"Maximum Effective Ranges" Topic

Is there any standardized way or formula for stating the maximum effective range of a weapon is? Do different publications use different definitions?

In WWII I've read many accounts of gunnery duels starting at 800-1200m when the guns stated maximum range or the gun sight goes out to 1500-3000m.

Thanks,
Wolfhag

The problem with 'maximum effective range' is that you have to be able to see that far…terrain is always a factor. That maximum is usually under optimal conditions.

This is a really good question. AIUI part of the rationale for assault rifles was that the average wartime conscript couldn't shoot straight over 200 metres. So he was better off with a rifle that couldn't either, which would mean it could also fire on full auto.

I wonder to what extent the effective range of a crew served weapon was, constructively, the longest distance at which the crew had some chance of hitting what they were aiming at?

MER (JP 1-02, NATO) – The maximum distance at which a weapon may be expected to be accurate and achieve the desired result. (Army) – The distance from a weapon system at which a 50 percent probability of target hit is expected, or the tracer burnout range.

r|Ph = 0.50 is the one that is used most often in weapons testing for NATO countries, so it is likely the most common definition for any formal testing you would find in references written in English. Even though JP 1-02 doesn't go back to WWII, it has inherited a lot of common practices from WWI on.

I would tend to underestimate for small arms. Theoretically rifles could fire to 1000m. But you wouldn't be able to see a target or evaluate effects except in special situations.

For WW2 I use an effective range of about 400m for rifles and about 1200-1600m for tripod MGs.

For larger ordnance I use 1000-1600m depending on calibre. I actually allow guns to fire further but given the penalties it's rare.

But that's not the OPs question. It is very hard to find this information in a standardised format for a range of weapons. Guesstimates are easy to get. Hard stats not so much.

Further to the above there is a very real difference between maximum effective range and actual effective range – there is good literature on the fact that while most WWII bolt action rifles were accurate up to 600 m or beyond almost all combat firing occured at range of below 300 m

Less than you'd think, and less than published, and less than "personal experience" would indicate.
So….less

tripod machine gun at 1200 metres? its not even supposed to be aiming at individual targets..its there to hit an area/building/road with enough bullets to stop people going there, and force them somewhere else so you can shoot them.

The 'effective' range of the weapon and the expected range at which the weapon would be used to engage the enemy [in other words typical actions, doctrine, visibility etc.]

For instance, the weapon range for a smoothbore 12 lber was out to about 2000 yards in the Napoleonic through ACW. Yet, the 'effective range' according to most all nations was half that:1000 yards. The same is true of rifled cannon during the ACW. 3000 yard range, 15000 as doctrine… the effective range actually pasted on the inside of caisson lids for Union Artillery.

The typical range for small arms firefights in the 20th and 21st Century has been within 400 yards or less, thought most weapons now have a range of 2000 or more.

There can be a big difference between the 'effective' range [such as the range where 50% or more casualties can be inflicted] stated for a weapon and how it was typically used because of doctrine and perceived 'effective range.'

There's tons of hard data. The challenge is the core challenge in developing a wargame – identifying what you want to be the relevant factors. Once you do that, it depends on what the factors. For most common ones in modern settings, there is copious data on the real or analogous situations. For others, it is fairly easy to work through simulation.

As noted, max effective range is shorter based on IIRC, the range that a target could be hit with a 50% probability of kill/hit. E.g. : an M16 5.56 round's max effective range was about 460m(?), IIRC. Where the round will fly about 2500m before grounding out.

But as also noted, terrain plays a very big factor as well. You can't do an effective attack with direct fire if you can't see the target.

So in most cases, in temperate terrain, like Europe, Infantry firefights took place at < 250m IIRC.

Where Armor, depending on era, from 500 to <1200-1500m, IIRC.

Wolfhag:

Weren't your 'to hit' tables based on a fairly extensive study of the question by the British?

15000 as doctrine… the effective range actually pasted on the inside of caisson lids for Union Artillery.

That is 1500 yards… too many zeros.

There's tons of hard data. The challenge is the core challenge in developing a wargame – identifying what you want to be the relevant factors.df

Well, there's the rub.

1. The military generate data about what they already think is relevant. If you agree, there isn't a lot of work to be done, at least not for combat WWII and after.

Even the term 'Hard Data' pre-supposes what is important/relevant in the way of information.

2. IF you think particular factors/data are relevant when the men who experienced combat, the professionals who generated the data don't, you have to ask yourself why?

3. To see something as relevant that others don't means you've asked different questions or seen something you believe is relevant that the data probably doesn't address. [Different starting questions which the data is meant to answer.]

4. Because what you believe is relevant may not agree with the combatants or the Military researchers who generated the data, the data may not work at all. Meaning: data that says weapons will cause 'on average' 50% damage can't reasonably be used to determine morale or even suppression at that or any range.

It's something to consider when using data.

What I was looking for was along the lines of etotheipi's answer.

IIRC US rifles needed to pass a test firing a 2 MOA groups or less. Correct me if I'm wrong but that's a 4 inch diameter group at 100 yards and 20 inches at 500 yards. That's fine but then throw in a slight aiming error and it is increased by about 20% (much more if being shot at).

So I'd guess a 2 MOA accuracy would give about a 50% chance to hit the upper body of a human at 500 yards under pretty much ideal conditions at a known range. It appears to me effective ranges were measures using a known range (not range estimation and correction).

