"The Mistake of All Mistakes " Topic

"…One of the best histories written about Gettysburg, or any battle for that matter, is George R.Stewart's "Pickett's Charge". Let Stewart describe the predicament that the Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia had to deal with "…..Lee faced the inevitable three possibilities for a general – to attack, to retreat, to stand still.The last had nothing to recommend it; Meade, with his lines of communication open, could win at a waiting game.Similarly to retreat after two days of what could be counted success was unthinkable.Such action would present the North with victory on a silver platter. Besides, the prospect of a long and harassed retreat was not pleasant.Therefore, for a fighting general in command of a fighting army, there was only one choice – attack!..Faced with the situation, having the inescapable three choices, any good soldier would – in some way or other – have attacked……..Now he could plan for the final day. First, the devestating and demoralizing bombardment;then the grand assault! The Union line crushed at that critical point; a third of Meade's army surrounded and captured; the rest of it streaming down to Baltimore in irretrievable rout, harried by Stuart's cavalry! A great and war-ending stroke, in the Napoleonic tradition of Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram!…"

If Lee hoped to mount a massive Napoleonic type assault, employing, in his own words, "proper concert" of action between the two wings of his army, this hope was dispelled by a Northern counter attack in the early hours of July 3rd. This took place in the Culp's Hill sector, and resulted in Ewell's men being pushed back. The Federals here enjoyed crucial artillery superiority, and the infantry of Slocum's Twelfth corps fought a superb battle. The conflict was a desperate pell-mell affair of attack and counter attack which lasted until late morning, by which time the rebels had lost 2,500 men and their foothold on Culp's Hill. This action, in which Northern casualties were fewer than half those of the Confederates, was crucial in stabilising the Union "Fish Hook" defensive line that defined the battlefield, and was distinguished by very competent management of the fighting by the Federals.

The Southern cavalry was also thwarted in its attempt to harry the rear of Meade's army and exploit any imminent breakthrough. The failure of Stuart's men to overcome Gregg and Custer's cavalry in a hard fought engagement to the North East of the main battlefield was another blow to Lee's aspirations for crushing victory.

There remained, however, the main affair of Pickett's Charge – obviously a misnomer, since there were two other divisions apart from Pickett's deployed for the attack.This was, indeed, truly Napoleonic in its grandeur….an advance of three infantry divisions supported by a massive artillery bombardment, aimed at breaking the Union centre. Well might this be compared with the advance of d'Erlon's columns at Waterloo, or with the more celebrated affair of Napoleon's Old Guard in that battle. If there is any suggestion that Meade resembled Wellington, this should be tempered with the realisation that, although Meade, in his midnight Council of War, had correctly predicted that Lee's main attack would be directed against his centre – on Gibbon's section of the line on Cemetery Ridge – he then to reinforce that sector and bolstered up his left wing instead!…"
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Amicalement
Armand

The other predicament facing Lee was that he had sold the entire advance into Pennsylvania plan to Jefferson Davis (who wanted to send parts of the Army of Northern Virginia west to raise the siege of Vicksburg) by promising a major victory on northern soil which would force the Union to raise the siege and transfer troops east. To retreat without achieving that victory would leave Lee unable to make good his promise-which was unacceptable to him.

Lee should have called off "Pickett's Charge" it was as Longstreet had told him, impossible with the forces and conditions on July 3rd. Having walked over the battlefield I just find it so hard to understand how Lee ordered Longstreet to throw so many life's away on such a stupid charge.

I appeal to anyone who has studied Longstreet's assaults at Second Bull Run, Second Day Gettysburg, Chickamauga or the Wilderness: does Pickett's Charge bear any resemblance to Longstreet's work? But to a certain school of Confederate historians, somehow it's always something Longstreet did--unless it's something Longstreet failed to do.

I will grant anyone that Lee was one of the finest commanders between the Napoleonic Wars and WWI, but even the greatest of generals have bad days. I will even concede that he was to some degree let down by his staff and subordinates. But the list of generals who had more say over who they had for subordinate commanders and how their staff was organized would be a very short list.

Lee said he should have won,and that it was all his fault. It's time we took him at his word.

I don't accept the premise that standing still had nothing to recommend it. In theory Meade could wait, allowing additional forces to come up or maneuver against Lee's supply lines, while the formations disordered in the first two days of fighting were reorganized and his army was resupplied. I suspect though that if Lee had not attacked, the pressure would have been on Meade to do something and do it now.

