"short and long barrel cannons" Topic

I think it's understood that it's technically light, as a field piece, but there were heavy and light 12-pounders were there not?

Its always my understanding the Russians had both light and heavy 12pdrs in a Position battery along with 20pdr licornes.

The French had both light and heavy 12-pounders, but the heavy 12-pounders were not field artillery but part of the older Valliere System (ca 1732) and were only used as garrison/fortress guns.

The Gribeauval 12-pounder was a field piece and was also Napoleon's favorite.

The 12-pounder had a six horse gun team, as did all French horse artillery units, instead of the usual four horse gun teams for the 4-, 6-, and 8-pounder field pieces.

However, the Gribeauval 12-pounder was a field piece and was designed as such as well as used as one. It was not a battering piece/siege gun.

The howitzers designed as field pieces were also used against built up areas and were definitely not siege/battering pieces.

Assuming Tousard, in the passage you quoted, was referring to the Gribeauval 12-pdr, which you refer to as "a field piece… designed as such as well as used as one" (and therefore "light artillery") -

- how might one describe what a 12-pdr was doing when being fired at "the walls of small enclosed towns" other than 'battering'?

how might one describe what a 12-pdr was doing when being fired at "the walls of small enclosed towns" other than 'battering'?

Opportunistic utilization of available assets to accomplish a mission for what they hadn't been planned nor designed for. In other words: what the military does with most of its gear. ;)

- or 'battering' for short?

That doesn't make it a siege or 'battering' piece; it's still a field piece.

Can we move on now?

Move on where? You mean accept your terms of reference? No, I don't think so. Rember what we agreed about 'function'?
wonder whether from a modern point view, 'heavier' and 'lighter' are more helpful. It is clesr that contemporaries did not see the situation in such cut and dried terms as you do- pace Tousard. To describe all guns of 12 pdr or under as 'light' seems not to be very helpful. They were merely not as heavy as the really heavy guns.

G'Day Kevin

"Their main problem was command and control and too many senior infantry officers trying to command/employ artillery"

"French artillery organization and their command and control were certainly superior to anything they faced in the field, but it had to develop also. By 1807, however, the ideas and employment came to fruition beginning with Friedland."

Command and Control is a modern concept, found in such manuals as FM 3 FM 5, FM 6…but not limited to…but the semantic change is one that may have a totally different meaning…

But what was the term used in 1807…even in English?

With that said what is so significant about 1807?

Art

Move on where? You mean accept your terms of reference? No, I don't think so. Rember what we agreed about 'function'? wonder whether from a modern point view, 'heavier' and 'lighter' are more helpful. It is clesr that contemporaries did not see the situation in such cut and dried terms as you do- pace Tousard. To describe all guns of 12 pdr or under as 'light' seems not to be very helpful. They were merely not as heavy as the really heavy guns.

I have presented information during the discussion based on the study of the following works, some primary sources from the period and others secondary material (26 each) that I have found helpful. My 'terms of reference' come from the following listed references, accumulated over at least fifteen years of the study of the subject of artillery of the period ca 1740-1815.

If you don't accept them, that's entirely up to you. Perhaps if you perused at least some of the primary sources listed, you would come to a logical conclusion. If you don't want to expend the time and effort required to do that, that's also up to you. The following references are all in my personal library, so if you have any questions about them, please ask.

I'll be helpful where I can, but I'm not going to get into another useless debate with no endgame in sight. In the long run, believe what you want.

Artillery Sources Short List:

Adye, Ralph Willett, The Bombardier and Pocket Gunner, Nash, London, 1813.

Alder, Ken, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Allix, Jacques-Alexandre-Francois, Systeme d'Artillerie de Campagne du Lieutenant-General Allix, Anselin et Pochard, Paris, 1827.

Anonymous, Petit Manuel de Canonier, Paris: 1810.
Anonymous, Compendious Exercise for the Garrison and Field Ordnance as Practiced in the United States, Washington, 1810.

Anonymous, Exerzir-Reglement fur die Artillerie, Berlin 1812.

Anonymous, Titre Troiseme Ecole Artillerie, no date.
Anonymous, Zur Ausbilding und Taktik der Artillerie, Biblio Verlag, Osnabruck, Germany, 1982.

Anonymous, Essai sur l'Usage de l'Artillerie: Dans la Guerre de Campagne et Dans Celle des Sieges, Chez Arckstee & Merkus, Amsterdam, 1771.

De Scheel, Otto von, Memoires d'Artillerie Contenant l'Artillerie Nouvelle ou les Changemens fait dans Artillerie Francoise en 1765, Paris 1795.

De Scheel, Otto von, DeScheel's Treatise of Artillery, Translated by Johathan Williams, Editied by Donald E. Graves, Ottawa: Museum Restoration Service, 1984.

D'Urtubie, Theodore, Manuel de L'Artilleur, Paris: 1794.
Du Teil, Jean, The New Use of Artillery in Field Wars: Necessary Knowledge, The Nafziger Collection, 2003.

Du Teil, Chevalier Jean, De l'Usage de l'Artillerie Nouvelle dans la Guerre de Campagne, Marchal Librarie, Metz, 1778.

Gassendi, Jean-Jacques Basilien de, Aide-Memoire a l'usage des Officiers d'Artillerie attaches au service de Terre, Paris: Chez Magimel, Anselin et Pochard, 1819.

Girod de l'Ain, Maurice, Grands Artilleurs: Drouot, Senarmont, Eble, Paris, 1895.

Graves, Donald E., American Ordnance of the War of 1812, Arms Collecting, Ottawa, 1993.

Graves, Donald E., ‘For Want of this Precaution so Many Men Lose Their Arms: Official, Semi-Official and Unofficial American Artillery Texts, 1775-1845', Unpublished Manuscript, no date.

Graves, Donald E., ‘Louis de Tousard and his Artillerist's Companion: An Investigation of Source Material for Napoleonic Period Ordnance,' Ottawa: Arms Collecting, 1983.
Hughes, BP, Smooth-Bore Artillery: The Muzzle Loading Artillery of the 18th and 19th Centuries, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1969.

Hulot, M., Instruction sur le Service de L'Artillerie, Paris: Magimel, 1813.

Kiley, Kevin F., Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815: Field Artillery, London: Greenhill, 2004.

Kiley, Kevin F., Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815: Artillery in Siege, Fortress, and Navy, Frontline, Barnsley, Yorkshire, 2015.

Kiley, Kevin F., ‘The Cannon's Breath: Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval and the Development of the French Artillery Arm 1763-1789,' First Empire Magazine, Volume 81, Summer 2005.

Landman, Isaac, The Principles of Artillery: Reduced into Questions and Answers, for the Use of the Royal Military Academy, at Woolwich. W Glendinning, London, 1801.

Lauerma, Matti, L'Artillerie de Campagne Francaise Pendant les Guerres de la Revolution: Evolution de l'Organization et de la Tactique, Helsinki 1956.

LeBlond, Guillaume, Treatise of Artillery, 1746, Ottawa: Museum Restoration Service, 1970.

Lombares, Michel, Histoire de la Artillerie Francaise, Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris, 1984.

MacLannan, Ken, ‘Liechtenstein and Gribeauval: ‘Artillery Revolution' in Political and Cultural Context,' War and History, Volume 10, Issue 3, July 2003.

Malinowsky, Louis, and Bonin, Robert, Geschichte der Brandenburgish-Preussischen Artillerie, 3 Volumes, Wiesbaden, 1982.

Muller, John, A Treatise of Artillery, Museum Restoration Service, Ottawa, 1977.

Naulet, Frederic, L'Artillerie Francaise (1665-1765) Naissance d'une Arme, Paris: Economica, 2002.Persy, N., Elementary Treatise on the Forms of Cannon and Various Systems of Artillery, Ottawa: Museum Restoration Service, 1979.

Peterson, Harold, Roundshot and Rammers: An Introduction to Muzzle-Loading Land Artillery in the United States, Stackpole, Harrisburg, 1969.

Picard, Ernest, L'Artillerie Francaise au Dix-Huit Siecle, Berger-Levrault & Cie, Paris, 1906.

