GarrisonMiniatures | 19 Jan 2017 1:10 p.m. PST |
Useful looking reference I came across. link |
Jabsen Krause | 19 Jan 2017 1:23 p.m. PST |
Very handy! Statistical overload :-) Best regards, Jabsen |
Broglie | 19 Jan 2017 1:32 p.m. PST |
Brilliant. Thanks for the link. Regards |
JimDuncanUK | 19 Jan 2017 1:50 p.m. PST |
Disappointing that the author(s) have excluded figures for Japan. |
mwindsorfw | 19 Jan 2017 2:14 p.m. PST |
Helps explain why the Soviets stationed their troops in Eastern Europe during the cold war. |
BeneathALeadMountain | 19 Jan 2017 3:42 p.m. PST |
That is a glut of information, thank you for the link. BALM. |
LostPict | 19 Jan 2017 6:19 p.m. PST |
Thats amazing pile of numbers. Thanks. |
hurrahbro | 19 Jan 2017 9:19 p.m. PST |
But I am still left wondering what was the fiscal value of damage done by the German forces in WW2 to the UK was? Just to use as a comparison to things like, the crash of 2008? |
Martin Rapier | 20 Jan 2017 12:15 a.m. PST |
The war bankrupted us and destroyed our industry, mercantile marine, overseas investments and Empire. So quite a lot. |
Wargamer Blue | 20 Jan 2017 6:33 p.m. PST |
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jdot317 | 21 Jan 2017 8:28 p.m. PST |
Really enjoyed the read Lots of great data |
acctingman1869 | 06 Feb 2017 8:41 a.m. PST |
There is no way the German's had 3x as many divisions than the US in 44-45. No way |
FatherOfAllLogic | 06 Feb 2017 9:44 a.m. PST |
Golly, why not? The Americans tried and failed to raise 100 divisions. The Germans created a lot more than 100. Course by 44-45 they were generally weak….. |
Marc33594 | 06 Feb 2017 11:21 a.m. PST |
First the Germans did indeed raise many more divisions then the Americans link And no the American Army did not try and fail to raise 100 Divisions. I suggest reading on the "90 Division Gamble". One good sources is here: link A summary is contained in the first few lines: Of all the calculated risks taken by General George C. Marshall in World War II none was bolder than the decision in mid-war to maintain the U.S. Army's ground combat strength at ninety divisions. Students of warfare will long debate whether the decision was as wise as it was courageous, as foresighted as it was successful. The decision to limit the Army, ratified in May 1944 on he eve of OVERLORD, was a compound of necessity and choice. A variety of influences played a part in it-national policy, Allied strategy, air power, American technology, the balance between American war economy and manpower, logistical and operational requirements, the needs of Allies and sister services, and General Marshall's faith in the fighting qualities of the American soldier. The decision came at the end of a long series of steps going back to the pre-Pearl Harbor days when American planners had first begun to be concerned about the problem of determining the size and shape of the Army needed for global and coalition warfare. |
christot | 07 Feb 2017 2:37 a.m. PST |
"There is no way the German's had 3x as many divisions than the US in 44-45. No way" I'm more amazed that you think they didn't. What had they been fighting the soviets with for nearly 4 years? Harsh language? |
FatherOfAllLogic | 07 Feb 2017 8:01 a.m. PST |
Well if they capped it at 90 divisions because of 'necessity and choice', they in fact failed to raise 100 divisions. |
Marc33594 | 07 Feb 2017 12:49 p.m. PST |
But the goal was never to raise 100, did you bother to read the article? Your comment was they tried to raise 100 and failed at it. |
FatherOfAllLogic | 09 Feb 2017 8:17 a.m. PST |
Ok, I read the article. By constantly lowering projections of required divisions, by pulling troops from units in training to flesh out deployed units, by lowering a perceived strategic reserve and by curtailing an officer training program, the US won. So yes, the US did not fail to raise 100 divisions, rather, they were barely able to raise 90 divisions. I mean our guys won and all so 90 was enough. |
Marc33594 | 09 Feb 2017 8:41 a.m. PST |
All were prudent steps based on experience. What would have been a problem is keeping to the original plans and projections when they proved outmoded. The fact that 90 divisions, maintained at full strength, were the answer is not a failing. It is known as efficiency. Had they been able to "barely" raise 90 divisions would have meant not being able to keep them at full strength. It has been pointed out that the Germans constantly raised "new divisions" when so many of their regular formations were under strength. Much has been written about Hitler's obsession with number of divisions some of which were in name only. Could the US have raised many more divisions? Of course they could have but at the price of not keeping veteran formations at strength. If one wants to argue the gross mistakes in the US replacement system that is one thing. But to somehow imply the US had tapped out its manpower reserve is simply not true. |
christot | 09 Feb 2017 1:08 p.m. PST |
90 divisions was obviously enough for the task…More divisions in europe?…could they be effectively shipped and supplied? given the supply problems for the existing units probably not, or if they could be then there would have been trade-offs elsewhere, Navy, air-force..Far East, whatever. One small point though, I'd be interested to know what the difference in "divisional strength" would be if the very high number of "non-divisional units" Artillery, armour, engineer etc were factored in..and then even more so the enormous tooth to tail ratio that the US enjoyed compared to say the Germans or the Soviets…If you factored those in the US had way more than 100 divisions. 90 did the job. (With a bit of help from the CW and 500 Soviet divisions) |
Marc33594 | 10 Feb 2017 5:58 a.m. PST |
You bring up a good point christot. In fact the original post here the statistics show the US maintained 45 percent of its strength in non divisional units. The Germans only retained 10 percent in non divisional units. That would mean at least 35+ more division equivalents in non divisional units. (It should be noted that the US actually raised more than 90. Once again, according to the numbers in the original post, a high of 95. That includes the 6 Marine divisions raised as well). As to manpower reserve at its height the Germans had some 31 percent of its population in the military while the US only had 9 percent. And of course the US population was nearly double that of Germany (132 million to 70 million in 1940 time period). According to the National WW2 Museum, once again at its height, the US had some 12,364,000 men and women in service while at its height the German had approximately 10,000,000. The US had a significant amount of course in both the Navy and the Army Air Corps, much more than the Germans. |
jah1956 | 27 Feb 2017 5:23 p.m. PST |
Logistics forget the planes, tanks, weapons, fuel, ammunition, men just sending the food to feed the troops was enormous undertaking the Atlantic is a bit wider than the Hudson River. Therefor you only use the manpower you can supply. I think that the Nazis had a small supply problem in Russia and the Japanese in Burma if I remember it did not turn out so well for them. |