The problem with going on the defensive is that it means forgoing the opportunity to destroy a chunk of the AOP.

Nobody asks who lost Chancellorsville. It was Hooker, even if he had plenty of help from subordinates.

Nobody asks who lost Second Bull Run. It was Pope.

Nobody asks who lost Fredricksburg. It was Burnside.

You can see where I'm going.

Lee lost Gettysburg.

Napoleon lost Waterloo.

+1, no make that +2 for vtsaogames. Lee goofed big time.

There was a fourth alternative: Manuever, as Longstreet advocated.

Yes Old Pete's idea might have worked, it certainly could not have proved to be worse.

'Gettysburg' a fictional book by Newt Gingrich and William Forstchen part of a trilogy and a very good read imagines Lee being stronger and more decisive which leads him to follow Longstreet's flank manoeuvre to a devastating effect.
Worth a read and very cheap second hand.

Yes Newt Gingrich one of Donald Trump's pals writes a good civil war fictional story. Who would have thought?

I agree with many here, maneuver on the Unions left flank. I'm sure if Lee had talked with some of his commanders on that flank he would have surmised how close they had come to breaking and outflanking Meade.

Maneuver is going to be very difficult after the Second Day's fighting. Ewell and Longstreet are in very close proximity to the Union troops. Any movement to the right (Union left) would require them to fall back a good distance and then swing around a very long arc along narrow and winding roads. Then there's the whole issue of Lee's supply train and all those wounded (nearly all of which are north and northwest of Gettysburg). Such a move could not be completed in a single day and it would not take long for Meade to figure out what was happening.

And of course where the Gettysburg position was concerned Meade had interior lines.

Given his losses on Days 1 & 2 the sensible thing was to leave. OK so Meade had been hit hard too but he started with more men to begin with.

Not knowing Meade's full strength and position, a flanking move, which would probably been observed the same as Longstreet's march on the 2nd Day, would have been a big risk.

While I do think that maneuvering was the better choice there is no guarantee that it would have been more successful with several days less supplies, still in enemy territory and longer for the Union to prepare.

Lee did try to make "Pickett's Charge" a two prong attack with the cavalry planned to attack the rear of the Union position. At least according to some scholars that was his plan, but it was stopped by Gregg's cavalry.

Still bottom line when you are in charge and your unit fails- then you bear the responsibility. Lee said it himself.

The soldier who shot Stonewall lost Gettysburg.

The Gettysburg campaign itself wasn't a mistake. Lee, and Davis, knew that the Confederacy was going to lose a war of attrition, and that without a major OFFENSIVE victory the war would remain a war of attrition, and no matter how many defensive victories won, the war would be lost. Consequently the Confederate offensive that led to Gettysburg was essential if the war had a chance of being won. The battle HAD to be fought, and won, for a successful offensive. A draw, or an indecisive campaign would just have delayed the inevitable overall defeat.

I think the difference is that A BATTLE had to be won it just didn't have to be Gettysburg!

By the end of Day 2 it wasn't going to be.

The battle in the Gettysburg campaign that HAD to be won was Champion Hill.

Once the battle had started at Seminary Ridge, that became the opener of Gettysburg, the decisive battle effectively had to be fought there and then. If Lee had sought to manoevre after the first day's action it would have been perceived as a retreat, and a retreat would have been seen as a failed offensive, both politically and diplomatically.

Lee, and Davis, knew that the Confederacy was going to lose a war of attrition, and that without a major OFFENSIVE victory the war would remain a war of attrition, and no matter how many defensive victories won, the war would be lost.

But it didn't have to be in Pennsylvania.

The battle in the Gettysburg campaign that HAD to be won was Champion Hill.

Amen, brother!

If Lee had sought to manoevre after the first day's action it would have been perceived as a retreat, and a retreat would have been seen as a failed offensive, both politically and diplomatically.

Well, he had to retreat anyway after day 3! But a success further down the line (as a result of clever maneuvering) would have more than made up for any temporary loss of face.

The battle in the Gettysburg campaign that HAD to be won was Champion Hill.

Good one Brad! Got to love it!

Bit hard to blame Lee for that one though! :o)

If Lee had sought to manoevre after the first day's action it would have been perceived as a retreat, and a retreat would have been seen as a failed offensive, both politically and diplomatically.

