en second commandant du parc
--- 4x artificier : artillery equipment overhaul and repair
--- 2x ouvrier en fer : metalworker
--- 2x ouvrier en bois : woodworker
--- 10x [5x] artilleur : artilleryman *
3 escouades, each – with 2x 6-pounder cannon each
--- sergeant : commands one piece
--- caporal : commands one pierce
--- 2x canonnier de première classe : 1 per piece
--- 8x canonnier de seconde classe : 4 per piece
--- 10x [8x] artilleur : artilleryman * : 5 [4] per piece
1 escouade – with 2x howitzer
--- sergeant : commands 1st piece
--- caporal : commands 2nd pierce
--- 4x canonnier de première classe : 2 per piece
--- 8x canonnier de seconde classe : 4 per piece
--- 12x [10x] artilleur : artilleryman * : 6 [5] per piece

* The peactime establishment was 68 men, with all the rankers qualified at least as canonnier de seconde class. In time of war, the company was to augmented by 52 additional artillerymen, for a total of 120 men. However, it was rare that a company's actual strength reached 120 men. The above shows the organization per the establishment of 120 men, and then in brackets, the distribution with a total of 107 men, the average for artillery companies of this type in Davout's Ier corps at the start of the Russian campaign.

The minimum time in grade for promotion from artilleur to canonnier de seconde classe to canonnier de première classe to caporal to sergent was 2 years at each step, making a minimum of 8 years service for the newly-made sergent.

Perhaps of interest, Gassendi, writing in the 1819 edition of the same work, argued (i) that 8 men were sufficent crew of any of the French field pieces, provided that they be well-trained, (ii) that a full-sized "spare" escouade be attached to the company park as a manpower reserve to make sure that there was always 8 crew on each piece, and (iii) that the peacetime strength should be the full strength.

A French compagnie du train d'artillerie (1811) ….
headquarters
--- lieutenant
--- sous-lieutenant
--- maréchal-des-logis chef : cavalry sergent-major
--- brigadier-fourrier : company clerk
--- 2x trompette
park :
--- 1x brigadier
--- 2x maréchal-ferrant : farrier
--- 2x bourrelier : leatherworker
--- 10x [4x] train soldat *
4 escouades, each (for 2 pieces each)
--- maréchal-des-logis : sergent – with 1st piece
--- brigadier : cavalry corporal – with 2nd piece
--- 20x [14x] train soldat * – 10 [7] per piece (2 per each of 3 [2] caissons, 4 [3] with limber)

* The peactime establishment was 78 men. In time of war, the company was to augmented by 31 additional soldats for a total of 109 men. However, it was rare that a company's actual strength reached 109 men. The above shows the organization per the establishment of 109 men, and then in brackets, the distribution with a total of 83 men, the average for train companies with light foot artillery companies in Davout's Ier corps at the start of the Russian campaign

See :
Gassendi's "Aide-mémoire à l'usage des officiers d'artillerie" (4e ed.- 1809)
link
link

Bio of General Gassendi
link

État militaire d'artillerie (1811)
link

gunners had to walk back to the ammunition waggons to get ammunition.

In action, the coffret was removed from the trail of the piece and placed on the limber. The ammunition from the coffret was used in action. It was refilled from the caisson assigned to the piece.

Also not all gunners would be employed at once, you needed some in reserve to re place casualties and rotate.

What is the source for this quote?

Given the strengths of a French foot and horse artillery company, this statement appears to be incorrect.

The diagram given in the posting above is per the regulations, not what was done in practice.

I would submit that there might be a better biography in Six than using Wikipedia.

Thank you
- Brechtel198
- von Winterfeldt
- Art
- Artilleriman
for the information. This is more than I expected. I am highly impressed with your knowledge !

so the coats were green?

so the coats were green?

Trick question eh?
In the French Army, certainly not!

Also not all gunners would be employed at once, you needed some in reserve to re place casualties and rotate.

The 'structure' may have contained some slack, however N. definitely allowed for 'slippage' over time on campaign.

For instance, in the IV Corps d'Armee (Soult) 1805, their 'Reserve' included 17e and 18e Compagnies of 5eme Regt á pied- troops only. They had no guns. Goetz is wrong.
AT least one detachment was handed off toanother compagnie on record.
I have the Situation for the campaign and beforehand since St.Omer (I think) and battle of course.

These crew supplemented the active 3 companies and Corps Reserve compagnie.

And

at least in the French Napoleonic army there was training for infantry as gunners as well, how they did it – and if that was realized – I don't know.

Well, we know now that at the Army of the Ocean Coasts since 1803 or thereabouts, ALL infantry, some Cav, others etc. were trained to swim, row boats, load and unload boats and ships, handle ordnance, fire naval cannon and assist both gunnery and boat crews in basic duties.

They also stood guard, mounted observations and assisted the artillery practice at shooting Btiish naval vessels who ventured too close to shore (that famous horse artillery peloton that fired upon a sloop etc. I think).

All in all that was a pretty good time in the French Army, and getting experience that was unmatched anywhere else. It wasn't all fun tho, sadly a few accidents and some little combat death and injuries did ensue.

regards d