So I guess what I'm looking for is what process was used to determine MER (JP 1-02, NATO).

Tripod mounted sustained fire machine guns should be effective out to tracer burnout which is 1200-1500 meters (if observed of course) in WWII. My Grandfather was a Machine Gun Company Commander in WWI (M1917 water cooled .30cal) and he'd set up indirect area fire at 2000 yards that according to German POW's was very effective if they ventured into the beaten zone.

German tank TZF coax MG sights show 800-1200m range for the MG34, Russians 1500m for the DT.

Like others said there are many factors. I'm trying to determine what the publishers and military manuals criteria is.

Wolfhag

McLaddie,
My small arms fire rules are based on a British War Office study using an Infantry Section with a Bren Gun against a frontage with defenders in trenches or bunkers. It gave a causality rate of a percentage per minute using volume of fire, not a to hit #.

My direct fire routine measures accuracy in mils (mostly from test firings) with an error budget (errors increase the mil error) that includes range estimation error, aiming error (somewhat based on optics and magnification). I put it all into a spreadsheet formula (no calcs during the game) for a base accuracy in 100 meter increments. The accuracy value is randomized with a die roll. If the result is <= to the target size (roughly the vertical area exposed) the round hits.

So a target that has 2 meters exposed will be hit on a result of 1.0 meters or less. The gunnery chart has all of the data and shows the number or less to hit.

It's always more complicated to explain than to play but there are less steps and less modifiers than other detailed games.

Wolfhag

Like others said there are many factors. I'm trying to determine what the publishers and military manuals criteria is.

Of course, there are many factors. So, you haven't found any treatises or manuals discussing that?

And once you have the casualty/hit rate at X range, then what?

The various small arms manuals generally list the effective ranges eg 600 yards for Bren.

You would of course need to amass quite a few manuals…

Theoretical effective does not necessarily correspond with the actual ranges weapons operated at, which was more determined by training, visibility, morale and training.

1200m does not seem unreasonable for tripod MG area fire, although the German defences on the Somme had successful MG engagements at ranges we'll over 2000 yards, and of course Vickers barrages ere shot right out the maximum range the rounds would travel (4000 yard?)

Wikipedia, and other sites frequently list the effective ranges for various weapons.

Dept. of Defense manuals too.

So I'd guess a 2 MOA accuracy would give about a 50% chance to hit the upper body of a human at 500 yards under pretty much ideal conditions at a known range.

I would suggest that is probably way too high. Those may be the technical capabilities of the weapon but the shooter will lower that likelihood dramatically, usually I would think to zero.

As a teenager I had to join the school's cadet force (the school was paid money to run one) and part of what they gave us to do to amuse us was to let us shoot rifles – SMLEs. We had a 40-yard range on the premises and regularly, as in once a term, we went to Longmoor or Bisley and fired 50 or 60 rounds off apiece over 200 and 300 yard ranges. Half of us would be shooting and the other half would be positioned downrange in the butts; two of us would be positioned under each target and tasked with noticing where each round hit. We'd then raise a pointer to indicate to the shooter where the round had gone, waving it from side to side if it had missed altogether.

The results of this were that at 40 yards we hit very regularly, but at 200 yards we scattered them everywhere. At 300 yards, hitting anywhere on the target board at all was the exception not the rule. Maybe 30% hot the actual board, 10% hit the man-shape target drawn on it and 2 or 3% hit the foot-square actual target.

Basically, to reuse a famous observation made about musket accuracy in the Napoleonic era, if you were 300 yards downrange of us you could consider yourself very unlucky indeed to be hit by a round that we had actually aimed at you.

Now it can be argued that these were cadets rather than trained soldiers, who would probably spend longer on this than us. But a 17-year-old cadet is not so very different from an 18-year-old conscript, and how practised a rifleman was an 18-year-old who then spends four months getting from Britain to the Western Desert? So if we couldn't hit anything at 300 yards under perfect conditions, I'd suggest that the average soldier couldn't hit anything at 300 yards under typical conditions either.

A high volume of poorly-aimed fire would still have a suppressive effect at that range, but the chances of actually hitting anyone would be pure random luck.

I have been rereading Middlebrook's book on Arnhem lately and he indicates that the British and Germans at Arnhem both had around 1,400 men killed. If we double that for the wounded, then each side lost about 300 men a day in that battle to all causes. Subtract out whatever losses the artillery, mortars and MGs inflicted and it becomes clear that even at streetfighty close ranges, rifle fire did not inflict a lot of casualties. At 500 yards I would say a decent number could perhaps suppress but no more.

Yes, the rule of thumb for 'effective' small arms fire is around 300m these days and (more like 200m in WW2) ie the point at which people have to take it seriously and use fire & manouvre to get forward or get hopelessly pinned and/or take losses if moving.

At ranges below 30m, things start to get unpleasantly dangerous, which is why it is often a critical point in the engagement (ie whether the attacker can cross that imaginary line).

One interesting observation I came across is that many firefights take place just outside the effective range of the weapons involved – so units will happily hunker down and blaze away at each other at ranges of a few hundred yards making lots of noise but otherwise not really achieving a great deal, and even if they make it across the effective fire line, they will then hunker down just outside the lethal fire line and see whose resolve or ammo gives out first. The odds are clearly with the defender in that situation, especially if they are dug in with dumped ammo.