Perceived by whom and what level of urgency? Foreign intervention was a Chimera and had been for a long while.

The Home Front was still solid and the North's will to fight had already been demonstrated after Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. So unless the "retreat" had been all the way back into Virginia, a major game changing boost to Northern moral on top of that was unlikely.

Lee's job was to keep the ANV out of Virginia for as long as possible, keep the army intact and win a battle.

He failed on all three counts.

He had inadequate control over his subordinates – Longstreet, Hill, Ewell and Stuart in particular – and as a result fought a battle on ground that was not of his choosing, against an enemy he had inadequate information about and in a fashion that didn't work under the circumstances he found himself in.

Taking the fight North was essential on logistical grounds as the ANV had been on substance level rations since before Chancellorsville but it needed a far more informed choice of when and where to fight than Lee had available, if he were to come anywhere near pulling of such a demanding set of criteria.

Overall, I give Lee the benefit of the doubt in a battle of maneuver

While Meade never showed the killer instinct required to conquer the Confederacy, the Bristoe Station campaign (and even Mine Run) showed him to be adept at maneuvering his army, unlikely to let it be caught badly off balance.

And he was holding the point where all the roads came together.

Main reason Lee didn't retreat: he was as aggressive as Grant and didn't like to retreat.

I appreciate the comment on Champion Hill. I have opportunities to teach kids from time to time. I usually put it this way: the war was not lost in the East but it was won in the West. Always amazed how few really appreciate what went on out there.

And he was holding the point where all the roads came together.

Although neither Meade nor Lee seems to have considered that important, oddly enough. I'm not even sure that Reynolds or Buford thought in those terms.

Meade intended to hold defensively behind Pipe Creek, but Reynolds never got the word on that, being dead before the circular reached him. Reynolds was going to Gettysburg simply because older orders told him (but not the whole army) to go there. Meade's idea was that once Lee was found everyone would fall back behind Pipe Creek, a tributary of the Monocacy River.

Lee told everyone to meet at Cashtown.

I agree with Trajanus that Lee's true course would have been to avoid battle as long as possible, unless he could pick off a few small detachments, and live off the Union resources as long as he could. That's what he indicated would be his strategy, but once in contact with Meade "his blood was up," as Longstreet put it, and he became overly pugnacious.

Even better might have been to send him and at least one corps to either Mississippi or Tennessee and let the rest stand on the defensive in Virginia. But once Grant had Vicksburg and most of Pemberton's army in his grasp, the Confederacy didn't really have an available strategy that was likely to work.

I never bought the flank move option as being realistic. Simple put, Lee didn't really know what was on the other side of Pipe creek. Getting his army crushed between Meade to the north and whatever might lay to the south while abandoning his own wounded in Gettysburg was a no go. He could easily be surrounded. Remember, the Union Army was coming up from southern direction and the Fresh troops that did chase him back into Virginia were in Frederick Maryland. The other issue "If Lee had sought to manoevre after the first day's action it would have been perceived as a retreat, and a retreat would have been seen as a failed offensive" was a big factor. The AoNV didn't know or understand defeat like the northern army. Lee's biggest worry wasn't some far-away England, but that his army would think him a coward. A southern army can take a loss, they cannot survive a lack of will and belief in itself and the cause.

Think Lee should have swung around to the right as suggested by Longstreet. Lee did have cavalry available and Stuart might have arrived earlier?
It is all ifs or buts, however things might have worked out there is little doubt that the result could not have been much worse for the Confederates than 'Pickett's Charge'.

A move around Meade's left flank was only one possible maneuver, there were other possibilities as well, including just standing on the defensive on Seminary Ridge or at Cashtown. But Meade was certainly worried about Lee turning his left (not so much an attack on the left of his line or even a flank attack, but a move around his left between him and Washington).

Also a move in that direction would have cut Meade off from his Train and the use of Westminster as a railhead.

Not to mention removing Pipe Creek as a fall back position if it all went wrong.