Rosen, Howard, ‘The Systeme Gribeauval: A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France', PHS Dissertation, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 1981.

Roquerol, G., L'Artillerie au Debut des Guerres de la Revolution, Paris 1898.

Saint Remy, Pierre Surirey de, Memoires d'Artillerie, Volume 3, Chez Rollin Fils, Paris, 1745.

Scharnhorst, Gerhard, Handbuch der Artillerie, Hannover: 1806.

Smola, Josef Freiherr von, Handbuch fur Kaiserlich-Konigliche Osterreichesche Artillerie-Offiziere, Vienna: 1839.

Smola, Karl, Smith, Digby, translator, ‘The Austrian Cavalry Gun in Comparison to the Horse Artillery of Other States by Smola in 1827, Smoothbore Ordnance Journal, 1(01) 1-26, August 2010.

Tousard, Louis de, American Artillerist's Companion, 3 Volumes, C & C Conrad, Philadelphia, 1809; Reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, 1969.

United States Department of War, A System of Exercise and Instruction of Field Artillery including Maneuvers for Light or Horse Artillery, Hilliard, Gray, Little, and Wilkins, Boston, 1829.

Langins, Janis, Conserving the Enlightenment: French Military Engineering from Vauban to the Revolution, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2004.

LeBlond, Guillaume, Traite de la Defense des Places, Alexander Jombert, Paris, 1783.

Lewis, Emanuel Raymond, Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory Essay, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1979.

Mahan, Dennis Hart, A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification with the General Outlines of the Principles regulating the Arrangement, the Attack, and the Defense of Permanent Works, Greenwood Press, New York, 1968.

Vauban, Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification, Translated by George A. Rothrock, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1968.

Artz, Frederick, The Development of Technical Education in France 1500-1850, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1966.

Duffy, Christopher, The Army of Frederick the Great, Revised edition, Chicago: The Emperor's Press, 1996.

Duffy, Christopher, Instrument of War, Chicago, The Emperor's Press, 2000.

Duffy, Christopher, Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700-1800, Terence Wise, Knighton, 1994.

Nafziger, George, Imperial Bayonets, London: Greenhill, 1996.

Quimby, Robert, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, New York: Columbia University Press, 1957.

Rothenberg, Gunther, Napoleon's Great Adversary, Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814, Sarpedon, New York, 1995.

Wilson, Sir Robert, Brief Remarks on the Character and Composition of the Russian Army and a Sketch of the Campaigns in Poland in 1806 and 1807, Newcastle, Worley, 2000.

Zhmodikov, Alexander, and Zhmodikov, Yurii, The Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars, two volumes, The Naafziger Collection, West Chester Ohio, 2003.

With that said what is so significant about 1807?

Senarmont introduced new artillery tactics with the artillery attack being supported by infantry, not infantry being supported by artillery.

And Senarmont commanded the entire corps artillery of I Corps, with 30 pieces used in the attack with 6 in reserve. It was the decisive point in the battle with Senarmont destroying the Russian center with artillery alone at close range.

In effect, Senarmont commanded the maneuver using two subordinates, his chief of staff, Colonel Forno commanding half of the large battery, and Captain Ricci commanding the other half during the action.

Artillery tactics and employment changed for the period of the wars and this tactic would be employed again at Ocana, Raab, Wagram, Lutzen, Hanau, and Ligny.

Just finished reading your posts…

I see that you are quick to critique Hans-Karl on how he has incorrectly used improper terms in his posting…and yet you blatantly do so as well.

Your posts are impressive and full of data which is parroted from manuals in English or translated into English.

That in its self is not wrong, but you continue to use sources that are prior to 1792 or Post Napoleonic. With your posting of sources that you have used…only three are in French and during the arrival of the new system…

But it is clear that you did not actually read them…

That puts a major gap of nearly 25 years that is missing in your studies…so to fill this void you continually use Tousard and remind us with the same phrase…

"And it should be noted that while Tousard wrote his 3-volume manual for the US artillery arm, he was a school-trained French artillery officer. And his manual was published in the US in 1809."…

Are we to presume that his volume covers French tactical system use by the French artillery that supported the military system that used l'ordre Perpendicular from 1803 to 1815?

Unlike you I realize that he left France in 1795 and his return was in 1802, which surely brought his expertise up to date…but sadly he retired in the same year, which was prior to Napoleon's new tactical system. If he had known of Napoleons new tactical system, then surely he would have included it into his three volumes.

I would have said…bravo…you have read at least sometime that was dated from 1790 to 1815…but if you had…you would not be having problems understanding…its all right there in those manuals…

As an example…recently on another thread an individual asked if anyone could give the proper terms to distinguish between the two basic formations…and you stated the following:

"French artillery units were assigned their guns and the train companies were usually, if not always, assigned to the same gun company which was then what is termed now in general usage the 'firing battery.'…"hmmm…is that the answer he wanted…or even a proper French terminology in the time period required?

With that said…what is the correct term for the British or Americans in a deployed battery…of even a French battery deployed?

What about your use of modern terms such as "command and control"…so what do you mean by that…and your constant used of the current term of doctrine…while it is true that you have given us the modern definition…what was the correct term the French used…and what was their definition of the term?

I asked you for the term they used for command and control…still waiting…

You then mention to Bill… "We're not discussing the Seven Years' War"…but your research in based upon 1740s, 1750's, 1763-1765, 1777, 1778, up to the 1790s…but we are discussing the Napoleonic era…when Napoleon developed the tactical order called l'ordre perpendicular which occurred in 1803.

As I mentioned earlier, the French dropped the term of pieced de campagne and started using "le piece de bataille"….due to the general principles.

"pourquoi s'appelait-il des pièces de bataille…parce que des pieces de bataille sorte de pieces de campagne qui sont plus mobiles, et different par la des pieces de position qui en sont la partie moins mobile et du plus fort calibre…
On peut dire des bouche a feu de bataille sont partie de l'ordre de bataille, tandis que les pieces position peuvent etre en dehors l'ordre de bataille…"

"Pour les Français en 1806 dans l'instruction sur le service d'artillerie, a l'usage des eleves de l'ecole speciale… ils ont aussi appelé les pièces…"bouche a feu de bataille" pour la même raison…mais pour le douze…ill n'a pas été considere comme un bouche a feu de batille…mais simplement appele un piece de douze."

‘Why was it called piece de bataille … because the pieces de bataille are like the pieces de campagne but which are more mobile, and yet different from the pieces de position which are the least mobile part and the strongest caliber, one can say that the bouche a feu de bataille are part of the battle order, while the position pieces are outside the battle order…for the French in 1806 in the instruction on the service of artillery, for the use of the pupils of the special school…the 12 pounders are not regarded as bouche a feu de campagne nor bouche a feu de bataille…but simply un piece de douze'

If you read the following:

O Manuel du Cannonier 1792, chapter, Commandemens De L'Exercice des Pieces de Bataille, page 68 and following chapters on how artillery was called de bataille and not de campagne

O Manuel du Cannonier 1793, chapter, Commandemens De L'Exercice des Pieces de Bataille, page 56 and following chapters on how artillery was called de bataille and not de campagne

O Aide-Memoire A L'Usage Des Officers D'Artillerie De France 1801, The chapter on manoeuvre…as you can see they no longer use the term of piece a campagne, but manoeuvre des "bouches –a-feu de bataille", page 729

O Aide-Memoire A L'Usage Des Officers D'Artillerie De France 1809, Service et maneouvre des piece de bataille, page 862, Manoeuvre des bouches a feu de bataille, page 872

O Instruction Sur Le Service D'Artilerie, A L'Usage Des Eleves De L'Ecole Speciale Imperiale Militarie 1806, Manoeuvre des pieces de bataille a la prolonge, page 36, Observations sur le tir des pieces de bataille, page 49, Remettre une piece de bataille sur son affut, page 102, De l'affut d'une piece de bataille, page 128, Parties de l'avant-train pour pieces de bataille, page 131

O Instruction Sur Le Service De L.Artillerie , A l'usage de MM les Eleves des Ecoles militaries etablies a Saint-Cyr et a Saint Germain 1813, CHAP. III. Exercice des pieces de bataille, page 75,CHAP. IV. Observation sur le tir des pieces de bataille

Of course in the end, with Napoleons final abdication, the King demands that the entire military system under the Empire be dismantled…thus the term of piece de bataille is no longer used.

