"Research on Tactical Effects for Napoleonic Warfare" Topic

A wargame this morning link got me wondering about tactical effects and modifiers for Napoleonic warfare. Has anyone done any actual research into this? That is, the actual effect of such things as:

Experience and training levels
Terrain
Casualties
Shock and disorder

And by research, I mean putting a number on things, not impressions.

I'm not sure you could put numbers on most of these.

Hard to put numbers on this sort of stuff, I would think!

Having read a lot of contemporary diaries and letters and stuff, I think rules should put a lot less emphasis on casualties and more on terrain and leadership.

It is very hard to replicate on a wargames table, but small areas of hidden ground are so important. Time and again, the sudden appearance of enemy troops from seemingly 'nowhere' had a massive effect on morale.

I would imagine the tactical factors used in the original Kreigspiel would be based on the authors experience.

The actual quantification of tactical factors is more of a twentieth century thing, and a post 1940 thing at that.

Dupuy of course makes reference to nineteenth century warfare in 'Numbers, Prediction and War' but the weapons effects curves and troop density effects are wildly different to those for the twentieth century, so the numerical modifiers for terrain, posture, weather etc are also likely to be quite different.

There has of course been quantification of the factors affecting the outcome of Napoleonic _battles_, but not individual tactical actions. Even Clausewitz had models for that, and the model is very simple. If you outnumber the enemy by 2:1 in a significant engagement (as opposed to a skirmish), you are virtually guaranteed to win (99%). Troop types, quality, leadership etc are irrelevant, numbers trump all. Hence his dictum that 'You can never be too strong'.

This equation does not hold true in the era of rapid fire rifled weapons, where numerical superiority can merely translate into a higher bodycount.

This equation does not hold true in the era of rapid fire rifled weapons, where numerical superiority can merely translate into a higher bodycount.

Although many rules for this period reward shoulder-to-shoulder (or track-to-track) assaults without giving them the higher losses that occur in the real thing.

I think the hub-to-hub issue is purely aesthetic, and a function of ground scale. Two tanks hub to hub are "in reality" 25 yards apart. But the models are just oversized. Gamers like lots of toys on the table.

One reason I like micro-armor. Switch from 15mm to 6mm and suddenly tanks are 2-3" apart with no changes to the game other than different models.

In regards to the OP, the data simply doesn't exist to do this kind of thing. Take morale for example. How do you quantify a unit's start value? How do you quantify taking an unexpected volley? Slow casualties over an hour compared to a sudden loss in 5 minutes?

Heck, even defining things can be difficult. What *exactly* is shock? How are we to distinguish training from experience from morale? Are they different things or aspects of one thing?

Whirlwind, didn't you go over this with McLaddie two years ago?
TMP link

So what you get is rule writers extracting from historical accounts what seem to be the significant tactical factors, and trying to apportion suitable weightings to them in our tactical models. Then we try to retrofit them to the available data (observed outcomes of particular historical actions). Do/can the results match history, both in the range of local tactical combat results, and in the larger outcomes of battles? Tweak until satisfied. When the results look plausible, then the rule writers are happy. But it's necessarily rather impressionistic.

So then it comes down to aesthetics for the players. Does a given ruleset match your own impressions of Napoleonic warfare, and give you the style of game you want?

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
link
bloodybigbattles.blogspot.co.uk

Except with rules favoring density of fire, those 6mm tanks are not 2-3" apart, but are track-to-track. That is why I don't think it is aesthetic, but the rules. They do not encourage separation and encourage cramming the table with their models.

@ChrisBBB,

Yes, I did. I wondered if anyone had any knowledge of stuff done since then; possibly McLaddie himself.

In regards to the OP, the data simply doesn't exist to do this kind of thing. Take morale for example. How do you quantify a unit's start value? How do you quantify taking an unexpected volley? Slow casualties over an hour compared to a sudden loss in 5 minutes?

Well all rules writers have to do this anyway to make their game. So perhaps some of them have done lots of tests against the historical examples.

