Hellcat F6F | 12 Jan 2017 10:04 p.m. PST |
And let's not forget that Old Snapping Turtle. I think Lee finally found an opponent that could read HIS mind. |
donlowry | 13 Jan 2017 8:55 a.m. PST |
Cemetery Hill WAS the focal point of Lee's attack on both 2 and 3 July. Or at least he intended it to be. |
Trajanus | 13 Jan 2017 12:02 p.m. PST |
After two days of fighting with near success and a lot Confederate casualties, and probable British recognition on the line if he could win a battle and force the retreat of the AoP on northern soil And then of course Vicksburg would still have fallen the following day and the "probable British recognition" would have vanished all over again! Not sniping at Hellcat here, he just happened to be the last one to mention it but people really do need to check out the "Recognition" business. Far to many folks have a view gleaned from authors who mention this in passing, or may have been informed by the Trent Affair , or read of Sewards mad idea to invade Canada. Military success was not an On Switch. There were a lot of complicated politics going on in Britain not least a wish not to be associated with a slave owing country after decades of abolition and being the world leader in stopping the Slave Trade. I'd recommend anyone to grab a read of "A World on Fire" by Amanda Forman to get a perspective on how much of this actually existed in the minds of Confederates themselves. |
Chouan | 13 Jan 2017 2:28 p.m. PST |
|
Hellcat F6F | 13 Jan 2017 2:44 p.m. PST |
donlowry wrote: "Cemetery Hill WAS the focal point of Lee's attack on both 2 and 3 July. Or at least he intended it to be." I agree about July 2nd, but not July 3rd. Why shift two of Rodes' brigades and one of Early's to Johnson's front if it was also the case on July 3rd ? Trajanus wrote: "Military success was not an On Switch." Lee never would've risked an offensive invasion and battle, outnumbered by the way, unless there was an "on switch". Remember Antietam was a defensive battle. I'm sure there were plenty of Brits with their complicated politics who would've been all to happy to see the continental power that was United States cut in half. Same strategy they tried during the American Revolution. |
Trajanus | 13 Jan 2017 4:51 p.m. PST |
Lee never would've risked an offensive invasion and battle, outnumbered by the way, unless there was an "on switch". Remember Antietam was a defensive battle. Hang on. I thought we had established that Lee invaded the North to avoid the ANV eating their belts. Besides which, all invasions are "offensive" or are you suggesting getting trapped in a river bend by nigh on twice your numbers was a cunning defensive ploy? Or there again, was it yet another sure fire gambit to loose 20% of your army teaching those pesky Federals a lesson? Which turned out OK in the end, as they were commanded by a paranoid egomaniac who totally missed the chance to end the war in a day. |
Hellcat F6F | 13 Jan 2017 5:29 p.m. PST |
Not established that they were eating their belts… yet. A cunning defensive ploy is to invade foreign soil outnumbered and then go on the attack in an offensive battle. And paranoid egomaniacs don't win the Emancipation Proclamation for their presidents. |
Hellcat F6F | 13 Jan 2017 6:01 p.m. PST |
Besides, McClellan took more than a day. |
Hellcat F6F | 13 Jan 2017 6:04 p.m. PST |
They had plenty of time. There was no rush. Something that's often over-looked in our war games. |
Trajanus | 14 Jan 2017 3:10 a.m. PST |
Belt eating: Read Sears Chancellorsville book on just how long it had been bad and his (or the original) edit of "Lee's Lieutenants" on the state of the ANV entering Maryland. They were deserting in droves through lack of shoes and rations. Paranoid Egomaniacs: Yes they do. Little Mac may have missed the one time opportunity to actually destroy the ANV but his forcing a retreat gave Lincoln the opportunity to make political capital out of it and turn the War publicly into the slavery issue it was always about. European intervention faded into the background thereafter. Plenty of time: Well he had the whole campaign but the opportunity that presented itself on 17th September, missed by not committing the whole of his reserves against an army holding on by its fingernails, is what I'm talking about. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 6:32 a.m. PST |
I happily have read Sears' Chancellorsville, Landscape turned Red and his Peninsula book. All excellent. In fact, it was his Landscape Turned Red which was the pivotal tactical history that got me into the ACW. I remember reading that paperback version way back when it first came out. I was like "WOW". I had never read anything like it before. I tried to keep the original paperback for as long as possible, but it eventually just fell apart. A major issue as I remember it with the Maryland invasion was the fact that it was an invasion, and a lot of Confederates refused to cross the Potomac. They didn't think it was right. Add in the Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, many minor battles and a lot of non-stop campaigning, and Lee only has 40,000 on Sept. 17th. GREEN CORN. They ate a lot of that, not their belts ! Little Mac wasn't really sure what he was facing. The Rebs did a great job of hiding their forces in woods and folds in the ground, i.e. blind spots. Little Mac called it a "masterpiece". It was a "masterpiece" of coordination and control. After the battle Longstreet said something to the effect that McClellan's "powers were growing" and it worried the Confederate high command if Little Mac was going to stay in command of the AoP. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 6:49 a.m. PST |