The UK certainly was never going to intervene, and France was unlikely to intervene without Britain doing so. However, Britain and France may well have recognised the Confederacy if Lee had been successful in this campaign. They certainly would not have recognised the Confederacy if the campaign wasn't a success, and success meant defeating the North in battle, not in out-manoevering Meade, but in bringing him to battle and defeating him. Hence, once the two armies were engaged the decisive battle had to be fought, otherwise the campaign would have been seen as a failure, by the world, including those of the South. Lee was correct in arguing for an offensive against the Army of the Potomac, as without a successful offensive the South was going to lose.

as without a successful offensive the South was going to lose.

I don't see the logic of that. All the Confederacy had to do was beat back every major Union offensive until Nov '64 and wait for Lincoln to be replaced by someone who would concede its independence.

The U.S. never waged a successful offensive in its Revolutionary War, and yet won its independence in the end.

Recognition by Britain and France wasn't going to win the war either, unless those countries intervened on the Confederate side by at least breaking the blockade. (And even that might not have done it.)

Interesting points Donlowry…

Amicalement
Armand

"I don't see the logic of that. All the Confederacy had to do was beat back every major Union offensive until Nov '64 and wait for Lincoln to be replaced by someone who would concede its independence."

But the Army of North Virginia was a wasting asset, and in a war of attrition, which is what you are suggesting, the South would eventually have been beaten, no matter how many Union offensives failed. The reason why Lee argued for his offensive, and why Davis agreed, was because they both knew this.

"The U.S. never waged a successful offensive in its Revolutionary War, and yet won its independence in the end."

Indeed, because it won the war of attrition. All the Continental Army needed to do to win was to continue to exist, Britain was in the same position as the Confederacy, it had to win an offensive and defeat the Continentals to win the war; it couldn't win in any other way. The South had to win an offensive or be defeated by economic starvation, as well as military attrition.

"Recognition by Britain and France wasn't going to win the war either, unless those countries intervened on the Confederate side by at least breaking the blockade. (And even that might not have done it.)"

But recognition would give them the international rights of combatants, would have broken the blockade, and would have allowed their economy to develop, as well as allowing them to order more and more effective and armoured warships to take on the USN, and allow them coaling facilities all over the world.

The Confederacy only had to last until November 1864, and produce enough casualties for the Union to get a sympathetic President elected. Or at least one that would seek peace. Remaining on the defensive for 14-18 months wasn't unrealistic or unattainable.

A bit of a gamble though. The only sure way of winning the war was through a successful offensive campaign, especially as the Mississippi was being seized by the North, and a pretty effective blockade was in place. Would the South have been able to survive on the defensive in 1863 into 1864 any more than they did in 1864-5? The war was lost through desertion as much as by military defeat.

Indeed, because it won the war of attrition. All the Continental Army needed to do to win was to continue to exist, Britain was in the same position as the Confederacy,

No, the U.S. was in the same position, during the Revolution, as the Confederacy was in the ACW. The onus of doing something was on the Union, just as it had been on Britain during the Revolution: the Rebels controlled the disputed territory; if the Federals/Royals wanted it back, they had to conquer it.

Lee's best course would have been the same as that of his hero, Washington, keep his army alive and avoid any battle that was not on his own terms. Instead, he tried to emulate Napoleon by going for a knock-out blow.

Agreed Don.

Its always been a source of irony for me that Washington in effect wrote the book on revolutionary warfare, that others have followed and the US struggled with in Vietnam.

As long as the NVA survived that couldn't be ignored either!

The onus was indeed on the Union to win, but it wasn't as simple as that. The North could have won simply by doing nothing, apart from maintaining the blockade, which would have eventually resulted in the complete collapse of the Confederacy's economy. If one looks at what was happening in 1863 in the rest of the Confederacy, if the Confederacy had just sat back and waited for another Northern offensive in Virginia, there would have been, at best, what Longstreet would have described as another pointless victory, as the South would have been no closer to victory. They would still have been beleaguered, still under siege, still with an economy in increasingly terminal decline, with still no hope of victory. Lincoln may well have been under political pressure, but so was Davis. How far would the Southern oligarchy have supported the passive defence that would have led to their financial ruin? At least an offensive gave them hope that there might be a successful conclusion to the war.
The problem for the Confederacy was that, although the North had to take and hold Confederate territory, they were doing so quite well. There were occasional pin pricks from Morgan, Mosby and Forrest, and guerilla actions in the Trans Mississippi, but nothing more than raids that could be contained. There was very little actual resistance to Northern occupation of Southern territory once regular troops had been withdrawn. More than that, one could argue that the desertion figures in the Southern armies suggest that many Confederate soldiers were no more willing to fight to the finish than the civilians in the occupied states. Guerilla war needs popular support, and there was simply no serious popular support in most of the territories captured and occupied by the North. Missouri apart, largely, the war was one between armies, not revolutionary or guerilla war. The war of attrition was very much in the North's favour, and would have led to the defeat of the South sooner or later, if the South had remained on the defensive.
Would reinforcement of Pemberton, or Johnson, have saved Vicksburg? The numerical superiority in men and material meant that the North could have recovered from a defeat at Vicksburg, much as they did at Chattanooga after Chickamauga. As the saying goes, he who defends everything defends nothing, the South couldn't win by defending, especially with a decrepit logistical system that was close to collapse, and impossible to repair and restore, lacking the industrial means to do so.