I wrote a set of Napoleonic rules once trying to accurately model the effect of casualties on a two rank and three rank line. In that a set number of casualties on a two rank line affects the firepower more than on a three rank line. Also used George Jeffrey's formation change numbers.

It was based a lot on the Empire III set but other than that it wasn't unique enough to pursue.

I am putting together a base of as many brigade/battalion engagements as I can for the game I am designing. [Then Cavalry and Artillery] to create a statistical base for 'average' combat outcomes at that level along with different conditions.

So far, I have nearly 250 and am shooting for 400. Once I have those, I can break out the effects of:

Numbers
Terrain
Training
Morale
casualties
Combat tactics
Times

So far I have found that volley fire rarely drove troops to withdraw without some outflanking, appearance of reinforcements or opponent charges. Disorder and halt, yes, leave, no. We are talking 2-4% of all engagements involving volley fire. Another is that there were only two outcomes to most close combat: one side withdrew in some order or rout.

I have already done this for movement with more examples. Some of the statistical results I am getting are:

1. Rough terrain slows troops about 1/3

2. Towns actually can slow troops [navigating winding and narrow streets to a town center and then picking the right road out.]

3. Movement speeds up the closer troops come to the enemy to volley range [e.g. @100 yards, not slow down.]

4. Movement outside the combat zone is fairly constant, but different than inside [artillery range- which becomes faster and even more uniform.]

5. Because of the above, the time it takes to get into position to attack or defend is much longer than any actual combat. It can take an hour or two to get into position and 15-40 minutes to resolve the issue. Situations like Albuera with Zaya, Houghton and Abercrombie's brigades were not the norm, as eye-witnesses note.

It does create time processing challenges for a game system.

The great thing about statistics is that even with rough numbers, conflicting eye-witnesses and a number of unknowns, with enough examples, those issues dissolve away and gives numbers that have predictive power with further narratives.

(Edited for terrible spelling…trying again)

While I applaud the approach to some of the designers and how they use their value sets inside a set of mechanics, I think they place too much value on the wrong value sets. Consequently, we have games that do not give good / believable historical results consistently.

Somebody, somewhere, over 50 years ago, based games on numerical strength and numerical casualties. Why? Because it was easily measurable as a game mechanic rather than being greatly rooted in historical fact or stats. So following this logic, the more casualties a unit takes the less likely it will stick around. Do you buy into that premise if you want to model history? If so, please explain why we see (in almost every period of history) some units running with little or no casualties while others stand till nearly wiped out. No two men are the same and therefore no two units are the same and both will most likely act differently (to some degree) facing the same challenge. Most games are designed to be linear in results, including dies rolls being better when higher and poorer with low rolls. Back on subject….

I suggest that units remain together because of the collective, training and experience of the men and leaders, and perhaps even more important, how long have these men served under these officers? Going back and re-reading accounts of battles, I found I had glanced over key phrases such as , "the unit was now in great disorder and confusion", "Total loss of cohesion", "leaderless", "inspired by the actions of…" etc. So I arrived at a theory that units performed better when their leaders maintained control over the efforts of the whole. Casualties, smoke, sound, smell, fatigue, and other environmental elements all were ingredients of a "soup" that provided powerful distractions for all in the unit to divert their attention elsewhere other than what the individual should be doing at the moment. Only a few were performing/focusing on what they should be doing while others remained affixed on the "din" of battle. Where are the rules that account for the actions of the unit's leaders on keeping the unit functioning as a unit each turn?

The "better" units were experienced enough to have dulled the edge of this hostile environment and some units (and therefore influential individuals) could even predict accurately what was about to happen next! Some inexperienced units had trained hard, played hard and marched hard together for long periods of time before their first battle. The length of service together provided insights to how leadership and the men might be expected to perform under stress. There are several examples of where "green" units performed better than some battle weary veterans! That really should not be as surprising as it may sound since those veterans could predict what was about to happen and refused to be a part of the expected slaughter- the greens didn't yet know any better, yet…their leadership kept them acting as a unit as they experienced seeing the elephant".