I remember, going through basic training, being told that the weapon (SLR in this case) had two effective ranges. One as a single weapon and one as a unit firing, the unit having a longer effective range than the individual.

Bear in mind that I was in the RAF as a techie and not playing with rifles as a regular thing so take it with a pinch of salt.

Why do you need to know this? I have a way of finding the theoretical to-hit probability so I've never had a need to research it. But, I've read that it is a 50% chance to hit.

That is what I thought, "As noted, max effective range is shorter based on IIRC, the range that a target could be hit with a 50% probability of kill/hit."

Another thought, an M2 50. cal has a max rg. of @ 6800 before the round fall from the air and hits the ground. It even could be fire Indirect. However, even on the ground without a scope of some sort, you'd rarely find a place where you could engage a target(s) at that range. Again, You can only fire directly effectively at a target(s) you can see.

The various small arms manuals generally list the effective ranges eg 600 yards for Bren.

Yes, that is generally the max effective range of most .30s. E.g. the M60's 7.62mm FMJ round's max range is listed as 3750m. But again you have to be able to see the target …

Yes, the rule of thumb for 'effective' small arms fire is around 300m

Yes as I said @ < 250m is generally a good estimate for WWII to currently.

Now something else, on US ARMY rifle ranges the max target is a 300m. And as some of you may know, at that range that target is down right tiny. Using the standard "open iron" sight, i.e. without a scope.

We were issued M14s when I was an ROTC cadet in '75. Which is standard 7.62 NATO FMJ. Again is a full .30 cal. round. But both the M16 and M14 have the same max range. As it's not about the max range of either round, 5.56 vs. 7.62. But the max effective range. Both listed as about 460m. As opposed it 2500m vs. 3750m. And as I said, on the range, at 300m the longest target, was tiny …

So I think the situation is that in general many games, in one way mirror "reality". When basically giving the Squad and Platoon a max range of @ 250m.

And in some cases, some MGs in the defense don't open up until the enemy reaches the FPL. Where most of the unit's fires are integrated with enfilade, flanking/cross-fires, etc. To make "metaphorically" a "wall of steal" …

Because "heavy weapons draw "heavy" fire" was one of the phrases we had heard. So to wait until the enemy is in the deadliest location, Kill Zone, if you will. Is one of the better ways to insure, e.g., the MGs are not knocked out before the other weapons in the unit. Can coordinate fires. And place all fires effectively on the enemy.

Before that in many cases indirect fires from mortars, FA, etc. is attriting the enemy before they get to the FPL, etc.

I appreciate the feedback and opinions, I don't disagree with anyone.

When reading and doing research you'll see entries that will state "Effective Range", "Effective Maximum Range", "Maximum Range" (how far the round will travel which is meaningless except with sustained MG fire).

We all know there is an infinite number of variables that can influence that but I don't think the publications consider that. They appear to base it purely on weapon performance which is fine. I can handle the variables myself, I'm looking for a base line.

I guess you can think of it as the range for a Base 50% chance to hit number. The reason is I'm trying to establish a base line of purely weapon performance for my own formula that will take into account the multiple defensive, combat and environmental variables and range estimation errors (troop training).

I wanted to know if anyone knew the CRITERIA or FORMULA (maybe there isn't one) the military manuals or publications use to determine the MAXIMUM Effective Range (different than Effective Range)of small arms/rifles. It's probably some formula (time of flight, MOA accuracy?)or from test firings most likely at known range. Or maybe I'm wrong and it is under combat conditions. That's what I'm attempting to find out. So far 50% chance to hit (aimed fire I assume) is the best documented answer.

Martin: Why 600 yards for the Bren? Sounds reasonable but how did they arrive at 600 yards? Most .30cal rifles have a muzzle velocity of about 750 yards per second. If the stated effective range is 300-400 yards that's about 0.5 seconds TOF. With a Bren firing a burst could you double that range? Would it be wrong to assume the Max Effective Range to be from 0.75 to 1.0 seconds TOF? What would the base chance to hit using aimed fire be under ideal conditions and would it still suppress? I think it's fairly subjective.

I'd think the "theoretical" maximum effective range would be determined by the elevation setting of the rear sights. If the range were known and everyone shooting with the same rear sight setting the results would be a beaten zone which would be somewhat effective at denying the enemy movement through it like area fire but not effective as aimed fire. However, the only real definition I've come across is "effective" being a 50% chance to hit the target with aimed fire.

Just prior to WWI massed small arms fire (area fire?)was being experimented with and in some European battles there was some success with it out to 1000 yards against troops in the open maneuvering. At extreme ranges the angle of descent was steep enough to hit soldiers in a trench that were below ground level (no overhead cover of course). This is not real applicable to skirmish level games of course.

Legion 4: We were both in the service in the same era. Can you imagine how much fun games would be if the entrenched defender held fire until the enemy triggered a coordinated FPF with enfilade MG, small arms and 60mm mortar fire? Yes, ineffective fire should draw mortars.