The Gribeauval system was designed to accompany the French military system that had fought in the Seven Year War…and with the testing at Camp de Vaussieux in 1778, the Gribeauval system worked well within the French military system being tested. Later had the French used the Prussian system of tactiques in 1792, the Gribeauval system would have been in compliance with the tactiques being used.

At the end of the seventeenth century and early eighteenth armies marched mostly through fields, and column by platoons, to be deployed quickly in case of surprise; but, even with these improvements, roads were still the main means of march, and 1791 ordinance considers walking on the roads as the general case, walking through fields as exceptional, at least for long haul (Colin)

Thus had the French used this method of tactics, the Gribeauval system would had been fine…but the new system of tactics that was developed by the French was called l'ordre perpendiculaire which found the Gribeauval system lacking and Napoleon wanted a new system to meet the new demands and tactical manoeuvre of the French.

Could you please explain these tactical differences that Napoleon found with the Gribeauval system, that made him create a new system?

There are five systems of artillery which operated during the linear armies, were the following:

In Du Teils book, he explains which system he is using…so tell us which one is it (Lauerma, Matti)?

1…La tactique linéaire
2…Combat de Post
3…Bataille Rangée
4…L'Artillerie de Position or L'artillerie de Reserve
5…The British..had a system for their artillery; which was based upon both a system Bataille Rangée and system L'Artillerie de Position or L'artillerie de Reserve.

Again I ask…why would Napoleon want to create a new artillery system if he thought the Gribeauval system was good enough, why did he want to one have a piece de six and and one caliber d'obusier in his new artillery system…

It was Gassendi who convinced Napoleon to keep the 12 pounder.

I believe that you have once given the definition of what an artillery system is:

"I know I'm repeating myself, an artillery system is not just the guns and howitzers, but the ancillary vehicles, gun carriages, the education and training establishment, the tactics, doctrine and command and control and overall organization of the artillery arm."

Hence…since you seem to use sources that are prior to or post…may I suggest you read what the French Dictionnaie de l'artillerie de 1822 has to say…

It is far more detailed that what Paul Dawson has written…

In 1822 the French military considered or called the Gribeauval system "l'ancien system", and "l'An XI as the nouveau system" which goes into the system which has general principles and intended tactcis. It then goes into the differences and parallels of both the l'ancien and du nouveau system, starting on page 289.

So it seem like the Instruction Sur Le Service De L.Artillerie , A l'usage de MM les Eleves des Ecoles militaries etablies a Saint-Cyr et a Saint Germain….all the Aide-Memoire A L'Usage Des Officers D'Artillerie De France from 1801 to 1813, and the French Dictionnaie de l'artillerie de 1822 do not agree with your beliefs.

I recall that you have told us countless times the French would never surrender a battery…but if you read the Aide-Memoire…

No 257…n'abandonne son canon que lorque l'ennemi entre dans vos batteries,les dernieres decharges sont les plus meurtrieres, elles seront votre salut, peut-etre, et a coup sur votre gloire

'Do not give up your cannon until the enemy enters your batteries, the last discharge are the most murderous, they will be your salvation, perhaps, and even give you glory.'

Hence as I have always stated, with in the general principles, maxim of the French military system, there was always an attempt to give a battery a "soutien" of detached grenadiers or even a battalion of infantry. Otherwise the masse batterie would form accordingly en echelon.

I also suggest reading up on all the Aide-Memoire and their updates concerning the canon du parc…

Also here is one that might be of use to you as well…it is on Precis in all Aide-Memoires

"Comme les auteurs militaires ont donne quelquefois des sens differrens aux memes expressions, et qu'il en est results des discussions, j'ai eru devoir commencer par definir ces expressions, quoique ne soit qu'un precis et non un traite."

‘As military authors have sometimes given different meanings to the same expressions, and as a result of these discussions, I have had to commence by defining these expressions, although it is a precise one, it is not a formal agreement with all.'

Lets take the definition for "en rougage" on the field of battle which has changed since 1800 to have a duel meaning; that of, counter battery fire or as Tousard's has defined it as battre en roughage only and not both.

Military terms and their definitions have always caused the French a head-ache. In the 1790's they even tried to fix the problem by coming out with a publication called "Sur le Langage De La Tactique Francoise", of course it would seem that it didn't fix the problem either.

-No wonder there was such a long and drawn out thread on grape…

Perhaps you should actually read the books you have listed…

Best Regards
Art

What are the principles of a massed battery?

what principle or new tactic did Sermont introduce…that has never been known…?

your response is…"Senarmont introduced new artillery tactics with the artillery attack being supported by infantry, not infantry being supported by artillery."

Sorry…but it was executed at a much smaller scale…even Colonel Foy executed the same tactic in Switzerland…

Of course Senarmont's assault was larger…and much more daring…but that is not was he introduced…

As for command and control…now you have really taken me for a loop…and here I thought you had read:

Grand artilleurs – Drouot – Senarmont – Eble

I withdraw my question…since you have not read:

Grand artilleurs – Drouot – Senarmont – Eble

On page 179 it is explained what his contribution was…

Best Regards
Art

G'Day Mr. 49,

I have a rather unusual question to ask you if I may…

When an Artillery Officer writes a treatise…essay…artillery procedures, artillery maxims, general procedures and tactics, or a system for artillery, &c.

He then has them printed…one copy he will keep for himself (human nature)…but another copy must be sent to General Gassendi, so that the authors name may be put in the Aide-mémoire à l'usage des officiers d'artillerie de France.

If you would like to know just how much influence an artillery author had in the Napoleonic era…any time you open a book from another author of military science, just look at the sources et bibliographie the author has used.

For authors of artillerie of some importance, it is suggested to look at the required Bibliothèque Régimentaire D'Artillerie which the Major was responsible for.

But it was not until 1818 that certain books were required in all Bibliothèque Régimentaire D'Artillerie.

Then one could read such books from Susane, Marmont, Rocquantcourt to assist us in determining who was the leading guidance in the maxins of artillery, it's system, general principles, and tactical role of artillery…

Or to assist us we have such journals as the Revue Des Etudes, or even Le Spectateur Militaire.

It has been proposed…that the French artillery used "the doctrine created by Du Teil"

But after years of searching…I have only found his name the in Aide-mémoire à l'usage des officiers d'artillerie de France, for the book he submitted, and he is not even required reading in the 1822 Bibliothèque régimentaire d'artillerie.

But surely someone of such importance would be required reading…nor is he mentioned in any sources I have presented above…

What am I to think…and if you have read his book, it is merely about general principles…Du Teil even mentions this himself in his introduction. I see absolutely no evidence that supports the fact that he was responsible for the general principles and tactics used by the French Army

Best Regards
Art

I have presented information during the discussion based on the study of the following works, some primary sources from the period and others secondary material (26 each) that I have found helpful. My 'terms of reference' come from the following listed references, accumulated over at least fifteen years of the study of the subject of artillery of the period ca 1740-1815.

If you don't accept them, that's entirely up to you. Perhaps if you perused at least some of the primary sources listed, you would come to a logical conclusion. If you don't want to expend the time and effort required to do that, that's also up to you. The following references are all in my personal library, so if you have any questions about them, please ask.

I'll be helpful where I can, but I'm not going to get into another useless debate with no endgame in sight. In the long run, believe what you want.

Artillery Sources Short List:

Adye, Ralph Willett, The Bombardier and Pocket Gunner, Nash, London, 1813.

Alder, Ken, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Allix, Jacques-Alexandre-Francois, Systeme d'Artillerie de Campagne du Lieutenant-General Allix, Anselin et Pochard, Paris, 1827.