Jackson was notorious for vanishing and Longstreet knew how to deliver power assaults. Little Mac had to be careful or he would be doing a piecemeal retreat into the Washington defenses like he did on the Peninsula. |
Chouan | 14 Jan 2017 8:30 a.m. PST |
One of the issues that supporters (for want of a better word) of the South tend to ignore are the enormous desertion rates of all of the Confederacy's armies, as well as the number of eligible men who avoided/evaded conscription. That these desertions were caused, to a great extent, by the shortages of food and supplies is probably true, but desertion was certainly a factor in the South's inability to sustain a war of attrition. |
donlowry | 14 Jan 2017 10:20 a.m. PST |
agree about July 2nd, but not July 3rd. In his report, Lee said the plan remained unchanged. i.e. advance up the Emmetsburg road and take Cemetery Hill. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 3:14 p.m. PST |
I look at Confederate desertion rates throughout the war like a revolving door. It was "Going home to help the family out and to take a much needed break from the army. I'll be back sometime later." Winter of 64/65, it got bad in the Petersburg lines and even then the ANV sustained a war of attrition for the better part of a year. I think a lot of the guys said "There's no way I'm going to back to that siege." And they either made for home or the Federal lines. The plan was instantaneously changed when the Federals made an early morning preemptive strike at the Confederates on Culp's Hill. That was the hill Lee wanted to take on July 3rd. He wanted Longstreet's attack on the Federal "left-center" to draw off Federal forces from the Culp's Hill front, which couldn't happen in time with the Federals preempting the Confederates as they did. So, why did Lee order the attack of Pickett's division after the Culp's Hill battle had already been decided with Johnson drawing off ? |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 3:25 p.m. PST |
Incidentally, E.P. Alexander mentioned the Federals had at least a battery of 20 pound Parrotts near or on Cemetery Hill for counter-battery fire. And I think their fuses worked. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 4:01 p.m. PST |
Lee's senior and most knowledgeable and proven corps commander was against the attack. Was it a question of all the other options had been exhausted? That was the only place for Pickett's division to have a chance of attacking successfully given the limitations of time and the Federal command preempting Confederate plans on July 3rd? Should Lee have just called it off and returned to Virginia after Johnson division drew off from Culp's Hill? Or given what Anderson's division did to the Federal "left-center" the day before, should Lee at least give it a shot with Pickett's division and hope the Federal reserves had been exhausted or pounded into submission by the bombardment? Lee knew they weren't going to know unless they tried. Was that a mistake ? I think the mistake would've been not knowing. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 4:18 p.m. PST |
If there's anyone who deserves the blame for the thwarting of ANV operations in Pennsylvania, it's JEB Stuart and his ride around the Army of the Potomac. Wade Hampton would've done a better job. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 4:44 p.m. PST |
Yeah, there was a "regulating battalion" alright. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 7:47 p.m. PST |
Lee didn't have much choice at that time. He got boxed in by that Old Snapping Turtle. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 7:59 p.m. PST |
|
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 8:10 p.m. PST |
They were getting boxed in because of the cavalry's absence. Longstreet knew that too. Which was just another reason he advocated for maneuver and a defensive battle. |
Hellcat F6F | 14 Jan 2017 8:15 p.m. PST |
Whole infantry brigades being detailed to watch the flanks while JEB was gallivanting. |
Trajanus | 15 Jan 2017 8:01 a.m. PST |
It was "Going home to help the family out and to take a much needed break from the army. I'll be back sometime later." Yeah that's a nice idea but Glatthaar's research shows that only 1:6 actually did come back. |
capncarp | 15 Jan 2017 8:39 a.m. PST |
At least one of the Mistakes was Harry Heth's not punching through the cavalry/infantry line and sweeping through town to Cemetary Ridge. |
Hellcat F6F | 15 Jan 2017 7:51 p.m. PST |
I think if Harry Heth had been ordered to punch through he would've punched through. If that was a mistake, that was a mistake that erred on the side of caution, and Jeb can be blamed for that one. Never would've been an issue if he were doing his job. |
donlowry | 16 Jan 2017 11:28 a.m. PST |