4th Cuirassier: The 2 MOA would be a formula for baseline weapon performance, not under combat conditions or with an inexperienced shooter. I was a marksmanship instructor in a youth program with .22cal rifles and our results were much better. In boot camp we had 17 year old guys from NYC that never fired a weapon before that were hitting a human silhouette 9/10 times at 500 yards with an M14 (iron sights, prone, sling and shooting jacket) after 2 weeks of intensive instruction – known range and ideal conditions of course but still a baseline of performance but NOT expected performance in a combat environment considering all of the variables people have mentioned.

Wolfhag

The rule of thumb I use is that effective range is where your weapon's dispersion will keep the round on target.

Example 1: your basic WW2 rifle has a 4MOA dispersion (it shoots a 4" group at 100 yards). The human torso is about 18" wide, so your max range where an aimed shot will still hit the torso is 450 yards.

Example 2: My Romanian PSL with the issue scope on it shoots a ~2" group at 100 yards. I can hit an 18" wide target at 900 yards assuming I read the wind correctly, and I can hit a head-sized target at 400 yards.

Example 3: The average AK47 and cousins shoots about an 8" group at 100 yards. It can hit an 18" wide target at 225 yards before you have shots aimed at the center of the target that miss due to dispersion.

I guess you can think of it as the range for a Base 50% chance to hit number. The reason is I'm trying to establish a base line of purely weapon performance for my own formula that will take into account the multiple defensive, combat and environmental variables and range estimation errors (troop training).

Wolfhag:

Is there actually something that can be called "purely weapon performance"? And if there is, you still have to know the relationship that has to actual combat. I tend to become impatient with the all the work on weapons' ratings when combat is about the behaviors of the men wielding them.

Wouldn't it be simpler--if not easier--to look at actual engagements to determine how weapons were used at what ranges…? And more importantly, their effects on the men down-range? Saying something has a 50% chance to hit at X range still leaves you with the important question:

So What? What does that mean in real world combat? Wouldn't it be easier just to go to accounts of real world combat… That is where you see where and if 'purely weapon performance' has any relationship to actual combat. You are going to have to at some point anyway. That is what you want to simulate…right?

I wanted to know if anyone knew the CRITERIA or FORMULA (maybe there isn't one) the military manuals or publications use to determine the MAXIMUM Effective Range (different than Effective Range)of small arms/rifles.

And that will get you what?

The 2 MOA would be a formula for baseline weapon performance, not under combat conditions or with an inexperienced shooter…after 2 weeks instruction--known range and ideal conditions of course but still a baseline of performance but NOT expected performance in a combat environment considering all of the variables people have mentioned.

So, where do you go for data on 'combat conditions' if that is what the wargame is about?

So, where do you go for data on 'combat conditions' if that is what the wargame is about?

dote.osd.mil
link

The types of data available are in "optimal conditions", so they represent best case chucking a piece of ordnance, letting something fly until it is our of fuel, or properly irradiating your target. The MER is the 50% Pk range, again under ideal conditions.

Operational test looks at weapon performance under realistic combat conditions. Whether you have accounted for all the ways rain affects rifle performance, if the requirement say it has to work in the rain, you fire it in the rain, you get the effects.

Pretty much the way every wargame Pk mechanic works is there is a nominal performance and certain identified conditions modify that performance. Knowing how MER is calculated allows you to understand what the data you have means (and whether or not you want that to be your referent nominal performance). Other test data allows you to attribute changes in performance based on your selected conditions.

Wouldn't it be simpler--if not easier--to look at actual engagements to determine how weapons were used at what ranges…?

But to know whether that information applies to the situation in your game, you would need a well defined understanding of what the actual conditions of that combat were.

Using weapons test data, I know what the conditions under which the data was collected were (not absolutely, but to a much higher degree than combat data). And I know what things I want to consider as important effects for my game because I choose them.

I harken back to an article in Guns & Ammo a few years back. They took an ACW Springfield and an Enfield and had them restored to issue condition as best they could determine from factory and test records by the same professional gunsmith. Then they had a series of marksmen practice then use them at various ranges. There was a minimal, not statistically significant difference in performance.

Point to ponder (not a conclusion): all the differences in combat performance between these two rifles is situational, not a function of the weapon. No one had ever been able to see that possibility by trying to reverse engineer from combat data, most likely because there are too many unknown unknowns.

"Martin: Why 600 yards for the Bren? "

It was discussing tactical employment of the weapon, not the physical characteristics of the projectiles and making the point that it was 'as effective at 600 yards as at 100' and suggesting that a 600 yard field of fire was desirable. Which of course nicely fits in with gun of the reserve section being able to provide covering flanking fire for the neighouring platoon.

irc the battle sight on a No. 4 was 200 yards, and on the SLR 300 yards. In both cases the rounds are still going pretty much flat at that range, so in principle you just point the weapon at the target and shoot. If only it was that easy…

As McLaddie says, you'd be much better off looking at the ranges weapons were actually used at than theoretical maximums. There probably is some sort of ballistic formula based on the maximum allowable deviation (I guess the 50% MER mentioned above), but those are the sorts of things which make defence contractors very rich and soldiers in the field somewhat annoyed when the new toys don't work as advertised.

The degradation between range conditiosn and exercises is around 90% (depending on type of weapon system), and the degradation between exercise and combat conditions is another 90% or so on top. The extent of degradation also varies by system type which complicates things a bit.