Anonymous, Petit Manuel de Canonier, Paris: 1810.
Anonymous, Compendious Exercise for the Garrison and Field Ordnance as Practiced in the United States, Washington, 1810.

Anonymous, Exerzir-Reglement fur die Artillerie, Berlin 1812.

Anonymous, Titre Troiseme Ecole Artillerie, no date.
Anonymous, Zur Ausbilding und Taktik der Artillerie, Biblio Verlag, Osnabruck, Germany, 1982.

Anonymous, Essai sur l'Usage de l'Artillerie: Dans la Guerre de Campagne et Dans Celle des Sieges, Chez Arckstee & Merkus, Amsterdam, 1771.

De Scheel, Otto von, Memoires d'Artillerie Contenant l'Artillerie Nouvelle ou les Changemens fait dans Artillerie Francoise en 1765, Paris 1795.

De Scheel, Otto von, DeScheel's Treatise of Artillery, Translated by Johathan Williams, Editied by Donald E. Graves, Ottawa: Museum Restoration Service, 1984.

D'Urtubie, Theodore, Manuel de L'Artilleur, Paris: 1794.
Du Teil, Jean, The New Use of Artillery in Field Wars: Necessary Knowledge, The Nafziger Collection, 2003.

Du Teil, Chevalier Jean, De l'Usage de l'Artillerie Nouvelle dans la Guerre de Campagne, Marchal Librarie, Metz, 1778.

Gassendi, Jean-Jacques Basilien de, Aide-Memoire a l'usage des Officiers d'Artillerie attaches au service de Terre, Paris: Chez Magimel, Anselin et Pochard, 1819.

Girod de l'Ain, Maurice, Grands Artilleurs: Drouot, Senarmont, Eble, Paris, 1895.

Graves, Donald E., American Ordnance of the War of 1812, Arms Collecting, Ottawa, 1993.

Graves, Donald E., ‘For Want of this Precaution so Many Men Lose Their Arms: Official, Semi-Official and Unofficial American Artillery Texts, 1775-1845', Unpublished Manuscript, no date.

Graves, Donald E., ‘Louis de Tousard and his Artillerist's Companion: An Investigation of Source Material for Napoleonic Period Ordnance,' Ottawa: Arms Collecting, 1983.
Hughes, BP, Smooth-Bore Artillery: The Muzzle Loading Artillery of the 18th and 19th Centuries, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1969.

Hulot, M., Instruction sur le Service de L'Artillerie, Paris: Magimel, 1813.

Kiley, Kevin F., Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815: Field Artillery, London: Greenhill, 2004.

Kiley, Kevin F., Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815: Artillery in Siege, Fortress, and Navy, Frontline, Barnsley, Yorkshire, 2015.

Kiley, Kevin F., ‘The Cannon's Breath: Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval and the Development of the French Artillery Arm 1763-1789,' First Empire Magazine, Volume 81, Summer 2005.

Landman, Isaac, The Principles of Artillery: Reduced into Questions and Answers, for the Use of the Royal Military Academy, at Woolwich. W Glendinning, London, 1801.

Lauerma, Matti, L'Artillerie de Campagne Francaise Pendant les Guerres de la Revolution: Evolution de l'Organization et de la Tactique, Helsinki 1956.

LeBlond, Guillaume, Treatise of Artillery, 1746, Ottawa: Museum Restoration Service, 1970.

Lombares, Michel, Histoire de la Artillerie Francaise, Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris, 1984.

MacLannan, Ken, ‘Liechtenstein and Gribeauval: ‘Artillery Revolution' in Political and Cultural Context,' War and History, Volume 10, Issue 3, July 2003.

Malinowsky, Louis, and Bonin, Robert, Geschichte der Brandenburgish-Preussischen Artillerie, 3 Volumes, Wiesbaden, 1982.

Muller, John, A Treatise of Artillery, Museum Restoration Service, Ottawa, 1977.

Naulet, Frederic, L'Artillerie Francaise (1665-1765) Naissance d'une Arme, Paris: Economica, 2002.Persy, N., Elementary Treatise on the Forms of Cannon and Various Systems of Artillery, Ottawa: Museum Restoration Service, 1979.

Peterson, Harold, Roundshot and Rammers: An Introduction to Muzzle-Loading Land Artillery in the United States, Stackpole, Harrisburg, 1969.

Picard, Ernest, L'Artillerie Francaise au Dix-Huit Siecle, Berger-Levrault & Cie, Paris, 1906.

Rosen, Howard, ‘The Systeme Gribeauval: A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France', PHS Dissertation, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 1981.

Roquerol, G., L'Artillerie au Debut des Guerres de la Revolution, Paris 1898.

Saint Remy, Pierre Surirey de, Memoires d'Artillerie, Volume 3, Chez Rollin Fils, Paris, 1745.

Scharnhorst, Gerhard, Handbuch der Artillerie, Hannover: 1806.

Smola, Josef Freiherr von, Handbuch fur Kaiserlich-Konigliche Osterreichesche Artillerie-Offiziere, Vienna: 1839.

Smola, Karl, Smith, Digby, translator, ‘The Austrian Cavalry Gun in Comparison to the Horse Artillery of Other States by Smola in 1827, Smoothbore Ordnance Journal, 1(01) 1-26, August 2010.

Tousard, Louis de, American Artillerist's Companion, 3 Volumes, C & C Conrad, Philadelphia, 1809; Reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, 1969.

United States Department of War, A System of Exercise and Instruction of Field Artillery including Maneuvers for Light or Horse Artillery, Hilliard, Gray, Little, and Wilkins, Boston, 1829.

Langins, Janis, Conserving the Enlightenment: French Military Engineering from Vauban to the Revolution, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2004.

LeBlond, Guillaume, Traite de la Defense des Places, Alexander Jombert, Paris, 1783.

Lewis, Emanuel Raymond, Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory Essay, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1979.

Mahan, Dennis Hart, A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification with the General Outlines of the Principles regulating the Arrangement, the Attack, and the Defense of Permanent Works, Greenwood Press, New York, 1968.

Vauban, Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification, Translated by George A. Rothrock, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1968.

Artz, Frederick, The Development of Technical Education in France 1500-1850, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1966.

Duffy, Christopher, The Army of Frederick the Great, Revised edition, Chicago: The Emperor's Press, 1996.

Duffy, Christopher, Instrument of War, Chicago, The Emperor's Press, 2000.

Duffy, Christopher, Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700-1800, Terence Wise, Knighton, 1994.

Nafziger, George, Imperial Bayonets, London: Greenhill, 1996.

Quimby, Robert, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, New York: Columbia University Press, 1957.

Rothenberg, Gunther, Napoleon's Great Adversary, Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814, Sarpedon, New York, 1995.

Wilson, Sir Robert, Brief Remarks on the Character and Composition of the Russian Army and a Sketch of the Campaigns in Poland in 1806 and 1807, Newcastle, Worley, 2000.

Zhmodikov, Alexander, and Zhmodikov, Yurii, The Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars, two volumes, The Naafziger Collection, West Chester Ohio, 2003.

I am sure your opinion is the result of many years reading and thought. But it is your opinion, your analysis. The hard and fast definition you have asserted several times, as if somehow gospel, does not acurately reflect contemporary useage, which I believe, inconsistent as it can be, should be our starting point. You don't seem to grasp that distinction but as you say, that is up to you. Believe what you want.

G'Day Mr. 42

I fear that I must have had 49 on my mind today…

Lets see what sort of excuse can I come up with…merde…really cant think of one…except that I have to get my kit ready for tomorrow…and I have to change out my ballistics (EyePro)…

No that is not a very one either… ;-)

Nevertheless
Best Regards
Art

Art, Quite all right. I wasn't sure… Did that represent promotion or demotion. Higher cardinally speaking, lower regimentally.

As for your question- I am sorry, I didnt' quite catch….could you repeat?

G'Day Mr. 42

Always a promotion… ;-)

Here are a few actions that found the French artillery advancing…which Kevin states that Senarmont was the first to ever execute such a manoeuvre.