Incidentally, E.P. Alexander mentioned the Federals had at least a battery of 20 pound Parrotts near or on Cemetery Hill for counter-battery fire. And I think their fuses worked. IIRC, Meade didn't have any 20-pdrs at Gettysburg. If there's anyone who deserves the blame for the thwarting of ANV operations in Pennsylvania, it's JEB Stuart and his ride around the Army of the Potomac. Stuart didn't have any good option when Lee ordered him to join Ewell in Pa. (And don't forget that Lee authorized the choice he made.) Lee's infantry was already crossing the Potomac, with Ewell already well up in Pa. So Stuart needed to get from the rear/flank of the army to its front -- how was he supposed to do that? To take the same route as the infantry meant overtaking them, using roads filled with marching infantry, artillery, and wagons. To cross the Potomac between Lee's infantry and Meade's army was very problematic -- not much room. So he took the third choice, move between the widely separated Union camps and cross the Potomac farther east. Unfortunately for him, the Union army began to move the same day he did, filling up the roads he had planned to use. If he turned back, he'd still have the same problem of overtaking Lee's marching infantry, so he moved around the Federals. You could say he erred in trying to keep most of the wagons and mules he captured just north of the Potomac, but part of his job was to round up supplies, etc. for Lee. No one ever seems to fault Ewell for not sending scouts out to find Stuart. Ewell heard the sound of Stuart's fight with Kilpatrick at Hanover, but didn't bother to try to find out who was fighting whom. He assumed the Federal side was militia, but didn't ask who the militia was fighting! Another point is that, besides Jenkins' Brigade, White's battalion, and the Md. Cav., all with Ewell, Lee also had Jones' and Robertson's brigades, which he could have called forward 2 or 3 days before he did. So he wasn't completely without cavalry. Perhaps Stuart's biggest mistake was not leaving a better commander for those two brigades, such as Hampton, as Longstreet suggested. |
Hellcat F6F | 16 Jan 2017 12:58 p.m. PST |
Well, maybe not officially Meade didn't have any 20 pounders. One has to wonder what the Federals were shooting into the flank of Pickett's division from the Round Top area as that would be a pretty long shot. Single shells were reported taking out ten men at a time. Within the first day of his expedition, Stuart discovered the AoP was on the road moving north of him. That was an entirely unanticipated development outside the scope of Lee's orders to Stuart. Stuart should've turned around right then and reported back to Lee. But he kept going. |
Old Pete | 16 Jan 2017 6:12 p.m. PST |
The third of July 1863 was a very, very bad day for Gen. Lee and his army the next day the fourth of July got even worse for the Confederacy with Gen. Grants army capturing Vicksburg. Some people state that these two days combined were the turning point in the war and inevitable defeat of the Confederacy, but I am not so sure. |
donlowry | 17 Jan 2017 9:34 a.m. PST |
IIRC, the 10-pdr Parrott and the 3" rifle both had about the same range and accuracy as the 20-pdr, just fired lighter shots/shells. Stuart did send warnings to Lee about the Union army being on the move, but the couriers didn't make it thru the Union lines, so he didn't get the word. Copies to the War Dept. in Richmond did get thru. Again, if he had turned back when he discovered the Federals were moving, he'd still have the problem of Lee's infantry and artillery clogging the roads ahead of him, plus he'd now have the problem of going back over the same distance he had just travelled to catch up with them. Nor could he be sure some Federals were not using those roads as well. As I said above, he had no good choice, only a selection of bad choices. Robertson is the one who should have notified Lee that Meade was moving, but he didn't. |
Trajanus | 17 Jan 2017 12:16 p.m. PST |
The guns on Little Round top were Hazlett's 5th US, Battery D – formed with 6 x 10pdr Parrots. They opened up with round shot and shell when the infantry left Seminary Ridge and then switched to case and canister as the range closed. Finally because of the angle only two guns could still fire on the flank of Kemper's Brigade which they hammered with double canister. Only Union 20pdrs were Taft's 5th Battery, New York Light which was on Cemetery Hill, with two sections facing Hill's Corps and the third initially in reserve although later deployed as per the other two. |
Hellcat F6F | 17 Jan 2017 5:17 p.m. PST |
There is some debate as to whether Lee used "not" or "now" in the 2nd paragraph. "Now" makes more sense with other words Lee uses like "I think you had better…" and "Be watchful and circumspect…" Stuart should've gone Sheperdstown to Fredericktown, and that's what Lee said he should do, although he was discretionary. Instead, Stuart marched south on a wide loop around the Federal army without judging the "hindrance". Lee needed Stuart to get up on the flank of Ewell asap, and how many days did Stuart lose making that loop south? 4 – 5 before he even crossed the Potomac? There's a reason Lee was so angry at him. "Now", not "not". Totally outside the scope of his orders. Get across the Potomac and link up with Ewell "In either case…" QUICKLY. Stuart must've known as soon as he had to turn south, that he was going outside the scope of his orders. That was turning into the "hindrance". It's amazing how much patience Lee could have for people. Any other commanding general in that situation… with those stakes… with a subordinate who so…. June 23, 1863—5 p.m. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry: General: Your notes of 9 and 10.30 a.m. to-day have just been received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money will not be taken, I am willing for your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the men get it from them, but I can have nothing seized by the men.