So your 70% range hit probability becomes less than 1% under combat conditions. See e.g. Rowlands 'The Stress of Battle' for extensive ops research on this stuff. Some of it is repeated in 'Brains and Bullets' which is handy as sadly Rowland is a little hard to obtain these days.

I wanted to know if anyone knew the CRITERIA or FORMULA (maybe there isn't one) the military manuals or publications use to determine the MAXIMUM Effective Range (different than Effective Range)of small arms/rifles. It's probably some formula.

Using a formula used by WWII Germans and published by Lorrin Bird and Robert Livingston the probability to-hit a stationary man sized target by a 7.92mm K98 is 50% at ~350m using 2x dispersion and no range error. Using a Cornell University formula it is 50% at about 250m.

Don't forget:you lose range shooting uphill. Especially up-mountain in Afghanistan, the Alps, etc.

Point to ponder (not a conclusion): all the differences in combat performance between these two rifles is situational, not a function of the weapon. No one had ever been able to see that possibility by trying to reverse engineer from combat data, most likely because there are too many unknown unknowns.

etotheipi:

First of all, where do you get the idea that 'no one had ever been able to reverse engineer from combat data?'

Second, isn't that exactly what wargame design of any stripe are attempting to do, well or poorly, at some level of accuracy?

Third, the methods for 'reverse engineering' anything from past data is what simulation designers do all the time… That is what simulations are: 'reverse engineered data' to create dynamics similar to the real thing.

The question is how or why you would spend time on "weapon performance under realistic combat conditions" when the issue is the soldier performance with the weapon under combat conditions which may or may not have any relationship to weapon performance.

And if you have to find out that 'relationship', you are going to have to find out human performance anyway, which is the bottom line in the first place…

Certainly ascertaining weapon performance is far easier than 'human performance,' but that isn't the issue, is it?

Using a formula used by WWII Germans and published by Lorrin Bird and Robert Livingston the probability to-hit a stationary man sized target by a 7.92mm K98 is 50% at ~350m using 2x dispersion and no range error. Using a Cornell University formula it is 50% at about 250m.

Now, if those men in combat would only remain stationary and upright, we'd have some meaningful numbers.

Legion 4: We were both in the service in the same era. Can you imagine how much fun games would be if the entrenched defender held fire until the enemy triggered a coordinated FPF with enfilade MG, small arms and 60mm mortar fire? Yes, ineffective fire should draw mortars.

Just like an L-Shaped Ambush … it wouldn't be very much fun to game.

First of all, where do you get the idea that 'no one had ever been able to reverse engineer from combat data?'

The hundreds of ACW articles by historians about the superiority of one rifle over the other. Can you provide a counterexample?

Second, isn't that exactly what wargame design of any stripe are attempting to do, well or poorly, at some level of accuracy?

Nope. Building a simulation is an entirely constructive process, not inductive or reductive. As you have said many times, the only thing that is in a simulation is the thing that was put there by the designer.

Third, the methods for 'reverse engineering' anything from past data is what simulation designers do all the time… That is what simulations are: 'reverse engineered data' to create dynamics similar to the real thing.

Not at all. Simulations are constructed to have outcomes, but not necessarily to replicate the dynamics. Nor do they have to. For any given relationship between variables, there are an infinite number of models that will map them. They can't be "right".

It is a huge fallacy (of hubris?) when someone who designs a model that gives outputs that match real world results believes that model must necessarily represent the actual dynamics.

For a wargame, you want to create dynamics that are driven by things that do not necessarily exist in the real world, often abstract concepts (cohesion, morale, elite troop status).

And if you have to find out that 'relationship', you are going to have to find out human performance anyway, which is the bottom line in the first place…

Certainly ascertaining weapon performance is far easier than 'human performance,' but that isn't the issue, is it?

No. I spent 15 years doing that professionally, and both sides are equally complex, just in different ways.

The behaviour of the warfighter is part (but not all) of realistic combat conditions under which weapons are tested.

In some weapon systems, human performance is a driving factor. In others it is not.

In some weapon systems, human performance is a driving factor. In others it is not.

Getting back to my Example #3:

Regardless of who is shooting the AK, the BEST you are going to get is hitting the target at 200m. That African child-soldier probably won't get a hit beyond 50m, a Russian conscript will probably get hits at 150m. Your badass Navy SEAL sniper will still NOT get consistent hits beyond 200m, the weapon isn't consistent enough to do the job.

If you get a good AK, one that shoots 4" groups at 100 yards, then your SEAL will shoot better.

First of all, where do you get the idea that 'no one had ever been able to reverse engineer from combat data?'

The hundreds of ACW articles by historians about the superiority of one rifle over the other. Can you provide a counterexample?

etotheipi:
You are going to have to unpack that for me. I may be misinterpreting your use of 'reverse engineer'. I don't see the connection between a bunch of historians writing articles about what they believe is the superiority of one rifle over the other and using data to 'reverse engineer' combat as a whole. Most all historians don't produce articles with a simulation as the goal.

Nope. Building a simulation is an entirely constructive process, not inductive or reductive. As you have said many times, the only thing that is in a simulation is the thing that was put there by the designer.

Well, I can see where we diverge. A simulation system is constructive, but what it is made of [constructed with] is very much inductive and/or reductive uses of data as well as deductive. That is true in both the creation and testing of the simulation. The final simulation system is simply the conclusion statement of those approaches. Garbage in/garbage out is only garbage if the inductive, reductive and deductive uses of the information the simulation is based on is garbage.