As Trajanus himself put it elsewhere:

"The ANV starts the year facing off against the AoP across the Rappahannock, barely able to feed itself and at the end of an impossibly inadequate railway system that delivers totally inadequate supplies.

Hooker crosses the river, is defeated at Chancellorsville, where the ANV loses Jackson and a bunch of other commanders, not to mention a load Colonels. They drive the AoP back over the Rappahannock with only the total captured and MOA separating the casualty numbers in their favour on the combined butcher's bill and where are they? Facing off against the AoP across the Rappahannock, barely able to feed themselves and at the end of an impossibly inadequate railway system that delivers totally inadequate supplies!

Lee invades the North. Gettysburg is a failure, another 20,000 odd casualties, even worse losses in Generals and unspeakable losses in Colonels. He is forced to retreat and where does he end up? Facing off against the AoP across the Rappahannock barely able to feed the army and at the end of an impossibly inadequate railway system that delivers totally inadequate supplies!

From there on, as we know, it's all downhill and you are left watching the Confederacy die….."

I would suggest that if Lee hadn't launched his offensive we would simply have had a continuation of the first premise:
"…. facing off against the AoP across the Rappahannock, barely able to feed itself and at the end of an impossibly inadequate railway system that delivers totally inadequate supplies."

Until desertion and the inadequacy of supplies leads to the collapse of the Confederacy.

Chouan,

The glib answer is the Confederacy couldn't win, period. As we know the Union was in possession of more of anything one might care to name and was an industrial economy into the bargain!

Desertion and inadequacy of supply was always always going to do for it in the end.

The West was too big to hold regardless of who was sent to do it and the East was ultimately too small to supply an army that couldn't get away from its opponent because of the size of the territory and the location of its capital. That's what Grant realised.

The other problem was that there were too many false dawns provided by incompetent commanders on the Union side that fed Lee the impression that one more big win would end it all. It never did.

Look at the score board for Lee's battles and it's easy to see that even his victories were unsustainable in percentage loss terms. He simply could not do enough damage to the Union forces without getting a good old wack in return.

There's no question that invading the North was the better alternative in 1863 but that only held as long as the ANV was living off the land and in a position to fight a successful action or actions that enabled it to stay there as long as possible, creating trouble.

A win, or a series of wins, that repeated the losses at pretty much anywhere but Fredericksburg, would have lead to a march back into Virginia and back to the same old starvation rations sooner or later.

As it turned out Lee accomplished that retreat, with 32% losses, in just one major action!

After that it was left to what I have long considered his true achievement.

Holding the army together during the Overland Campaign in the face of continuing loss and ever more desertion with a senor command group that was either incapacitated or incompetent.

There's no question that invading the North was the better alternative in 1863 but that only held as long as the ANV was living off the land and in a position to fight a successful action or actions that enabled it to stay there as long as possible, creating trouble.

Just so! The problem was, he didn't stick with his stated strategy, but once in contact with the AotP he again tried for the knock-out blow, at a cost of tremendous casualties. He tried again at the Wilderness, and wanted to at the North Anna, but couldn't pull it off.

His real problem was that he couldn't do much about the fact that the Confederacy was losing the war in the West, no matter what he did in the East. Several Confederate leaders could see that the best place for a counter-offensive was in Tennessee, where Rosecrans was operating at the end of a very long and vulnerable supply line. The problem there was that Bragg was not the right man to lead such a counter-offensive. It has often been stated that Lee refused to go there; I think that's wrong; he advised against it, but said he would go if Davis thought it best. It was Davis who decided to stick with Bragg, and even Bragg for all his faults and many problems almost managed to pull it off, at Chickamauga. I can't help but think that Lee would have done better, especially if sent back in May or June, when the idea was first seriously considered.