Casualties have only a small part to play in the effectiveness of unit capabilities- especially when the unit as a whole were such poor shots! The mere fact that someone was shooting at you in anger was enough to rattle that chain of distraction and disorganize units- despite any magical number of "hits" causing a loss of morale…See what I am getting at? Doesn't that indicate that casualties alone cannot determine unit effectiveness?

Just something offered to stimulate and challenge the status quo mind-set.

Best and Happy Holidays to all!
Tom

Firepower, by B.P. Hughes

Ardant DuPiq

+1 to emckinney! Add "Open Fire" from B.P. Hughes, too! DuPiq was ahead of his time and died too young. Would love to have seen where he would have taken his beliefs should he have survived the F-P War (IIRC).

I think Bill's point about "setup time" vs "battle time" and the difficulties trying to model this in a "fun" game poses for designers is well taken.

If the desire is to learn something from tabletop battles, the game flow should work much more like a WW2 computer submarine sim, rather than two lines of models moving forward and bashing each other. In "Silent Hunter," you could spend a good hour or two tracking a convoy; setting up your approach; then executing the approach and tweaking for any mistakes. All this to setup a few minutes of all heck breaking loose as you fired, and then endured the destroyer attacks.

Computer first-person shooters used to be like the original "Rainbow 6" and "Ghost Recon" which involved quite a bit of planning and setup. With one-shot, one-kill, executing your plan was very suspenseful as you could be walking through the woods on a sunny day, with birds all around and then, BLAM game over--a sniper you didn't plan for got you.

However, when Call of Duty showed up, with constant action from minute one, and "your wounds heal if you rest behind this crate for ten seconds," the "thinking man's" shooter's number was up. We want to have fun!

Which is perfectly fine, unless your goal is to learn something about tactics and the challenges commanders faced. The issue as I see it is not so much fun vs simulation, but constant game action vs real-life dynamics. Games that supply the latter can be every bit as fun (and I would argue, offer much more in the way of tension) as their contant action brethren, but will probably not garner mass acceptance, due to the higher barrier to entry, and far less initial gratification.

I suggest that units remain together because of the collective, training and experience of the men and leaders, and perhaps even more important, how long have these men served under these officers? Going back and re-reading accounts of battles, I found I had glanced over key phrases such as , "the unit was now in great disorder and confusion", "Total loss of cohesion", "leaderless", "inspired by the actions of…" etc. So I arrived at a theory that units performed better when their leaders maintained control over the efforts of the whole.

Tom:
I agree about cohesion, but that still is a generalization of many, many factors. The question is how those very vague narrative descriptors play out. For instance, units could be described "in great disorder and confusion" and still remain in line, e.g. Houghton's brigade at Albuera and another veteran unit never have those applied and break apart suddenly, such as the 64th Ligne at Albuera.

So cohesion is a group behavior and as such needs to be dealt with as such… which I think you would agree.

I think Bill's point about "setup time" vs "battle time" and the difficulties trying to model this in a "fun" game poses for designers is well taken.

Jeffrey23:
Yep. My approach is to make the 'setup time' a simple and quick process, so to get to the 'good stuff' of combat without negating the very interesting and critical things that go on in the 'set up' which determine how the combat will go. Game time and scale time do not have to equate. Gamers don't have to spend more time on setup than combat to simulate the issues involved in both, or scrub the scale time. And of course, fun is the goal.

It's a work in progress.

Black Powder has attempted this with the longer moves [as Rick and company were using larger tables.] The usual choice between four or more turns to get to an actual engagement or only having setup that precluded the critical 'setup', making those decisions for the players, where units are set up one move apart. The scenarios for F&F and RF&F do that to large degree.