It is a huge fallacy (of hubris?) when someone who designs a model that gives outputs that match real world results believes that model must necessarily represent the actual dynamics.

There is no 'must necessarily represent the actual dynamics.' Simulation designers have to thoroughly test that representation. That is basic simulations 101. It would be hubris to assume because you used some data and wanted to simulate something, that it does--or because the outputs [results] match the real world results someplace…. that the job is done. Dynamics is process, not just results. It isn't an either /or situation. You aren't saying that it is a fallacy or hubris to say that any simulations works--represents/models what the reality they were designed to, or are you?

And if you have to find out that 'relationship', you are going to have to find out human performance anyway, which is the bottom line in the first place…
Certainly ascertaining weapon performance is far easier than 'human performance,' but that isn't the issue, is it?

No. I spent 15 years doing that professionally, and both sides are equally complex, just in different ways.

Interesting. In what capacity? I wasn't saying they weren't both complex. I was saying that one of the differences is that human behavior individually and in different groups is more difficult to model--not impossible, just more difficult.

The behaviour of the warfighter is part (but not all) of realistic combat conditions under which weapons are tested.In some weapon systems, human performance is a driving factor. In others it is not.

Agreed, it is the relationship, so the behaviour can't be ignored, Whichever, the weapon or human performance, is the "driving force"…whatever that means, it is the relationship of those two and many other factors that we see on the battlefield--in an effort to represent them. In any case, 'realistic combat conditions' is only part of creating a simulation that mimics the dynamics of battle, and not just the conditions.

Regardless of who is shooting the AK, the BEST you are going to get is hitting the target at 200m. That African child-soldier probably won't get a hit beyond 50m, a Russian conscript will probably get hits at 150m. Your badass Navy SEAL sniper will still NOT get consistent hits beyond 200m, the weapon isn't consistent enough to do the job.

Lion: To design a wargame that will represent that relationship, you have to get some real numbers for that 'probably'. i.e. establish if there is some reality to those guesses.

Dynamics is process, not just results. It isn't an either /or situation.

Modeling and simulation is only results. Again, for any given set of data (it doesn't matter how much), there are an infinite number of models that can fit it. Simulationists do not look for the one that is "right", they look for the one that is useful for their purpose.

Lion: To design a wargame that will represent that relationship, you have to get some real numbers for that 'probably'. i.e. establish if there is some reality to those guesses.

This completely misses the point of his post. He was not talking about the specifics of the AK and the three classes of operator named. He was using that case to a point about the relationship between operator and weapon performance.

Agreed, it is the relationship, so the behaviour can't be ignored, Whichever, the weapon or human performance, is the "driving force"…

By driving factor, I mean one which has a significant impact on the outcome. Sometimes human performance is a driving factor, sometimes it isn't.

Well as many here have mentioned, and I agree. There are very many variables which play into a wargame/combat simulation. As in real life, and we know somethings maybe hard to "simulate" in a wargame.

But once you design/get a workable game/simulation, that takes in the effects of many of those variables. Like the effects of terrain, unit training, weapons deployed, etc. Then the randomness of all those variables comes down to a die or dice rolls. You have to have a random outcome generator, like dice to "divine" the end result.

Based on some of those variables that may be added or subtracted to the die roll. Like a cover/terrain bonus, e.g. -1 to attacker's die, etc.

So IMO you can only do so much to try to get a workable game, include as many states of nature, paradigms, etc. and the game be playable & enjoyable. E.g. AH's Squad Leader games did a pretty good job, attempting to simulate those battles their historical scenarios represent. IMO, of course. It all depends one's perception of the level of "reality" one wants to accept or reject within the rules of the various game systems.

Dynamics is process, not just results. It isn't an either /or situation.

Modeling and simulation is only results.

etotheipi:

I guess we'll have to disagree there. For participatory simulations such as games or training designs, Modeling the process that gets the results matters. That is true for a number of research simulations. I can get reasonable results of a battle by rolling one die. But that isn't simulating a battle… and participation is nil. It is the series of decisions that is important.

Again, for any given set of data (it doesn't matter how much), there are an infinite number of models that can fit it. Simulationists do not look for the one that is "right", they look for the one that is useful for their purpose.

I certainly agree with that.

Lion: To design a wargame that will represent that relationship, you have to get some real numbers for that 'probably'. i.e. establish if there is some reality to those guesses.

This completely misses the point of his post. He was not talking about the specifics of the AK and the three classes of operator named. He was using that case to a point about the relationship between operator and weapon performance.

And I was pointing out that those 'relationships' were all qualified with probably. It could well be true, but to know the reality of his guess or theory, he will need some evidence to base it on… The difference between simulating a guess and simulating something from evidence… reality. There are a number of ways to test that theory to see if it is supportable.

By driving factor, I mean one which has a significant impact on the outcome. Sometimes human performance is a driving factor, sometimes it isn't.

I appreciate the clarification. Obviously you'd have to know the impact of both to make that determination.

Then the randomness of all those variables comes down to a die or dice rolls. You have to have a random outcome generator, like dice to "divine" the end result.

Lion:
It can come down to a die roll, but the 'probability' of any outcome supposedly represents the probability of something happening in real life.