If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hinderance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, &c. Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army. As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better. The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first divisions will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow. Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements. I am, very respectfully and truly, yours, R. E. Lee, General. Source: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Vol. 27, Part 3, p. 923 Taken from link |
Hellcat F6F | 18 Jan 2017 5:06 a.m. PST |
Lee's unsealed orders to Stuart were going through Longstreet who was adding post-scripts to them Initially, Lee had agreed to a raid which ended with Stuart supporting Ewell's flank in PA/Maryland in front of the army. And initially it was a question of around the AoP via Hopewell Gap or between it and the ANV through Point of Rocks Clearly, by June 23rd Lee was leaning against a raid around the AoP, especially if the AoP was moving north. Longstreet ordered Stuart to leave Wade Hampton behind… that probably would've been better for the ANV if Stuart had thought that was something he felt like doing. |
donlowry | 18 Jan 2017 11:38 a.m. PST |
The AotP was NOT moving at the time Stuart decided to slip between its various corps (not around the whole), but it started moving the next morning, just as Stuart set out, and Stuart ran into the 2nd Corps using the road he wanted to take, so he then moved farther southeast, which was not part of the original plan. He had to stop early that evening to allow the horses to graze, as he didn't bring any wagons (with forage) along. Again, had he turned back, he'd still have the problem of infantry blocking the roads, only then it would be Confederate infantry. Longstreet didn't ORDER Stuart to leave Hampton behind, he just told Stuart that he assumed that he would do so. Stuart wanted to take his three familiar, reliable brigades with him, and he definitely didn't want Grumble Jones. He could have left Hampton, detached, in charge (he was senior to Jones and Robertson) and still take his brigade under its senior colonel (Baker?), but chose not to. It wasn't until after G'burg that his cavalry was organized into 2 (later 3) divisions, under Hampton and Fitz Lee (and later Rooney Lee). |
Hellcat F6F | 18 Jan 2017 3:11 p.m. PST |
To Jefferson Davis, Richmond, Virginia Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, June 23, 1863 Mr. President:
Reports of movements of the enemy east of the Blue Ridge cause me to believe he is preparing to cross the Potomac. A pontoon bridge is stated to be laid at Edward's Ferry… …. With great respect, your obt servt R.E.Lee Genl "Now", not "not". |
Hellcat F6F | 18 Jan 2017 3:25 p.m. PST |
Stuart wanted to take his most reliable and experienced cavalry commander and his brigade with him too. If Hampton and his brigade had been left behind, they would've had smooth sailing to the Sheperdstown ford. No traffic jams. If Hampton had his brigade and one other he would've been out on the flanks doing the job that needed to be done, while Stuart was busing taking 2 days to do what everyone else did in one. Stuart was on a page all his own. |
Hellcat F6F | 19 Jan 2017 7:40 p.m. PST |
Interesting how in his post-script to Lee's unsealed orders to Stuart, Longstreet said "You had better not leave us…" Further: "In the body of my note were orders that he [Stuart] should report to me of affairs along the cavalry line before leaving; that he should assign General Hampton to command of the cavalry to be left with us, with orders to report at my head-quarters. These, orders, emanating properly from the commander of the rear column of the army, should not have been questioned…" James Longstreet Stuart was going to go on his expedition around the AoP regardless b/c Lee had left that open to him. However, within the letter of Lee's discretionary orders to Stuart, Lee was obviously giving Longstreet the authority to qualify the parameters of that expedition. Stuart should've left Wade Hampton and gone on his expedition as Longstreet said he could do. Why Stuart couldn't do that is a different question. But not only did Stuart not do that, he didn't even send orders to Robertson to report to Longstreet's HQ which is why the two cav brigades left behind did nothing to replace the hole in ANV operations that Stuart was single-handedly creating. |