Combat et prise d'Arlon (6 juin 1792); The French had to attack the Austrians, which occupied Arlon. Colonel Sorbier commanded the mass battery, which advanced with the army. He was able to advance his light guns within 50 paces of an Austrian square.

Affaire de Schanzel (13 juillet 1794); The general Saint-Cyr placed his massed battery next to the village of Rosbach. It was to protect a creek that traversed the village. Using the aide of the terrain and light fog, Saint-Cyr advanced his artillery to the enemy left flank and threw them into a panic and confused state.

Pendant le blocus de Mayence (1794); Saint-Cyr with a massed battery of 16 guns; advance them to bring fire upon the enemy. With "sans escorte".

L'avant-garde du center, at the battle of Riberach (2 oct. 1796); With 12 light artillery pieces and 12 pieces from the reserve; Saint-Cyr advanced his guns up to the enemy position, in the same manner that Senarmont at Friedland did.

Bataille de Zurick (1799); Foy with a battery of horse and a battery of 12pdrs; manoeuvred up a plateau on the enemy's left flank to break their lines of communications.

It's a must to read, Foy's career as an artillery officer. During the 1815 campaign, he had command of an artillery regiment.

What Senarmont did was brilliant…and deserves credit for everything he did at Friedland…

But in Grand artilleurs – Drouot – Senarmont – Eble,
On page 179 it really explained what his contribution was to the French Artillery…

Ah…my question about Du Teil…I see absolutely no evidence that supports the fact that he was responsible for the general principles and tactics used by the French Army…do you or anyone else have something I do not?

Best Regards
Art

I am sure your opinion is the result of many years reading and thought. But it is your opinion, your analysis. The hard and fast definition you have asserted several times, as if somehow gospel, does not acurately reflect contemporary useage, which I believe, inconsistent as it can be, should be our starting point. You don't seem to grasp that distinction but as you say, that is up to you. Believe what you want.

You are incorrect.

What I have posted, and backed up by the sources cited on this thread, most certainly is contemporary usage.

And if you don't agree, again, post something that supports that viewpoint.

All you have posted is your opinion without supporting evidence.

…which Kevin states that Senarmont was the first to ever execute such a manoeuvre.

Do you understand what Senarmont did at Friedland? His action became the French main attack after Ney's first attack had failed. And he attacked, not merely advanced, the Russian center and destroyed it with artillery fire as well as defeating a Russian cavalry counterattack.

That is quite different from the actions you are describing.

Would you mind explaining what you are actually referring to on page 179 of Grand Artilleurs? I guess I missed the point.

What you might want to take a look at regarding Senarmont at Friedland are his two after action reports for the action at Friedland on pages 223-226 of Grand Artilleurs which also covers his ammunition expenditure for the action.

There is also a I Corps after action report for Friedland covering the same action which is contained in one of the older volumes of La Sabretache from the Journal of Operations of I Corps.

Finally, the conclusions of both John Elting and AF Becke regarding Senarmont's action are exactly in line with the aforementioned after action reports. Both highlight the new artillery tactics introduced by Senarmont at Friedland. Becke mentions that artillery was now not merely a supporting arm as it always had been but was now an equal partner with the infantry and cavalry on the battlefield.

There is also a letter from Senarmont to his brother after Friedland which describes the carnage caused to the Russian center by his artillery attack.

And if you don't agree, again, post something that supports that viewpoint.

All you have posted is your opinion without supporting evidence.

Actually, no. I quoted from Adye, that excellent reference for the period, upon which I based the observations that have already posted. It may be that you didn't read these.

And if you don't agree, again, post something that supports that viewpoint.

All you have posted is your opinion without supporting evidence.

Actually, no. I quoted from Adye, that excellent reference for the period.

It's a must to read, Foy's career as an artillery officer. During the 1815 campaign, he had command of an artillery regiment.

Are you referring to Maximilien-Sebastien Foy, the author of Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsula sous Napoleon?

He was originally an artillery officer, educated at both artillery schools of La Fere and Chalons. However, he did not command an artillery regiment in 1815, but was the commander of the 9th Infantry Division of the II Corps d'Armee at Waterloo in 1815. He had transferred to the infantry in 1808 and also commanded an infantry division in Spain and in southern France. He was wounded at Waterloo.

Regarding Duteil's doctrinal artillery publication in 1778, he wrote it in support of Gribeauval's artillery reforms, which he supported, advocating a war of maneuver in which the artillery was to play a large part.

Quimby covers Duteil quite well, but you have to read the book in order to understand what Duteil advocated. Napoleon was a student and subordinate to the Duteil brothers and they had a large part in his professional education and development.

It is quite evident in the publication that Duteil's writing supports a war of maneuver and artillery's part in it. It is the only doctrinal artillery publication of the period that covers material above the battery/company level.

I have referenced both Tousard and DeScheel in English because this is an English-speaking site and both of these period artillery publications can be easily found on Google Books if anyone is interested in reading them.

And they reflect current French artillery thought and doctrine.

Regarding questions, I have asked you a few that remained unanswered, especially the one regarding the posting supposedly from me to you that you believe was out of line from 2014 on this site. I've looked through all the 2014 threads in which you have participated, and cannot find the offending posting. I guess I either missed it or it doesn't exist. So, if you would be so kind as to point it out I would be very grateful.

I quoted from Adye, that excellent reference for the period.

In context? And only one source? Surely you can do much better than that.

And does Adye cover the Gribeauval System other than praising it? And does Adye differentiate between field/light artillery and heavy/siege artillery?

Lastly, as Adye criticized the British artillery arm as being something in disarray, ca 1800, I would suggest that should be taken into consideration.

Your postings are simply a game of one-upsmanship (e.g., I know more than you do)…merely a one-hitter who repeats the same tired mantra over and over.

That is absolutely ridiculous as well as being incredible.

And you haven't answered the questions put to you, yet you wish to have your question answered.

Seems to me that is somewhat hypocritical.

Have you read Senarmont's after action reports as well as the letter he wrote to his brother after Friedland?

Do you actually understand what Senarmont did at Friedland?

Have you read Duteil?

The examples you gave of artillery support clearly indicate that you don't understand how artillery was employed and what changed at and after Friedland.

Do you have any idea of the artillery command structure in the Grande Armee?

You're making a lot of historical mistakes here, Foy being the least important (though I thought it was quite 'interesting') and your reluctance to acknowledge those errors and answer pertinent questions is quite telling.

Perhaps you are guilty of what you're accusing me of?

Lastly, where is the offending posting from 2014 that you accused me of making?

I quoted Adye as an interesting example, given that it was one of the two sources that you had just recommended and contradicted your assertion

I would refer you to two references that would be of help:

-The Bombardier and Pocket Gunner by Ralph Willett Adye.

-The American Artillerist's Companion by Louis de Tousard.

Both are excellent references for the artillery of the period.

Odd, that you seem somewhat dismissive of him now, and are apparently unaware of what he wrote on this subject. Were you to read the post in question, it ought to jog your memory.

I wasn't being dismissive of Adye; I was questioning your questionable usage of the work.

The question is for you, not Adye.

being a heretic, what is new that guns were used in an attack -
rien

-

why

they were used already in the Ancien regime for that.

At Friedland, Senarmonts command was supported by two full battalions of infantry – and more or less also by the division of the excellent Dupont.

On its own – not supported by infantry or cavalry – artillery was very vulnarble, explained well in Tagebücher des Kapitän Probsthain of the 2nd Saxon Horse artillery

Thanks Art for the highly informative contributions, a lot to learn for that.

I was questioning your questionable usage of the work.

I see. My questionable usage of Adye was questionable in what sense?

At Friedland, Senarmonts command was supported by two full battalions of infantry – and more or less also by the division of the excellent Dupont.

And that is partially the point-the artillery went from being the supporting arm to the supported arm. That is a complete departure from common practice.

And the fact that Senarmont became the main effort because of Senarmont's initiative and performance, and seeing an opportunity, is the difference in using artillery offensively.

No one else during the period handled their artillery in that manner and you can see the beginnings of that idea in Duteil.

My questionable usage of Adye was questionable in what sense?

Perhaps you should quote Adye in full?