Another game designer once gave the example of a Prussian line volleying a French column and stated that you can't know the chances of the Prussians driving the French away with volley fire.

The issue is the probability of that happening, the real life chances of that occurring modeled by the die probabilities.

That is a statistical question. Now, I have forty examples of Prussians volleying advancing French Columns.
None of them have the Prussians driving off the French with volley fire. So, the odds of that happening, based on statistical evidence is basically zero. With a base of 40, the margin of error is @5%. So, it would be far more 'realistic' to have only a 5% chance of Prussian volleys driving off French columns. With a D6 or D10, that probability can't be provided, so with those random generators, the chances would realistically be zero.

In those 40 examples, while the French could be halted and/or disorganized, go to line, any retreat or rout was caused by Prussian flanking moves, subsequent charges or Prussian reinforcements.

That is what all those die rolls are supposedly providing: the historical chances/ the real odds of some result.

It's like determining the odds of an accident happening on a stretch of freeway. You can guess and theorize or you can use historical numbers of accidents to generate the 'probability.' Which is more 'accurate?' What's more, once you have a good base of 'accidents' to work from, you can find out where most accidents occur, when and the circumstances, making the odds of something happening in your simulation even more 'accurate.' Or you can just say it's all random…but in reality it isn't. Even Chaos Theory admits to patterns.

I'm not saying statistical analysis is perfect, not by a long short, but is far, far more 'realistic' than just using 'random' results.

But once you design/get a workable game/simulation, that takes in the effects of many of those variables. Like the effects of terrain, unit training, weapons deployed, etc. Then the randomness of all those variables comes down to a die or dice rolls. You have to have a random outcome generator, like dice to "divine" the end result.

I said that … not Lion … for better or worse. I don't want Lion to take the blame for something dumb I may have said …

It can come down to a die roll, but the 'probability' of any outcome supposedly represents the probability of something happening in real life.

I do agree, and by having modifiers to those die roll(s) for like I said, cover from terrain, etc. Makes the probability of something occurring either higher or lower.
As I said, e.g., if a target is behind cover or concealment it will be harder to hit generally. That should effect the die roll.

We also played with the idea of using different die types for those modifiers. As instead of adding +1 for some modifier. we'd go up a die type. Like d6 to a d8. But we found a d6 with just adding modifiers, worked out as well.
And less complex, etc.

Based on military training exercises I was involved with long ago. Chaos, "the fog of war" and Murphy rules in many cases.

But still you need a baseline of the state of nature/paradigm first to add or subtract those modifiers to. That again is why we stayed with the d6.

E.g. Better trained and experienced units will perform better than those who are not. Or a certain weapon is going to be more effective than another, etc., … The d6 is the random generator with or without a modifier that may prove to be the difference between success or failure.
I.e. say, hitting target followed by damaging or killing the target.

But you still have to have a starting point and stat analysis is one of the first steps, I'd think …

Legion:

Well, shoot. Accept my apologies. I agree that Murphy rules in many cases. The question would be how often and where?

All organizations have weak points or nexus where Murphy shows up more often, often based on a particular type of organization. And of course, in battle you have an enemy focused on creating chaos for the opposing army. When and where each Murphy event may be random, but how often is less so, and the reasons for them are generally a fairly limited set seen over and over again in some form.

AH's Squad Leader games did a pretty good job, attempting to simulate those battles their historical scenarios represent. IMO, of course. It all depends one's perception of the level of "reality" one wants to accept or reject within the rules of the various game systems.

Yep, we do the same thing with life in general.

Is there any standardized way or formula for stating the maximum effective range of a weapon is? Do different publications use different definitions?In WWII I've read many accounts of gunnery duels starting at 800-1200m when the guns stated maximum range or the gun sight goes out to 1500-3000m.

Wolfhag:
We may have strayed from your original question, but it seems from the posts that there are different definitions around. I guess my question is:

What difference does it make if there is a standard definition or many?

Wow, you guys are getting pretty deep.

The base line or starting point as Legion 4 mentions is why I was looking at maximum effective ranges and trying to find a formula that I could use that would be consistent with all weapons. Using data on different weapons from different sources is a sure way to mess things up.

McLaddie, it's not so much the definition as it is how different sources arrived at the ranges. I think I can use what Mobius said because those figures can be scaled for different ranges. By being able to determine the accuracy/dispersion a volume of fire it can be compared to the target exposure area to get an idea (not exact science) of being hit.

I'm trying to model a volume and accuracy of small arms fire (BUT NOT THE ACCURACY AND RESULT OF EACH ROUND FIRED) against the amount of exposure of the target to arrive at the causality rate.

I figure once you have a consistent baseline or formula for weapons you can throw in all of the factors and modifiers desired. So like Martin said a 70% chance can become a 1% chance, that's what I'm striving for.

I look at small arms engagements as a simultaneous exchange of a volume of fire over a specific period/turn, not as single figures firing and rolling to hit. In the game firing is done by a team/section or crew served weapon. The volume is compared against the defenders posture/defenses and other modifiers and gives a causality rate from 1% to 99%. I've tweaked the results so that with a 3:1 ratio in firepower superiority you should suppress the defender to the point it is safe to maneuver or force him to pull back.

