"Long Island/Brooklyn" Topic

What was George Washington's objective at the battle of Brooklyn in September 1776. What was his best case outcome for the engagement between his troops on the Gowanus ridge and Howe's invasion force?

IIRC, Lee said it was indefensible, but Congress ordered it defended. If so wasn't Washington just following orders from the political leaders?

I guess his hope was that the Crown forces would storm the rebels frontally and be repulsed with heavy losses. That appears to be what he was tempting Howe to do at various battles around NY.

It took Washington a while to learn that he knew more about what was going on than a group of pompous blowhards…. err, Honourable Members of the Continental Congress.

I think Gnu has it right. If the Americans had known their ground properly, their left would not have been rolled up as it had. But that would not have guaranteed victory.

Many historians think Howe held back on assaulting Brooklyn Heights for fear of Bunker Hill like casualties.

Washington was trying to win a military war. The Continental Congress was trying to win a political one. Charles Lee was correct that NYC was largely indefensible against an assault by an enemy who had command of the waterways. The flip side is what kind of message would it send if the U.S. forces simply abandoned one of their largest cities to the enemy without a fight.

The rebellion in 1776-77 was relying on the various colonies to raise and equip largely volunteer forces and then send them to fight elsewhere. It was also relying on militia to turn out and resist British efforts in areas where Continental forces were not present, or were too weak to resist the British on their own. Would this have happened if the colonies and if the citizens of the colonies had felt the Continental Army was going to abandon them? There is reason to respect the concerns of the Continental Congress. Look at what happened in Charleston in 1779 and 1780 when the British attacked the city. They also were relying on resources being supplied by France and Spain which might have dried up if those kingdoms had felt the U.S. wasn't prepared to resist the British.

By fighting at Gowanus Ridge and later at Kipp's Bay Washington was able to send the message "The Continental Army will fight to defend you" just as Trenton and Princeton sent the message "If we leave we will fight our way back". The biggest mistake was probably the failure to evacuate Fort Washington.

My question pertained more specifically to the intention of placing the, let us call it, screening force on Gowanus Ridge, in front of the works on Brooklyn Heights. This force was heavily outnumbered, before we consider the decisive effect of Cornwallis and Clinton's right-flanking manoeuvre.

True, there was some sharp fighting on the American right, where the British suffered their heaviest casualties of the day, but what did Washington expect to gain by holding Gowanus Heights weakly, rather than let the British risk a costly assault on his lines at Brooklyn Height.

This is after all where Howe blinked, despite the rout of the American forward troops.

Even if we see the Gowanus ridge position in terms of a'crumple zone,' intended to wear down the British strength somewhat before they invested Washington's MLR, it seems to me, with the wonderful 20/20 of hindsight, that the benefits were only ever going to be minimal.

Am I, like Howe, over-estimating the strength of the lines of Brooklyn?

McCollough's book 1776 is a good overview and easy read on the early war.

1776 is a great book.

I don't recall The Continental Congress playing a decisive role in Washington's decision to defend Manhattan. Both he and Lee recognized the strategic importance of NY harbor, especially since the British had just been kicked out of Boston and would almost certainly be heading there.

But one of the several times Washington was outflanked by Howe. An adage as old as the original The Art of War (though perhaps unfamiliar to Washington). Protect your flanks – even your extended flanks. I'm guessing Howe knew his Sun Tzu.

I'm guessing Howe knew his Sun Tzu.

I think 'Black Billy' preferrred to use his spare time for other leisure pursuits than reading.

On re-reading Schechter's 'The Battle for New York', it is clear that Washington ordered Putnam to send his best troops forward to meet the British force on Long Island forward of the Brooklyn lines- "at all hazards, prevent the Enemy's passing the Wood and approaching your works." (p.131)

Schechter describes Washington's planning at Brooklyn as 'muddled' and I guess that's as good a description as any. It is true that Howe's campaign of misinformation had misled Washington who had underestimated British strengt on Long Island. It seems he hadn't yet learned the value of entrenchments in boosting the morale of unseasoned troops.

Ironically, the vulnerability of the Jamaica pass on the American left flank had been noted by several American officers, but insufficient resources were available to screen that extremity of the line. In the end, only five mounted officers were posted to patrol in front of the pass and the British decision to leave the road and cut aross country led them behind that picket, who remained unaware of the British column's approach.

For the record, Sun Tzu wasn't translated into English until the early 1900s, but it was translated into French in 1772.

There is that, too, of course.

I was wondering about the translations. However, my assertions about Howe knowing his Sun Tzu was somewhat allegorical in the sense that I meant he knew tactics well. Perhaps he was less well versed on strategy given his lack of follow-through after his battlefield victories. And I say this accounting for the political elements such as his possible restraint on being overly aggressive. (Though I've never bought into that theory – clearly, the king was, truly, royally pissed off so I don't thing he was in favor of any restraint; he wanted all out victory and subjugation. Not to say some of his councillors might not have harbored other ideas.)

Howe was lumbered both with responsiblity for defeating the rebellion militarily and negotiating peace terms. While he might have crushed Washington's army on Long Island, inflicting a bloody reverse on the rebels risked hardening opinions on the American side and making a negotiated peace less attainable.

I think the relevance of the bloody victory at Bunker Hill was not so much that it made Howe squeamish about taking casualties but that he was acutely aware that he was at the end of a long line of communication with limited manpower. As he couldn't turn the Brooklyn lines, he paused.

Investing Washngton's lines at Brooklyn instead of making a costly assault, perhaps calling even a parley in the wake of the rout at Gowanus, made sense given that Washington's remarkably successful evacuation was not easily foreseen.