To put it in a nutshell, morale determines the behavior of any given unit in battle. However, morale is a complex psychological phenomenon, involving many different specific factors, most of which have been mentioned in various posts above. The level of casualties sustained by the unit is certainly not a negligible aspect, but is not usually the most important factor. What nobody has explicitly stated so far is that a unit's perception of the situation, rather than the reality of the situation, is what really counts. Maybe sometime in the distant future somebody will be able to quantify and predict perception, but it is certainly way beyond any present capability. The vagaries of perception plus the presence or absence of inspired leadership explain why veteran elite units occasionally gave way to panic, while raw militia or volunteers might (very infrequently) fight heroically to the bitter end (the Alamo comes to mind). So we must, in the end, get by with the chance factor as determined by dice or some similar mechanism, tinkering with the results tables until they seem to normally give outcomes that bear some reasonable relation to historical events.

I am not trying to discourage McLaddie from developing his data set, but I really do not see how anyone can pretend to accurately assign numerical values to the various factors that affect morale in any particular situation. It will always be a subjective judgement call. Also, to develop playable rules, it is necessary to limit the number of "modifiers," rather than trying to list everything that can be thought of.

"Doesn't that indicate that casualties alone cannot determine unit effectiveness?"

Absolutly – Clausewitz is very strong on that – battle is to crack the morale of the opponent

Otherwise – Kriegsspiel and the revised edition of it /where the rules were corrected by a group of officers who played them and who served in the Napoleonic wars – would be a good start for any rules.

I am not trying to discourage McLaddie from developing his data set, but I really do not see how anyone can pretend to accurately assign numerical values to the various factors that affect morale in any particular situation. It will always be a subjective judgement call. Also, to develop playable rules, it is necessary to limit the number of "modifiers," rather than trying to list everything that can be thought of.

Attila:

It all depends on what constitutes 'accurately'. And assigning the probabilities of something happening is done all the time with simulations, even group behaviors. It is also something that most EVERY single wargame does anyway: assign probabilities of some unit behavior. Using actual events to develop that probability base is far better than guessing and calling the result 'reasonable.'

If you believed past and current wargames, no one would have predicted that Napoleonic units retreating because of volley fire rarely happened. That is one reason I find statistics fascinating… they can reveal how wrong first impressions and a few anecdotes can be--or how right--such as most bayonet charges never making contact with the enemy.

Perception is a trained behavior. Experience focuses perception too. Large groups of people tend to act in far more predictable ways than individuals. The military knows this. Because of those factors, statistically based predictions of group behaviors when faced by different perceived conditions, events and circumstances, have a good prediction quotient. Simulation designers have been doing it for a long time, whether predicting the flow of panicked crowds in a stadium to traffic behaviors. Not perfect, but far more representative of reality than 'reasonable' results.

In this case, 'accuracy' is how well the statistical probabilities can predict the outcomes of new examples. When I have my statistical base, I should find that they anticipate the outcomes of most new engagements I find after that. HOW accurately the statistics models events can be described with numbers…. Even if what I do is 'in the ballpark' and nowhere near home plate, it will still be light years ahead of guessing from a few anecdotes and something that 'feels right' when it comes to representing actual history.

Actually guys, I feel it IS possible to quantify these issues! Please let me explain:

Do we really need to know how many people were hit when being shot at in order to determine the effect of the fire on the target unit? No. We are only after the effect of the fire! Those actual numbers are not worth it in game terms as much as the effects on the unit's behavior. Therefore, consider this:

If in pre-game prep we have determined a unit to be (say) rated as a "7" (on a scale of 1-10). If combat results are expressed in terms of a loss of cohesion due to that fire (results oriented) and the CRT is set up to where only effects of 1/4 (25%) are considered to be significant, then we can reduce that unit's value by "1" for each loss incurred. NOT 25% loss of people; 25% loss of unit cohesion! If our sample unit took 1 hit, it would be now rated as a "6".

At the end of the (in this example) Brigade's turn (assuming activation is by Brigade), we need to account for the effects of actions taken during that time of our unit's leadership, to maintain control. So we look at things at this point in time of the game, like a snapshot. This is the WORST that this unit has suffered up to this point in game time. Similar to what most call a "morale check", we do a "Cohesion Check".