After determining the causality rate I use a single die roll on a binomial table for the rate and # targets to determine the # hit. There is no magical "to hit #" like traditional games. With this method I can determine a rate from 1% to 99% per more quickly and with less die rolls. With multiple players everyone is determining the results of their firefight at the same time which speeds up the game.

I've play tested it a number of times including at three conventions with players having no previous experience or read rules before the game. I did a 5 minute intro and sample turns. In a 4 vs 4 game with each player having a squad and vehicle we got through 15 rounds of firing and moving and finished the scenario in 2.5 hours. With the design I start with a lot of detail and then start simplifying things and tossing stuff out. I'm always looking for shortcuts or ways to combine things.

Suppression decreases the units firepower and also the causality rate too (spending less time in LOS). The result is if on the losing end of a fire fight suppression will eventually prevent effective return fire and force the unit to withdraw. I use situational awareness rules for reaction fire and movement under fire advantages to squads performing a coordinated fire & maneuver. Suppression means slower reaction.

It scales good for extended fire fights with both sides in good cover or short range ambushes that can give a 75%+ kill rate in a single turn. There is no need for additional over watch or opportunity fire rules.

The system keeps all players involved equally (no IGOUGO or activation's). The system interacts with direct fire and artillery that can land during the turn.

As a starting point I'm basing the small arms system on a study by the British War Office because it gives a causality rate as a starting point but it is by no means definitive:

British WO 291/471 Weight of small-arms fire needed for various targets.

"These figures are exceedingly tentative, and it should be realised that even if correct, they may have little value in the Infantry battle, where the weight of fire needed is in general decided more by what is available, and then corrected empirically."

Targets are considered to be in slit trenches, exposing an area of ½ sq ft to fire, or pillboxes, exposing an area of ¼ sq ft to fire from an embrasure.

Two levels of neutralisation are recognised.

"Light neutralisation" is defined as the minimum weight of fire to appreciably effect the accuracy of enemy fire. The enemy will suffer casualties at a rate of 2½% per minute, or one man per platoon per minute, if they stay in a firing position for more than a third of the time they are fired on.

"Heavy neutralisation" is defined as the weight of fire needed effectively to stop any retaliatory measures on the part of the enemy, with a casualty rate of 10% per minute, or one man per section per minute. It is estimated that a bullet passing within 3 yards sounded near enough to be dangerous.

Sections are assumed to be at full strength, 1+9, with Bren, Sten and 8 rifles, although it is acknowledged that rarely in battle will section strength exceed 1+6. Brens are assumed to fire 120 rds/min, rifles 18 rds/min. The range of engagement is assumed to be 100 to 200 yards. The effect of 2-in mortars is neglected.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag, WO 291/476 Comparison of rifle, Bren and Sten also provides some good data. But, it is not easy to translate that data into useful rules. I would guess it might help to translate theoretical potential hits into actual hits.

No problem McLaddie, Lion and I are well know to each other. And get along quite well …

I agree that Murphy rules in many cases. The question would be how often and where?

Yes, that IMO, would come down to unit training, experience, etc. for one, IMO.

I.e. after running a certain mission or op, etc., a number of times, you generally get better at doing it.
E.g. in the US ARMY, rehearsals, battle drills, SOPs etc. limits the affects of "old Murph". But never makes it go away 100%.

As we see in many wargames that mirror reality to a point. In certain periods on certain fronts, etc., say of WWII. Certain units like e.g. the Germans during the France '40 Campaign. Were less likely to "frakk up" vs. other participants in those same battles. And again some games I've played generally reflected that.

And we see the same situation today. Many armies/forces/groups in the current conflicts qualities vary. So that will generally be reflected in the games or should …

Yep, we do the same thing with life in general.

Yep … every day …

The base line or starting point as Legion 4 mentions

Yes, Wolfhag and I have similar military backgrounds. So generally we see many things in the same light.

Lion: To design a wargame that will represent that relationship, you have to get some real numbers for that 'probably'. i.e. establish if there is some reality to those guesses.

Way to miss my point.

The point was that for pretty much all small arms (and light support weapons like RPGs/Bazookas and bipod MGs), operator skill/training is vastly more significant than theoretical weapon capabilities.

The presence or absence of nightvision equipment (of any generation) is more significant than one side having WW2-era IR converters and the other side having 2017-vintage equipment.

Way to miss my point.
The point was that for pretty much all small arms (and light support weapons like RPGs/Bazookas and bipod MGs), operator skill/training is vastly more significant than theoretical weapon capabilities.

The presence or absence of nightvision equipment (of any generation) is more significant than one side having WW2-era IR converters and the other side having 2017-vintage equipment.

Lion:
You are making statements about relationships between skill and weapon capabilities [vastly more significant] or presence or absence of night vision [more significant].

That well could be. The issue is translating that 'vastly more significant' in to game mechanics which means finding out the 'expected outcomes' with that as probabilities. And those 'expected outcomes' have to be based somehow on real outcomes--if that is what you are representing: Those relationships in the real world.

That's all I was saying.

Why isn't the skill/training of the operator theoretical as well?

Well it actually depends on training and experience of the unit and the weapons used. If you are going from a historical standpoint. In many wargames units are designated, based on training, skill and experience, etc., e.g. Elite, Veteran, Green, or something like that.

There is an old saying, "A weapon is only as good as the trooper behind it." …