Should Lee have known that Pickett's division wasn't going to get across that 1400 yards fast enough ? Longstreet knew it, but Lee didn't.

That "Old Snapping Turtle" knew what he was doing.

I don't think the Confederate artillery was shooting high either. That's a myth. They were shooting exactly where they wanted to.

The attack was a disaster and should never been contemplated. Lee could have moved to the defensive and with Stuart back their flanks would have been secure. Lee required to be firmer with his Corps Commanders something he found hard to be, it worked with Longstreet and Jackson but both Ewell and Hill were not of their calibre.
Lee needed to fight a battle on his terms something for three days he seemed to forget.

I don't see the logic of that. All the Confederacy had to do was beat back every major Union offensive until Nov '64 and wait for Lincoln to be replaced by someone who would concede its independence.

The U.S. never waged a successful offensive in its Revolutionary War, and yet won its independence in the end.

Recognition by Britain and France wasn't going to win the war either, unless those countries intervened on the Confederate side by at least breaking the blockade. (And even that might not have done it.)

This is my feeling as well. Lee didn't need a major victory. He didn't need to win the war, he just needed to not lose it, and get a some opportunistic victories here and there for morale, while sapping that of the North. I think that would have been their best chance of success, if they had any.

I feel like much is made of the idea that if Lee had gotten a decisive victory at Gettysburg, that would have won the war. Is that even realistic? Or was that an outdated idea from the Napoleonic wars? The idea being if you broke the enemy army, it would disintegrate, and the opposing monarch would have to seek terms to avoid his capital being occupied.

Even imagining as complete a victory as Lee could possibly have achieved at Gettysburg, does anyone think that would have make Lincoln give up?

If Lee had achieved a decisive victory, if, Davis and Lee both believed that it would lead to a chance of victory. Fighting a series of successful defensive battles, no matter how many, would have led to defeat in the end. The offensive wasn't a mistake, it was a gamble that failed. The alternative to an attempt at an offensive was inevitable defeat, sooner or later, but inevitable.

The longer the war went on the North would become stronger and the South would grow weaker. Attrition was not a good strategy for the South. If Lee kept waiting for that election, one day the Union Army of Tennessee will show up on his left flank.

Even imagining as complete a victory as Lee could possibly have achieved at Gettysburg, does anyone think that would have make Lincoln give up?

I certainly don't. Nor do I think it possible that Lee could have achieved a victory so lopsided as to make Washington fall into his grasp. Even if he had killed and captured the entire AotP, there were still troops in the defenses of Washington and others nearby (WVA, the Peninsula) that could be rushed to its defense. And even if Pickett's charge had broken Meade's center, surely a great many of his troops would have made it to Washington ahead of Lee.

If Lee kept waiting for that election, one day the Union Army of Tennessee will show up on his left flank.

How so? Even with all the casualties Lee took at Gettysburg, the Wilderness, etc., when the election came the AoT was still in Georgia. How was Lee's NOT taking all those casualties going to speed up the retreat of the AoT? But, as you imply and as I have said above, the war was being lost in the West and there was little that Lee could do in the East to stop that. (Send him west, however, and who knows?)

A strategic maneuver around the left flank of the AoP was out of the question by July 3rd. Even Longstreet knew that and his proposal was for attacking the extreme left of the AoP line where it stood and rolling it up into the center. Lee had two options on July 3rd. 1. Withdraw and call the invasion campaign off 2. Attack the federal line somewhere along its length on July 3rd and force it to retreat. Lee needed a retreat not a crushing defeat and he knew that. After two days of fighting with near success and a lot Confederate casualties, and probable British recognition on the line if he could win a battle and force the retreat of the AoP on northern soil, number 1 wasn't really much of an option. Lee had to attack on July 3rd. The question is, where was the best place and what was the best way to attack. Apart from Longstreet's proposal to attack the extreme left, E.P. Alexander later argued Cemetery Hill should have been the focal point of the attack on July 3rd and as an artilleryman and tactician he gives some strong reasons for it. Main point is there were other options other than the attack on the Federal "left-center" which is what Lee wanted and which came to be known as Pickett's Charge.