The difference is that a cohesion check determines the EFFECT of the unit's leadership on the functioning of the unit during the length of time a turn represents. We are not interested in the techniques or events used to maintain control, only the effects their efforts had on the unit's cohesion. In our sample, a 1D10 is rolled and if equal to or under a "6", the unit regains one point. If roll is higher, their attempts to regain the attention of the men was not significant enough to raise control by 25%. The unit remains operating as a "6".

One could use 10%, 20% etc. to add more granularity, but in practice, at 25%, the game moves rather quickly and a unit in combat for 45 scale minute continuously without let up, seems to be the "norm" before the unit ceases to exist as a UNIT. Easy-peasy once seen played!

So by changing the value set the rules are based on casualties to Unit Cohesion, we can take an unknown factor and add or subtract based upon what the designer feels the degree of EFFECT he wishes the gamers to track. (one loss equaling 10, 20, 25% of an unknown value; in math terms: x-1, X+2, etc. The key lies in formulating a starting value and effectiveness starts at 100% (best a unit will be is before the battle starts- least fatigue, most ammo, etc.) During the course of a battle, cohesion can be lost AND regained should the higher leadership and/or the enemy allows it some time to regain a grip.

I hope this shows how we can build a game system, devising a way to track effects without actually assigning a specific value for un-measurable factors to arrive at a whole state of being of a unit.

This is the basic premise for what I have been working on for over 15 years now. It takes more to explain than to play!

Tom

Bill (McLaddie), that statistical base of yours sounds like a terrific project. All power to you! Naturally I am pleased to see that your findings seem to tally with how BBB works. :-)

(Simple exchange of volley fire is generally indecisive;
two outcomes of close combat, pushed back a little way with no loss or a long way with losses;
difficult terrain, including towns, reduces movement by ~25-40%).

Of course there are plenty of other fine rulesets out there that can make similar claims. It's just reassuring to see that the 'feels right' route might not be too far from the mark.

But I'll be very interested to see what your more scientifically informed approach comes up with!

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
link
bloodybigbattles.blogspot.co.uk

In my opinion one needs those examples and facts McLaddie is speaking about – as usual the difficult task is to see them in context.

Musket fire is not only there to cause casualties but also to cause a threat, the other side is firing earlier than us so they inflict more casualties, for that reasons, units opened up at 800 paces or more to induce the attacker to stop and return fire. By this the attack stalled – regardless how few casualties were inflicted.

This is an interesting discussion, though a little tangential to the OP. Since we are talking about psychology, let me add a theory I am working with, which is relavant to bigger games – i.e. those representing hours of battle time, rather than minutes.

This is an idea of stress and breaking point. Exposure to stress takes a toll, but it can be slow to act, and indeed invisible for a long time. And then it becomes too much and people become incapable of functioning. I have in mind something I picked up about living on adrenaline – though I have been unable to trace where this idea comes from.

So what happens is that in battles soldiers are exposed to variable amounts of stress. Nothing happens for a while, and then things fall apart. Factors that might affect stress levels and the ability to absorb it are fatigue (e.g. forced marches, exposure to artillery fire (or even just the noise of fire), exposure to skirmish combat, and, of course, the dramatic events such as charges and close order volleys. When things start to get too much men start to take the opportunities provided by the chaos of battle to leave the ranks – or formations might collapse dramatically under relatively little stress. The French army at Waterloo would seem to be an example – though much of the Allied army was in a very poor state at that point too.

The use of this in games is that it gives more point to historical tactics such as cannonading which seem to cause relatively few casualties and which most rulesets struggle to represent. How to use it is another matter, but some form of generalised fatigue measure seems to be the way – such as that used by Et Sans Resultat.

Matthew

This is an interesting discussion, though a little tangential to the OP. Since we are talking about psychology, let me add a theory I am working with, which is relavant to bigger games – i.e. those representing hours of battle time, rather than minutes.

Matthewgreen:

Is it tangential? The OP is asking

"Has anyone done any actual research into this? That is, the actual effect of such things as:

Experience and training levels
Terrain
Casualties
Shock and disorder

And by research, I mean putting a number on things, not impressions."