From the 1813 edition of Adye's Bombardier and Pocket Gunner, 2-5:

‘ARTILLERY.-The proportion of artillery and ammunition necessary to accompany an army in the field, to lay siege to a fortified place, or to defend one, must depend on so many circumstances, that it is almost impossible, in a small work of this kind, to lay down any satisfactory rules as guides on the subject: the following principles are, however, drawn from the best authorities:
1st. Artillery for the Field.
Field artillery is divided into troops of horse artillery of 6 pieces each; brigades of foot artillery of 6 pieces; and Artillery of the Park, according to the nature of warfare…'
‘Artillery of the Park.-The Park of Artillery, in addition to a requisite proportion of light guns, to replace such as may be disabled or taken, ought to contain a proportion of ordnance of heavy caliber, such as 18-pounders, 12-pounders, and 8-inch howitzers, for the purpose of forming batteries of position, defending entrenched posts, breaking down bridges, dislodging an enemy from temporary works, or old castles, fortified in order to impede the march of an army for a short time. It is not absolutely necessary that those of the heaviest caliber should follow the army in all its movements, but they may be brought up as near to it as circumstances will admit of; and in general and decisive actions, would be found of the greatest utility.'

It appears that Adye recommends that the artillery park also contain heavy artillery, or siege pieces, whereas the French would organize a separate siege train, as they did in Syria and in Russia.

Adye also clearly made a difference between field artillery and heavy or siege artillery.

In full? I presume we can all sit down and read the book in the privacy of our own homes.

I would still be interested to learn what in my highlighting of the terms used by Adye, which I quoted for you previously, you found questionable?

some more information about long and short barrels, heavy and light artillery pieces

by un ami

"Let us start with the 12-pounder, then go to the others.
Russian 12-pounder short barrel
dia of the bore 120,9 mm, length overall 13 calibres
weight of the ball 5,78 kg, of the charge 1,03 kg, of the round 6,81 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1486 kg, per each of 6 horse 248 kg
total weight of the usual 3 caissons and 120 carried rounds 2477 kg, per each of 9 horse 275 kg
Russian 12-pounder long barrel
dia of the bore 120,9 mm, length overall 16 calibres
weight of the ball 5,78 kg, of the charge 1,65 kg, of the round 7,43 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1849 kg, per each of 6 horse 308 kg
total weight of the usual 3 caissons and 120 carried rounds 2539 kg, per each of 9 horse 282 kg
French 12-pounder
dia of the bore 121,3 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 6,07 kg, of the charge 1,86 kg, of the round 9,23 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 9 carried rounds 1981 kg, per each of 6 horse 330 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 144 carried rounds 2411 kg, per each of 8 horse 301 kg
Some of my ideas:
1. There is one more Russian horse (15 vice 14), but he is with the systeme of caissons, not the pièce.
2. As @Kevin F Kiley will say, 1 caisson was often empty (going to and from the parc). If so, Russians have 92 rounds with the pièce and French have 81.
3. Russians did think that 250 to 275 kg = max. load for sustained trotting of an horse, and 300 to 325 kg = max. possible trotting, but wil kill an horse if sustained (in a day, or some times over many days). This was a good reason for the 12-pounder short barral. Russian will say that one cannot really trot the French 12-pounder pièce, other than to kill the horses very soon.
4. In comparing to Russian 12-pounder short barral, the horses on the pièce for the Russian 12-pounder long barral are 24% more loaded and the horses on the pièce for the French 12-pounder are 33% more loaded.
4. In comparing to Russian 12-pounder short barral, the horses on the caisson for the Russian 12-pounder long barral are 3% more loaded and the horses on the caisson for the French 12-pounder are 10% more loaded.
From these ideas, one may conclude that Russian systeme was more mobil on the battlefield and did have better endurance and mobility over a campagne, especially for the 12-pounder short barral. Russian systeme requires 7% more horses, but these may last longer and the total horses needed in a campagne might there by be the same or fewer.
- un ami

We continue with the smaller guns :
For a foot artillerie
Russian 6-pounder
dia of the bore 95,5 mm, length overall 17 calibres
weight of the ball 2,89 kg, of the charge 0,83 kg, of the round 3,72 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 20 carried rounds 1156 kg, per each of 4 horse 289 kg
total weight of the usual 2 caissons and 154 carried rounds 1486 kg, per each of 6 horse 248 kg
total horses 10
rounds available with one caisson empty 97
French 6-pounder
dia of the bore 99,1 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 2,69 kg, of the charge 1,03 kg, of the round 3,72 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1486 kg, per each of 4 horse 372 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 280 carried rounds 2312 kg, per each of 8 horse 289 kg
total horses 12
rounds available with one caisson empty 152
French 8-pounder
dia of the bore 105,7 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 4,04 kg, of the charge 1,14 kg, of the round 5,18 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1817 kg, per each of 4 horse 454 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 184 carried rounds 2411 kg, per each of 8 horse 301 kg
total horses 12
rounds available with one caisson empty 104
For an horse artillerie
Russian 6-pounder
dia of the bore 95,5 mm, length overall 17 calibres
weight of the ball 2,89 kg, of the charge 0,83 kg, of the round 3,72 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 20 carried rounds 1156 kg, per each of 6 horse 193 kg
total weight of the usual 2 caissons and 100 carried rounds 1288 kg, per each of 6 horse 215 kg
total horses 12
rounds available with one caisson empty 70
French 6-pounder
dia of the bore 99,1 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 2,69 kg, of the charge 1,03 kg, of the round 3,72 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1486 kg, per each of 6 horse 248 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 280 carried rounds 2312 kg, per each of 12 horse 193 kg
total horses 18
rounds available with one caisson empty 152
French 8-pounder
dia of the bore 105,7 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 4,04 kg, of the charge 1,14 kg, of the round 5,18 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1817 kg, per each of 6 horse 303 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 184 carried rounds 2411 kg, per each of 12 horse 201 kg
total horses 18
rounds available with one caisson empty 104
Some of my ideas:
1. It is in effect the situation that the French systeme uses more horses than the Russian systeme, 33% more in the case of an horse artillerie.
2. The French systeme will provide more rounds near to the pièce, many more in the case of an horse artillerie. This may be can create a better endurance and mobility in a campagne for the French pièces, especially for an horse artillerie.
3. The French 8-pounder pièce drawn by 6 horses for an horse artillerie would lie above the Russian ideal for an horse artillerie, but will likely be OK except in a very long campagne.
4. For the foot artillerie, the French 6-pounder weighs upon each horse 29% more than for the Russian 6-pounder, and in their caissons 17% more. The horses for the French 8-pounder are much more loaded than would be allowed under the Russian systeme, and they could only trot the pièce smaller distances. Still more horses are used (12 vice 10) for the French systeme for either gun, but the overall mobility advantage and advantage of endurance clearly lies with the Russian systeme for the foot artillerie.
- un ami

@Bagration1812
This is all just copy/paste from the Colonel Nilus, a standard work on the artllerie in Russian.
«История материальной части артиллерии»
The relevant parts is on line :
link
You will find the comparisons for Prussians and Austrians aslo, bit I did not make a check of these to see if the numbers are OK. For Frenches (my régiments for "mini's") and Russians, the infos seem very very good.
You see, no magicks ! But I thnak you for your kind comments.
:-)
- votre ami