Hellcat F6F | 19 Jan 2017 8:08 p.m. PST |
Passing the Occoquan east of Manassas. I bet that took some time ! There's a reason there were no major ACW ground offensives launched down the I-95 corridor direct from Washington to Fredericksburg. Check out all those steep hills and river banks next time. Probably why it's taking 20 years to finish that road in Virginia. |
Hellcat F6F | 19 Jan 2017 11:19 p.m. PST |
It wasn't Lee who made the mistake of all mistakes, and as Old Pete said, it wasn't over either. |
donlowry | 20 Jan 2017 10:02 a.m. PST |
Stuart should've left Wade Hampton and gone on his expedition as Longstreet said he could do. Why Stuart couldn't do that is a different question. But not only did Stuart not do that, he didn't even send orders to Robertson to report to Longstreet's HQ which is why the two cav brigades left behind did nothing to replace the hole in ANV operations that Stuart was single-handedly creating. Agreed. Tho Longstreet doesn't seem to have worried about it much, as he didn't (as far as I can tell) say anything to Lee about it at the time. |
Old Pete | 26 Jan 2017 2:37 p.m. PST |
Reading 'Shattered Nation' by Jeffrey Brooks a very plausible alternative history where the turning point is north of Atlanta in 1864. Gen. Johnston is not relieved of command which in turn alters the fight in Georgia and the war. Worth a read as it is an excellent description of battle in the ACW. |
donlowry | 28 Jan 2017 9:13 a.m. PST |
How far did Johnston retreat, then? |
Old Pete | 28 Jan 2017 6:12 p.m. PST |
For once he did not retreat. The rest, well get the book it is worth a read and it could have? |
steve1865 | 04 Feb 2017 4:00 p.m. PST |
Donlowry you forget. Washington won the RW by taking the offensive and winning at Yorktown. LEE tried to do the same thing, but he did not have the French. |
donlowry | 05 Feb 2017 10:07 a.m. PST |
Well, yeah. Give Lee a French army and a French fleet and he might pull a Yorktown --- but I doubt it. |
donlowry | 10 Feb 2017 9:19 a.m. PST |
Come to think of it: Give the Confederacy some help from the Royal Navy in time for it to take control of Chesapeake Bay just as McClellan retreats to the James River, and you'd have a good replication of the situation at Yorktown. |
Tango01  | 10 Feb 2017 11:31 a.m. PST |
Interesting point my friend… Amicalement Armand
|
John Miller | 11 Feb 2017 4:32 p.m. PST |
I have never seen the wisdom of Longstreet's idea of disengaging with the AOP, moving around their right, placing the ANV in a strong defensive position that would threaten Washington and or Baltimore, and wait for Potomac Army to attack them. Would not that place the garrisons of Washington and or Baltimore in the Confederate rear? Would not the communications of the ANV be extremely vulnerable to being severed? How long can the Confederates stay in such a position in enemy territory, (food & ammunition wise)? Is it reasonable to assume that the Union leadership is going attack them in this position exactly as the Confederates want them to do, (every Union commander was not Burnside)? These are most of the reasons I am not impressed with Longstreet's idea. Of course my opinions may be all wet, they frequently are. Because I won't have access to a computer for a few days thanks in advance for any comments anyone may care to make. John Miller |
donlowry | 12 Feb 2017 10:19 a.m. PST |
Yes, the garrisons of Washington and Baltimore would be in Lee's rear -- but they could be counted on to stay put; they were garrisons, not field armies. Lee couldn't have known for sure, but in fact those had been stripped of all moveable units to reinforce Hooker/Meade. Lee's communications, such as they were, ran down the Cumberland Valley, so as long as he didn't have Union troops to his west he was in fairly good shape. He did, however, have a vast train of supply wagons full of plunder to worry about. He could not have stayed in such a position very long, but Meade would have to either attack him or somehow get around him and between him and Washington fairly quickly. |
John Miller | 14 Feb 2017 5:14 p.m. PST |
donlowry: Thanks very much for your response to my questions. Many of you guys know a lot more than I do so I value your opinions. I do not share the high regard of Longstreet that is popularly held so perhaps my feelings are colored by my biases. Thanks again for your comments, John Miller |