He seems to be asking about research, numbers. Y

our idea is:

Since we are talking about psychology, let me add a theory I am working with, which is relevant to bigger games – i.e. those representing hours of battle time, rather than minutes.

This is an idea of stress and breaking point. Exposure to stress takes a toll, but it can be slow to act, and indeed invisible for a long time. And then it becomes too much and people become incapable of functioning. I have in mind something I picked up about living on adrenaline – though I have been unable to trace where this idea comes from.

So what happens is that in battles soldiers are exposed to variable amounts of stress.

Okay, I can see that. The OP is asking "So what?" What is the effect of that stress. WHEN do units become incapable of functioning, under what conditions?

Statistics can address that as a set of probabilities, of what result, when and under what conditions, which is what wargames are based on.

Whenever a wargame has you rolling dice or drawing cards, whether combat, command, fatigue, stress or morale, it is based on the probability of something happening.

IF the probabilities are meant to represent the chances of something happening in reality/history etc., then the probabilities have to mimic some statistical basis from real life for that die roll or card draw.

Bill (McLaddie), that statistical base of yours sounds like a terrific project. All power to you! Naturally I am pleased to see that your findings seem to tally with how BBB works. :-)

Chris:
Thanks. I just gave a few things that have become really clear without much work…so it might be premature to say they tally with how BBB works. It might. The "probability" is that it will tally in some places and not in others. It will also be a graduated relationship in many cases [More or less of some factor] rather than black or white.

Of course there are plenty of other fine rulesets out there that can make similar claims. It's just reassuring to see that the 'feels right' route might not be too far from the mark.

Because the 'feels right' route is based on few examples, some generalized guesses and a lot of wargaming conventions, From what I have seen so far, it is just what a series of guesses are: Hit and Miss, some spot on and others way, way wide of the mark.

"But I'll be very interested to see what your more scientifically informed approach comes up with!"

I am not sure that statistics and probability analysis is 'scientific' the way you are using the word, but it works. Certainly, like science, whatever I come up with will be much closer to 'the way it was' than games without the statistical analysis, but not "the last word" or "the final truth". Just closer.

Whirlwind:

From the game AAR you mentioned:

The French artillery continues to defeat all Prussian attempts to attack up the road – some of the Prussian infantry rout in the face of such intense, effective fire.

Here is another example of a possible insight from statistics. I haven't done the work yet, BUT from just collecting examples, I haven't found infantry and cavalry
'routing' before artillery fire. Taking casualties, halting, becoming disorganized and/or deciding to withdraw out of range, yes… but not routing--running aways as a panicked crowd.

Like volley fire, in each case, it required other actions, usually the threat of flanking or close combat to rout the units damaged by artillery fire. The Netherlands battalion at Waterloo stuck out in the open took horrible casualties, but didn't rout until the French I Corps advanced towards it. The same is true of Aurgeau's Corps at Eylau or Ney's Corps at Friedland.

At this point, this is just an impression, nothing statistical, but an example of what might be revealed.

Interesting note on Bijlandt's Brigade:
link

Jeffery:

Good catch. One of the things I have to do with each example is look at the sources. I can take Bijlandt's brigade out of the growing list of artillery examples, which I have said, I haven't gotten to yet.

Thanks!

I should mention that I will take any help folks might want to offer. I need infantry or cavalry brigade or battalion accounts folks might want to help with.

I need the following information about the event to use it:

Source: Where the account is found [Where you found it]

Forces: by name and type of unit: brigade or battalion[s] [Not divisions or larger accounts.]
Numbers: if you have them, only if the account doesn't
provide them.

Any defensive terrain:

Outcome:

Obviously, the only thing I really need are the sources of the accounts. Primary over secondary, but the other information is needed at some point.

Interesting stuff,

I recently started reading Lewis' 'Voices from the Napoleonic wars' which is a collection of first hand accounts, including old favorites such a Harris and Mercer and 12 others, some I've not previously read.