Then for the early years, some detailes of the artillerie of systeme of 1797 year :
Field artillerie in reign of the TSAR Paul.
(Implementing experiments among the Gatchina force and at the arsenaux and artillerie schools from before his reign)
Foot Artillerie
50 compagnies in the Army + 3 compagnies in the Guard
Horse Artillerie
5 horse compagnies in the Army + 1 horse compagnie in the Guard
12 pièces per compagnie in the Army
Foot compagnie : 4x 12-pounder long * + 4x 12-pounder short + 4x 20-pounder unicorn *
Horse compagnie : 6x 6-pounder + 6x 10-pounder unicorns
* team of 8 horses for the pièce and the front/limber, others of 6 horses
guns
12-pounder long – overal length 16,5 calibres – weight of the pièce 167x the round
12-pounder short – overal length 13 calibres – weight of the pièce 97x the round
6-pounder – overal length 17 calibres – weight of the pièce typ. 133x the round
unicorns
20-pounder – overal length 9 & 10 calibres* – weight of the pièce 64x & 70x the round
10-pounder – overal length 9 & 11 calibres* – weight of the pièce 68x & 80x the round
* the lighter pièces actually from the project of the General Möller under the reign of the TSARITSA Catherine, and based on designs of the General Shuvalov era.
carraiges
new designs per the General Euler
caissons
traditional 2-wheel design, pulled in troika by 3 horses
3 caissons per pièce in the foot artillerie
2 caissons per pièce in the horse artillerie
some 4-wheeled also attempted, but not a success
Note – more few older pièces did lurk in the inventory of the Army, especially in the final years of the reign of the TSAR Paul, and there was some variation in the making of these designes, in comparison to the new system of 1805 year.
These must be the one that @Kevin F Kiley does tell to us had to left in abandon in great numbers in the bad weather during the Eylau campagne.
I am sorry , but I can find no mention of such leaving (and the pièces look rather mobile and light), so one remains very eager for more infos about this suject.
- votre ami
"

Thank you von Winterfeldt for posting the detailed information on the Russian field pieces of the Napoleonic era.

you are wellcome, but it is all just pasted and copied information which I gratefully received by true experts instead of the usual dogma contibutor – this may help also to obtain good knowlege

un ami

Some notes (my translation) from …..

HISTORY OF ARTLLERY MATERIEL
Colonel A. NILIUS
Saint Petersburg: P.P. Soikin Typography, 1904

HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CLOTHING AND ARMS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY
A.V. VISKOVATOV
Saint Petersburg: Military Typography Office, 1841 – T. VII & T. 10

1765-1795
- 2 regimental guns for each army regiment; in the guard, 8 guns for the Preobrazhenskiy and 6 for the Semenovskiy regiments
- To operate these guns, special commands under an officer were appointed; all ranks were trained in artillery drill; even gun carriages were under construction in the regiments. The artillery department was limited only to casting of peices, and fabrication of shells, charges and cartridges and occasionally — repair of spoiled equipment.
- In dragoon regiments, the artillerists were mounted on saddlehorses.
- The pieces used were
…….. 3-lb guns
…….. 1/4-pud (10-lb), 8-lb and 3-lb unicorns (gun-howitzers)
…….. 6-lb coehorn mortars.

1796-1799
- The guns from the guard regiments are sent into the new guard artillery battalion.
- The regimental artillery is standardized as 4x 6-lb gun and 2x 10-lb unicorn per regiment. This detachment is placed under the command of an artillery officer and non-commissioned officers. The guns are distributed to the commanders of regiments (2 guns and 1 unicorn per battalion).
- Some 3-lb unicorns are retained for some of the newly-formed jäger regiments (May 1797), 2 per regiment (1 unicorn per battalion).
- This is the system for the 1799 campaign.
- 3-lb unicorns are said to remain in service, as a sort of ad hoc sledge and mountain gun, until 1838.

1800-1805
- In late 1800, after the peace, the regimental guns are ordered to be sent into arsenals and garrisons. They are re-issued in 1803, on the same ratio as before, which after the new organization of April 1802 results in 2 guns or unicorns per battalion for the grenadier and musketeer regiments.
- There is no mention of re-issue of the 3-lb unicorns to the jäger regiments.
- The guns are distributed as artillery companies (all ranks from the artillery) and are put at the disposal of the brigade (2x regiment) commander.
- This is the system for the 1805 campaign.

1806-1807
- The doctrine of regimental artillery is abolished per order of 23.VII.1806 O.S. which (i) groups the artillery companies into artillery brigades composed of ~5 battery ("heavy"), light and horse artillery companies, commanded by an artillery senior officer and (ii) attaches these brigades to same-numbered divisions.
- This is the system for the 1807 campaign.

--------------------------------------------

Some questions that one might ask ….

1. Is there primary source evidence for use of 3-lber unicorns by jägers after the 1799 campaign (excluding in fortified places and in the Caucasus/Siberia/etc.) ? I know of none.

2. Is there primary source evidence (other than in 1800-1803 when all the regimental guns were collected into arsenals and garrisons) for regimental artillery not being usually "with the regiment" to which it was assigned ? I know of none.
3. Is there any primary source evidence of regimental artillery (artillery broken up into smaller than 1/2-company units and controlled by infantry officers) in Russian service in the 1807 campaign or later ? I know of none.
4. What are the exact orders issued by Kutusov in late 1812 on this subject ? When and how were they implemented, if at all ? When and by whom were they rescinded, if they were ever given ? I have never heard of this at all, and suspect something is being mis-interpreted or even mis-translated. There were several "emergency" organization changes (such as combining the much-reduced regiments in each brigade of the 7th and 8th Corps) after Borodino. Perhaps Kutusov did something unusual because of the shortage of men in the ranks, looking to stiffen them with guns until replacements arrived ?

By:Ralph R. Reinertsen
Date: Sunday, 19 October 2008, 9:08 am
In Response To: Russian battalion guns in 1807? (Jean Tessier)

Perhaps more than you wished, the following starts on the organization and then goes on to address the actual number of Russian pieces during the 1806 actions. The losses play a part in determining the number of cannon at Eylau. – R
The Russian heavy companies (batteries) and light companies each contained fourteen pieces as part of their organization. In the field, as each of these companies included two light pieces the light pieces were assigned to the jager units as regimental guns. The remaining pieces within the light companies were assigned to the grenadier and musketeer regiments with each regiment receiving a half company (six pieces). Thus, on campaign and at full strength, the heavy batteries operated with 12 pieces as did the horse artillery companies.
The cannon in each company (battery), per regulations:
Heavy battery 8 twelve-pound cannon and 4 one-half pud unicorns (in field) 2 three-pound unicorns (to jagers)
Light battery 8 six-pound cannon and 4 one-quarter pud unicorns (in field)
Horse battery 6 six-pound cannon and 6 one-quarter pud unicorns (in field)
The artillery organization used during 1806 and 1807 arose after Austerlitz as Russia reorganized its artillery in 1806. The decision abolished the former artillery regiments and created brigades assigned to the newly established divisions. By this change, the military authorities intended the artillery to operate more closely with the other arms.
With these intentions, the number of cannon with the Russian armies in Poland bore the effects of the prior campaign. Thus, many of the companies (batteries) in Buxhöwden's Corps d'Armée (5th, 7th, 8th and 14th divisions) did not conform fully to the intended organization as they took part in the 1805 campaign and suffered losses both during the battle at Austerlitz and from the retreat. Artillery companies (batteries) in Bennigsen Corps d'Armée (2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th divisions) had not participated in the campaign and their organization reflected the new structure.
The companies assigned to the divisions with Bennigsen match the numbers ordained in the new brigade organization. His force was fresh. Over time, Buxhöwden's divisions moved toward the ideal numbers, but at any point from October on, they used whatever cannon available. For example, at least initially, the Eighth Division contained no light companies, only one horse and four heavy companies. During the campaign, one commander of in the Eight Division, Prince Karl von Mecklenburg, stated his force included three regiments and 18 cannon, implying the commanders distributed the cannon of the heavy batteries to the regiments.
Although heavy and horse companies (batteries) should operate in the field with twelve pieces, during the retreat from the Wkra River line to Golymin and Pultusk, Bennigsen's troops lost 52 pieces either during the fighting or by their being left behind in the muddy roads. Using the horse artillerist Yermolov and his experiences as a guide, battery commanders found themselves forced to leave a few cannon behind as they hitched more horses to the teams to move other pieces along the difficult and muddy roads. In this fashion, each battery lost a portion of their cannon. The greatest loss occurred in the heavy batteries. Kamenski's aide at the time, Prince Eugen von Württemberg, said the difficulties applied mainly to the heavier cannon. Yermolov reported the same. (Soult reported of the twelve cannon left behind in his march on December 26, eight were his twelve-pound cannon.)
The Russian Seventh and Fifth Divisions left approximately forty behind in their retreat after the battle at Golymin, mainly heavy pieces (this according Yermolov who fought at there as part of Chaplitz's command). The only artillery brigades to avoid such losses were in Anrep's Fourteenth Division across the river from Pultusk and in Essen's Eight Division with its four heavy batteries (explaining its languid march west).
Using comments from Russian officers, they lost roundly ninety field pieces of all types. Napoleon reported that his army captured eighty cannon. A review of reports and accounts with specific references, one can reach the sum of seventy cannon (Augereau captured 6 from Barclay, Friant took 3 from Osterman, Marulaz and d'Aultanne of Davout's corps found 40 from various units – 14 discovered near Moszyn said to be from Sacken's division, Dahlmann picked off 2 from Pahlen, Durosnel reported 4 from Chaplits and Zapolsky, and Murat gathered up 15 following the Russians retreating from Golymin).
Given these events, the numbers in each of Bennigsen's fighting batteries counted more reasonably as ten, rather than twelve, during the battles. The losses explain why regiments fought with four light pieces rather than the intended half-battery strength of six guns. Sherbatov's Kostromo Musketeers at Golymin are an example.
While Bennigsen's artillery park at Tykoczyn would contain some spares, it is unlikely he replaced all of the cannon lost before he began his winter offensive. Wilson states Bennigsen had 500 cannon, excluding the Sixth Division (it had thirty pieces), at that time: suggesting he may have restored a quarter of the loss. All battery commanders did not manage to replace cannon uniformly. For example, while Yermolov had two full batteries each with twelve cannon for the fight on February 7, when he took three horse batteries to oppose Davout the next day, together they had thirty cannon or an average of ten each. Thus, except possibly in the Eighth and Fourteenth Divisions, each heavy and horse battery marched with ten or fewer cannon during the Eylau phase of the campaign.
When giving the number of cannon, the main historians used an extrapolation of the number of batteries times the number of assigned cannon. In doing so for the Russian army in 1806, both Mikhailovsky-Danielevsky and Höpfner take the list of batteries and, using twelve, yield the number of artillery pieces reported by them. They used returns for this summary. Höpfner acknowledged in his text the assigned total of fourteen cannon to the heavy as fourteen. The 492 sum for Bennigsen (23 batteries with 276 pieces) and Buxhöwden (19 batteries with 216 pieces) was before the start of the campaign and prior to the December losses.
Lettow-Vorbeck noted the detachment of two cannon per heavy and light battery to the jagers, but – like Höpfner – calculates totals using twelve per battery. Petre used the organic 14 pieces whenever he writes about a battery and does take account of the regimental cannons. Sir Robert Wilson participated in the campaign and Baron Jomini served in the Russian army after 1813, writing on many aspects of the battle. Jomini stated the armies started out with 504 cannon. Wilson penned the Rusians had "above 500 pieces of field-cannon.". He also stated that Bennigsen had 500, excluding the Sixth Division, when he began his offensive. It is unclear whether he included the cannon with the Prussian batteries in this total.
Reworking the numbers of cannon assigned to the batteries gives an establishment total of 548 pieces (returns suggest they were below the assigned strength before the campaign started with 492 to hand). Reduced by the December 1806 loss of 80 cannon, there remained 468 Russian pieces before any resupply and excluding the 28 pieces in the three Prussian batteries.
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By:Robert Goetz
Date: Monday, 20 October 2008, 4:21 pm
In Response To: Re: Russian battalion guns in 1807? (Ralph R. Reinertsen)

Ralph – Some information you might find useful.
You noted that "Thus, many of the companies (batteries) in Buxhöwden's Corps d'Armée (5th, 7th, 8th and 14th divisions) did not conform fully to the intended organization as they took part in the 1805 campaign and suffered losses both during the battle at Austerlitz and from the retreat. Artillery companies (batteries) in Bennigsen Corps d'Armée (2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th divisions) had not participated in the campaign and their organization reflected the new structure."
I have seen this stated before, but I have doubts. The artillery at Austerlitz was drawn from the 3rd, 4th and 5th artillery regiments. But a spring 1806 OOB describing the new divisional organization for the 2nd through 13th divisions [RGVIA f. 846, o. 16, d. 3164] details the disposition of 8 companies from the 3rd artillery regiment, 8 from the 4th and 7 from the 5th regiments. These companies were distributed among 11 different divisions – 12 of the companies went to the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th divisions, 7 to the 5th, 7th and 8th (Buxhowden's) and 4 (all light) to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th (Bennigsen's).
In the absence of any evidence of reorganization/renumbering of artillery regiments between Dec 1805 and May 1806, it would seem that the artillery losses from Austerlitz were replaced by spring 1806 and the shortage of light companies results from an insufficient quantity in the old organization. Taking the organization before the formation of 14th division, divisions 2-12 each had 6 musketeer/grenadier regiments and 1st and 13th had 5 musk/gren regiments each. If there was to be a consistent 2 battery companies per division and a half-company of light per regiment, there would be a need for 26 battery and 38 light companies = 64 companies. The 8 western artillery regiments had a total of 32 light companies and 32 battery companies = 64 companies. Three of the battery companies were already in the Ionians, so the result is to use some of the battery companies in place of light companies and assign 1-2 battery companies per division.
There were three other artillery regiments (9th-11th), but the majority of these were in the Caucaus, Orenburg and Siberia. I have no details on the disposition of these 24 companies, but none are mentioned in the original formation of the divisions.
Also interesting to note that in the document detailing the divisional organization, a number of the battery companies are listed under light companies with a note explaining that the battery companies were being used as "light" companies (i.e. regimental/brigade support). So certainly some divisions have extra battery companies in lieu of light companies – 5th, 8th, 10th and 12th divisions – but this doesn't seem to result from Austerlitz losses. These 4 divisions fell into 4 different armies in spring 1806 – the armies of Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia and Moldavia. Significant that they are spread one per army? The shortage seems to have been made up with the formation of new light companies by 1808 or so, at which point the artillery allocations become more consistent.

Now that I am back again…

Indeed…yes…I admit you have me…I am a bad editor who lacks proof reading skills when taking articles from the my archives and merging them into a new documents…paint me stupid for my cutting and pasting on Foy..

Nevertheless I am happy that you "though it was quite interesting"…to the point that you had to mention it twice in two different postings…

Indeed it happens…and it will happen to me again…to someone else I am certain…perhaps even to you…

Hmmm…but wait it did…twice since I have been away.

Your 1st typo…"The Russian Guard infantry had already been defeated by Dupont when Bennigsen took command of them."

"That is a mistake/typo on my part. What I meant to say was Bagration, not Bennigsen."

Your 2nd typo … "In effect, Senarmont commanded the maneuver using two subordinates, his chief of staff, Colonel Forno commanding half of the large battery, and Captain Ricci commanding the other half during the action."

Don't worry…I fully understand it is a typo…and I shall give you credit for almost getting it right the first time…

14 Aug 2013 5:40 a.m.

TMP link

"Captain Ricci was with Col Forno and took over command of that half of Senarmont's artillery when Col Forno was killed later in the action."

…as I mentioned…this is only partially correct…but I attribute your Misinterpretation to not understanding French.

For if you take a look at the report Senarmont made, which you constantly remind us that we have not read, it states that Senarmont took over the second division (or "la 2e en postion, dite de droite" when Forno was killed, and with Bernard wounded & taken out of action, Capitaine Ricci would command when Senarmont was elsewhere.

Perhaps this will help you:

From Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought by David Hackett Fischer, 290-291:

‘The fallacy of argument ad hominem occurs in many different forms, all of which serve to shift attention from the argument to the arguer. Among its more common varieties are, first, the abusive ad hominem, which directly denounces an opponent. The classic example, perhaps apocryphal, is the note passed from one desperate lawyer to another: ‘No case, abuse plaintiff's attorney.'

You shouldn't make inaccurate and insulting comments like that above because it reflects much more on you than on anyone else.

You tend to judge those with whom you disagree by your own low standards and that's not good for anyone.