I have been marking up passages that might reflect on wargamer wisdom of what happened in battle. A few things that stood out include the importance of well positioned 'batteries' of just two guns. I guess if they are pointed at you they will focus your attention.

And what sounds like infantry forming squares when their flanks are threatened by infantry – but it's often hard to tell if the author means individual battalions forming square or the brigade / division forming up in a defensive box.

Trivia includes Frenchmen pissing on their muskets as they had become too hot to load due to repeated firing.

David F Brown

"Trivia includes Frenchmen pissing on their muskets as they had become too hot to load due to repeated firing."

Any decent quote on that? The musket barrel is getting very hot, but you don't need to touch it in case of loading and firing – how to pee down a too hot barrel to handle – excapes my immagination.

I have been marking up passages that might reflect on wargamer wisdom of what happened in battle. A few things that stood out include the importance of well positioned 'batteries' of just two guns. I guess if they are pointed at you they will focus your attention.

That book is a good example. Lots of anecdotes, great ones at times, but the effect is the question. The same with two gun 'batteries'. Importance doesn't tell you why or to what effect.

Pissing down the barrels is also another good example. I have read it wasn't to cool the barrels but to break up the fowling that would quickly accumulate. And course, what effect this behavior might have on a battalion's performance.

I think when the flanks are threatened by infantry is to refuse a flank unless it is a really deep intrusion.

" I have read it wasn't to cool the barrels but to break up the fowling that would quickly accumulate"

that makes more sense – warm fluid – down a warm barrel, I assume they let it cool off a bit, still placing a 5 feet long musket and pissing into the barrel, what a sight.

the question – fixed or no fixed bayonets ;-))

Hi Bill,

Oh, sure, I don't want to overstate any claims. I realise your findings were just preliminary and partial. But so far, so good.

What is the scope of your database, geographically and in time? Do you include the revolutionary period or just the later Napoleonic? Are you interested in the contemporary actions in North and South America, or only continental Europe?

Chris

vW: Warm Ureic Acid down a warm barrel.

Chris:

The period 1792-1815. If I get enough examples, I will be able to compare combat behaviors/results against each period, say Revolution, 1805-1807 and later years.

With BBB, you have a 100 year+ breath of time. I *think* the combat behaviors for the later 1800s could be significantly different. The ACW would be a far easier conflict to analyze with the OR and the far easier access to English accounts.

and Merry Christmas to you too!

McLaddie – I'd hazard that any discussion involving unit morale is going to include a lot of "feels right" ;-)

I'd hazard that any discussion involving unit morale is going to include a lot of "feels right" ;-)

Weasel:
Probably, but it doesn't have to. Morale is a word given to a unit's potential [that is, a group of men--usually] in action.

So, what is done is identify those units that contemporaries believed had 'good' and 'bad' morale, including the names they attached to them, elite, grenadiers, Carabiniers, guard, special names etc. and compare how well they did over time compared to average or poor units. IF you get statistics that show, let's say the units identified as having 'good' morale won engagements 20% more often that average units in the same situations [again comparing numbers of 40 or more] you have the unit's future 'potential' for success compared to the average unit. You can do the same with how often such unit's retreated or routed [Wellington once said "All regiments run at some point] Then we can have a morale potential at the lower side of the question.

That isn't a 'what feels right' conclusion if the analysis is done right. That's what designers do, determine the probabilities of behavior by different 'morale' levels, but they simply guess within a basic high, middle and low hierarchy. The difference is those determinations are done by…. what? Whatever feels right at the time. That isn't simulating anything other than the designer's 'feelings'.

If you are representing the historical probability of a unit with X morale doing something, obviously it has to be based on history, not my feelings about it at some point, based on some impression of something, or because it 'works' as a game mechanic.

It is an either/or question of what is being what is being represented. The results aren't necessarily black and white. There is a continuum of validity and confidence, but even the crudest statistical analysis in the gray is better than a wild-assed guess or some undefined and idiocentric 'feelings.'

If I am designing a model of an actual Sherman Tank, I don't simply do whatever feels right and call it a Sherman Tank. I go to sources and continually compare my model to pictures, design drawing, the documented HISTORY of the vehicle and in the end compare my completed model with the real thing.

Bill have you formed any thoughts on counting muskets and stand removal yet? Or perhaps effect of loses on offensive power might be a better way of asking.

I spent just over 20 years shooting cannons at things and it has always appeared that the more guns i could mass on a given target, the greater effect i would have. And of course when guns went out of action for what ever reason, we had less effect.

It would seem that the same should translate to shoulder arms, but that is one of those feels right things you are working on.

Badger:
Happy Holidays! There certainly a lot of ways to look at the question, but yes, the effect of loses is a way of looking at the issue of counting muskets.

Certainly, the more guns you amass at a target, the greater 'the effect.' The question is what is the effect? We can calculate that based on ordnance tests, the number of hits on a unit *should* have a loss of 400 out 1200 men.

The question is always, "and so?" What does that result cause, what is the probability of different reactions to that number of losses?

Whether you take stands or count individual figures, that is just a way of record-keeping. What that record-keeping represents in the way of results is the issue.

I've also asked the question: "What did commanders know of unit damage/states, when and how did they know?"

IF commanders only had the vaguest idea of the state of their troops, then maybe we don't have to show damage in many cases.

Just thoughts.

a fool's errand.

a fool's errand.

That's a bit harsh. Everybody should do the things that make them happy. There's plenty of room in the hobby for guys who care an awful lot about this or that. Hobbies by definition are about odd or idiosyncratic passions.

For me, this hobby has never been a research project, but I know that there are a few guys who really care a lot about getting uniforms Just-So and would never considering using the "wrong" miniatures on the table, just as there are a few guys who need to believe that exhaustive research has resulted in getting this or that movement or combat rule Exactly Historically Correct. Not my thing, but Hey, Whatever floats their boats.

McLaddie – What I was getting at is that you can take real life impressions but you're still going to have to make a guesstimate, unless it's something that can be measured like your Sherman tank.

"feeling" and "data" aren't at all mutually exclusive.

We can say "Italians lost 20% more battles in Africa than the British" but does that mean Italians have 20% worse morale?

Well, it can, but does every battalion have a 20% higher chance of breaking?
What about every squad?
Every soldier?

WHat if their leader wasn't incompetent? WHat if they have local superiority in a particular battle?

Since we can't see their character sheets, at some point you're going to have to take your information and turn it into a +/-1 on a D10.

What if you emphasize one point and I emphasize another? Which one is "feeling" and which one isn't?

@ Weasel,

Well Dupuy and Rowland have had a fair go at it for more modern conflicts. Some of the things you can have a go at disaggregating relatively easily – leader effects, for example. Napoleon and Wellington both fought a lot of battles, but the French and British armies fought a lot more; you might well be able to see a "Napoleon" or "Wellington" effect.

Now there might well be things which remain murky. But it will only be known what they are after somenone having at least tried. Maybe at least McLaddie (or others) will find out what is for definite, to serve as a starting point.

Incidentally, if an "army" is worse by a given amount, off-hand I'd expect its sub-formations to be worse by more like the square route of that amount, and so on through its order of battle. So in the controversial "pro-German" work of Dupuy based at divisional level, then I'd expect (in the absence of all other knowledge) that at regimental/brigade level, the effectiveness difference would be the square of that. And so on. At platoon level, the difference might be almost imperceptible (or rather, indistinguishable from the more dominant tactical and equipment factors).

Since we can't see their character sheets, at some point you're going to have to take your information and turn it into a +/-1 on a D10.

Knowing if certain things – being uphill, or in woods, say – were normally a +1 or a +3 would be a great start.

Sure, and those are helpful.

My point I guess is that Dupuy and others are writing about winning battles, but we're writing about a specific dice roll at a specific point of the turn sequence.

If there's an objective truth, similar to the armour thickness of a Sherman, then surely someone can provide it for us :-)

a fool's errand.>/q>

Daler24od:

Because?